Leslie T. Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

The California Constitution grants voters the power of

referendum, which allows them to approve or reject laws

enacted by their elected representatives before the laws take

effect. But to prevent the referendum process from disrupting

essential governmental operations, the Constitution exempts

certain categories of legislation, including “statutes providing

for tax levies or appropriations for usual current expenses” of

the government. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd. (a).) The

question in this case is whether this exemption applies to

measures setting municipal water rates. We conclude the

answer is yes. Municipal water rates and other local utility

charges may be challenged by other means, but they are not

subject to referendum.

I.

A.

Under the California Constitution, “[t]he legislative power

of this State is vested in the California Legislature . . . but the

people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and

referendum.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.) The powers of initiative

and referendum were enacted as part of the Constitution in 1911

as companion reforms. The initiative power allows voters to

propose new measures and place them on the ballot for a popular

vote. If the measure is approved by popular vote, it becomes

law. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8; id., § 10, subd. (a).) The

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

2

referendum power, by contrast, allows voters to weigh in on laws

that have already been passed by their elected representatives.

Any voter or group of voters that gathers enough signatures can

place a legislative enactment on the ballot for an up or down

vote. A referendum suspends operation of the law until it is

approved by a majority of voters. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd.

(a); id., § 10, subd. (a); see City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey (2018)

5 Cal.5th 1068, 1078 (City of Morgan Hill).) Like the initiative

power, the referendum power applies to both state statutes and

local enactments. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 11, subd. (a) [“Initiative

and referendum powers may be exercised by the electors of each

city or county under procedures that the Legislature shall

provide”]; City of Morgan Hill, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1078; cf.

Elec. Code, §§ 9141 et seq. [extending referendum to county

electors], 9235 et seq. [extending referendum to electors of

general law cities].)

The referendum power is, however, subject to certain

exceptions. These exceptions are spelled out in article II, section

9, which provides, in relevant part: “The referendum is the

power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of

statutes except urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and

statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual

current expenses of the State.” (Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd. (a),

italics added.) Although this section is, by its terms, addressed

to state statutes, the same exceptions apply to local legislation.

(Rossi v. Brown (1995) 9 Cal.4th 688, 698 & fn. 4 (Rossi); Geiger

v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 836–837 (Geiger);

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

3

Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976)

18 Cal.3d 582, 591–592, fn. 7.)1

B.

Several decades after the powers of initiative and

referendum were established in the Constitution, voters enacted

a series of reforms aimed at increasing voter control over

revenue-raising measures. These provisions are of limited

relevance to our decision in this case, for reasons we explain

below, but help to explain the history of this litigation and the

nature of the parties’ arguments in this court.

The series of reforms began with Proposition 13, a ballot

initiative passed in 1978 to cap increases in property taxes and

assessments, as well as other state and local taxes. Then, in

1996, voters passed Proposition 218, which further curbed state

and local government authority to generate revenue through

taxes and other exactions. Finally, in 2010, voters approved

Proposition 26, which expanded the reach of these limitations

by broadening the definition of “tax” to cover “any levy, charge,

or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government,” subject

to several specified exceptions. (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1,

subd. (e); see generally City of San Buenaventura v. United

Water Conservation Dist. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1191, 1199–1200.)

The provisions most relevant here are articles XIII C and

XIII D of the California Constitution (hereafter articles XIII C

and XIII D), which were added by Proposition 218. These



1 Charter cities have more leeway and “may reserve a

broader referendum power to the voters” than is reserved in the

Constitution. (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 698; see also, e.g.,

Rubalcava v. Martinez (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 563, 571.) The

City of Dunsmuir is, however, a general law city.

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

4

articles set out detailed procedural and substantive

requirements for imposing or increasing various types of

government exactions. Article XIII C requires the approval of

either a majority or two-thirds of voters before new or increased

local taxes take effect, depending on the type of tax. (Art. XIII

C, § 2.) Article XIII C also affirms voters’ power to reduce or

repeal local taxes, assessments, fees, and charges through the

initiative process. (Id., § 3.) Article XIII C does not address the

availability of the referendum.

Article XIII D circumscribes state and local government

authority to impose or increase property-related taxes,

assessments, fees, and charges. Under this article, a fee or

charge is defined as “any levy other than an ad valorem tax, a

special tax, or an assessment, imposed by an agency upon a

parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership,

including a user fee or charge for a property-related service.”

(Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (e).) These are commonly referred to as

property-related fees and charges — a category that includes

water service fees. Before levying new or increased fees or

charges, article XIII D requires the relevant government

authority to conduct a public hearing and allow property owners

who are affected by the exaction to submit written protests. If

a majority of affected owners file protests, the exaction cannot

be imposed. (Art. XIII D, § 6; see Plantier v. Ramona Municipal

Water Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 372, 381–382.) In general,

property-related fees and charges must also be approved by

either a majority of affected property owners or two-thirds of

voters. Fees for sewer, water, and refuse collection services are,

however, exempt from this voter approval requirement. (Art.

XIII D, § 6, subd. (c).)

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

5

With this backdrop in mind, we turn to the facts of the case

before us.

C.

The City of Dunsmuir is known for its water. Located on

the Upper Sacramento River, just south of Mount Shasta, the

City draws its water from natural mountain springs and dubs it

the “Best Water on Earth.” The City pumps, stores, and

distributes this water to its residents using a water system that

the City owns and operates. The City pays for this system using

proceeds from monthly water rates paid by the City’s residents.

Like any public utility, the water system requires regular

repair and periodic improvements. In 2014, the City conducted

an assessment of the improvements needed to meet the City’s

projected water needs. This assessment concluded that a

significant number of the system’s aging water main sections

required replacement and that the water storage tank, which is

more than 105 years old, would need to be upgraded “to insure

water pressure and fire protection in major sections of the City.”

As the City explained in a public notice, 50,000 feet of old water

pipes had remained in the ground well past their lifespan, and

an “extremely large number of leaks” pervaded the water

system, leading to regular loss of water and a “continuous need

to decontaminate large sections of water mains adjacent to the

break in the pipe.” The City’s aging water tank likewise suffered

from leaks. The City also commissioned a study to evaluate its

water rates, which were at the time based on a 20-year-old water

plan. The study proposed new water rates that would raise the

funds necessary for the infrastructure improvements.

In early 2015, the City appointed a committee of city

council members and community members to evaluate the

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

6

proposed water rates. (Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir (2018) 29

Cal.App.5th 158, 164 (Wilde).) The committee recommended

new rates to support the replacement of the water storage tank

and water mains. (Ibid.) Plaintiff Leslie T. Wilde, a Dunsmuir

resident, opposed the proposed rates. She has attempted to

block them by various means.

Wilde’s first attempt came in March 2016, when the city

council held a public hearing on the proposed water rates.

(Wilde, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 164, 165.) Consistent with the

requirements of Proposition 218, the City issued public notice of

the hearing and provided an opportunity for residents to submit

objections via protest ballots. Wilde organized the protest effort,

but it yielded only 40 protest ballots — far short of the

approximately 800 that would have been needed to halt the rate

increase. (Wilde, at p. 165.)

The city council thereafter passed Resolution 2016-02

(Resolution), establishing a five-year plan for a $15 million

upgrade to the City’s water storage and delivery infrastructure.

(Wilde, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) The Resolution set new

water rates that vary based on the amount of water used, the

type of residential unit served, and the diameter of the water

supply pipe in place. (Ibid.)

Having led the failed Proposition 218 preadoption protest,

Wilde next attempted to undo the Resolution in two ways. First,

almost immediately after the city council passed the Resolution,

Wilde submitted a petition for a referendum seeking to overturn

it. (Wilde, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) Second, Wilde

gathered signatures for an initiative that would implement a

different water rate schedule. The initiative appeared on the

November 8, 2016, ballot but was rejected by voters. (Ibid.)

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

7

Wilde’s proposed referendum, by contrast, was never

submitted to voters. The City declined to place the referendum

on the ballot, telling Wilde, “The setting of Prop. 218 rates is an

administrative act not subject to the referendum process. Also,

Proposition 218 provides for initiatives (Art. XIIIC, sec. 3), but

not referenda.” In response, Wilde filed a petition for a writ of

mandate seeking to compel the City to place the referendum on

the ballot. (Wilde, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) The trial

court denied Wilde’s writ petition, agreeing with the City that

Proposition 218 allows voters to challenge property-related fees

by means of initiative but not referendum.2



The Court of Appeal reversed. (Wilde, supra, 29

Cal.App.5th at p. 179.) Like the trial court, the Court of Appeal

focused its attention primarily on Proposition 218. The court

noted that article II, section 9 of the California Constitution

(hereafter article II, section 9) exempts tax measures from



2 The trial court also concluded the City’s water-rate setting

was an administrative act, not a legislative one, and therefore

not subject to referendum. (See Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d

561, 569–570 [explaining that the initiative and referendum are

available only to challenge “legislative acts by a local governing

body” and not administrative acts].) The Court of Appeal

disagreed, concluding that the Resolution is, in fact, a legislative

act. (Wilde, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at pp. 172–175.) The City

has not sought review of this aspect of the Court of Appeal’s

decision.

The City also argued below that the issues in this case

were moot since voters had already rejected Wilde’s proposed

initiative. The Court of Appeal rejected the claim (Wilde, supra,

29 Cal.App.5th at p. 164), and the City has not raised the

challenge again here. In any event, we agree that the failure of

Wilde’s initiative does not moot her request to place a

referendum on the ballot.

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

8

referendum, but reasoned the exemption does not apply here

because both parties agreed that the water charges are a

“property-related fee” and not a “tax” under Proposition 218.

(Wilde, at p. 172, fn. 3.) The court rejected the City’s argument

that the water rates must be exempt from referendum because

a referendum would suspend implementation of the rates and

disrupt the City’s ability to provide an essential government

service, explaining that the City could always revert to its old

rates or craft a new water plan. (Id. at pp. 175–179.) The court

remanded the case with directions to the trial court to issue a

peremptory writ of mandate ordering the City to place the

referendum on the ballot in the next municipal election. (Id. at

p. 179.)

In view of the importance of the issue presented to local

governments and ratepayers across the state, we granted

review. Shortly thereafter, a different panel of the Court of

Appeal addressed a similar issue and arrived at a different

conclusion in Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Amador Water

Agency (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 279. The court there held that a

local water agency’s resolution adopting new water service rates

for its customers is exempt from referendum as a tax measure

under article II, section 9 and that the scope of this exemption

was not altered by Proposition 218. (Amador, at pp. 283–286,

304.)

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

9

We reach the same conclusion as the Amador court and

reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeal in this

case.3

II.

A.

Article II, section 9, subdivision (a) provides, as relevant

here: “The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or

reject statutes or parts of statutes except urgency statutes,

statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax levies

or appropriations for usual current expenses of the State.” The

question before us is whether a measure instituting new

municipal water rates qualifies as a tax measure exempt from

referendum.

Article II, section 9 does not define the term “tax.” Wilde

contends that to understand its meaning, we should begin by

looking to articles XIII C and XIII D, both added by Proposition

218. The parties do not dispute that for purposes of the

substantive and procedural requirements established by these



3 For purposes of addressing the merits of Wilde’s claim, the

City asks us to take judicial notice of two documents: (i) the

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association’s “annotation” of

Proposition 218, dated September 5, 1996, as it was reprinted in

the League of California Cities Propositions 26 and 218

Implementation Guide dated May 2017, and made available on

the League’s website; and (ii) the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers

Association’s Proposition 218 “Statement of Drafters’ Intent.”

The request is denied. Neither the existence nor the content of

these documents is relevant to our resolution of the case. (See

Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1147, fn. 5; see also

Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 904; Mission

Springs Water Dist. v. Verjil (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 892, 921,

fn. 6.)

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

10

provisions, the new water rates are categorized as “fees” —

specifically, “property-related fees” — rather than “taxes.” (Art.

XIII D, § 2, subd. (e); id., art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e) [defining “tax”

for the purpose of article XIII C]; see Richmond v. Shasta

Community Services Dist. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 409, 426–427.)

Wilde contends — and the Court of Appeal in this case agreed

— that the same should be true under article II, section 9.

We see no reason why that should be so. We have long

recognized that “ ‘tax’ has no fixed meaning, and that the

distinction between taxes and fees is frequently ‘blurred,’ taking

on different meanings in different contexts.” (Sinclair Paint Co.

v. State Bd. of Equalization (1997) 15 Cal.4th 866, 874 (Sinclair

Paint); accord, e.g., Mills v. County of Trinity (1980) 108

Cal.App.3d 656, 660 [“ ‘Tax’ is a term without fixed definition.

The word may be construed narrowly or broadly depending on

its particular context and the purpose for which the definition is

to be used”].) There is no reason why an exaction cannot be both

a “fee” under article XIII C or XIII D and a “tax” within the

meaning of article II, section 9 (or any other constitutional

provision, for that matter).

The definitional provisions of both articles XIII C and

XIII D begin with the phrase “As used in this article” and do not

purport to apply to other provisions of law. (Art. XIII C, § 1; art.

XIII D, § 2; see Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 205, 213–216 [discussing article XIII D, § 2].)

Nor do the articles contain any other indication of intent to alter

or amend the meaning of “tax” as used in any other

constitutional provision — including the referendum provision,

which predates articles XIII C and XIII D by several decades.

In the absence of such an indication, we presume no alteration

or amendment was intended. (See, e.g., City and County of San

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

11

Francisco v. County of San Mateo (1995) 10 Cal.4th 554, 563; see

also, e.g., Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek

(1990) 52 Cal.3d 531, 540–541 [“Implied amendments or repeals

by implication are disfavored”].)

Wilde asserts we must impose a common definition of “tax”

to harmonize articles XIII C and XIII D with the referendum

provision. But while we have a duty to harmonize constitutional

provisions where possible, this duty does not compel us to graft

the tax terminology of articles XIII C and XIII D onto the

referendum provision when the voters have not chosen to do so.

Wilde points out that, broadly speaking, the referendum

provision’s taxation exception and articles XIII C and XIII D all

concern voter control over government finances. But this is not

reason enough to impose the definition of “tax” from articles

XIII C or XIII D on the referendum provision. The two more

recently enacted articles do not constitute a comprehensive

“revision of the entire subject” of voter involvement in revenue

measures. (City and County of San Francisco v. County of San

Mateo, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 563.) Nor does the operation of

articles XIII C and XIII D depend in any way on whether the

taxation exception covers exactions that are considered “fees” for

purposes of these articles. Even as articles XIII C and XIII D

detail various methods for challenging government exactions —

including voter initiative — neither so much as mentions the

referendum. In the absence of any clear connection between

these two parts of the Constitution, let alone a conflict, there is

no reason to “harmonize” articles XIII C and XIII D with the

referendum provision in the manner Wilde proposes. In short,

the constitutional provisions added by Proposition 218 do not

control whether the water rates at issue are subject to challenge

by referendum.

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

12

B.

We return, then, to the question before us: Is a measure

adopting water rates exempt under the referendum provision as

a “statute[] providing for tax levies?” (Art. II, § 9, subd. (a).)

Again, the word “tax,” on its own, has no single “fixed meaning.”

(Sinclair Paint, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 874.) This was as true

in 1911, when the referendum provision was adopted, as it is

today. Dictionary definitions for “tax” from the turn of the

century reference a wide range of exactions paid to a

government authority for public purposes, including: “a ratable

portion of the produce of the property and labor of the individual

citizens, taken . . . for the support of government, for the

administration of the laws, and as the means for continuing in

operation the various legitimate functions of the state”; “the

enforced proportional contribution . . . levied by the authority of

the state for the support of the government, and for all public

needs”; and “any contribution imposed by government upon

individuals, for the use and service of the state, whether under

the name of toll, tribute, tallage . . . or other name.” (Black’s

Law Dict. (2d ed. 1910) pp. 1136–1137; see also id. at pp. 1138–

1139 [defining “taxation”].) The City’s water rates fit

comfortably with the scope of several of these definitions of

“tax,” if not all of them: Municipal water rates are contributions

imposed by the municipal government upon individuals for a

service provided by the municipality — namely, the delivery of

water.4



4 The use of the word “levy” adds nothing of substance to the

analysis. In its verb form, the term meant to “lay or impose a

tax,” and sometimes, to collect taxes. (Black’s Law Dict., supra,

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

13

Judicial decisions from the time of article II, section 9’s

passage likewise make clear that the term “tax” was understood

to be capacious enough to cover charges for municipal utility

services. In City of Madera v. Black (1919) 181 Cal. 306 (City of

Madera), for example, this court explained that rates charged to

fund the construction of a municipal sewer system qualified as

a “tax” within the meaning of a constitutional provision that

conferred jurisdiction over tax cases to the superior courts. “A

tax, in the general sense of the word, includes every charge upon

persons or property, imposed by or under the authority of the

legislature, for public purposes.” (Id. at p. 310, citing Perry v.

Washburn (1862) 20 Cal. 318, 350, People v. McCreery (1868) 34

Cal. 432, 454.) The sewer charge, we said, “was a charge upon

persons; it was imposed by the legislative authority of the city

of Madera for public purposes, and under these definitions it

was a tax . . . .” (City of Madera, at p. 310.)5



at p. 714, cols. 1–2; see City of San Luis Obispo v. Pettit (1891)

87 Cal. 499, 503 [the words “ ‘assessing and collecting’ . . .

include[d] the operation called levying the tax,” in what was

then Cal. Const., art. XI, § 12].) Wilde notes the term “levy” was

also sometimes used to refer to the seizure of property to satisfy

a judgment or debt, but this is plainly not the sense in which the

term is used in article II, section 9. (See, e.g., Geiger, supra, 48

Cal.2d at pp. 839–840 [exemption for “statutes providing for tax

levies” in art. II, § 9 applies to sales tax measures].)

5 Having assured itself of the lower court’s jurisdiction, we

went on to invalidate the sewer charges because they were being

used to generate general revenue without legislative

authorization to do so. (City of Madera, supra, 181 Cal. at

pp. 311, 313–314.) Wilde argues that the fact the revenue was

being used for general purposes was critical to our

determination that the charges qualified as taxes. But our

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

14

Municipal water rates fall well within this broad

understanding of the term “tax.” Article XIV, section 1, of the

1879 Constitution stated that “[t]he use of all water” was a

“public use” and that water rates were to be set by local

government authorities. (See People v. Stephens (1882) 62 Cal.

209, 233–234.) And in October 1911, in the same election in

which voters approved the right to referendum, voters amended

the Constitution to empower municipalities to establish “public

works” to provide “public utilities,” including water. (Cal.

Const., former art. XI, § 19; see Clark v. Los Angeles (1911) 160

Cal. 30, 47; see also German Sav. etc. Soc. v. Ramish (1902) 138

Cal. 120, 124 [referring to charges imposed to pay for public

works as tax levies].) The provision of water was understood to

be a public purpose, so water rates would have been classified

as “taxes” as City of Madera interpreted the term.

City of Madera does not stand alone. Several cases from

around the same time reflect a similarly broad understanding of

the term “tax” as used in various provisions of California law.

(See, e.g., Yosemite L. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1922) 187 Cal.

774, 783 [reiterating the public purpose definition of “tax” from

City of Madera and concluding that a mandatory workers’

compensation payment to the state was a tax]; cf. German Sav.

etc. Soc. v. Ramish, supra, 138 Cal. at p. 124 [“The power to levy

a tax for general purposes, which shall be a lien superior to all

other liens, prior or otherwise, is not doubted, and it is not

because it is called a tax, but because of its object and the

necessity for raising revenue in order to execute the functions of



opinion says nothing of the sort; it says only that the charges

qualified as taxes because they were imposed for “public

purposes.” (Id. at p. 310.)

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

15

government”]; Wood v. Brady (1885) 68 Cal. 78, 80 [defining a

tax as “a public imposition, levied by authority of the

government, upon the property of the citizen generally, for the

purpose of carrying on the government”]; People v. Parks (1881)

58 Cal. 624, 639 [characterizing drainage and irrigation as a

“public purpose in which the public may be interested” and

explaining that “promot[ing] a public purpose by a tax levy upon

the property in the State . . . is within the power of the

Legislature”]; Engineering etc. Co. v. East Bay M. U. Dist. (1932)

126 Cal.App. 349, 365–366 [“the power of taxation is regarded

as a most important and essential attribute of a public

corporation or utility in order that there may be the ability to

function generally and freely under exigencies and situations

that may present themselves”].)

Based in large measure on this body of precedent, the

Court of Appeal would later opine that other municipal utility

charges, not unlike the water rates at issue here, were subject

to the taxation exception to the referendum in article II, section

9. (See Dare v. Lakeport City Council (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 864,

868 (Dare) [concluding sewer rates are subject to the exception];

cf. Fenton v. City of Delano (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 400, 403–407

[discussing Dare and holding that a city fee on users of gas,

electricity, phone, and cable television utilities was a tax

measure exempt from referendum].)6

Although we are not



6 In Dare, the Court of Appeal concluded that because sewer

rates are taxes under City of Madera and therefore exempt from

referendum under the referendum provision in the Constitution,

voters were barred from challenging new sewer rates by

initiative as well. (Dare, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at pp. 868–869.)

This court later overruled this holding, explaining that an

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

16

bound by these characterizations, they lend further credence to

the conclusion that the water rates at issue here fall within the

range of possible meanings of the term “tax” in the referendum

provision, even if they do not reflect the only plausible

interpretation of the term.

Wilde disagrees. According to Wilde, by the time the

referendum provision was added to the Constitution in 1911, the

law already distinguished between “taxes” and “fees” in much

the same way articles XIII C and XIII D do now, following

passage of Proposition 218. The term “tax,” Wilde argues, was

narrowly understood to refer to a compulsory exaction designed

to raise revenue for general government expenses. A charge in

exchange for a particular benefit or service, like the water rates

in this case, instead would have been denominated a “fee” —

unless, of course, it was excessive relative to the reasonable

costs of providing a service, in which case it would have been



initiative that repeals a tax prospectively is “not the ‘functional

equivalent’ of a referendum.” (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 711,

italics added.)

Wilde asserts that Dare is no longer good authority after

Rossi, even for the limited proposition that sewer rates are taxes

exempt from referendum. Wilde highlights language in Rossi

stating, in passing, that Dare did not involve the “repeal of a

tax.” (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 708.) This was true insofar

as the initiative measure at issue in Dare would have amended

the rates at issue, not “repealed” them. But Rossi did not

address whether the sewer rates were taxes for any purpose. We

thus disagree with Wilde’s suggestion that Rossi rejected Dare’s

characterization of the sewer rates as a tax or casually overruled

the authorities on which Dare relies for that conclusion,

including City of Madera. Rossi simply did not address the

issue.

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

17

deemed a “tax” in disguise. In support of her argument, Wilde

cites various cases that use the term “tax” in a range of

unrelated contexts. (See, e.g., County of Plumas v. Wheeler

(1906) 149 Cal. 758, 761–765 [explaining that a regulatory

business license fee was a permissible exercise of the county’s

police power, not a statutorily prohibited tax for revenue-raising

purposes, as long as the amount of the fee was reasonable given

its purpose]; Fatjo v. Pfister (1897) 117 Cal. 83, 84–85

[invalidating legislation increasing filing fees for county clerk

inventory and appraisal of high-value estates as an

unauthorized property tax]; The People v. Naglee (1850) 1 Cal.

232, 252–254 [charge on foreigners operating gold mines was not

a “tax” within the meaning of constitutional provision

mandating that taxation be uniform throughout the state];

Oakland v. E. K. Wood Lumber Co. (1930) 211 Cal. 16, 25–26

[fee imposed in city’s proprietary capacity for service of

providing wharves for use of vessels was not an unconstitutional

duty on tonnage]; Arcade County Water Dist. v. Arcade Fire Dist.

(1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 232, 240 [allowing water district to impose

water rates on fire district as a “charge for services rendered,”

and rejecting argument that the charge was disallowed as a

“tax” by one governmental entity upon another]; cf. Western

Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury (1915) 170 Cal. 686, 700 [comparing

a mandatory workers’ compensation payment requirement for

employers that had “some of the characteristics of a tax” with a

requirement that an employer pay for an insurance-like

workers’ compensation scheme].)

The law certainly drew such distinctions for some

purposes. But did it draw the same distinction for every

purpose, including for purposes of referendum? None of the

cases says so. Nor do the other authorities on which Wilde

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

18

relies, most of which refer in passing to both “water rates” and

“taxes” without ever suggesting that water rates and taxes were

uniformly considered to be mutually exclusive categories. (See

Henderson v. Oroville-Wyandotte Irr. Dist. (1931) 213 Cal. 514,

532 [noting that the cost of water in a water district included

both “the acre-foot rate charged all water users” and other “taxes

and assessments” without referencing the referendum power];

Shelton v. City of Los Angeles (1929) 206 Cal. 544, 551 [noting,

in the context of a different constitutional provision and a

dispute about municipal authority to incur debt, that even

though a city’s water rates would be used to repay debt issued

to fund the city’s water system, the debt was not being paid

using “moneys derived from taxation”]; South Pasadena v.

Pasadena Land etc. Co. (1908) 152 Cal. 579, 593 [describing a

city’s administration of a public utility as a “proprietary and

only quasi-public” activity in a different context, without

discussion of taxes or fees]; Stats. 1911, ch. 671, §§ 22–24,

pp. 1300–1301 [addressing, in a distinct statutory context,

municipal water districts’ authority to set “rate[s]” to pay

operating expenses and levy “tax[es]” to cover outstanding bond

payments].)7



7 Similarly, the 1948 Legislative Counsel’s interpretation of

the term “revenue acts” in a separate provision of the

Constitution as covering “every kind of tax, fee, or charge

imposed and collected for the support of the State Government”

does not establish that, for purposes of the referendum

provision, the word “tax” could not encompass what Wilde would

categorize as a “fee.” (Ops. Cal. Legis. Counsel, No. 197 (Mar.

15, 1948) Consideration of Revenue Acts at Budget Sessions, 1

Assem. J. (1948 Reg. Sess.) p. 388.)

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

19

C.

Given the wide range of uses of the term “tax,” it is

plausible that the water rates at issue here qualify as taxes for

some constitutional purposes. Whether they qualify as taxes for

the particular purpose in question here requires a closer

examination of article II, section 9. In City of Madera, we

adopted a broad definition of “tax” in light of the purpose of the

jurisdictional provision at issue: “to give to the sovereign power

of the state, whether exercised generally or locally, the

protection of having the legality of any exaction of money for

public uses or needs cognizable in the first instance in the

superior courts alone.” (City of Madera, supra, 181 Cal. at

p. 311.) “In view of this purpose,” we said, “it is apparent that

the words used should be applied in their broadest sense with

respect to moneys raised for public purposes or needs.” (Ibid.)

Likewise here, the proper understanding of the scope of the

taxation exception to referendum requires close attention to the

purpose of the exception.

We have previously explained that “[o]ne of the reasons, if

not the chief reason, why the Constitution excepts from the

referendum power acts of the Legislature providing for tax

levies or appropriations for the usual current expenses of the

state is to prevent disruption of its operations by interference

with the administration of its fiscal powers and policies.”

(Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at pp. 839–840.) Referendum, we have

explained, poses a distinct potential for disruption that sets it

apart from the ordinary legislative process. To give voters an

opportunity to propose referendum measures, all legislative

enactments subject to referendum must wait some period of

time before they take effect. At the state level, all nonexempt

measures must wait 90 days; the Constitution imposes

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

20

additional restrictions on when nonexempt measures may be

passed by the Legislature. (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd.

(c)(1); id., art. II, § 9, subd. (b) [referendum measure may be

proposed within 90 days after the enactment date of the

statute]; id., art. IV, § 10, subd. (c) [“No bill may be passed by

either house on or after September 1 of an even-numbered year

except statutes calling elections, statutes providing for tax

levies or appropriations for the usual current expenses of the

State, and urgency statutes, and bills passed after being vetoed

by the Governor”].)

8

Similar rules apply to referenda at the city

and county levels. (Elec. Code, § 9141 [county ordinances other

than those subject to certain exceptions become effective 30 days

after passage]; id., § 9235 [same for municipal ordinances].) By

contrast, measures that are exempt from referendum may be

enacted at any time and take effect immediately. (Cal. Const.,

art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(3); see Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 703.)

Article II, section 9’s exemptions from referendum reflect

a recognition that in certain areas, legislators must be permitted

to act expediently, without the delays and uncertainty that

accompany the referendum process. All of the exemptions — for

urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes

providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current



8 The same was true under article II, section 9 as it was

originally enacted. (Cal. Const., former art. IV, § 1 [“No act

passed by the legislature shall go into effect until ninety days

after the final adjournment of the session of the legislature

which passed such act, except acts calling elections, acts

providing for tax levies or appropriations for the usual current

expenses of the state, and urgency measures necessary for the

immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety,

passed by a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to each

house”].)

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

21

expenses of the state — are for “measures having special

urgency, a delay in the implementation of which could disrupt

essential governmental operations.” (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at

p. 703.) For this reason, “ ‘[i]f essential governmental functions

would be seriously impaired by the referendum process, the

courts, in construing the applicable constitutional and statutory

provisions, will assume that no such result was intended.’ ”

(Ibid., quoting Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 839; see also

McClure v. Nye (1913) 22 Cal.App. 248, 251 (McClure)

[describing the exceptions to the referendum as “ample enough

to prevent any menace to the public welfare by reason of such

delay incidental to a submission to popular vote”].)

In Geiger, we elaborated on these principles as applied to

tax measures. We held that a statute providing for a system of

local sales and use taxes was exempt from referendum,

explaining that allowing a referendum on these taxes would

hamstring the ability of counties to budget and manage their

fiscal affairs. (Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 840; accord, Hunt

v. Mayor & Council of Riverside (1948) 31 Cal.2d 619, 628–630

[sales tax exempt from referendum].) We later summarized the

principles as follows: “[I]f a tax measure were subject to

referendum, the county’s ability to adopt a balanced budget and

raise funds for current operating expenses through taxation

would be delayed and might be impossible. As a result, the

county would be unable to comply with the law or to provide

essential services to residents of the county.” (Rossi, supra, 9

Cal.4th at p. 703.) An initiative, by contrast, would have no such

effect: Because an initiative does not delay or suspend the

operation of statutes or ordinances, “[p]assage of an initiative

which repeals an existing tax will rarely affect the current

budgetary process of a local government.” (Ibid.)

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

22

These cases explain why article II, section 9 exempts the

sorts of exactions that fall within Wilde’s narrow conception of

taxes — that is, compulsory general-purpose exactions such as

sales taxes and income taxes. Each represents a source of

revenue on which government depends for its essential

operations. But the rationale underlying these cases is not

limited to such exactions. Local governments also depend on

other types of exactions to perform their essential functions, and

subjecting such exactions to referendum would be no less

disruptive to their operations. Here, the City depends on water

charges to provide water to residents and to maintain the

infrastructure necessary to do so. Even the temporary

suspension of a rate-setting resolution would run the risk of

undermining the City’s ability to finance its water utility and

manage its fiscal affairs. The result would be to impair the

City’s ability to carry out one of its most basic and essential

functions. The potential for disruption from subjecting water

rates to referendum is at least as significant as the disruption

that results from temporarily suspending an increase in the

sales tax. (See Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at pp. 839–840.) It

follows from our cases that charges used to fund a city’s

provision of water, like other utility fees used to fund essential

government services, are exempt from referendum.

9



9 The rule we apply here is related to, but distinct from, the

rule we articulated and applied in Simpson v. Hite (1950) 36

Cal.2d 125. In Simpson, we granted a request for a writ of

mandate that sought the removal of a proposed initiative from

the ballot. The initiative would have repealed and replaced a

county board of supervisors’ selection of a site for local

courthouses. (Id. at pp. 127, 135.) As we explained, the

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

23

It may be the case, as the Court of Appeal below observed,

that the City would not be entirely without recourse should

Wilde’s referendum succeed. Perhaps the City could simply

default to its prior rates while it restarts the process of

“study[ing], plan[ning], and implement[ing] a new water rate

master plan.” (Wilde, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.) But the

exceptions to referendum do not exist solely to shield

governments from certain and immediate disaster. From the

standpoint of the Constitution’s referendum provision, the

gradual disrepair of a fundamental government service is as

much a cause for concern as a wholesale shutdown. Leaking



Legislature had required, by state statute, that the county board

of supervisors “provide suitable quarters for the municipal and

superior courts,” and voters could not “nullify th[is] legislative

policy” by way of an initiative. (Id. at pp. 129, 133.) To allow

otherwise would be to permit the use of the initiative or

referendum to “ ‘impair or wholly destroy the efficacy of some

other governmental power.’ ” (Id. at p. 134, quoting Chase v.

Kalber (1915) 28 Cal.App. 561, 569–570.)

The City relies on Simpson for the broad proposition that

the powers of direct democracy are not to be interpreted to

defeat essential government functions. But in Simpson, we

invoked the essential government services reasoning not to

effectuate the express exceptions in the referendum provision of

the Constitution, but to foreclose the operation of the initiative

or referendum where it would conflict with the Legislature’s

express delegation of authority to a local government. (See

DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 776 [describing

Simpson as concluding that “the initiative and referendum

power could not be used in areas in which the local legislative

body’s discretion was largely preempted by statutory

mandate”].) No similar exclusive delegation argument has been

raised here. Nonetheless, for reasons given above, whether

allowing referendum would impair essential government

functions is a critical consideration in interpreting the scope of

article II, section 9’s taxation exemption.

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

24

water pipes and aging water tanks only last for so long. The

City will inevitably need to raise the funds required for the

operation, repair, and upkeep of its utilities, just as it would for

any other essential government service. Waiting to institute

new water rates until a successful referendum runs the risk of

forcing the City to wait too long. The purpose of the taxation

exception in article II, section 9 is to alleviate that risk.

Wilde makes various additional arguments as to why the

water rates should not be counted as taxes for purposes of the

exemption in article II, section 9, but none is persuasive. First,

Wilde argues that the water rates are disqualified because the

proceeds from the water charges are not deposited in the City’s

general fund and used for the general operation of the City. But

into what specific accounts the money goes, and whether it funds

general operations, are not article II, section 9’s concern. It

suffices that the money goes to the City to fund an essential

governmental function — namely, the provision of water. Nor

does it matter, for purposes of our analysis, that water is

sometimes provided by private companies rather than local

governments; when a local government undertakes to provide

water, the rates it sets are exempt from referendum in the same

manner as other taxation measures.

Wilde also asserts that “taxes are no longer protected from

the delay that a referendum election would entail” because they

are subject to preapproval under article XIII C, which requires

any new tax under that article to be approved by either a

majority or two-thirds of voters before taking effect (art. XIII C,

§ 2). The same is true for most fees and charges under article

XIII D. (Art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (c).) Because so many exactions

are already subject to what Wilde calls a “ ‘referendum’ of

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

25

sorts,”10 Wilde argues that there is no reason they should be

insulated from an actual referendum under article II, section 9.

But a preenactment vote does not suspend the operation of new

rates in the same way as a postenactment challenge. Nor, in

any event, is every exaction subject to a preapproval vote; the

water rates at issue here, for example, are not. (Art. XIII D, § 6,

subd. (c).) And at any rate, these preapproval requirements do

not affect our interpretation of the referendum provision that

long predated passage of Proposition 218.

It is true, as Wilde emphasizes, that it is “ ‘the duty of the

courts to jealously guard this right of the people’ ” to the

initiative and referendum, such that ordinarily “ ‘[i]f doubts can

reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power,

courts will preserve it.’ ” (Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v.

City of Livermore, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.) But “when taxes

levied to support essential governmental services arguably are

involved in a referendum, the general rule requiring that

referendum provisions be liberally construed to uphold the

power is inapplicable.” (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 703; see

also Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d 832, 839–840.) That is the case

here.

Finally, Wilde points to a handful of fees that have been

the subject of referenda at various points in time, ranging from

an “oleomargarine fee” on the ballot in 1926 (which sought to

“regulate[] the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine” and



10 “[O]f sorts,” but not in fact. (See Consolidated Fire

Protection Dist. v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers’ Assn. (1998) 63

Cal.App.4th 211, 225–226; see generally Santa Clara County

Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th

220, 247–254.)

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

26

required oleomargarine dealers to pay a fee (Ballot Pamp., Gen.

Elec. (Nov. 2, 1926) summary of measure, p. 6)) to a “plastic bag

fee” put to the voters in 2016 (which would bar single-use plastic

bags and impose a charge on the use of certain bags in stores

(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) analysis of

Prop. 67 by Legis. Analyst, pp. 110–113)). But Wilde points to

no historical practice of subjecting exactions like the water

charges at issue here to referendum. Whether other exactions

were similarly levied to fund essential government functions —

a question we need not answer here — the water charges at

issue are.11 The resolution imposing the charges therefore

qualifies as a tax measure within the meaning of the exception

to the referendum power in article II, section 9.

12

D.

Whether this is the end of the inquiry, however, turns on

another question of constitutional interpretation. Recall that

the taxation exception to the referendum is framed as follows:

“The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or reject

statutes or parts of statutes except . . . statutes providing for tax

levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the State.”

(Art. II, § 9, subd. (a), italics added.) Even if the water rates at

issue here qualify as taxes, Wilde says, they must be taxes “for



11 We do not hold that every government revenue-raising

measure is necessarily exempt from referendum; our holding is

limited to utility fees on which local governments depend to

provide essential services to their residents.

12 We disapprove of Bock v. City Council (1980) 109

Cal.App.3d 52 to the extent it conflicts with our reasoning here.

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

27

usual current expenses” to be exempt from referendum, and

these rates are not.

13

We identified this very issue without resolving it in Geiger.

We noted there that while several cases had “assumed without

discussion” that “tax levies must be for usual current expenses

in order to be exempt from referendum,” there were arguments

to the contrary. (Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 836, fn. *.) We

pointed in particular to a Legislative Counsel opinion dated

June 27, 1947, that had concluded that the phrase “ ‘for the

usual current expenses’ ” did not modify “ ‘tax levies,’ ” based “on

the ballot argument, on contemporaneous construction at the

1913 session of the Legislature, and on the continuous practice

of making state taxes effective immediately regardless of use of

the proceeds therefrom for capital outlay as well as usual

current expenses.” (Geiger, at p. 836, fn. *.) But we left the

question open, explaining that the revenue from the tax

ordinance at issue in Geiger was undisputedly to be used for

current expenses. (Id. at p. 836 & fn. *.) We have not revisited

the issue since. (See Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 730 (dis. opn.

of Mosk, J.).)

Again confronted with the issue in this case, we now

conclude the taxation exception from referendum is not limited

to tax measures “for usual current expenses.” As a very general

rule, we understand a qualifying phrase to apply only to the

word or phrase that immediately precedes it and not to other

words or phrases that appear earlier in a list or series. (White

v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680; accord,



13 Although Wilde did not raise this question in her initial

briefing, we sought supplemental briefing in order to provide a

full response to the issue presented.

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

28

Lockhart v. United States (2016) ___ U.S. ___, ___–___ [136 S.Ct.

958, 963–964].) Under this “last antecedent rule,” we would

understand the qualifying phrase “for usual current expenses”

to modify its immediate antecedent — “appropriations” — and

not the earlier-appearing phrase “tax levies.”

Of course like all such interpretive rules, the last

antecedent rule has its exceptions, such as when the qualifying

language applies just as naturally to the earlier items in a list

as the later items. (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th

735, 743.) But that is not the situation at hand. Here it is far

more natural — and makes far more practical sense — to read

“for usual current expenses” as applying only to

“appropriations” than it does to read it as applying to both

“appropriations” and “tax levies.” Taxpayers typically pay

certain sums to the government on the basis of income, property,

purchases, or services used; quite often, taxpayers have no

guarantee as to how those funds will be deployed, whether for

usual or unusual matters. Even if some exactions may be levied

for a specific purpose identified in advance, that is hardly the

case for all exactions. Governments routinely raise tax revenue

first and allocate it to various ends afterward. Indeed, in the

early twentieth century, some of the largest pools of tax revenue,

often from sources such as property taxes, were not tethered to

specific expenditures. (See Cal. Tax Com., Final Rep. (Mar. 5,

1929) table I-2, pp. 16–17 [listing the major categories of state

tax revenue in 1911]; see also id. at pp. 14–16.) In those cases,

classifying taxes based on whether they are “for usual current

expenses” would have been an unwieldy, if not impossible, task.

The same is not true of appropriations. Legislative bodies

cannot spend money without first designating the purpose of the

expenditure. (58 Cal.Jur.3d (2012) State of California, § 80,

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

29

p. 257 [“In the context of the appropriation requirement of the

state constitution, an ‘appropriation’ is a legislative act setting

aside a certain sum of money for a specified object in such

manner that the executive officers are authorized to use that

money and no more for such specified purpose”]; The Cal.

Municipal Law Handbook (Cont.Ed.Bar 2019) § 5.276 [“A

specific appropriation is an act by which a named sum of money

is set apart in the treasury and made available for the payment

of particular claims or demands. The city may accomplish this

by adopting a budget or passing an appropriations ordinance or

resolution”].) Against this backdrop, the enactors of the

referendum provision would have understood the qualifying

“usual current expenses” language to apply in a straightforward

manner to appropriations measures, which could be

distinguished on such a basis, but would have had no similar

understanding about tax bills.

What evidence exists of contemporaneous understandings

of the referendum provision reinforces the conclusion that the

taxation exception is not limited to taxes for usual current

expenses.14 Most pertinently, in 1913, the chair of the Senate

Committee on the Judiciary submitted a report to the Senate on

the interpretation of the referendum provision. (1 Sen. J. (1913

Reg. Sess.) p. 226.) The chair at the time, Senator Lee Gates,

had helmed the committee that had drafted the referendum



14 Despite best efforts, we have been unable to locate a copy

of the 1947 Legislative Counsel opinion cited in Geiger, which

evidently reviewed various contemporary sources to conclude

that the taxation exception is not limited to taxes for usual

current expenses. (See Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 836, fn. *.)

Our own review of contemporary sources, however, leads us to

the same conclusion.

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

30

provision. Senator Gates’s report described the four categories

of legislation that could take effect immediately upon a twothirds vote of each house, without being subject to referendum:

“Acts calling elections. Acts providing for tax levies. Acts

providing for appropriations for the usual current expenses of

the State. [A]nd urgency measures necessary for the immediate

preservation of the public peace, health or safety.” (Ibid.) The

report stated that “any Act of the first three classes, to wit, an

Act calling an election, or an Act providing for a tax levy, or an

Act providing an appropriation for the usual current expenses

of the State, have in such Act a section substantially in words

and figures as follows: ‘This Act, inasmuch as it * * * shall under

the provisions of [the referendum provision] take effect

immediately.’ ” (Ibid.) In enumerating the exceptions to the

referendum this way, the report made clear that “for usual

current expenses” modifies “appropriations” and not “tax

levies.”15 (See also, e.g., Ops. Cal. Legis. Counsel, No. 341 (Dec.



15 The occasional legislative assertion that a tax bill is

exempt from referendum “inasmuch as it provides for a tax levy

for the usual current expenses of the state” does not alter our

analysis (e.g., Stats. 1913, ch. 596, § 5, p. 1086), since there is no

evidence that these legislative pronouncements constitute

considered constitutional analysis (McClure, supra, 22 Cal.App.

at pp. 251–252).

For the same reason, the language of Government Code

section 36937 does not resolve the inquiry. This provision,

enacted in 1949, lists the types of city ordinances that can take

immediate effect (instead of 30 days after final passage) and

includes ordinances “[r]elating to taxes for the usual and current

expenses of the city.” (Gov. Code, § 36937, subd. (d).) This

language does not affect our analysis. Not only does the

Legislature not have the power to limit the application of the

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

31

13, 1949) Enactment of Bills to Take Effect Immediately,

2 Assem. J. (1949 1st Ex. Sess.) pp. 156–157 [listing the four

categories of legislation exempt from referendum in similar

fashion].)

The California Constitution reserves the power of referendum to voters with specific exemptions for certain kinds of legislative enactments. The City’s water rates, adopted in the Resolution at issue here, fall within the exemption for “tax levies” and therefore are not subject to referendum. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.