Fairchild Heights Residents Association, Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc.

The plaintiff, Fairchild Heights Residents

Association, Inc. (association), appeals from the

judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the

judgment of the trial court and directed that court to

dismiss the association's claims alleging negligence and

violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices

Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., against

the defendant, Fairchild Heights, Inc., for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. The association argues that the

Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that it failed to

exhaust its administrative remedies before requesting

declaratory relief and that it did not have standing to

bring an action under CUTPA. We reverse in part the

judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case

for a new trial on the association's CUTPA claim.

The following relevant facts and procedural history

are set forth in the trial court's memorandum of decision.

The association is a nonstock corporation that

represents approximately forty-five mobile home owners

who reside at the Fairchild Heights Mobile Home

Park (park) in the town of Shelton. Nancy Dickal, a

park resident for more than thirty years, has been the

association's president since its creation in February,

2005. The defendant is a Connecticut corporation that

owns and operates the park. The defendant's majority

shareholder and the park's on-site manager is Jeffrey

Doolan.

The association was established in part to address

maintenance issues. Shortly after its creation, the association

distributed a membership application to residents

that included questions asking them to identify

specific concerns regarding the park's operation and

condition. On March 28, 2005, the association's attorney

sent a letter to the defendant's attorney discussing these

concerns and requesting a meeting to address them.

Thereafter, the attorneys conducted a walk-through of

the park on June 15, 2005, following which the association's

attorney sent a letter to the defendant's attorney

listing a series of maintenance violations and giving the

defendant three weeks to make the necessary repairs

or commit to make the repairs in a timely manner.

After the defendant rejected the deadline and the

parties' negotiations broke down, the association filed

an action against the defendant in July, 2006, seeking

redress for the defendant's failure to respond to the

association's concerns.1 The first two counts of the complaint

alleged per se negligence for violations of state

statutes and municipal ordinances, respectively, relating

to maintenance standards applicable to mobile

home park owners under chapter 412 of the General

Statutes, entitled ''Mobile Manufactured Homes and

Mobile Manufactured Home Parks. Park Owners and

Residents,'' General Statutes § 21-64 et seq. The third

count alleged a violation of CUTPA. The complaint

sought declaratory relief pursuant to Practice Book

§ 17-56 (a) (2), and injunctive relief, punitive damages

and attorney's fees pursuant to CUTPA. It also sought

costs and other equitable relief to which the association

might be entitled.

In September, 2006, the association filed a complaint

with the Office of the Attorney General.2 The attorney

general forwarded the complaint to the Department of

Consumer Protection (department), which assigned the

matter to a department investigator.3 Following several

inspections, the investigator sent a letter dated October

13, 2006, to Doolan advising him of ''serious violations''

of General Statutes § 21-82 (a).4 The letter listed the

violations and requested that Doolan advise the department

by October 30, 2006, as to when the violations

would be corrected, adding that a failure to cooperate

would lead to additional enforcement action. Apparently

in response to this letter, Doolan initiated certain

actions intended to correct the violations.

Thereafter, the department investigator conducted

further inspections of the park. In July, 2007, he issued

two written reports noting certain improvements but

stating that a number of violations had not yet been

corrected. On July 31, 2007, the department conducted

an informal compliance hearing, which was attended

by the parties' counsel. At the hearing, it was noted

that the defendant had made progress in addressing

the violations but that concerns remained. In response,

Doolan agreed to perform additional work to eliminate

these concerns and to bring the park in compliance

with the applicable statutory standards.

On October 24, 2007, the department investigator conducted

another inspection and noted in a subsequent

report that various improvements had been made. He

also noted certain outstanding work that remained to

be done. In a report dated November 28, 2007, however,

the investigator referred to the October 24 inspection

and stated that ''[a]ll previous concerns appeared to

be addressed.'' A letter from the department to the

defendant's attorney dated December 28, 2007, similarly

stated that the department had ''determined'' that the

park was ''in compliance'' with state law, ''no further

action [was] warranted,'' and the file regarding the park

had been ''closed.''

On August 20, 2008, the association amended the

complaint previously filed with the trial court in July,

2006, adding more detail to the existing three counts

and one count of per se negligence for the defendant's

alleged violations of statutory provisions relating to

renewal of the residents' mobile home leases in December,

2007. The association also requested declaratory

relief under Practice Book §§ 17-55 and 17-56, and

injunctive relief to compel the defendant's compliance

with the applicable statutory provisions, to correct any

current areas of noncompliance, and to preclude the

defendant from attempting to recover from the association's

members or other park residents any costs or

expenses arising out of or relating to the litigation.

The association further clarified that it was requesting

injunctive relief pursuant to CUTPA, among other statutory

provisions.5

The case was tried to the court in May, 2009, after

which the parties filed posttrial briefs. In a memorandum

of decision dated September 24, 2009, the trial

court found in favor of the defendant on all counts. The

court explained that, '' '[a]s a general matter, administrative

decisions are entitled to preclusive effect' '' and

that, with regard to counts one and three, the association

had failed to provide the court with case law to

support a modification of the department's findings for

the defendant in the absence of an administrative

appeal. The trial court further stated, with regard to

count two, that the association had not met its burden

of proof because no municipal employee had testified

that the park was in violation of the municipal ordinances.

The trial court finally found in favor of the

defendant on the CUTPA count, declining to modify

the department's finding that the defendant was in compliance

with the statutes cited in the association's complaint.

The association appealed to the Appellate Court,

which ordered supplemental briefs on the issue of

whether the association had standing to bring a CUTPA

claim. Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. Fairchild

Heights, Inc., 131 Conn. App. 567, 571 n.7, 27 A.3d

467 (2011). The Appellate Court subsequently concluded

that ''the [association] failed to exhaust its

administrative remedies and that the trial court otherwise

lacked jurisdiction and should have dismissed the

case.'' Id., 568–69.

The Appellate Court first determined that the operative

complaint for purposes of addressing subject matter

jurisdiction was the association's original complaint,

and not the amended complaint on which the action

had been tried. See id., 574 n.8. The Appellate Court

thus did not address the alleged violation of statutory

lease provisions, a claim that had not been included in

the original complaint. The court then concluded, with

respect to the first two counts of the original complaint

alleging violations of maintenance standards and

municipal ordinances under chapter 412, that the association's

request for declaratory relief should be dismissed

because the association had not sought a

declaratory ruling from the department and thus had

failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. See id.,

577–80. The Appellate Court also concluded that the

association did not have standing to seek injunctive

relief because the original complaint did not allege that,

in the absence of an injunction, the association would

suffer irreparable harm.6 See id., 580–82. The court

finally concluded that the association lacked standing

to bring a CUTPA claim because the association's allegations

of damages required the participation of the

individual association members in order to satisfy the

CUTPA requirement of demonstrating ascertainable

loss. Id., 582–84. Accordingly, the Appellate Court

reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the

case to that court with direction to dismiss the association's

action. Id., 584.

The association filed a petition for certification to

appeal to this court, and we granted certification limited

to the following issue: ''Did the Appellate Court properly

reverse and remand with direction to dismiss the action

based on a determination that the plaintiff failed to

exhaust its administrative remedies and lacked associational

standing?'' Fairchild Heights Residents Assn.,

Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc., 303 Conn. 928, 36 A.3d

242 (2012).

I

APPLICABILITY OF THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

A

We first consider whether the Appellate Court properly

applied the exhaustion doctrine to the association's

request for declaratory relief in connection with its

claims of per se negligence for violations of chapter

412 of the General Statutes. The association claims that

the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that it failed

to exhaust its administrative remedies because the

exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable in light of the procedures

that the department followed in responding to

the association's complaint. The association contends

that, because the department chose to address the complaint

solely through informal compliance efforts, it

foreclosed the association's ability to challenge the

department's decision through a formal administrative

proceeding or administrative appeal. The association

also claims that the statutory scheme does not compel

administrative exhaustion because use of the word

''may'' in General Statutes § 21-83e (a), which provides

that a mobile home park resident who alleges a violation

of the statutory scheme ''may'' request a declaratory

ruling from the department prior to seeking judicial

relief, means that the request for a declaratory ruling

is discretionary. The association finally claims that

requiring the filing of an administrative complaint prior

to seeking judicial relief would have harmful public

policy consequences because it would result in an

increase in department costs and an explosion of formal

proceedings.

The defendant responds that the Appellate Court's

conclusion ''comports with the numerous public policies

underlying the exhaustion doctrine,'' including use

of the department's expertise, where possible, in evaluating

alleged statutory violations, the efficiency and

economy achieved by relying on the department's factual

findings, the likelihood of a resolution during an

administrative proceeding, and the disincentive it provides

to forum shop. The defendant also argues that

the Appellate Court's conclusion is consistent with this

court's reasoning in Connecticut Mobile Home Assn.,

Inc. v. Jensen's, Inc., 178 Conn. 586, 424 A.2d 285 (1979),

in which we determined that the trial court had no

subject matter jurisdiction over an association's claim

for declaratory relief because the association had failed

to exhaust its administrative remedies. See id., 589–91.

The defendant finally contends that the use of the word

''may'' in § 21-83e suggests that the request for a declaratory

ruling is discretionary only in the sense that a

mobile home resident is not obligated to seek declaratory

relief rather than other statutory remedies, but

merely has the option of doing so in order to pursue a

subsequent judicial remedy. We agree with the defendant.

''As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable

standard of review. . . . Because the exhaustion [of

administrative remedies] doctrine implicates subject

matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as a threshold

matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of

the [plaintiff's] claim. . . . [Additionally] [b]ecause [a]

determination regarding a trial court's subject matter

jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary.''

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nyenhuis v. Metropolitan

District Commission, 300 Conn. 708, 715, 22

A.3d 1181 (2011).

''It is a settled principle of administrative law that if

an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be

exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction

to act in the matter. . . . Thus, exhaustion of

remedies serves dual functions: it protects the courts

from becoming unnecessarily burdened with administrative

appeals and it ensures the integrity of the

agency's role in administering its statutory responsibilities.''

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Piquet v. Chester, 306 Conn. 173, 179–80, 49 A.3d

977 (2012).

There are two ways to determine whether an administrative

remedy has been exhausted. ''[When] a statute

has established a procedure to redress a particular

wrong a person must follow the specified remedy and

may not institute a proceeding that might have been

permissible in the absence of such a statutory procedure.

. . . When, however, a statutory requirement of

exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by [legislative]

intent in determining whether application of the

doctrine would be consistent with the statutory scheme.

. . . Consequently, [t]he requirement of exhaustion

may arise from explicit statutory language or from an

administrative scheme providing for agency relief.''

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Piteau v. Board of Education, 300 Conn. 667, 678–79,

15 A.3d 1067 (2011).

We begin our inquiry by examining the statutory language

and the remedies provided in chapter 412 of the

General Statutes to determine whether the association

was required to request a declaratory ruling from the

department prior to seeking judicial relief. In this

endeavor, we are guided by the well established principle

that ''[i]ssues of statutory construction raise questions

of law, over which we exercise plenary review.

. . . The process of statutory interpretation involves

the determination of the meaning of the statutory language

as applied to the facts of the case, including the

question of whether the language does so apply. . . .

When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective

is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of

the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine,

in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory

language as applied to the facts of [the] case,

including the question of whether the language actually

does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,

General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the

text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and

unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the

statute shall not be considered.'' (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Ugrin v. Cheshire, 307 Conn. 364, 379–

80, 54 A.3d 532 (2012).

In the present case, the relevant statutory provisions

on mobile home parks are contained in chapter 412 of

the General Statutes, which operates in conjunction

with the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act

(UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. Beginning with

the provisions in chapter 412, General Statutes § 21-75

provides that ''[t]he Commissioner of Consumer Protection

shall adopt such regulations as are necessary to

carry out the purposes of . . . chapter [412], in accordance

with the provisions of [the UAPA].'' In addition,

§ 21-83e (a) provides that ''[a] [mobile home] resident

who claims that an owner is violating any provision of

. . . chapter [412] . . . may request a declaratory ruling

from the [d]epartment . . . .'' General Statutes

§ 21-72 further provides that ''[a]ny person aggrieved

by any action of the department may appeal therefrom

in accordance with the provisions of section 4-183.''

Turning to the UAPA, General Statutes § 4-176 (a)

provides that ''[a]ny person may petition an agency . . .

for a declaratory ruling as to the validity of any regulation,

or the applicability to specified circumstances of

a provision of the general statutes, a regulation, or a

final decision on a matter within the jurisdiction of the

agency.'' Section 4-176 (i) also provides that, ''[i]f an

agency does not issue a declaratory ruling within one

hundred eighty days after the filing of a petition therefor

. . . the agency shall be deemed to have decided not to

issue such ruling.'' General Statutes § 4-175 (a) further

provides that, ''if an agency (1) does not take an action

required by . . . section 4-176 . . . (2) decides not to

issue a declaratory ruling under . . . section 4-176, or

(3) is deemed to have decided not to issue a declaratory

ruling under . . . section 4-176, the petitioner may

seek in the Superior Court a declaratory judgment as

to the validity of the regulation in question or the applicability

of the provision of the general statutes, the

regulation or the final decision in question to specified

circumstances. . . .'' General Statutes § 4-183 (a)

repeats this rule in more general terms, providing that

''[a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies

available within the agency and who is aggrieved

by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court

as provided in this section. . . .''

We have recognized on multiple occasions that an

aggrieved party must exhaust its administrative remedies

before it may seek judicial relief. See, e.g., Republican

Party of Connecticut v. Merrill, 307 Conn. 470, 480,

55 A.3d 251 (2012) (''prior to bringing an action in the

trial court, the plaintiff . . . was required to exhaust

its administrative remedies by requesting a declaratory

ruling from the defendant''); Polymer Resources, Ltd.

v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 557, 630 A.2d 1304 (1993)

(''[i]t is a well settled principle of administrative law

that, if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it

must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain

jurisdiction to act in the matter'' [internal quotation

marks omitted]); LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199

Conn. 70, 83–84, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986) (same); see also

Connecticut Mobile Home Assn., Inc. v. Jensen's, Inc.,

supra, 178 Conn. 589–91 (association of mobile home

park residents improperly bypassed administrative remedy

by failing to seek declaratory ruling from agency

prior to commencing action in trial court). In the present

case, the association did not comply with this

requirement.

The association filed a complaint with the trial court

in July, 2006. Two months later, in September, 2006, it

filed a complaint with the Office of the Attorney General,

which forwarded the complaint to the department.

The department conducted an informal investigation

and closed its file on the complaint in December, 2007.

Accordingly, the association failed to exhaust its administrative

remedies with respect to counts one and two

because it filed the complaint with the Office of the

Attorney General two months after it sought judicial

relief and the department did not complete its investigation

until fifteen months after the filing.

Even if the association had filed the complaint after

the investigation was completed, however, it still would

have failed to exhaust its administrative remedies

because it did not seek a declaratory ruling pursuant

to § 21-83e (a), from which it could have appealed to

the trial court under §§ 4-183 and 21-72. The association

merely sent a letter to the Office of the Attorney General

in which it listed the alleged maintenance violations,

made other claims regarding retaliatory actions by the

defendant against individual members of the association's

board of directors, and sought an ''immediate

investigation.''

Furthermore, we disagree with the association's

claim that the language used in § 21-83e (a) does not

require that a complainant request a declaratory ruling

prior to seeking judicial relief. Although § 21-83e (a)

provides that ''[a] [mobile home] resident who claims

that an owner is violating any provision of . . . chapter

[412] . . . may request a declaratory ruling from the

[d]epartment''; (emphasis added); the legislature's use

of the more permissive word, ''may,'' rather than the

generally mandatory word, ''shall,'' does not mean that

the request for a declaratory ruling is discretionary insofar

as it may serve as a prerequisite to seeking declaratory

relief from the court. The statutory scheme

provides dissatisfied residents with numerous other

administrative remedies for addressing substandard

conditions at a mobile home park, either by way of a

department investigation or by direct individual action.

These remedies include suspension or revocation of

the owner's license to operate the park; see General

Statutes § 21-71 (a); the imposition of fines; see General

Statutes § 21-71 (a); prohibitions on the collection of

rent after suspension or revocation; see General Statutes

§ 21-73 (a); termination of the rental agreement

following proper notice for breach of the landlord's

responsibilities; see General Statutes § 47a-12 (a); and

placement of the required rent in a special account

administered by the court until the statutory violations

are addressed. See General Statutes § 47a-14h. When

viewed in this context, the language in § 21-83e (a)

providing that a resident ''may request a declaratory

ruling from the [d]epartment'' simply means that a resident

has the discretion to request a declaratory ruling

or to seek any of the other remedies available to achieve

statutory compliance. It does not mean, even implicitly,

that a resident has the discretion to request a declaratory

ruling prior to seeking a declaratory judgment from

the court.

If this was the meaning of the statute, a declaratory

ruling would be required only if the word ''shall'' had

been used in place of the word ''may.'' As the Appellate

Court noted, however, this would lead to an absurd

result because it would mean that, in addition to another

type of statutory remedy or informal compliance procedure,

like the one employed in the present case, all

complainants would be required to request a declaratory

ruling, despite their preference for another remedy,

in seeking relief for a statutory violation by an owner.

See Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. Fairchild

Heights, Inc., supra, 131 Conn. App. 578.We therefore

conclude that, even if the association had filed

its complaint with the trial court after the department

closed its file on the matter, the association would have

failed to exhaust its administrative remedies because

an administrative remedy was available in the form

of a declaratory ruling under § 21-83e (a), which the

association did not request.

Finally, the fact that the department chose to follow

an informal compliance procedure is no excuse for the

association's omissions. The department did exactly

what the association asked it to do, which was to investigate

the association's complaint. The association had

the responsibility in the first instance to request a

declaratory ruling, from which it could have appealed

to the court pursuant to §§ 4-183 and 21-72 if it was not

satisfied with the outcome. This it did not do. As a

consequence, the fact that there was no declaratory

ruling by the department from which the association

could appeal was not the department's fault. It was the

association's obligation to pursue this option at the

outset, and its failure to do so means that it did not

exhaust its administrative remedies with respect to

counts one and two.

B

We next consider whether the Appellate Court properly

applied the exhaustion doctrine to the association's

claim for declaratory relief based on the alleged CUTPA

violation. The association claims that the Appellate

Court incorrectly concluded that the association was

required to seek a declaratory ruling from the department

prior to seeking a judicial remedy under CUTPA.

The defendant responds that the Appellate Court did not

conclude that the association should have exhausted its

administrative remedies with respect to the CUTPA

claim, and, therefore, this court need not address that

issue. We agree with the defendant that the Appellate

Court's holding as to the CUTPA claim was not based

on the association's failure to exhaust its administrative

remedies.

After the parties filed their briefs, the Appellate Court

issued the following order: ''Counsel are hereby sua

sponte ordered to file . . . simultaneous supplemental

briefs . . . in which they address whether the [association]

has standing to assert a CUTPA claim. See Connecticut

Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell,

199 Conn. 609, 616–17 [508 A.2d 743] (1986); D'Angelo

Development & Construction Corp. v. Cordovano, 121

Conn. App. 165, 181 [995 A.2d 79, cert. denied, 297 Conn.

923, 998 A.2d 167] (2010).'' (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v.

Fairchild Heights, Inc., supra, 131 Conn. App. 571 n.7.

The two citations in the order refer, respectively, to

the ''three part test that must be satisfied before an

association will be granted standing to assert the rights

of its members, without also asserting injury to itself'';

Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v.

Worrell, supra, 616; and the proof required to establish

under CUTPA that a plaintiff has suffered ''an ascertainable

loss of money or property'' as a result of ''unfair

or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any

trade or commerce . . . .'' (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) D'Angelo Development & Construction Corp.

v. Cordovano, supra, 181. In light of these citations, the

association argued in its supplemental brief that it had

associational standing to pursue a CUTPA claim on

behalf of its members and that it had established the

requisite ascertainable loss. Correspondingly, the

defendant argued in its supplemental brief that the association

did not have standing in its representational

capacity to bring a CUTPA claim, and, because of the

lack of standing, it would be unable to prove ascertainable

loss. Neither party discussed, or even mentioned

in passing, the exhaustion doctrine.

Thereafter, the Appellate Court stated in the introductory

portion of its decision: ''[D]uring our review of the

record, we questioned whether the [association] had

standing to bring a CUTPA claim and ordered, sua

sponte, counsel to submit supplemental briefs on that

issue. We conclude that the [association] failed to

exhaust its administrative remedies and therefore

lacked standing to bring a CUTPA action. The trial

court, therefore, was without subject matter jurisdiction

and the action must be dismissed.'' (Footnote omitted.)

Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. Fairchild

Heights, Inc., supra, 131 Conn. App. 571–72. In

part II of its opinion, however, in which the court conducted

an in-depth analysis of the issues of associational

standing and ascertainable loss in relation to the

association's CUTPA claim; see id., 582–84; it made no

reference to the exhaustion doctrine. Rather, it rejected

the association's CUTPA claim on the ground that the

association had failed to satisfy the third prong of the

associational standing test set forth in Connecticut

Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. See id., 584.

On the basis of these facts, we conclude that the

Appellate Court did not reject the association's CUTPA

claim on the ground that the association had failed

to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Appellate

Court's single, isolated reference to the exhaustion doctrine

in connection with the CUTPA claim, without any

further explanation, must be attributed to an oversight.

We nonetheless consider whether the exhaustion doctrine

applies because a reviewing court may consider

the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time; see,

e.g., Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport, 304 Conn. 483, 506,

43 A.3d 69 (2012); and the association and amici curiae

have addressed the issue of exhaustion on appeal to

this court.

The association claims that it was not required to

exhaust its administrative remedies before bringing a

CUTPA claim because (1) the department did not have

the ability to award the injunctive relief, punitive damages

and attorney's fees that the association sought

under CUTPA, (2) the legislative history of CUTPA

evinces a clear legislative intent not to require private

litigants to exhaust any remedies available through the

department before pursuing a CUTPA action in the

Superior Court, and (3) public policy warrants allowing

parties to bypass administrative remedies and to bring

CUTPA actions directly in the Superior Court because

it will decrease the burden on the department, provide

consumers with a judicial remedy and affirm the attorney

general's power to enforce the ban on unfair trade

practices. In their amicus brief, the state and the department

argue that CUTPA provides consumers with a

comprehensive, multi-faceted enforcement framework

that includes administrative proceedings but that allows

private parties to assist in the enforcement of CUTPA

through private actions brought in the Superior Court.

As previously noted, the defendant claims that there is

no need for this court to address the issue because the

Appellate Court never held that exhaustion is required

prior to the commencement of a CUTPA action. Accordingly,

the defendant has not expressed an opinion one

way or another. We agree with the association and the

amici curiae that CUTPA does not require litigants to

exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing

a CUTPA claim.

The language of CUTPA and our prior case law

strongly suggest that the exhaustion doctrine does not

apply. CUTPA provides for two general enforcement

mechanisms. These include (1) administrative proceedings

initiated by the commissioner of consumer protection

(commissioner) and carried out by the commissioner's

authorized representatives, including the attorney

general, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 42-110d

and 42-110m, and (2) actions initiated by private parties

in the Superior Court for punitive damages, costs, attorney's

fees, injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant

to General Statutes § 42-110g. Section 42-110g contains

no requirement that a private party exhaust administrative

remedies prior to seeking judicial relief.

In interpreting the foregoing provisions, we have

stated that CUTPA is ''remedial in character . . . and

must be liberally construed in favor of those whom

the legislature intended to benefit.'' (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merchants of

Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363, 379, 880 A.2d 138

(2005); see also General Statutes § 42-110b (d) (''[i]t is

the intention of the legislature that [CUTPA] be remedial

and be so construed''). There is no express or

implicit exhaustion requirement in the statutory provision,

and we decline to impose one. Consequently, it

was not improper for the association to go directly to

the trial court and seek judicial relief under CUTPA.

We also note that exhaustion is not required when

an administrative remedy is futile or inadequate. See

Connecticut Mobile Home Assn., Inc. v. Jensen's, Inc.,

supra, 178 Conn. 592 (''[when] an administrative remedy

does not exist . . . or is inadequate . . . a party will

be allowed to resort to the courts in the first instance''

[citations omitted]). ''[A]n administrative remedy is

futile or inadequate if the agency is without authority

to grant the requested relief.'' (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Neiman v. Yale University, 270 Conn. 244,

259, 851 A.2d 1165 (2004). In contrast, ''[a]n adequate

remedy at law is one which is specific and adapted to

securing the relief sought conveniently, effectively and

completely.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Bianco v. Darien, 157 Conn. 548, 554–55, 254 A.2d

898 (1969).

In the present case, the remedies available to the

association included a request for declaratory relief;

see General Statutes § 21-83e (a); the imposition of fines

on the owner of the mobile home park; see General

Statutes § 21-71 (a); suspension or revocation of the

owner's license to operate the park; see General Statutes

§ 21-71 (a); prohibitions on the collection of rent

after suspension or revocation; see General Statutes

§ 21-73 (a); termination of the rental agreement following

proper notice for breach of the landlord's responsibilities;

see General Statutes § 47a-12 (a); and

placement of the required rent in a special account

administered by the court until the statutory violations

are addressed. See General Statutes § 47a-14h. The

department has no authority to award the injunctive

relief, punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs

sought by the association and available under CUTPA.

Accordingly, any administrative request for such remedies

would have been futile and inadequate.

The present case is similar to Griswold v. Union

Labor Life Ins. Co., 186 Conn. 507, 519, 442 A.2d 920

(1982), in which the plaintiff sought monetary and punitive

damages, attorney's fees, and costs for violations

of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act,

which is currently codified at General Statutes § 38a-815

et seq. In that case, we concluded that ''[t]he pertinent

statutes do not authorize the [insurance] commissioner

to award damages to an aggrieved person nor does he

have the authority to determine a private right to

damages.

''It appears, therefore, that the plaintiffs had no practical

or adequate administrative remedy which would

require exhaustion. . . . The plaintiffs are entitled to

maintain a private right of action for monetary damages

for alleged unfair trade practices, as defined by [what

is now General Statutes § 38a-816], without first

exhausting the administrative remedies under [what is

now General Statutes § 38a-817] and it was error for

the court to hold otherwise.'' (Citations omitted.) Id.,

520–21. In the present case, as in Griswold, the relevant

state agency was unable to award the punitive damages,

attorney's fees, costs, injunctive and other equitable

relief sought by the association. Accordingly, there was

no administrative remedy that the association could

have exhausted to obtain such relief before bringing its

CUTPA claim.

II

ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING UNDER CUTPA

The association next claims that the Appellate Court

incorrectly concluded that it lacked associational standing

to bring a CUTPA claim on the ground that the

third prong of the associational standing test required

residents of the park to testify regarding their firsthand

knowledge of the alleged statutory violations and how

they were individually harmed. The association specifically

claims that the Appellate Court misapplied the

applicable law because, under United States Supreme

Court and other federal precedent, the participation

of each individual member of the association was not

indispensable to a determination of whether the defendant

had committed the violations and whether the

association was entitled to injunctive relief, punitive

damages and attorney's fees. The association also

claims that individual participation was not required

to establish the CUTPA element of ascertainable loss

because it was not necessary for the association to

prove quantifiable damages in order to satisfy that

element.

The defendant responds that the Appellate Court correctly

concluded that the association failed to satisfy the

third prong of the associational standing test because

extensive member participation was required to prove

ascertainable loss and to recover punitive damages and

injunctive relief under CUTPA. We agree with the association.

''[S]tanding is the legal right to set judicial machinery

in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction

of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or

representative capacity, some real interest in the cause

of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest

in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . Nevertheless,

[s]tanding is not a technical rule intended to

keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test

of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept

designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed

by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests

and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights

of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view

fairly and vigorously represented.'' (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Citibank, N.A. v.

Lindland, 310 Conn. 147, 161, 75 A.3d 651 (2013). ''If

a party is found to lack standing, the court is without

subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause. . . .

A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter

jurisdiction is a question of law. When . . . the trial

court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary

and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally

and logically correct and find support in the facts that

appear in the record.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission,

288 Conn. 143, 155, 953 A.2d 1 (2008).

In Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc.

v. Worrell, supra, 199 Conn. 610, 615–16, we considered

whether two associations lacked standing to bring an

action on behalf of their members and adopted the test

articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Hunt

v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,

432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977),

which that court had derived in turn from its decision

in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45

L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975). Quoting from Hunt, we stated:

''[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf

of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise

have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests

it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's

purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the

relief requested requires the participation of individual

members in the lawsuit. . . . Representational standing

depends in substantial measure on the nature of

the relief sought. If in a proper case the association

seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of

prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that

the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those

members of the association actually injured.'' (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut

Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell,

supra, 616. In Warth, the United States Supreme Court

also had explained, with respect to the third prong,

that, ''so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief

sought does not make the individual participation of

each injured party indispensable to proper resolution

of the cause, the association may be an appropriate

representative of its members, entitled to invoke the

court's jurisdiction.'' (Emphasis added.) Warth v. Seldin,

supra, 511.

The defendant concedes that the first two prongs

of the foregoing test were satisfied and that the only

disputed issue is whether the third prong was satisfied.

Thus, in order to determine whether the claim asserted

and the relief requested required the participation of

the association's individual members, we must consider

the principles that govern a CUTPA claim.

''[T]o prevail on a CUTPA claim, [a plaintiff] must

prove that (1) the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive

acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or

commerce; General Statutes § 42-110b (a); and (2) each

class member claiming entitlement to relief under

CUTPA has suffered an ascertainable loss of money or

property as a result of the defendant's acts or practices.

General Statutes § 42-110g (a).'' (Footnote omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Neighborhood

Builders, Inc. v. Madison, 294 Conn. 651, 657, 986 A.2d

278 (2010). ''An 'ascertainable loss' is a loss that is

'capable of being discovered, observed or established.'

. . . 'The term ''loss'' necessarily encompasses a

broader meaning than the term ''damage,'' ' and 'has

been held [to be] synonymous with deprivation, detriment

and injury.' . . . To establish an ascertainable

loss, a plaintiff is 'not required to prove actual damages

of a specific dollar amount.' . . . '[A] loss is ascertainable

if it is measurable even though the precise amount

of the loss is not known.' '' (Citations omitted.) Artie's

Auto Body, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 287 Conn.

208, 218, 947 A.2d 320 (2008).

Although the association alleged per se CUTPA violations

of several provisions of chapter 412 of the General

Statutes; e.g., General Statutes § 21-83e (b) (''[a] violation

of any of the provisions of . . . chapter [412] shall

be deemed an unfair or deceptive trade practice under

[CUTPA]''); it still was required to prove that it had

suffered an ascertainable loss because of the violations.

See, e.g., A. Secondino & Son, Inc. v. LoRicco, 215

Conn. 336, 343–44, 576 A.2d 464 (1990). Accordingly,

the question of standing in the present case may be

more accurately stated as whether the association was

able to properly represent its individual members in

light of the relief requested and the proof required to

establish the alleged statutory violations and ascertainable

loss under CUTPA.

As previously noted, ''[r]epresentational standing

depends in substantial measure on the nature of the

relief sought. If in a proper case the association seeks

a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective

relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the

remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those

members of the association actually injured.'' (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Assn. of Health

Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, supra, 199 Conn. 616.

We thus concluded in Connecticut Assn. of Health Care

Facilities, Inc., that the third prong of the test was

satisfied because ''[t]he relief sought by the declaratory

judgment actions [would] 'inure to the benefit' of all

members of both associations . . . [and] [b]ecause

money damages [were] not sought for alleged injuries

to the individual members, proof relating solely to the

variant experiences of each [member] . . . [would] not

be necessary.'' (Citation omitted.) Id., 617. We similarly

concluded in two subsequent cases that the third prong

was satisfied when the plaintiff associations were seeking

declaratory relief rather than money damages. See

Connecticut Assn. of Not-For-Profit Providers for the

Aging v. Dept. of Social Services, 244 Conn. 378, 387,

709 A.2d 1116 (1998) (''because this action seeks only a

general declaration concerning the legality of the [state

agency's] practice, it is unnecessary for any individual

member to be a party''); Connecticut State Medical

Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn.

295, 305, 524 A.2d 636 (1987) (''[b]ecause money damages

are not sought for alleged injuries to the individual

members, proof relating solely to the variant experiences

of each [member] resulting from the [board's

declaratory ruling] will not be necessary'' [internal quotation

marks omitted]).

In the present case, the association seeks injunctive

relief to ensure that the defendant will operate the park

in compliance with chapter 412 and other applicable

statutes, will address any issues of noncompliance, and

will not be allowed to recover from association members

or other park residents any costs or expenses

arising out of or relating to the present litigation. This

is exactly the type of prospective relief to which we

referred in Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities,

Inc., and the other cases in which we addressed the

issue because such relief would inure to the benefit of

all injured association members and thus would not

indispensably require the testimony of each individual

member. Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities,

Inc. v. Worrell, supra, 199 Conn. 616.

Insofar as the association also seeks punitive damages,

costs, and attorney's fees, they are awarded at

the discretion of the court; see, e.g., Votto v. American

Car Rental, Inc., 273 Conn. 478, 485–86, 871 A.2d 981

(2005) (punitive damages); Gargano v. Heyman, 203

Conn. 616, 622, 525 A.2d 1343 (1987) (punitive damages

and attorney's fees); and are considered after a statutory

violation and ascertainable loss have been established.

See, e.g., Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc.,

supra, 485–86 (''[a] court may exercise its discretion to

award punitive damages to a party who has suffered

any ascertainable loss pursuant to CUTPA''); see also

Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh

BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 40, 717 A.2d 77

(1998) (''[w]e have stated that § 42-110g permits a recovery

of actual damages, attorney's fees and punitive damages

for violations of [CUTPA]'' [internal quotation

marks omitted]).

In addition to the fact that punitive damages, costs

and attorney's fees are discretionary, they would not

require the testimony of each individual member of the

association in the present case. In Ulbrich v. Groth, 310

Conn. 375, 78 A.3d 76 (2013), we stated that, ''[i]n order

to award punitive or exemplary damages [under

CUTPA], evidence must reveal a reckless indifference

to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton

violation of those rights. . . . In fact, the flavor of the

basic requirement to justify an award of punitive damages

is described in terms of wanton and malicious

injury, evil motive and violence.'' (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 446. We also stated that the factors

that a court should consider in determining the amount

of a punitive damages award include the degree of relative

blameworthiness, whether the defendant's action

was taken to maximize profit, whether the wrongdoing

was difficult to detect, the extent of the plaintiff's injuries,

the amount of compensatory damages awarded,

and whether the punitive damages award would deter

the defendant and others from similar conduct, without

financially destroying the defendant. Id., 454. Only one

of these factors refers to compensatory damages, which

are based on injuries to individual members7 and which

the association does not seek in the present case.

Accordingly, because an award of injunctive relief, punitive

damages, costs and attorney's fees would not

require proof of injuries to the individual association

members, we conclude that the Appellate Court improperly

determined that the association lacked standing to

assert its CUTPA claim.

To the extent the defendant persists in arguing that

the testimony of all the individual association members

was required to establish the existence of the alleged

statutory violations and ascertainable loss, we disagree.

With respect to the statutory violations, the association's

complaint contained numerous allegations concerning

the defendant's failure to comply with the

statutory requirements relating to the physical condition

of the park (count one), municipal ordinances governing

mobile home parks (count two), and lease

obligations imposed on mobile home park owners and

tenants (count three).8 All of these allegations appear

to be directed to the defendant's failure to maintain the

common areas of the park or to matters affecting all

or a large number of the association members and residents,

such as the condition of the roads and the proposed

lease for 2008 that the defendant delivered to all

of its tenants. In addition, the association presented

documentary and testimonial evidence at trial in support

of these allegations. This included a large number

of photographs depicting the violations, several department

inspection reports discussing the violations and

the status of the defendant's compliance efforts, correspondence

between the parties' attorneys and between

the parties' attorneys and the department regarding the

violations, a copy of the defendant's proposed lease for

2008, and the testimony of the department investigator,

the department counsel, Doolan, and two association

members, including Dickal. In view of the allegations

and the evidence introduced to support them, we conclude

that all of the association's individual members

were not required to testify regarding their firsthand

knowledge of the violations and how they were individually

harmed.

We likewise conclude that the individual members'

participation was unnecessary to establish ascertainable

loss. In addition to the fact that the association's

allegations were directed principally to relief relating to

maintenance of the common areas and other conditions

that affected the functional or aesthetic experience of

all of the association members and park residents, the

association specifically alleged that the defendant, by

engaging in the acts and omissions described in the

complaint, ''has deprived, and continues to deprive, the

[a]ssociation's members and other [p]ark residents of

the benefits to which they are entitled as tenants, and

for which they have made monthly rental payments to

[the defendant].'' We reiterate that '' '[t]he term ''loss''

necessarily encompasses a broader meaning than the

term ''damage,'' ' and 'has been held [to be] synonymous

with deprivation, detriment and injury.' . . . To establish

an ascertainable loss, a plaintiff is 'not required to

prove actual damages of a specific dollar amount.' . . .

'[A] loss is ascertainable if it is measurable even though

the precise amount of the loss is not known.' '' (Citations

omitted.) Artie's Auto Body, Inc. v. Hartford Fire

Ins. Co., supra, 287 Conn. 218. Indeed, we have specifically

held that ''the words 'any ascertainable loss' as

used in [CUTPA] do not require a plaintiff to prove a

specific amount of actual damages in order to make

out a prima facie case.'' Hinchliffe v. American Motors

Corp., 184 Conn. 607, 612–13, 440 A.2d 810 (1981); see

also Service Road Corp. v. Quinn, 241 Conn. 630, 644,

698 A.2d 258 (1997) (proof is not required to demonstrate

that particular loss occurred but, rather, that

unfair trade practice occurred and that, based on reasonable

inference, unfair trade practice resulted in

loss). Moreover, ''[when] money damages are not

sought for alleged injuries to the individual members,

proof relating solely to the variant experiences of each

[member] resulting from the . . . [violation] at issue

will not be necessary.'' Connecticut Assn. of Health

Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, supra, 199 Conn. 617.

In other words, ''[w]henever a consumer has received

something other than what he bargained for, he has

suffered a loss of money or property.'' Hinchliffe v.

American Motors Corp., supra, 614.

In the present case, the allegations that the association's

members were not receiving the benefits to which

they were entitled as tenants and for which they made

monthly rental payments are sufficient under this standard

because the alleged violations were such that they

affected the mobile home park as a whole, and, therefore,

all of the association members received something

less than what they bargained for. We therefore conclude

that the association did not require the participation

of all its individual members to allege ascertainable

loss for the purpose of obtaining injunctive and other

equitable relief under CUTPA.

III

RELIEF ON REMAND

With respect to the appropriate relief to be ordered,

in light of our conclusion that the association has standing

to assert a CUTPA claim, the defendant argues that

this court should remand the case to the trial court

with direction to render judgment for the defendant

because the association failed to prove a violation of

CUTPA. The association responds that the record established

clear violations of chapter 412 of the General

Statutes, and, accordingly, this court should remand

the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment

for the association as to liability and to hold a

hearing in damages. We note that the association is not

seeking compensatory damages but, rather, injunctive

relief, punitive damages, attorney's fees, costs and other

equitable relief. We disagree with both of the proposed

approaches.

The trial court dismissed the association's CUTPA

claim on the ground that the department ''found [the

defendant] to be in compliance with chapter 412 of the

General Statutes. Due to the reasons set forth in part

III A of [the] court's memorandum of decision, [the]

court declines to modify the [department's] finding that

[the defendant] was in compliance with chapter 412

. . . . If [the defendant] was in compliance with chapter

412 . . . then there can be no per se violation of

CUTPA through § 21-83e (b). Therefore, the court finds

in favor of the defendant with regard to count four of the

operative complaint.'' In part IIIA of its memorandum of

decision, the trial court had determined with respect to

count one that, because the department had concluded

''that the defendant was in compliance with chapter

412 . . . and closed its file regarding the park,'' and

because, ''[a]part from the deference [the] court must

give to the findings of the [department], the [association

had] not provided [the] court with case law to support

[the] court's modification of the [department's] findings

absent an administrative appeal,'' the court would not

modify the department's ''finding that [the defendant]

was in compliance with chapter 412 . . . .'' In sum, the

trial court concluded that the CUTPA claim failed on

the ground that the department's ''finding'' that the

defendant was in compliance with chapter 412 must

be given preclusive effect in the absence of any legal

authority provided by the association that would support

the court's modification of the finding.

We conclude that the trial court's reasoning was

flawed. The court's conclusion was based entirely on

the department's informal determination that the defendant

was in compliance with chapter 412 of the General

Statutes and its decision to complete its investigation

because ''no further action [was] warranted . . . .''9

Moreover, the association's CUTPA claim was not an

appeal from an administrative proceeding but was

brought separately pursuant to § 42-110g, which provides

that any person who suffers any ascertainable

loss of money or property as a result of the use or

employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by

section 42-110b, may bring an action to recover actual

or punitive damages, attorney's fees, costs and other

equitable relief. A CUTPA action thus may be brought

directly in the court. Accordingly, the trial court improperly

deferred to the department's conclusions because

they were based on an informal investigation of the

association's complaint that did not result in a final

decision in a contested case subject to appeal under

§ 4-183 (a). In addition, the court failed to engage in

the fact-finding process necessary to reach its own conclusions

with respect to the association's independent

CUTPA claim. The association is therefore entitled to

a new trial on that claim.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed only

as to the association's CUTPA claim and the case is

remanded to the Appellate Court with direction to

remand the case for a new trial on that claim; the judgment

of the Appellate Court is affirmed in all other

respects.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 Prior to filing the complaint, the association filed a complaint against

the defendant in October, 2005, that was dismissed in May, 2006, on the

ground that the association lacked standing to sue on behalf of the individual

park residents.

2 The complaint was in the form of a letter dated September 11, 2006,

from the association's attorney, in which he listed a number of maintenance

violations and other claims regarding alleged retaliatory actions by the

defendant against individual members of the association's board of directors.

The letter concluded as follows: ''I have assured the [a]ssociation and its

[b]oard of [d]irectors that your office will not allow Connecticut mobile

home residents to live in substandard, unhealthy, unsafe conditions, in a

park run by an oppressive and unscrupulous landlord. This situation cannot

continue; and I look forward to your immediate investigation.''

3 The original investigator was Gregory Carver. After Carver left his position

in 2007, Keith Lombardi assumed Carver's duties.

4 General Statutes § 21-82 (a) describes sixteen responsibilities of a mobile

home park owner.

5 The association also requested injunctive relief pursuant to General

Statutes §§ 35-52, 52-570b (a) and 53-452 (a). Those statutory provisions,

however, are contained in chapters relating to trade secrets and computer

crimes, respectively, and thus are inapplicable for purposes of the present

appeal.

6 We note that the Appellate Court's conclusion as to the association's

request for injunctive relief and its discussion of irreparable harm, which

appear to be directed to the first three counts of the complaint, are not at

issue in this appeal. The association, however, sought injunctive relief under

CUTPA, which does not require allegations of irreparable harm. See, e.g.,

Artie's Auto Body, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 287 Conn. 208, 219, 947

A.2d 320 (2008) (''[t]he fact that a plaintiff fails to prove a particular loss

or the extent of the loss does not foreclose the plaintiff from obtaining

injunctive relief and [attorney's] fees pursuant to CUTPA if the plaintiff is

able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an unfair trade

practice has occurred and a reasonable inference can be drawn by the trier

of fact that the unfair trade practice has resulted in a loss to the plaintiff''

[emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); Collins v. Anthem

Health Plans, Inc., 275 Conn. 309, 344–45, 880 A.2d 106 (2005) (same);

Service Road Corp. v. Quinn, 241 Conn. 630, 644, 698 A.2d 258 (1997) (same);

see also Bristol Technology, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 59, 95

(D. Conn. 2000) (''the 'irreparable harm' standard that usually governs the

decision of whether to award equitable relief is inapplicable in a CUTPA

case''), vacated on other grounds, 250 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001); Conservation

Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 429, 430, 479 A.2d 187 (1984) (irreparable

harm need not be shown in statutory injunction case because ''the

enactment of the statute by implication assumes that no adequate alternative

remedy exists and that the injury was irreparable, that is, the legislation

was needed or else it would not have been enacted,'' although ''a [trial

judge] . . . is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every

violation of law'' [internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, the fact

that the Appellate Court did not consider the association's request for injunctive

relief under CUTPA does not affect the association's ability to seek

injunctive relief under CUTPA in any future proceeding.

7 Monetary damages thus require more specific proof. See Ulbrich v. Groth,

supra, 310 Conn. 441 (''[w]hen damages are claimed they are an essential

element of the plaintiff's proof and must be proved with reasonable certainty''

[internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Connecticut Assn. of

Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, supra, 199 Conn. 617 (''[b]ecause

money damages are not sought for alleged injuries to the individual members,

proof relating solely to the variant experiences of each [member] resulting

from the [state agency's] policy at issue will not be necessary'').

8 Among the violations alleged in the complaint and noted by the Appellate

Court were the following acts and omissions: ''[F]ailure (1) to maintain

roads in the park in good condition, (2) to remove or repair abandoned

mobile homes in the park that it owns, (3) to keep the park free from

stagnant water and repeated flooding, (4) to keep common areas free from

refuse and debris, (5) to remediate fuel oil contamination, (5) [to] maintain

and repair retaining walls in the park, (6) to maintain the electrical system

in the park, (7) to maintain the plumbing system in the park resulting in

the continual deposit of sand, grit and rust into the faucets, sinks and tubs

of the mobile homes in the park, (8) to maintain the septic system in the

park that frequently results in the backup of waste into mobile homes in

the park and (9) to grade lots level.'' Fairchild Heights Residents Assn.,

Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc., supra, 131 Conn. App. 584.

9 A CUTPA claim is a statutory cause of action that is distinct from an

informal administrative proceeding.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed only

as to the association’s CUTPA claim and the case is

remanded to the Appellate Court with direction to

remand the case for a new trial on that claim; the judgment

of the Appellate Court is affirmed in all other

respects.