STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RONALD BROWN

The dispositive issue in this certified

appeal is whether the ten year maximum allowable

period of special parole1 established by General Statutes

§ 54-125e (c)2 operates as an aggregate limitation on

the total effective sentence of special parole when a

defendant is convicted of, and sentenced for, multiple

offenses. The state appeals, following our grant of its

petition for certification to appeal,3 from the judgment

of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment

of the trial court denying the motion to correct an illegal

sentence filed by the defendant, Ronald Brown. State

v. Brown, 133 Conn. App. 140, 156, 34 A.3d 1007 (2012).

On appeal, the state claims that the Appellate Court

improperly interpreted § 54-125e (c) as imposing a ten

year maximum on the aggregate sentence of special

parole and, therefore, improperly concluded that the

two consecutive sentences of special parole at issue in

the present case—neither of which exceeded ten years

individually, but together imposed a total effective sentence

of sixteen years of special parole—violated § 54-

125e (c). We agree with the state, and conclude that

the ten year limitation on a period of special parole

provided for in § 54-125e (c) applies per offense, rather

than to the total effective sentence of special parole.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate

Court.

The record and the Appellate Court opinion reveal

the following undisputed facts and relevant procedural

history. In 2005, the state charged the defendant, under

Docket No. MV-05-0443087S, with reckless driving in

violation of General Statutes § 14-222 for conduct that

occurred on June 12, 2005, and, under Docket No. CR-

05-0109070, with, inter alia, possession of narcotics with

intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277

(a) for conduct that occurred on July 1, 2005. Id., 142–43.

In 2006, the state charged the defendant, under Docket

No. CR-06-0112604, with, inter alia, sale of narcotics in

violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b) for conduct

that occurred on March 6, 2006. Id.

Thereafter, the state and the defendant reached a

plea agreement resolving these three cases and, on January

25, 2007, the prosecutor set forth the details of

that agreement before the trial court. Id., 143. Specifically,

the prosecutor stated that, in exchange for his

guilty pleas to the three particular offenses, the defendant

would be sentenced as follows: (1) on the sale of

narcotics charge, under Docket No. CR-06-0112604, to

a mandatory term of incarceration of five years, followed

by a ten year term of special parole; (2) on the

charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell,

under Docket No. CR-05-0109070, to a term of incarceration

of four years, followed by a six year term of special

parole, both sentences to run consecutively; and (3) on

the reckless driving charge, under Docket No. MV-05-

0443087S, to an unconditional discharge. Id. Additionally,

pursuant to the plea agreement, in exchange for

the defendant's guilty pleas on these three charges, the

state agreed to enter a nolle prosequi as to numerous

other charges pending against the defendant. Id. The

defendant's counsel thereafter agreed that the state had

accurately set forth the terms of the plea agreement. Id.

Before accepting the plea agreement, the trial court

canvassed the defendant, ensuring that he understood

that he was agreeing to a ''total effective sentence of

nine years to serve, five of which are a mandatory minimum'';

(internal quotation marks omitted) id.; and that

the terms of incarceration would be ''followed by sixteen

years of special parole.'' (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 144. ''Following the canvass, the court

accepted the defendant's pleas as having been freely,

voluntarily and intelligently made with the effective

assistance of counsel. The court found a factual basis

for the pleas, and a finding of guilty entered on the

three offenses.

''On March 8, 2007, the defendant appeared before

the court for sentencing. As he had at the January 25,

2007 hearing, the prosecutor set forth the terms of the

plea agreement, and the defendant's attorney stated his

agreement with those terms. The court sentenced the

defendant according to the plea agreement.

''[Thereafter] [o]n September 22, 2009, the defendant,

as a self-represented party, filed a motion to correct an

illegal sentence.4 The gist of the motion was that the

court illegally sentenced him to a sixteen year term of

special parole when, in light of the crimes at issue,

the maximum term of special parole authorized was

ten years.

''On July 12, 2010, the sentencing court held a hearing

to consider the motion to correct. The defendant, [then]

represented by counsel, argued that the court lacked

the authority to sentence him to a term of special parole

that exceeded ten years. The defendant argued that

although the court imposed consecutive sentences

under two docket numbers, it was not authorized to

exceed a ten year maximum term of special parole. The

defendant [also] argued that any ambiguity with regard

to the court's authority to sentence him in the manner

that it did should favor the defendant such that the

court was required to reduce the term of special parole

from sixteen years to ten years. . . . The court denied

the motion to correct . . . .'' (Footnotes altered.) Id.,

144–45.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant reiterated

his claim that the total effective sentence of

sixteen years of special parole was ''illegal because it

exceeds the ten year maximum period of special parole

authorized by . . . § 54-125e (c).'' Id., 145.

In a divided opinion, the Appellate Court majority

first concluded that it was ''not clear from a review of

subsection (c) of § 54-125e whether the ten year limit

on the 'period of special parole' limits the special parole

portion of the sentence imposed for individual offenses

or whether it limits a defendant's aggregate sentence

that arises from his conviction of multiple offenses for

which special parole was imposed by the sentencing

court.'' Id., 150–51. After noting that the language of

§ 54-125e (c) created a distinction between different

classes of offenders by providing an exception to the

ten year limitation on a period of special parole for

certain offenses, the majority concluded that the ''distinction,

based upon the type of offense committed by

the defendant, [did] not clarify the issue'' of whether

an aggregate sentence of a period of special parole,

imposed after a conviction of multiple offenses, that

exceeds ten years violates § 54-125e (c). Id., 151.

The majority, therefore, looked to § 54-125e (a),5 and

concluded that the language of that subsection

''acknowledges that, in a situation in which a person

has been sentenced for multiple offenses to terms of

incarceration and special parole, a single 'period of

special parole' begins after the expiration of the maximum

terms of incarceration have expired.'' Id., 152. The

majority further stated that ''[t]he 'period of special

parole' that commences after the expiration of a person's

maximum term or terms of incarceration 'shall

not be less than one year or more than ten years' for

a person, like the defendant, who has not been convicted

of one of the enumerated exceptions set forth

in subsection (c) for which a longer period of special

parole may be imposed.'' (Emphasis in original.) Id.

After rejecting the state's argument that numerous other

statutory provisions related to criminal sentencing and

probation reflect that a '' 'period of special parole' refers

to the special parole portion of a sentence imposed

for a single applicable offense''; id., 153; the majority

concluded that the trial court had ''exceeded its sentencing

authority insofar as it sentenced the defendant

to serve sixteen years of special parole. The court [further]

abused its discretion in denying the motion to

correct because it lacked the authority to sentence the

defendant to a term of special parole that exceeded ten

years'' in the aggregate. Id., 152–53. Accordingly, the

Appellate Court rendered judgment reversing the trial

court's denial of the defendant's motion to correct an

illegal sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

6 Id., 160. This certified appeal followed. See footnote

3 of this opinion.

On appeal, the state claims that the Appellate Court

improperly concluded that the two individual sentences

of special parole, neither of which individually

exceeded ten years, together were illegal under § 54-

125e (c). Specifically, the state contends that a review

of related sentencing statutes reveals that a court may

impose a sentence of up to ten years of special parole

for each individual offense, and that such sentences

may run consecutively even if the aggregate sentence

exceeds ten years. In response, the defendant claims

that § 54-125e (c) is unambiguous and is capable of only

one interpretation, namely, that the ten year maximum

applies to the aggregate sentence. The defendant further

contends that the interpretation advanced by the

state would lead to bizarre results, and that, although

a sentencing court has numerous options with which

to fashion a criminal sanction, those options simply do

not include imposing any period of special parole that

exceeds ten years. We agree with the state that the ten

year limitation on a period of special parole set forth

in § 54-125e (c) applies to each offense, rather than

the aggregate term provided by multiple, consecutive

sentences. We, therefore, conclude that the two consecutive

sentences of special parole imposed by the trial

court in the present case, for a total effective sentence

of sixteen years of special parole, were legal because

neither individual sentence exceeded ten years.

Before turning to the state's claims on appeal, we set

forth the appropriate standard of review. ''[A] claim

that the trial court improperly denied a defendant's

motion to correct an illegal sentence is [typically]

reviewed pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard.

. . . In the present case, however, the defendant's

motion to correct an illegal sentence raise[d] a question

of statutory construction. Issues of statutory construction

raise questions of law, over which we exercise

plenary review. . . .

''When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective

is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent

of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to

determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the

statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,

including the question of whether the language actually

does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,

General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the

text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and

unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the

statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to determine

ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in

context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Adams, 308 Conn. 263, 269–70,

63 A.3d 934 (2013).

We begin, then, with the text of § 54-125e (c), and

observe that the phrase providing that ''[t]he period of

special parole shall be not less than one year or more

than ten years'' is not modified by any language specifying

whether that ten year limitation applies to a sentence

of special parole imposed for one offense, or

whether it applies to a defendant's aggregate sentence

of special parole imposed for multiple offenses. We,

like the Appellate Court majority, note that § 54-125e

(c) further provides an exception to the general ten

year limitation on a period of special parole when a

defendant is convicted of certain specified offenses,

namely, risk of injury to a child, certain sexual assaults,

and being a persistent felony offender, none of which

applies to the defendant in the present case. See footnote

2 of this opinion. Contrary to the Appellate Court

majority, however, we conclude that the exception for

specified offenses in § 54-125e (c) suggests that ''[t]he

period of special parole'' that is subject to the ten year

limitation is related to a conviction for each offense,

rather than an aggregate sentence for multiple offenses.

Indeed, it seems implausible that the legislature would

have intended the first portion of § 54-125e (c) to apply

to all sentences in the aggregate, while recognizing

exceptions to the ten year limitation for specific, individual

offenses within the same sentence of the statute.

Nevertheless, we agree with the Appellate Court majority

that the text of § 54-125e (c) does not, by itself,

clearly reveal the legislature's intent with respect to

the applicability of the ten year limitation. See State v.

Brown, supra, 133 Conn. App. 150–51.

Therefore, we look to other subsections of § 54-125e

to attempt to ascertain the meaning of ''[t]he period of

special parole'' in § 54-125e (c). Like Judge Bear in his

well reasoned dissent, we find the language of § 54-

125e (a) instructive in divining the intent of the legislature

with respect to the applicability of the ten year

limitation provided in § 54-125e (c). See State v. Brown,

supra, 133 Conn. App. 163–64 (Bear, J., dissenting).

Section 54-125e (a) provides in relevant part that ''[a]ny

person convicted of a crime . . . who received a definite

sentence of more than two years [of incarceration]

followed by a period of special parole shall, at the

expiration of the maximum term or terms of imprisonment

imposed by the court, be automatically transferred

to the jurisdiction of the chairperson of the Board

of Pardons and Paroles . . . .'' (Emphasis added.) In

our view, the terms ''a crime,'' ''a definite sentence,''

and ''a period of special parole'' used in § 54-125e (a)—

all of which are expressed in the singular—indicate that

a period of special parole not to exceed ten years can

be imposed upon any person who is convicted of a

crime. Thus, when an individual is convicted of multiple

offenses, it logically follows that a period of special

parole may be imposed for each offense.

Indeed, ''[a]lthough General Statutes § 1-1 (f) provides

that [w]ords importing the singular number may

extend and be applied to several persons or things, and

words importing the plural number may include the

singular, we have held that because § 1-1 (f) uses the

word may it is clearly directory and not mandatory.

. . . [S]uch statutory expressions are legislative statements

of a general principle of interpretation. . . . The

principle does not require that singular and plural word

forms have interchangeable effect, and discrete applications

are favored except where the contrary intent or

reasonable understanding is affirmatively indicated.''

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shawhan v. Langley,

249 Conn. 339, 347, 732 A.2d 170 (1999). Viewing

this concept in practice, we have held that the legislature's

use of both the singular and plural forms of a

term in a statute ''is a strong indication that the use of

the singular was deliberate.'' Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon,

220 Conn. 30, 36 n.6, 594 A.2d 977 (1991). Similarly, we

have held that when statutory language is framed, as

a whole, in the singular, it suggests that the statute

contemplates the relevant terms in the singular. See

Shawhan v. Langley, supra, 344 (''[t]he language of

the statute [regarding an offer of judgment], which is

framed in the singular, suggests . . . that the statute

contemplates one offer of judgment'' [emphasis

added]). In this regard, contrary to the defendant's interpretation,

we do not believe that the legislature would

have used the singular forms of ''a crime'' and ''a definite

sentence'' in § 54-125e (a) to encompass both a single

crime and single definite sentence and multiple crimes

and multiple definite sentences, while limiting the singular

form of ''a period of special parole'' in the same

sentence to exclude multiple periods of special parole.

Furthermore, we disagree with the Appellate Court

majority and the defendant that the phrase ''term or

terms of imprisonment'' in § 54-125e (a) indicates that

the trial court has the authority to sentence a defendant

to multiple terms of imprisonment, but only a single

term of special parole not to exceed ten years. On the

contrary, we, like the state, read the phrase ''term or

terms of imprisonment'' simply to indicate the starting

point for any postincarceration period of special parole.

Section 54-125e (a) contemplates the potential for a

defendant to have been convicted of multiple offenses

and sentenced to multiple terms of incarceration. In

that respect, the statute requires that a defendant be

transferred to the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons

and Paroles only after he has served all of the terms

of incarceration for which he has been sentenced.

Therefore, § 54-125e (a) merely establishes the time at

which an individual will begin serving any term of special

parole to which he has been sentenced, specifically,

only after he has completed any and all periods of

incarceration. The statute does not, as the defendant

contends, indicate that, although the legislature used

the singular terms ''a crime,'' ''a definite sentence,'' and

''a period of special parole,'' it intended the phrase ''a

period of special parole'' to be read in the singular.

General Statutes § 54-125e (a).

A review of the relationship of § 54-125e (c) to other

criminal and sentencing statutes further supports an

interpretation of § 54-125e (c) as limiting a sentencing

court's ability to impose a sentence of special parole

to a maximum of ten years for each offense, rather than

in the aggregate. We begin by noting that our sentencing

statutes are structurally organized per offense, and provide

that a separate sentence shall be imposed for each

offense. See General Statutes § 53a-28 (a) (''[e]xcept as

provided in section 17a-6997 and chapter 420b,8 to the

extent that the provisions of said section and chapter

are inconsistent herewith, every person convicted of

an offense shall be sentenced in accordance with this

title'' [emphasis added; footnotes added]). Section 53a-

28 (b) provides: ''Except as provided in section 53a-

46a, when a person is convicted of an offense, the court

shall impose one of the following sentences: (1) A term

of imprisonment; or (2) a sentence authorized by section

18-65a or 18-73; or (3) a fine; or (4) a term of

imprisonment and a fine; or (5) a term of imprisonment,

with the execution of such sentence of imprisonment

suspended, entirely or after a period set by the court,

and a period of probation or a period of conditional

discharge; or (6) a term of imprisonment, with the execution

of such sentence of imprisonment suspended,

entirely or after a period set by the court, and a fine

and a period of probation or a period of conditional

discharge; or (7) a fine and a sentence authorized by

section 18-65a or 18-73; or (8) a sentence of unconditional

discharge; or (9) a term of imprisonment and a

period of special parole as provided in section 54-125e.''

(Emphasis added.) Section 53a-28 (b) (9) expressly provides

that one of the sentencing options for conviction

of ''an offense'' is ''a term of imprisonment and a period

of special parole as provided in section 54-125e.''

(Emphasis added.) Our general sentencing scheme and

§ 53a-28 (a) and (b), therefore, further support our interpretation

that the limitation on a period of special parole

established by § 54-125e (c) similarly applies per

offense rather than in the aggregate.

Another statute referencing special parole also suggests

that the limitation on a period of special parole

should be read as limited to a single offense. In setting

forth the rules for returning a defendant to the jurisdiction

of the Department of Correction after a special

parole violation, the language of General Statutes § 54-

128 (c) references a single term of special parole in

relation to a single offense for which the person was

convicted. See General Statutes § 54-128 (c) (''[t]he total

length of the term of incarceration [after a person has

been returned to the Department of Correction for a

violation of special parole] and term of special parole

combined shall not exceed the maximum sentence of

incarceration authorized for the offense for which the

person was convicted'' [emphasis added]). Thus, it

becomes clear that, in all references to special parole,

the legislature has related the conviction of a single

offense to the imposition of a single period of special

parole.

Moreover, our statutes that generally address multiple

convictions and the imposition of multiple sentences

of imprisonment provide the trial court with the

authority to determine whether those sentences should

run concurrently or consecutively. See General Statutes

§ 53a-37 (''[w]hen multiple sentences of imprisonment

are imposed on a person at the same time, or when a

person who is subject to any undischarged term of

imprisonment imposed at a previous time . . . is sentenced

to an additional term of imprisonment, the sentence

or sentences imposed by the court shall run either

concurrently or consecutively with respect to each

other and to the undischarged term or terms in such

manner as the court directs at the time of sentence'').

In the related context of probation, however, the legislature

expressly has deprived the trial court of the authority

to impose sentences of probation consecutively.

General Statutes § 53a-31 (a) provides that ''[m]ultiple

periods [of probation], whether imposed at the same

or different times, shall run concurrently.'' (Emphasis

added.) Neither § 53a-28 (b) (9), which provides the

trial court with the authority to impose a sentence of

special parole, nor § 54-125e (c), which establishes the

ten year maximum allowable sentence of special parole,

similarly restricts the trial court's authority to impose

multiple sentences of special parole consecutively,

whether imposed at the same or different times.

It is clear, therefore that, when the legislature intends

to limit the trial court's authority to impose a sentence

of postincarceration supervision consecutively or concurrently,

it has done so expressly, and its failure to

limit, by express terms, the trial court's authority in the

context of special parole indicates that the legislature

had no intention to limit the trial court's sentencing

authority beyond setting a maximum allowable sentence

that the trial court could consider when sentencing

a defendant convicted of an offense.

Our interpretation is further bolstered by the fact

that, contrary to the defendant's contention, an interpretation

of § 54-125e (c) limiting any aggregate sentence

of special parole to a maximum of ten years, rather than

viewing the statute as imposing a ten year maximum

allowable sentence per offense, would lead to bizarre

and unworkable results. Although interpreting the ten

year limitation to apply to an aggregate sentence may

be workable under the circumstances of the present

case, namely, where the defendant was sentenced on

two separate docket numbers for two separate criminal

incidents at the same sentencing hearing after he had

pleaded guilty to those charges pursuant to an overall

plea agreement, we can see bizarre and unworkable

results under the Appellate Court's interpretation when

a defendant is convicted of two (or more) separate

offenses at different times.

By way of example, assume that the defendant was

convicted of the two offenses relevant to this case in

2005 and 2006, respectively, rather than pleading guilty

to those offenses together in 2007. Had the defendant

been convicted and sentenced to ten years of special

parole for his 2005 offenses in 2005, under the Appellate

Court majority's interpretation, it would appear that the

trial court would be unable to exercise its authority

pursuant to § 53a-28 (b) (9) to impose a sentence of

incarceration followed by a period of special parole for

the defendant's 2006 offenses in 2006.9 We do not

believe that the legislature intended § 54-125e (c) to

leave so many questions unanswered. Nor do we believe

that the legislature intended to deprive the trial court

of its authority to impose a sentence of special parole

under § 53a-28 (b) (9) simply on the basis of the timing

of a defendant's multiple convictions.

Finally, although the interpretation of § 54-125e advocated

for by the defendant, along with his proposed

remedy of simply shortening his sixteen year total effective

sentence of special parole to ten years, would yield

a favorable result for this defendant, we do not believe

that, as a general matter, construing the statute to limit

the allowable sentence of special parole to no more

than ten years in the aggregate would benefit the criminal

justice system as a whole. Indeed, the defendant

conceded at oral argument before this court that so

construing the statute might well result in the state

being unwilling to negotiate favorable terms for criminal

defendants in plea agreements for multiple crimes,

which could lead to longer terms of incarceration for

some of those defendants. An interpretation of § 54-

125e (c) that would not only allow, but essentially

require, a trial court to consider and impose a longer

term of incarceration even when an individual meets

the qualifications for special parole, is not reasonable.

We do not believe that the legislature intended such a

bizarre result.

After our careful review of the language of § 54-125e

(c), in the context of §§ 54-125e (a), 54-128 (c), 53a-28,

53a-37, and 53a-31 (a), we conclude that the legislature

clearly intended to provide the trial court with the

authority to impose a sentence of up to ten years of

special parole for each offense for which a defendant

is convicted. We further determine that the legislature

has not expressed any intention to prevent a trial court

from imposing such sentences of special parole consecutively

if it deems appropriate, regardless of whether

such consecutive sentences impose a total effective

sentence of more than ten years of special parole.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court

improperly reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's

motion to correct an illegal sentence.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and

the case is remanded to that court with direction to

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 Pursuant to § 54-124a (j) (1)-1 (19) of the Regulations of Connecticut

State Agencies, '' '[s[pecial [p]arole' means that period of supervision of an

offender ordered by the court to follow a term of imprisonment, subject

to conditions of parole set by the Board [of Pardons and Paroles or its

chairperson], as provided in sections 53a-28 (b) (9) and 54-125e of the

Connecticut General Statutes.''

2 General Statutes § 54-125e (c) provides in relevant part: ''The period of

special parole shall be not less than one year or more than ten years, except

that such period may be for more than ten years for a person convicted of

a violation of . . . subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 53-21 or

section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b or sentenced as

a persistent dangerous felony offender pursuant to subsection (h) of section

53a-40 or as a persistent serious felony offender pursuant to subsection (j)

of section 53a-40.''

3 We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal limited to the

following questions: (1) ''Did the Appellate Court properly determine that

the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to

correct an illegal sentence?''; and (2) ''If the answer to question one is in the

affirmative, did the Appellate Court properly determine that the appropriate

remedy was to remand the case for resentencing, rather than to vacate the

defendant's guilty pleas?'' State v. Brown, 304 Conn. 901, 901–902, 37 A.3d

745 (2012). Because we answer the first question in the negative, we do not

reach the second question.

4 ''The defendant brought the motion pursuant to 'Practice Book Rule 93-

22,' a provision that does not exist.'' State v. Brown, supra, 133 Conn. App.

144 n.2. Both the trial court and the Appellate Court treated the motion as

one properly filed pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22, which governs motions

to correct an illegal sentence. Id. We, likewise, view the defendant's motion

as a motion filed pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22. See generally Oliphant

v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 569, 877 A.2d 761 (2005)

(''[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of

pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties

to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party. . . .

The modern trend . . . is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically,

rather than narrowly and technically. . . . The courts adhere to this rule

to ensure that pro se litigants receive a full and fair opportunity to be heard,

regardless of their lack of legal education and experience . . . .'' [Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]).

5 General Statutes § 54-125e (a) provides in relevant part: ''Any person

convicted of a crime committed on or after October 1, 1998, who received

a definite sentence of more than two years followed by a period of special

parole shall, at the expiration of the maximum term or terms of imprisonment

imposed by the court, be automatically transferred to the jurisdiction of the

chairperson of the Board of Pardons and Paroles or, if such person has

previously been released on parole pursuant to subsection (a) of section

54-125a or section 54-131a, remain under the jurisdiction of said chairperson

until the expiration of the period of special parole imposed by the court.

. . .''

6 In his dissent, Judge Bear disagreed with the majority's conclusion that

the trial court had improperly denied the defendant's motion to correct.

State v. Brown, supra, 133 Conn. App. 160. Relying on the language of § 54-

125e (c), when read in context with § 54-125e (a) and General Statutes §§ 54-

128 (c), 53a-28, and 53a-37, Judge Bear concluded that ''the sentencing court

may sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment and special parole for

each crime upon which he or she is convicted, provided [that] each individual

sentence does not exceed the maximum sentence allowed for that offense,

and that the court has the authority to order those sentences to run consecutively,

even if the aggregate term of special parole exceeds ten years.'' Id.,

165–66 (Bear, J., dissenting). Judge Bear also noted in his dissent that, even

if it were assumed, arguendo that the language of § 54-125e was not plain

and unambiguous, the legislative history of a proposed amendment to that

statute further indicated that the legislature intended the ten year maximum

to apply to each sentence of special parole rather than an aggregate sentence

for multiple convictions. Id., 167–70.

7 General Statutes § 17a-699 (b) provides the trial court with the additional

authority to ''impose a sentence and order [drug or alcohol] treatment . . .

if the court finds that (1) the convicted person was an alcohol-dependent

or drug-dependent person at the time of the crime for which he was convicted,

(2) there was a relationship between the dependency and the crime,

(3) the person presently needs and is likely to benefit from treatment for

the dependency, (4) the person is not ineligible under subsection (a) of this

section [which excludes any person convicted of certain, specified violent

offenses or any person who has been previously ordered to undergo drug

or alcohol treatment from eligibility] and (5) the person meets the criteria

for probation under subsection (c) of section 53a-29.'' (Emphasis added.)

8 Chapter 420b, General Statutes § 21a-240 et seq., provides the trial court

with the authority to impose specified sentences for certain specified

offenses related to controlled substances.

9 It is also entirely unclear what result the Appellate Court majority's

interpretation would yield should a defendant be convicted of a second

offense after he has begun to serve, or already has completed serving, a

sentence of special parole imposed for a prior offense. For example, if we

assume that a defendant had served two years of a ten year special parole

sentence for the prior offense, would the trial court in the second case have

the authority to impose a sentence of two additional years of special parole?

Or, would the first conviction and sentence of ten years of special parole

preclude a future trial court from ever imposing any new term of special

parole?

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and

the case is remanded to that court with direction to

affirm the judgment of the trial court.