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William Maldonado, et al. v. Kelly C. Flannery, et al.

Date: 05-02-2022

Case Number: SC 20522

Judge: Ecker

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut (Hartford County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: Philip F. von Kuhn

Defendant's Attorney: Jack G. Steigelfest

Description:
Hartford, Connecticut personal injury car wreck lawyer represented Plaintiffs, who sued Defendant on auto negligence theories.



The plaintiffs, M and H, sought to recover damages for personal injuries

they sustained when a vehicle driven by the defendant F and owned by

the defendant T rear-ended the vehicle in which the plaintiffs were

traveling. The defendants admitted that the accident resulted from F's

negligence, and the trial was therefore limited to the issues of causation

and damages. The plaintiffs introduced into evidence their medical

records and bills, including reports by their chiropractor, P, in which

P diagnosed M and H with, inter alia, various injuries to and conditions

associated with their necks and backs that, in his opinion, were perma-

nent in nature and would require future treatment. After the accident,

M was treated approximately sixty-two times over the course of two

years and H was treated approximately forty-nine times over the course

of eight months, primarily at P's practice, and they each received chiro-

practic manipulation of the spine and neck, application of hot and cold

packs, electrical stimulation, and, on one occasion, an epidural steroid

injection. M received two magnetic resonance imagining (MRI) scans,

H receive one MRI, and they both were referred for physical therapy.

The defendants' expert, L, agreed that the plaintiffs sustained injuries

to their necks and backs as a result of the accident and that a period

of physical therapy and chiropractic treatment was reasonable and nec-

essary, but he disagreed with P that the length of their treatment was

reasonable and that future treatment was necessary. The jury returned

a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them each economic

damages but zero noneconomic damages for their pain and suffering.

The verdict form indicated that the jury awarded the plaintiffs all of

their respective claimed medical expenses for their hospital visits on

the day of the accident, as well as their MRIs, X-rays, and physical

therapy, but made slight reductions in the expenses claimed for the

chiropractic treatment P provided. Thereafter, the trial court granted the

plaintiffs' joint motion for additurs and awarded each plaintiff additional

money damages for pain and suffering, concluding that the jury verdict

awarding economic damages but zero noneconomic damages was inher-

ently inconsistent because the jury necessarily found that the plaintiffs'

medical treatment was reasonable and necessary and because the plain-

tiffs' particular medical treatment inherently involved treatment for pain.

Although the plaintiffs accepted the additurs, the defendants filed an

appeal in lieu of accepting or rejecting the additurs. The Appellate Court

reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the trial court had

failed to identity the part of the record that supported its conclusion

that the jury's failure to award noneconomic damages was unreasonable,

and also concluding that the jury's verdict was not inconsistent because

the jury reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiffs had incurred

reasonable and necessary medical expenses but zero noneconomic dam-

ages for pain and suffering in light of the conflicting and inconsistent

evidence adduced at trial. On the granting of certification, the plaintiffs

appealed to this court. Held:

Outcome:
1. Contrary to the Appellate Court’s conclusion, the trial court properly set

forth in its memorandum of decision, in accordance with this court’s

case law, the evidentiary and logical basis for its decision to grant the

plaintiffs’ joint motion for additurs, and that explanation was sufficiently

specific to allow appellate review for an abuse of discretion: in its

memorandum of decision, the trial court observed its obligation to view

the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict,

described the specific nature of the medical expenses incurred by the

plaintiffs, including the treatment each plaintiff received, and noted

the agreement of the parties’ respective experts that each plaintiff had

sustained sprains or strains to his neck and back as a result of the

accident; moreover, the trial court concluded that, because the jury

explicitly awarded damages based on the plaintiffs’ claimed medical

costs, it must have credited those records and found the treatments to

be necessary and reasonable, and that, because those specific treatments

inherently signified a level of physical pain suffered by the plaintiffs,

it was illogical and inconsistent not to award noneconomic damages,

especially when the jury awarded the exact amount of the vast majority

of the plaintiffs’ claimed expenses; accordingly, on the basis of that

articulation, a reviewing court was able to identify the evidence and

jury findings that the trial court believed, in the exercise of its discretion,

warranted the relief granted, to assess the court’s reasoning for logical

or legal flaws, and to determine whether the court had abused its discre-

tion by ordering additurs.

2. The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had abused

its discretion by granting the plaintiffs’ joint motion for additurs, and,

because the defendants effectively declined to accept the additurs, the

case was remanded for a new trial with respect to the issues of causation

and damages: the jury necessarily credited the plaintiffs’ medical bills

and/or the testimony of L regarding the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs

as a result of the accident and the reasonableness of the treatment they

received, and the trial court reasonably concluded that the inherent

purpose of the medical treatment credited by the jury, including the

chiropractic manipulations, the application of hot and cold packs, and

the epidural steroid injections, was to treat pain and suffering and was

not merely diagnostic or prophylactic in nature, which may not involve

pain; moreover, because the trial court could have reasonably concluded

that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent insofar as the jury found, on the

one hand, that the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries in the accident

that necessitated such medical treatment but, on the other hand, that

the plaintiffs experienced no pain or suffering as a result of the accident

that warranted an award of noneconomic damages, the court’s decision

to grant the plaintiffs’ joint motion for additurs was not an abuse of discretion.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:

About This Case

What was the outcome of William Maldonado, et al. v. Kelly C. Flannery, et al.?

The outcome was: 1. Contrary to the Appellate Court’s conclusion, the trial court properly set forth in its memorandum of decision, in accordance with this court’s case law, the evidentiary and logical basis for its decision to grant the plaintiffs’ joint motion for additurs, and that explanation was sufficiently specific to allow appellate review for an abuse of discretion: in its memorandum of decision, the trial court observed its obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict, described the specific nature of the medical expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, including the treatment each plaintiff received, and noted the agreement of the parties’ respective experts that each plaintiff had sustained sprains or strains to his neck and back as a result of the accident; moreover, the trial court concluded that, because the jury explicitly awarded damages based on the plaintiffs’ claimed medical costs, it must have credited those records and found the treatments to be necessary and reasonable, and that, because those specific treatments inherently signified a level of physical pain suffered by the plaintiffs, it was illogical and inconsistent not to award noneconomic damages, especially when the jury awarded the exact amount of the vast majority of the plaintiffs’ claimed expenses; accordingly, on the basis of that articulation, a reviewing court was able to identify the evidence and jury findings that the trial court believed, in the exercise of its discretion, warranted the relief granted, to assess the court’s reasoning for logical or legal flaws, and to determine whether the court had abused its discre- tion by ordering additurs. 2. The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion by granting the plaintiffs’ joint motion for additurs, and, because the defendants effectively declined to accept the additurs, the case was remanded for a new trial with respect to the issues of causation and damages: the jury necessarily credited the plaintiffs’ medical bills and/or the testimony of L regarding the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the accident and the reasonableness of the treatment they received, and the trial court reasonably concluded that the inherent purpose of the medical treatment credited by the jury, including the chiropractic manipulations, the application of hot and cold packs, and the epidural steroid injections, was to treat pain and suffering and was not merely diagnostic or prophylactic in nature, which may not involve pain; moreover, because the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent insofar as the jury found, on the one hand, that the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries in the accident that necessitated such medical treatment but, on the other hand, that the plaintiffs experienced no pain or suffering as a result of the accident that warranted an award of noneconomic damages, the court’s decision to grant the plaintiffs’ joint motion for additurs was not an abuse of discretion.

Which court heard William Maldonado, et al. v. Kelly C. Flannery, et al.?

This case was heard in Supreme Court of Connecticut (Hartford County), CT. The presiding judge was Ecker.

Who were the attorneys in William Maldonado, et al. v. Kelly C. Flannery, et al.?

Plaintiff's attorney: Philip F. von Kuhn. Defendant's attorney: Jack G. Steigelfest.

When was William Maldonado, et al. v. Kelly C. Flannery, et al. decided?

This case was decided on May 2, 2022.