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W. Frederick Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Technologies, Inc., et al.

Date: 03-05-2008

Case Number: SC 17792)

Judge: Vertefeuille

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Plaintiff's Attorney: Jeffrey S. Bagnell, Darien, Connecticut, with whom, on the brief, was Steve Horner, Darien, Connecticut, for the appellants-appellees (plaintiffs).

Defendant's Attorney: William Ballaine, Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford P.C., New York, New York, pro hac vice, with whom was
Christopher Fretel, pro hac vice, for the appellees/appellants
(defendants).


Marc Mercier filed a brief for the Connecticut
Employment Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Description:
This consolidated appeal1 arises
out of separate actions2 brought by the plaintiffs, W.
Frederick Ravetto and Raymond Bartko, former
employees3 of the named defendant, Triton Thalassic
Technologies, Inc. (Triton), wherein the plaintiffs
alleged that Triton and the defendant Barry Ressler4
had failed to pay them wages in accordance with the
provisions of General Statutes §§ 31-71a to 31-71i, inclusive.


Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-72,5 the plaintiffs
sought to recover the unpaid wages, double damages,
costs, interest and attorney's fees. Bartko also sought
damages resulting from Triton's failure to repay in a
timely manner a loan he made to the company from
his retirement account. Ravetto's claim was tried to the
court and the parties agreed to have Bartko's claim
decided on the briefs. The plaintiffs now appeal and
the defendants cross appeal from the judgment of the
trial court, concluding that the plaintiffs were not entitled
to double damages and attorney's fees under § 31-
72 and that Ravetto was not obligated to repay the
excess advances on unearned commissions.


In their appeal, the plaintiffs assert that the trial court
improperly: (1) concluded that the plaintiffs were not
entitled to double damages and attorney's fees under
§ 31-72; (2) failed to award the plaintiffs 12 percent
prejudgment interest for unpaid wages pursuant to General
Statutes §§ 31-2656 and 31-72; and (3) failed to
award Bartko damages resulting from Triton's failure
to repay his loan in a timely manner. In their cross
appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly
concluded that Ravetto was not obligated to repay
advances that he had received against unearned commissions
based on the absence of any language in the
employment agreement expressly requiring that
Ravetto make such repayment. We affirm the judgment
of the trial court.


The trial court reasonably found the following facts.
Triton was founded in August, 1994, by Ressler and
others, to develop and market a technology that uses
a monochromatic light source to treat and control bacteria
and viruses in certain fluids. In June, 2000, Bartko
entered into an employment agreement with Triton, in
which the parties agreed that Bartko would be paid an
annual salary of $90,000 for the position of engineering
manager. Bartko began his employment with Triton on
August 1, 2000.


In January, 2001, Ravetto entered into an employment
agreement with Triton, in which the parties agreed that
Ravetto would be employed in the position of vice president
of sales, for which he would be paid an annual
base salary of $110,000. In addition, he would be paid
a commission on product sales to certain industries.
The agreement further gave Ravetto the right to take
a draw against his future commissions during each pay
period. Ravetto began his employment with Triton on
February 1, 2001.


On September 30, 2001, Ressler met with all employees
of Triton and advised them that, due to financial
difficulties, Triton could not meet its payroll. He further
stated that he could not ask the employees to continue
working for Triton because it could not pay them.
Ressler gave all employees the opportunity to resign,
and four employees did so. The remaining employees,
including the plaintiffs, continued working with the
hope that the company would obtain the funds needed
to pay them. Ressler referred to the employees who
continued working without payment as employees who
were working ‘‘on a deferred compensation basis.''


Ressler had told the remaining employees that Triton
would make every effort to obtain funding to pay them,
but he did not guarantee the employees that they would
be paid. The plaintiffs nevertheless voluntarily chose
to remain at Triton and continue working.


On January 16, 2002, during another employees' meeting,
Ressler again reviewed Triton's poor financial position.
He employed a power point presentation during
which he informed employees that Triton could not ask
them to work if it could not meet payroll obligations.
The plaintiffs nevertheless continued working for
Triton.


Thereafter, on March 11, 2002, Ressler convened a
final employees' meeting. Triton issued a memorandum
to all of its employees, informing them that: ‘‘Effective
[immediately], all employees will be furloughed until
further notice. On a person by person basis, we may
ask some of you to provide services on an assigned,
independent contractor basis.'' Bartko continued working
for Triton on a contract basis until March 25, 2002.
Ravetto did not continue his employment with Triton
after March 11, 2002.


Approximately one month later, Ravetto and Bartko
filed separate claims with the state department of labor
seeking unpaid wages in the amounts of $88,356 and
$41,725.32, respectively. The plaintiffs thereafter withdrew
their complaints with the department of labor and
brought these actions in the Superior Court, seeking
unpaid wages, attorney's fees, costs, prejudgment interest,
and double damages. Bartko's complaint also
sought damages for breach of contract for Triton's failure
to repay the $50,000 loan that he had made to
the company.


On March 31, 2004, while the actions were pending
in the trial court, Triton made payments to Ravetto
and Bartko. Triton paid Ravetto his unpaid wages plus
interest, less $40,000 in advances that had been paid to
Ravetto that exceeded his actual commissions earned.
Triton paid Bartko all of his unpaid wages plus interest.


On April 4, 2005, Triton repaid Bartko the principal and
interest on the loan that he had made. Prior to trial,
therefore, the plaintiffs had been paid their wages, and
Bartko had been paid his loan.


After the trial court consolidated the two actions,
Ravetto's claim was tried to the court, and the parties
agreed that Bartko's claim could be decided by the
court on the briefs. The trial court concluded that: (1)
the plaintiffs were not entitled to double damages and
attorney's fees pursuant to § 31-72 because they failed
to establish that the defendants acted with bad faith,
arbitrariness or unreasonableness; and (2) with regard
to the calculation of Ravetto's unpaid wages, the defendants
improperly had deducted the excess advances
over actual commissions because Ravetto's employment
agreement did not contain any express language
requiring him to reimburse the company if the advances
exceeded commissions earned. This appeal and the
cross appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth
as necessary.

I


The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court improperly
concluded that they were not entitled to double
damages and attorney's fees under § 31-72 for the defendants'
failure to pay their wages in a timely manner.


Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that the defendants'
salary deferral plan7 was unreasonable as a matter of
law. The plaintiffs also assert that the trial court's factual
finding that the defendants did not induce the
employees to remain at work without pay was clearly
erroneous. We disagree with the plaintiffs.
Section 31-72 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[w]hen
any employer fails to pay an employee wages in accordance
with the provisions of sections 31-71a to 31-71i,
inclusive, or fails to compensate an employee in accordance
with section 31-76k . . . such employee . . .
may recover, in a civil action, twice the full amount of
such wages, with costs and such reasonable attorney's
fees as may be allowed by the court . . . .'' The statute
provides for ‘‘a discretionary award of double damages,
with costs and reasonable attorney's fees, to employees
who are successful in actions against their employers
for wages due.'' Crowther v. Gerber Garment Technology,
Inc., 8 Conn. App. 254, 265–66, 513 A.2d 144 (1986)
(affirming judgment of trial court awarding double damages
and attorney's fees where employer unilaterally
reduced employee's commission rate despite employment
agreement). Although § 31-72 does not set forth
a standard by which to determine whether double damages
should be awarded in particular cases, ‘‘it is well
established . . . that it is appropriate for a plaintiff to
recover attorney's fees, and double damages under
[§ 31-72], only when the trial court has found that the
defendant acted with bad faith, arbitrariness or unreasonableness.''
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210,
269, 828 A.2d 64 (2003), quoting Sansone v. Clifford,
219 Conn. 217, 229, 592 A.2d 931 (1991).


A


The plaintiffs' claim that they were entitled to double
damages and attorney's fees because the defendants'
salary deferral was unreasonable as a matter of law
presents a question of law. Our review of a question of
law is plenary. A & M Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Guay,
282 Conn. 434, 440, 923 A.2d 628 (2007).


The plaintiffs claim that, as a matter of law, it was
unreasonable for the defendants to permit employees
like the plaintiffs to continue working with the hope
that they could be paid in the future if Triton obtained
adequate funding. The plaintiffs assert that the defendants
were obligated to terminate the employment of
Triton's employees once Triton became unable to meet
payroll because of financial difficulties.


We recognize that the wage statutes were designed
to ‘‘[effectuate] the statutory policies of compensating
employees and deterring employers from failing to pay
wages.'' Butler v. Hartford Technical Institute, Inc.,
243 Conn. 454, 463, 704 A.2d 222 (1997). We cannot
conclude as a matter of law, however, that an employer
experiencing financial hardship that honestly informs
employees that it cannot meet payroll and that does
not promise them that future payment will be made
is acting unreasonably when it allows employees to
continue to work with the hope of future payment. This
is particularly true where the employees are experienced
business people and members of management
who choose to continue working in the hope that their
services to the employer will improve the financial status
of the company. We can imagine circumstances in
which such a choice by employees may inure to their
benefits particularly when the financial hardship is
short-lived and the financial status of the company ultimately
improves. In the present case, we recognize that
Triton ultimately did pay the plaintiffs the wages that
were due them. Determinations of reasonableness are
especially fact bound. See Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford
Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559, 580, 657 A.2d 212
(1995) (citing cases from variety of contexts wherein
‘‘[w]e have consistently held that reasonableness is a
question of fact for the trier to determine based on all
the circumstances''). On the basis of the facts of the
present case, we cannot conclude that the defendants'
salary deferral was unreasonable as a matter of law.


The plaintiffs rely on a series of out-of-state cases to
support their claim that the defendant's salary deferral
plan was unreasonable as a matter of law. We are unpersuaded.
These cases are wholly unrelated to claims for
unpaid wages. For example, the plaintiffs cite National
Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 104 S. Ct. 2948,
82 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1984), which involved an antitrust claim
related to the National Collegiate Athletic Association's
plan for televising football games. The plaintiffs also
cited Dinaco, Inc. v. Time Warner, Inc., 346 F.3d 64, 69
(2d Cir. 2003), which involved a contract claim between
two corporate entities for unpaid debt wherein the court
concluded that the plaintiff entity's reliance on the
apparent authority of an alleged joint venturer of the
defendant entity was ‘‘unreasonable as a matter of law.''


In White v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 807
F. Sup. 1212, 1219–20 (D.S.C. 1992), the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina rejected
the plaintiff employee's claim of promissory estoppel
on the ground that the employee's reliance on a promise
of at-will employment was ‘‘unreasonable as a matter
of law . . . .'' The plaintiffs in the present case also
cited one case from the Appellate Court, Jones v. Ippoliti,
52 Conn. App. 199, 200–201, 727 A.2d 713 (1999),
which involved, inter alia, a claim under the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a
et seq., in a construction dispute. None of these cases
provides any support for the plaintiffs' contention that
an employer's permitting employees to continue to
work voluntarily without current compensation with
the intention of paying those employees in the future
if funding becomes available is unreasonable as a matter
of law.

B


The plaintiffs also contend that the trial court's factual
finding that the defendants did not induce the plaintiffs
to continue working for Triton was clearly
erroneous. The plaintiffs claim, more particularly, that
it was ‘‘logically impossible'' for them to have agreed
to continue working voluntarily without having been
induced to do so by the defendants. We disagree.


Whether the plaintiffs were induced to continue
working is a question of fact. ‘‘Questions of fact are
subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.
. . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there
is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
. . . Because it is the trial court's function to weigh the
evidence . . . we give great deference to its findings.''
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reiner, Reiner &
Bendett, P.C. v. Cadle Co., 278 Conn. 92, 107, 897 A.2d
58 (2006); see Practice Book § 60-5.


In the present case, the trial court set forth its factual
findings and conclusions of law in a written memorandum
of decision. The court noted that in several unpaid
wage cases wherein double damages had been awarded,
there had been evidence that employees were induced
to continue working by false promises of payment. The
trial court then continued, ‘‘[t]here is no such proof in
this case. The defendant corporation simply could not
meet payroll and so advised its employees including
the two plaintiffs on September 30, 2001. Some employees
left immediately, but the plaintiffs voluntarily
decided to remain at work under a ‘deferred salary
plan.' The defendants did not guarantee that the
deferred salary would ever be paid, but only that Triton
would make every effort to do so, which it did on March
31, 2004, with interest. The employer did not induce
the employees to remain at work without pay but told
them clearly that there was no guarantee of payment
if they wanted to remain at work.''


‘‘It is well established that [i]t is within the province
of the trial court, when sitting as the fact finder, to
weigh the evidence presented and determine the credibility
and effect to be given the evidence. . . . Credibility
must be assessed . . . not by reading the cold
printed record, but by observing firsthand the witness'
conduct, demeanor and attitude. . . . An appellate
court must defer to the trier of fact's assessment of
credibility because [i]t is the [fact finder] . . . [who
has] an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses and the parties; thus [the fact finder] is best
able to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to
draw necessary inferences therefrom.'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141,
155, 920 A.2d 236 (2007).


In the present case, the trial court credited Ressler's
testimony, as it was entitled to do. Ressler testified that
he had met with all of the employees, including the
plaintiffs, on more than one occasion and had informed
them that Triton would not be able to make payroll.
Ressler further testified that he had explained to all of
the employees, including the plaintiffs, that Triton could
not ask them to stay if it could not pay them, and that
he had given every employee, including the plaintiffs,
the opportunity to resign. Ressler also testified that the
defendants never guaranteed that the employees who
remained working for Triton would be paid, only that
Triton would try to pay them if it received adequate
funding to do so. Additional evidence before the trial
court demonstrated that Ravetto and Bartko were both
experienced businessmen, who, as vice president of
sales and engineering manager, respectively, sufficiently
were aware of Triton's financial status to understand
that they were not guaranteed payment for their
continued services after September 30, 2001. We must
defer to the trial court's assessments concerning credibility;
see id.; and, therefore, we conclude that the evidence
amply supported the trial court's finding that
the defendants did not induce the plaintiffs to remain
employed. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court's factual finding was not clearly erroneous.


II


The plaintiffs' second claim on appeal is that the
trial court improperly failed to award the plaintiffs 12
percent prejudgment interest on their unpaid wages
pursuant to §§ 31-72 and 31-265. The plaintiffs contend
that those statutes required the trial court to award 12
percent prejudgment interest on the plaintiffs' unpaid
wages, instead of the 4 percent that the defendants
voluntarily had paid. In response, the defendants assert
that the plaintiffs did not raise this claim in the trial
court, and, therefore, it is not preserved for appellate
review. We agree with the defendants.


In their complaints in the present cases, the plaintiffs
included a general claim for prejudgment interest in
their demand for relief. The plaintiffs did not cite any
statute or other authority for their request of prejudgment
interest, nor did they indicate the specific interest
rate that they were seeking. The record and the transcript
of the proceedings demonstrate that the plaintiffs
never raised the issue of prejudgment interest at trial,
in their briefs, or by motion. In its memorandum of
decision, the trial court awarded Ravetto $40,650 in
damages, representing the commission advances and
subsequently subtracted by the defendants when they
calculated his unpaid wages, plus 4 percent interest,
which was consistent with the rate of interest that the
defendants voluntarily had paid the plaintiffs on their
back wages. The plaintiffs thereafter never filed any
motion asking the trial court to award the 12 percent
interest that they now claim it improperly failed to
award.


‘‘Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part that
[t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless
it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent
to the trial. The court may in the interests of justice
notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial
court. . . . Indeed, it is the appellant's responsibility to
present such a claim clearly to the trial court so that
the trial court may consider it and, if it is meritorious,
take appropriate action. That is the basis for the requirement
that ordinarily [the appellant] must raise in the
trial court the issues that he intends to raise on appeal.

. . . For us [t]o review [a] claim, which has been articulated
for the first time on appeal and not before the
trial court, would result in a trial by ambuscade of the
trial judge. . . . We have repeatedly indicated our disfavor
with the failure, whether because of a mistake of
law, inattention or design, to object to errors occurring
in the course of a trial until it is too late for them to
be corrected, and thereafter, if the outcome of the trial
proves unsatisfactory, with the assignment of such
errors as grounds of appeal.'' (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Schoonmaker v. Lawrence
Brunoli, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 265. Accordingly, we
conclude that the plaintiffs failed properly to preserve
this issue for appellate review.


III


The final claim in the appeal is Bartko's assertion
that the trial court improperly failed to award him consequential
damages resulting from Triton's failure to
repay timely the loan that he had made to the company.


Specifically, Bartko asserts that, because the loan he
made to Triton had come from his 401k account, Triton's
failure to repay the loan in sixty days as agreed
forced Bartko to report the withdrawal from his 401k
account as personal income and pay early withdrawal
penalties on the money. We conclude that the record
is inadequate to decide this issue, which was not
addressed by the trial court.


The record reflects the following additional facts. In
2001, after learning of Triton's bleak financial situation,
Bartko offered to loan $50,000 to Triton. On November
1, 2001, Triton executed a $50,000 promissory note,
which was due and payable on December 31, 2001, with
interest at a rate of 5.5 percent per year. Triton did not
repay the loan by December 31, 2001. On April 4, 2005,
Triton paid Bartko $60,035, representing the entire principal
balance plus 5.5 percent annual interest to March
31, 2005.


Bartko's complaint in this matter included a breach
of contract claim against the defendants for their default
on the promissory note and claimed both harm and
detriment resulting from the nonpayment. He briefed
this claim for damages related to the tax penalty in his
posttrial brief. In its memorandum of decision, however,
the trial court stated that ‘‘the only issue in the
Bartko case is whether he is entitled to double damages
pursuant to . . . § 31-72. . . . [Bartko] is not entitled
to such damages.''


‘‘This court recently has reiterated the fundamental
point that [i]t is incumbent upon the [appellant] to take
the necessary steps to sustain [his] burden of providing
an adequate record for appellate review. . . . Our role
is not to guess at possibilities . . . but to review claims
based on a complete factual record developed by a
trial court. . . . Without the necessary factual and legal
conclusions furnished by the trial court . . . any decision
made by us respecting [the appellant's claims]
would be entirely speculative.'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Canales, 281 Conn. 572, 583–84,
916 A.2d 767 (2007).


In the present case, it is unclear from the trial court's
memorandum of decision why it did not award Bartko
consequential damages for Triton's failure to repay the
loan on time. In other words, the trial court could have
failed to award such damages for any number of reasons,
such as factual insufficiency or a legal conclusion
that such damages were not recoverable under the
terms of the promissory note. Alternatively, the trial
court simply may have forgotten to address Bartko's
claim for such damages. See Stone-Krete Construction,
Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 685, 911 A.2d 300 (2006).


‘‘Under these circumstances, the plaintiff should have
filed a motion for articulation to preserve an adequate
record for review. See Practice Book §§ 61-108 and 66-5.9
It is well established that [a]n articulation is appropriate
where the trial court's decision contains some ambiguity
or deficiency reasonably susceptible of clarification.
. . . [P]roper utilization of the motion for articulation
serves to dispel any . . . ambiguity by clarifying the
factual and legal basis upon which the trial court rendered
its decision, thereby sharpening the issues on
appeal. . . . In the absence of an articulation, we are
unable to determine the basis for the court's decision,
and we therefore decline to review this claim.'' (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone-Krete
Construction, Inc. v. Eder, supra, 280 Conn. 685–86.
Because Bartko failed to seek an articulation from
the trial court, we are unable to determine the basis
for the court's failure to address his claim. Accordingly,
we decline to review it.


IV


In their cross appeal, the defendants claim that the
trial court improperly concluded that Ravetto was entitled
to retain the advances paid to him against commissions
that ultimately were not earned. The defendants
contend that the trial court's conclusion was based on
an incorrect construction of Connecticut law. Ravetto
asserts in response that the trial court properly concluded
that he could retain the excess advances because
the defendants did not establish that there was an
express or implied agreement requiring him to repay
the excess advances. We agree with Ravetto.


The following additional facts reasonably found by
the trial court are relevant to the resolution of the cross
appeal. Ravetto's employment agreement with Triton
included a provision for the payment of commissions
on sales of Triton products to certain industries. The
agreement permitted Ravetto to take a draw every pay
period against these future commissions. Once Ravetto
began working for Triton in February, 2001, he began
receiving approximately $2700 per pay period as an
advance on commissions to be earned in the future.


When Ravetto ended his employment with Triton, the
advances that he had taken exceeded the commissions
that he had earned by approximately $40,000. When
Triton paid Ravetto for his unpaid wages in March, 2004,
the company deducted approximately $40,000 from the
wages that it had calculated that he was owed.
At trial, Ravetto claimed that the defendants improperly
had deducted these advances from the back wages
that it owed him. The defendants asserted that Ravetto
was obligated to repay the excess advances under the
terms of the agreement. More specifically, the defendants
claimed that the use of the term ‘‘advance'' in
the agreement established that Ravetto was required
to repay the excess unearned commissions. The defendants
further claimed that because the terms of the
employment agreement were clear and unambiguous,
any evidence beyond the four corners of the agreement
was irrelevant to determining whether Ravetto was obligated
to repay the excess advances.


The trial court concluded that an employee is not
required to repay excess advances unless the parties
expressly or impliedly agree that he or she would do
so. The trial court cited Sutton v. Avery, 132 Conn. 397,
399, 44 A.2d 701 (1945), in support of its conclusion
that an employer is not entitled to reimbursement of
excess advances in the absence of an express or implied
agreement by the employee to reimburse the employer.
The trial court found that ‘‘[t]he written employment
agreement in this case is silent as to whether an
employee is required to pay back excess advances. It
does not contain any express language on reimbursement
of unearned commissions. Ravetto never agreed
to repay advances in excess of earned commissions.
Accordingly, Ravetto is entitled to retain excess
advances and Triton owes him the $40,650 that it
improperly subtracted from the wages paid him . . . .''


We first set forth the appropriate standard of review.
‘‘[T]he scope of our appellate review depends [on] the
proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial
court. To the extent that the trial court has made findings
of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether
such findings were clearly erroneous. When, however,
the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is
plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions
are legally and logically correct and find support in the
facts that appear in the record.'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Kelly v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 281 Conn.
768, 776, 918 A.2d 249 (2007). Because the defendants'
sole claim on appeal is that the trial court incorrectly
construed and applied Connecticut law, our review is
plenary. See id.


On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court
improperly relied on Sutton v. Avery, supra, 132 Conn.
399, in support of its conclusion that an employee is
not required to repay excess advances unless the parties
expressly or impliedly agreed that he or she would do
so. The defendants contend that the trial court's reliance
on Sutton is improper because this court did not
reach a conclusion in Sutton as to the issue in the
present case. We agree with the defendants. In Sutton,
the plaintiff employed the defendant to sell baby chicks
on a commission basis. Id., 397. The parties agreed that
if the defendant's commissions did not cover his living
and travel expenses, the plaintiff would pay him the
difference. The plaintiff and the defendant operated
under this agreement for approximately six months,
with the plaintiff paying the defendant weekly sums
that totaled $387.25. Id., 398. The plaintiff thereafter
sued the defendant claiming that the amounts paid were
loans that had to be repaid. This court concluded that
the defendant was not liable to repay these amounts
because the agreement between the parties ‘‘amounted
to a contract by the plaintiff to guarantee a weekly
return to the defendant of an amount equal to the latter's
minimum requirements for living and traveling
expenses.'' Id. This court later went on to state, in dicta,
that, ‘‘[e]ven if the advances were to be regarded as
sums to be deducted from future commissions, the
weight of authority is against recovery.'' Id., 399. We
agree with the defendants in the present case that,
because this court did not construe the agreement
between the parties in Sutton as providing for advances
to be offset against future commissions, but, rather, to
provide a weekly guaranteed return to the defendant
therein, this court did not decide the issue of whether
excess advances against commissions must be repaid
in the absence of a contractual obligation to do so.


Both parties and the trial court also cite to Valoco
Building Products, Inc. v. Chafee, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 322,
231 A.2d 101 (1966). In that case, the Connecticut Circuit
Court held that an employer could not recover
excess advances against unearned commissions when
there had been no express or implied agreement requiring
the employee to repay such excess advances. Id.,
326. In support of its conclusion, the court cited Sutton
when stating that, ‘‘Connecticut has adopted the majority
rule that, where advances made to a salesman are
charged against commissions earned, he is not required
to pay excess of advances over commissions unless it
has been expressly or impliedly agreed that he do so.''
Id., 323. As set forth previously herein, we disagree
with the court's characterization of Sutton in Valoco
Building Products, Inc., as adopting a general rule
addressing whether an employee is obligated to reimburse
an employer for advances against unearned commissions
when the contract between the parties is silent
concerning reimbursement.


The issue, however, is presented to us squarely by
the cross appeal in the present case. As we consider
it, we are mindful that this issue ‘‘is a matter of policy
for the court to determine based upon competing concerns
in society.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., 267 Conn. 210, 216,
837 A.2d 759 (2004).


A number of courts in other states have examined
whether an employee is obligated to repay advances
that exceed earned commissions. These courts recognize
that whether an employer is entitled to recover
advances in excess of earned commissions generally is
a question of contract interpretation. See, e.g., Shaler
Umbrella Co. v. Blow, 199 Wis. 489, 492, 227 N.W. 1
(1929) (‘‘the purpose [in construing a contract] is to
discover the intent of the parties''). ‘‘Whether or not
money given by a principal is given as an advance and
is to be repaid by the agent in the event that his commission
or other compensation does not amount to the
sum advanced, is dependent upon the interpretation of
the contract between them.'' 2 Restatement (Second),
Agency § 382, comment (d), p. 186 (1958). ‘‘A contract
must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties,
which is determined from the language used interpreted
in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances
connected with the transaction. . . . [T]he
intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and
reasonable construction of the written words and . . .
the language used must be accorded its common, natural,
and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be
sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract.''
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alstom Power, Inc.
v. Balcke-Durr, Inc., 269 Conn. 599, 610, 849 A.2d
804 (2004).


In construing these contracts to effectuate the intent
of the parties regarding excess advances, the majority
of the jurisdictions applies the general rule that if no
express or implied contract for repayment is established,
the employee is not liable to the employer for
repayment of advances that exceed earned commissions.
See, e.g., Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Hendricks, 108 Ga. App. 148, 151, 132 S.E.2d 152 (1963)
(‘‘[a] prerequisite to the right of the principal to recover
the excesses of advances over earned commissions,
under the authorities cited, is the existence of an
‘express or implied agreement, or promise to repay'
such excesses''); Perma-Home Corp. v. Nigro, 346
Mass. 349, 353, 191 N.E.2d 745 (1963) (‘‘we adopt the
rule which appears to prevail elsewhere, that in the
absence of an express or implied agreement to repay
any excess of advances over the commissions earned,
the employer may not recover from the employee the
amount of the excess''); annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 802, 806
(1970) (‘‘the overwhelming preponderance of case law
is to the effect that while the parties may provide in
the agreement for personal liability, in the absence of
language, or at least some evidence, indicative of such
an intention, it will generally be presumed that no liability
was intended, and that the principal's sole source
of reimbursement was intended to be the fund contemplated,
that is, the anticipated commissions, bonus,
or profits'').


In applying this general rule, the majority of these
courts has concluded that the use of terms such as
‘‘advance'' or ‘‘draw,'' standing alone, is not sufficiently
indicative of the parties' intent to obligate the employee
to repay the advances.10 ‘‘It is pointed out that such a
liability on the part of the [employee] does not necessarily
arise from the agreement on the part of the employer
to make certain advancements. To advance does not
necessarily mean to loan.'' Shaler Umbrella Co. v. Blow,
supra, 199 Wis. 491. ‘‘To advance is to bring forward.
Standing by itself it means nothing more than that the
company will ‘forward' to [the employee] this money;
they will take it from their treasury and put it in his
hands.'' North-western Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mooney,
108 N.Y. 118, 124, 15 N.E. 303 (1888); see also Richmond
Dry Goods Co. v. Wilson, 105 W. Va. 221, 225, 141 S.E.
876 (1928) (‘‘without a promise to repay, express, or
fairly to be implied from the agreement under which
the advances were made, a promise to advance money
for a particular purpose - as here, the furtherance of
the defendants' business - does not import an expectation
of its return personally by the person to whom
the money was advanced'' [internal quotation marks
omitted]). We agree with the majority of courts that
the mere use of the terms ‘‘draw'' or ‘‘advance'' in an
employment agreement is not sufficient to establish the
parties' intent that the employee is obligated to repay
the excess advances.


In arriving at the general rule that an employer may
not recover excess advances unless an express or
implied agreement to repay is established, many courts
have reasoned that because the employer usually drafts
the employment agreement, it easily may include language
in the agreement obligating the employee to repay
any advances that exceed commissions. See, e.g., Shaler
Umbrella Co. v. Blow, supra, 199 Wis. 492 (‘‘[w]here it
is the intent of both parties that the [employee] shall
repay the excess of advancements it is a simple matter
to expressly so provide''). ‘‘[I]n an agreement so fully
and minutely defining the duties and contract obligations
of the agent, and the contract rights of the company
. . . [i]t would have been much more natural to
insert words signifying [the transaction between the
employer and employee to be a loan], if it was so
intended, than omit them, and much easier to say
directly that [the employee] assumed a personal liability,
if that were the fact, than to use words which require
an extended argument on the part of counsel to satisfy
a referee or court that such liability, although not
expressed, may be inferred.'' North-western Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Mooney, supra, 108 N.Y. 123–24. We
find such reasoning persuasive.


Similarly, many of these courts have reasoned that,
because the employer generally enjoys superior bargaining
power in the employment relationship, it is
incumbent upon the employer to make any obligation
for reimbursement explicit in the employment
agreement. ‘‘The majority rule is further predicated
upon the obvious reality that the superior bargaining
power of the employer in contracting with an agent or
employee requires the imposition upon the employer of
the duty of making explicit his rights under the contract
agreement, particularly in situations where he demands
the return of previously transferred funds.'' Agnew v.
Cameron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 619, 624, 55 Cal. Rptr. 733
(1967), citing Shaler Umbrella Co. v. Blow, supra, 199
Wis. 489; Joseph Toker, Inc. v. Cohen, 67 N.J. Super.
68, 74–75, 169 A.2d 838 (1961). This court recently has
acknowledged the superior bargaining power of an
employer that enters into an employment contract with
an employee. ‘‘[A]n employer . . . possesses a decisive
advantage of bargaining strength against the . . .
employee. Considering the economic compulsion facing
those in search of employment . . . [t]o suppose
that [an employee] . . . had any bargaining power
whatsoever defies reality.'' (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Brown v. Soh, 280 Conn. 494, 504, 909 A.2d
43 (2006). We agree with this reasoning also.
The majority rule is further based on the rationale
that, when an employee works for an employer on a
commission basis, the employee and employer are
engaged in a joint venture. See, e.g., Agnew v. Cameron,
supra, 247 Cal. App. 2d 624; Perma-Home Corp. v.
Nigro, supra, 346 Mass. 353; Richmond Dry Goods Co.
v. Wilson, supra, 105 W. Va. 224; Shaler Umbrella Co.
v. Blow, supra, 199 Wis. 491; annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 802,
806 (1970). If an employee were to be required to repay
all excess advances when the business did not produce
sufficient commissions to cover the advances, the entire
risk of the joint undertaking would be placed unfairly
on the employee, and such an outcome would be contrary
to the nature of the relationship as a joint venture.
Indeed, ‘‘the employee's undertaking is in the nature of
a joint enterprise with the employer, the main object
of which is the furtherance of the employer's business,
and it is not to be assumed that the employee, in furnishing
his time and ability, likewise assumes all the risk.''
Agnew v. Cameron, supra, 624.


We therefore agree with the majority of jurisdictions
that ‘‘absent a contractual provision expressly holding
[an employee] personally liable for advances, [an
employer] must show that [the employee], by his [or
her] conduct, exhibited an intent to be held personally
liable for the repayment of the advances.'' SDJ Ins.
Agency, LLC v. American National Ins. Co., 292 F.3d
689, 694 (10th Cir. 2002). This rule is consistent with
the ‘‘well settled judicial reluctance to cause a forfeiture
of money already received unless it convincingly
appears that such a result was intended by the parties
. . . .'' Agnew v. Cameron, supra, 247 Cal. App. 2d 624.
The trial court properly concluded that an employer
that seeks reimbursement from an employee of
advances that exceeded earned commissions has the
burden of proving that the employee explicitly or
impliedly agreed to repay any such excess advances.
In the present case, the defendants claimed in the
trial court that the employment agreement was clear
and unambiguous in establishing Ravetto's obligation
to repay the excess advances, and relied on the use of
the term ‘‘advance'' to establish the repayment obligation.
We agree with the trial court and the majority
of other jurisdictions that the mere use of the term
‘‘advance'' is not sufficient to establish an express
repayment obligation.


On appeal in this court, the defendants now claim that
the trial court improperly failed to determine whether
there was an implied agreement between the parties
that required Ravetto to repay the excess advances.11
As we previously have noted, however, the defendants
disavowed any claim of an implied agreement in the
trial court. We therefore decline to consider this claim
on appeal because it was not raised at trial. See Practice
Book § 60-5.

* * *

http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR285/285CR128.pdf

Outcome:
The judgment is affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Unknown
Defendant's Experts:
Unknown
Comments:
None

About This Case

What was the outcome of W. Frederick Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Technologies, In...?

The outcome was: The judgment is affirmed.

Which court heard W. Frederick Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Technologies, In...?

This case was heard in Supreme Court of Connecticut, CT. The presiding judge was Vertefeuille.

Who were the attorneys in W. Frederick Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Technologies, In...?

Plaintiff's attorney: Jeffrey S. Bagnell, Darien, Connecticut, with whom, on the brief, was Steve Horner, Darien, Connecticut, for the appellants-appellees (plaintiffs).. Defendant's attorney: William Ballaine, Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford P.C., New York, New York, pro hac vice, with whom was Christopher Fretel, pro hac vice, for the appellees/appellants (defendants). Marc Mercier filed a brief for the Connecticut Employment Lawyers Association as amicus curiae..

When was W. Frederick Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Technologies, In... decided?

This case was decided on March 5, 2008.