In re Anthony Maurice Cook, Jr., on Habeas Corpus

In People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), the

defendant committed a murder at age 16, was tried as an adult

and given a sentence of 50 years to life. He challenged the

sentence as a violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel

and unusual punishment. While his appeal was pending, the

Legislature enacted Penal Code1

sections 3051 and 4801 to

provide a parole hearing during the 25th year of incarceration

for certain juveniles sentenced as adults. Because Franklin was

eligible for such a hearing, we held that his Eighth Amendment

challenge was rendered moot, and affirmed his sentence.

(Franklin, at pp. 280, 286.) We also held that sections 3051 and

4801 contemplated “that information regarding the juvenile

offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the

offense will be available at a youth offender parole hearing to

facilitate” consideration by the Board of Parole Hearings

(Board). (Franklin, at p. 283.) Because assembling such

information was “typically a task more easily done at or near the

time of the juvenile’s offense” (ibid.), we remanded the case to

the trial court to give Franklin a chance to “put on the record

the kinds of information that sections 3051 and 4801 deem

relevant at a youth offender parole hearing” (id. at p. 284). We

authorized the trial court to receive “any documents,



1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the

Penal Code.

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

2

evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that

may be relevant at [Franklin’s] eventual youth offender parole

hearing.” (Ibid.)

Franklin involved a direct appeal. The question here is

whether a sentenced prisoner whose conviction is final can seek

the remedy of evidence preservation and, if so, by what means.

We conclude that offenders with final convictions may file a

motion in the trial court for that purpose, under the authority of

section 1203.01. That statute provides that, postjudgment, the

trial court may generate, collect, and transmit information

about the defendant and the crime to the Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation. The statute specifically

mentions statements prepared by the court, prosecutor, defense

counsel, and investigating law enforcement agency. But the

court has inherent authority under Code of Civil Procedure

section 187 to authorize additional evidence preservation

consistent with our holding in Franklin. Because section

1203.01 provides an adequate remedy at law to preserve

evidence of youth-related factors, resort to a petition for writ of

habeas corpus is unnecessary, at least in the first instance.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2007, Anthony Cook, Jr., was convicted of two counts of

first degree murder and one count of premeditated attempted

murder, with findings that he personally and intentionally

discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death.2



Cook was 17 years old when he committed the offenses. He was

sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for the attempted



2 Sections 187, subdivision (a), 664, 12022.53, subdivision

(d).

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

3

murder, and five consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the

murders and enhancements. The judgment was affirmed on

appeal.

In 2014, Cook filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

challenging his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment

under the Eighth Amendment and Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567

U.S. 460 (Miller). The Court of Appeal held that Cook’s sentence

was constitutional because newly enacted sections 3051 and

4801 entitled him to a parole hearing during his 25th year of

incarceration. Accordingly, it denied the writ, and Cook

petitioned for review.

While Cook’s petition was pending, we decided Franklin,

supra, 63 Cal.4th 261. Thereafter, we granted Cook’s petition

for review and transferred the case to the Court of Appeal with

directions to vacate its decision and consider whether, in light of

Franklin, Cook was “entitled to make a record before the

superior court of ‘mitigating evidence tied to his youth.’ ” (In re

Cook, S234512, Supreme Ct. Mins., July 13, 2016.)

On remand, the Court of Appeal held that Cook was

entitled to such a proceeding. (In re Cook (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th

393, 398–399, review granted Apr. 12, 2017, S240153.) The

court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that habeas

corpus relief was not available because Franklin’s remand

procedure was not based on an underlying illegality or unlawful

restraint as would be necessary to exercise habeas jurisdiction.

(Id. at pp. 399–400.) It reasoned: “A previously convicted

defendant may obtain relief by habeas corpus when changes in

case law expanding a defendant’s rights are given retroactive

effect.” (Id. at p. 399.) Accordingly, the court held that “the

deprivation of the rights granted by Franklin is cognizable on

habeas corpus” and that the “appropriate remedy . . . is to

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

4

remand the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct

a hearing at which [Cook] will have the opportunity to make

such a record.” (Id. at p. 400.)

We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review,

and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Scope of Franklin’s Holding

Whether juvenile offenders with final convictions are

entitled to a Franklin evidence preservation proceeding turns on

the scope of Franklin’s holding. The Attorney General would

have us limit entitlement to defendants sentenced after

Franklin and to cases pending on direct appeal when Franklin

was decided. He points out that Franklin did not find an

illegality in the juvenile’s sentence. Instead, the remand

procedure was based on a statutory change in the law providing

for juvenile parole hearings. The Attorney General cites the

presumption that, in the face of legislative silence, an amended

statute applies only to defendants whose judgments are not yet

final. (Citing People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323; In re

Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–748.) He urges the authority

for the remand in Franklin logically derived from (1) the

procedural mechanisms available to the trial court to compile a

relevant record at the sentencing stage of an open criminal

action (§ 1204; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.437; see Franklin,

supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284); (2) this court’s inherent supervisory

authority over criminal trial procedure (see Tide Water Assoc.

Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 815, 825 (Tide

Water)); and (3) our authority on direct appeal to remand a

criminal case “to the trial court for such further proceedings as

may be just under the circumstances” (§ 1260). The Attorney

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

5

General maintains that neither a trial nor reviewing court can

authorize a proceeding of the scope contemplated in Franklin

once the appeal has concluded and the conviction is final.

It is true that Franklin did not declare the juvenile’s

sentence unlawful. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 278–281,

284.) Rather, we concluded that “[s]ection 3051 . . . effectively

reforms the parole eligibility date of a juvenile offender’s

original sentence so that the longest possible term of

incarceration before parole eligibility is 25 years.” (Id. at p. 281.)

“[T]he combined operation of section 3051, section 3046,

subdivision (c), and section 4801 means that Franklin is now

serving a life sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity

for release during his 25th year of incarceration. Such a

sentence is neither [life without parole] nor its functional

equivalent.” (Id. at pp. 279–280.) Accordingly, Franklin was

“not subject to a sentence that presumes his incorrigibility; by

operation of law, he is entitled to a parole hearing and possible

release after 25 years of incarceration.” (Id. at p. 281.) Under

our interpretation of the statutes, “Franklin’s two consecutive

25-year-to-life sentences remain valid, even though section

3051, subdivision (b)(3) has altered his parole eligibility date by

operation of law . . . .” (Id. at p. 284, italics added.) “By simply

transforming the affected sentences to life with parole terms,

[section 3051] avoid[s] the Miller issues associated with the

earlier sentences.” (In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1054

(Kirchner).) In the words of the high court: “Giving Miller

retroactive effect . . . does not require States to relitigate

sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile

offender received mandatory life without parole. A State may

remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide

offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

6

resentencing them.” (Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S.

__ [136 S.Ct. 718, 736] (Montgomery).)

The Attorney General understates the significance of

Franklin’s evidence preservation function in the statutory

scheme. The Legislature’s intent in enacting sections 3051 and

4801 was “ ‘to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that

provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she

committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release’ ” upon

a showing of maturation and rehabilitation. (Franklin, supra,

63 Cal.4th at p. 277, quoting Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.) Franklin

authorized postjudgment proceedings to effectuate that intent.

A Franklin proceeding gives “an opportunity for the parties to

make an accurate record of the juvenile offender’s

characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so

that the Board, years later, may properly discharge its

obligation to ‘give great weight to’ youth-related factors (§ 4801,

subd. (c)) in determining whether the offender is ‘fit to rejoin

society’ . . . .” (Franklin, at p. 284.)3

At the proceeding, “the



3 Franklin processes are more properly called “proceedings”

rather than “hearings.” A hearing generally involves definitive

issues of law or fact to be determined with a decision rendered

based on that determination. (People v. Pennington (1967) 66

Cal.2d 508, 521; see generally Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19

Cal.4th 1232, 1247; Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 836, col.

1.) A proceeding is a broader term describing the form or

manner of conducting judicial business before a court. (See

generally The Recorder v. Commission on Judicial Performance

(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 258, 270–272; People v. Gutierrez (1986)

177 Cal.App.3d 92, 99–100; Black’s Law Dict., supra, p. 1398,

col. 1.) While a judicial officer presides over a Franklin

proceeding and regulates its conduct, the officer is not called

upon to make findings of fact or render any final determination

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

7

court may receive submissions and, if appropriate, testimony

pursuant to procedures set forth in section 1204 and rule 4.437

of the California Rules of Court, and subject to the rules of

evidence. [The defendant] may place on the record any

documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to crossexamination)

that may be relevant at his eventual youth

offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put

on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile

offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears

on the influence of youth-related factors.” (Franklin, at p. 284.)

We recently explained the role a Franklin proceeding

plays in the youth offender parole process. In People v.

Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123 (Rodriguez), the Court of

Appeal declined to remand the case to the trial court, reasoning

that the defendant had a “ ‘ “sufficient opportunity” ’ ” at the

original sentencing hearing to make a record. (Id. at p. 1131.)

We disagreed and held that Rodriguez was “entitled to remand

for an opportunity to supplement the record with information

relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.

Although a defendant sentenced before the enactment of Senate

Bill No. 260 [(2013–2014 Reg. Sess.)] could have introduced such

evidence through existing sentencing procedures, he or she

would not have had reason to know that the subsequently

enacted legislation would make such evidence particularly

relevant in the parole process. Without such notice, any

opportunity to introduce evidence of youth-related factors is not

adequate in light of the purpose of Senate Bill No. 260.” (Ibid.)



at the proceeding’s conclusion. Parole determination are left to

the Board.

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

8

Nothing about the remands in Franklin and Rodriguez

was dependent on the nonfinal status of the juvenile offender’s

conviction. On the contrary, “[t]he statutory text makes clear

that the Legislature intended youth offender parole hearings to

apply retrospectively, that is, to all eligible youth offenders

regardless of the date of conviction.” (Franklin, supra, 63

Cal.4th at p. 278, italics added.) By a parity of reasoning, an

evidence preservation process should apply to all youthful

offenders now eligible for such a parole hearing. As Franklin

emphasized, the possibility that relevant evidence will be lost

may increase as years go by. (Id. at pp. 283–284.) This reality

is no less true for offenders whose convictions are final on direct

appeal.

Nor were the remands in Franklin and Rodriguez

dependent on this court’s authority under section 1260 to

resolve a factual issue affecting the validity of the judgment.

(See People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 818–819 [citing

cases].) Rather, a Franklin proceeding is unrelated to the

validity of the defendant’s sentence. Neither the entitlement to

a youth offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation

process “disturb[s] the finality of state convictions.”

(Montgomery, supra, 577 U.S. at p. __ [136 S.Ct. at p. 736].) It

follows that nothing in that proceeding depends on the pendency

of a direct appeal challenging the judgment or this court’s

remand authority under section 1260. Consistent with this

view, Cook confirmed at oral argument that he does not seek to

attack the validity of his judgment, which is final.

Accordingly, we hold that an offender entitled to a hearing

under sections 3051 and 4801 may seek the remedy of a

Franklin proceeding even though the offender’s sentence is

otherwise final.

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

9

B. Section 1203.01 Provides an Adequate Remedy at Law in

the First Instance To Conduct a Postjudgment Evidence

Preservation Proceeding in the Trial Court

A question remains. How does a juvenile offender with a

final conviction gain access to the trial court for an evidence

preservation proceeding? We have explained that “ ‘[t]here is no

statutory authority for a trial court to entertain a postjudgment

motion that is unrelated to any proceeding then pending before

the court. [Citation.] Indeed, a motion is not an independent

remedy. It is ancillary to an on-going action and “ ‘implies the

pendency of a suit between the parties and is confined to

incidental matters in the progress of the cause. As the rule is

sometimes expressed, a motion relates to some question

collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with,

and dependent on, the principal remedy.’ ” [Citation.] In most

cases, after the judgment has become final, there is nothing

pending to which a motion may attach.’ ” (People v. Picklesimer

(2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337 (Picklesimer), quoting Lewis v.

Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 70, 76–77.)

Cook sought a writ of habeas corpus and the parties

vigorously debate the propriety of that remedy. The Attorney

General argues that the remand procedure contemplated in

Franklin was not necessary to cure an underlying illegality in

the juvenile’s sentence. Rather, he urges, it is an evidencegathering

procedure designed to implement the new parole

provisions in section 3051 by reopening youthful offenders’

sentencing hearings, allowing them to build a more robust

record of their characteristics and circumstances related to the

offense for later use at a parole hearing. Here, the Attorney

General reasons that, “absent any underlying unlawful

restraint or illegal sentence, habeas corpus would not

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

10

historically lie to reopen a sentencing hearing in a long final case

in order to supplement a record.”

Cook counters that depriving him of an opportunity to

make a record in the trial court amounts to an unlawful

custodial restraint cognizable on habeas corpus. According to

Cook, a Franklin proceeding is necessary to effectively cure the

unconstitutionality of his sentence under Miller, and to carry

out the statutory mandate of section 4801, subdivision (c) that

the Board “shall give great weight to the diminished culpability

of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth,

and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the

prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” He argues that

the writ of habeas corpus is a proper vehicle to oversee the

operation of the parole system.

Our state Constitution guarantees the right to habeas

corpus. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 11; In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th

428, 449.) The availability of the writ is implemented by section

1473, subdivision (a), which provides: “A person unlawfully

imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any

pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into

the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint.” (See also

People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1068.) “ ‘[I]t is well

settled that the writ of habeas corpus does not afford an allinclusive

remedy available at all times as a matter of right. It

is generally regarded as a special proceeding. “Where one

restrained pursuant to legal proceedings seeks release upon

habeas corpus, the function of the writ is merely to determine

the legality of the detention by an inquiry into the question of

jurisdiction and the validity of the process upon its face, and

whether anything has transpired since the process was issued

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

11

to render it invalid.” ’ ” (Villa, at pp. 1068–1069, quoting In re

Fortenbury (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 284, 289.)

We need not decide if the writ of habeas corpus is

expansive enough to afford Cook the relief he seeks. Cook has a

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law that makes resort to

habeas corpus unnecessary, at least in the first instance. (In re

Gandolfo (1984) 36 Cal.3d 889, 899–900; see generally,

Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1052, and cases cited; 6 Witkin

& Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Writs, §

25, pp. 630–631.) In cases with final judgments, section 1203.01

gives the trial court authority to conduct an evidence

preservation proceeding as envisioned in Franklin.

Under section 1203.01, the trial court may create a

postjudgment record for the benefit of the Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation. Specifically, subdivision (a)

provides: “Immediately after judgment has been pronounced,

the judge and the district attorney, respectively, may cause to

be filed with the clerk of the court a brief statement of their

views respecting the person convicted or sentenced and the

crime committed, together with any reports the probation officer

may have filed relative to the prisoner. The judge and district

attorney shall cause those statements to be filed if no probation

officer’s report has been filed. The attorney for the defendant

and the law enforcement agency that investigated the case may

likewise file with the clerk of the court statements of their views

respecting the defendant and the crime of which he or she was

convicted.” (§ 1203.01, subd. (a).) Thereafter, the clerk of the

court must mail copies of the statements and reports to the

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (ibid.), providing

information to assist effective administration of the law (see In

re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal.3d 639, 650).

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

12

The purpose of section 1203.01 parallels that of a Franklin

proceeding. As we explained in Franklin, the statutes

“contemplate that information regarding the juvenile offender’s

characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense will

be available at a youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the

Board’s consideration.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 283.)

A Franklin proceeding serves that purpose. (Id. at p. 284.)

Further, recognizing the court’s authority under section 1203.01

to gather youth offender evidence effectuates sections 3051 and

4801.

Section 1203.01, subdivision (a) does specify that any

statements by the judge and prosecutor should be filed

“[i]mmediately after judgment has been pronounced.” As

California Rules of Court, rule 4.480 explains, a section 1203.01

statement “should be submitted no later than two weeks after

sentencing so that it may be included in the official Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Adult Operations

case summary that is prepared during the time the offender is

being processed at the Reception-Guidance Center of the

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . .” There is no

indication, however, that the statute’s requirement deprives the

court of authority to act at a later time. (See People v. Duran

(1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 35, 37.)

Section 1203.01, subdivision (a) also uses permissive

language: If a probation report is filed, the judge, the district

attorney, defense counsel, and the investigative law

enforcement agency “may” cause statements about the offender

and the offense to be filed with the clerk. But it would be

improper for the court to preclude a juvenile offender’s chance

to supplement the record with information relevant to his

eventual youth offender parole hearing. We recently

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

13

emphasized that point in Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th 1123.

There, the Court of Appeal rejected the juvenile offender’s

request to remand the case under Franklin, reasoning that

“ ‘[i]nformation from the probation reports prepared for both

defendants, the juvenile fitness hearing reports, their pretrial

statements to officers, as well as what was provided at the

sentencing hearings, would all be available for consideration at

the youth offender parole hearing.’ ” (Id., at p. 1131.) We

concluded that, without prior notice of Senate Bill No. 260

(2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) and the Franklin process, “any

opportunity to introduce evidence of youth-related factors is not

adequate in light of the purpose of Senate Bill No. 260.”

(Rodriguez, at p. 1131.) Accordingly, we held that the juvenile

offender was “entitled to remand for an opportunity to

supplement the record with information relevant to his eventual

youth offender parole hearing.” (Ibid.)

At oral argument, the Attorney General agreed section

1203.01 authorizes the court to receive postjudgment

submissions for transmission to the Board and opined the

statute was “the most elegant way to cut the Gordian knot in

this case.” But he has also emphasized the limited scope of the

remedy, observing that “the ‘brief statement’ provisions of

section 1203.01 bear little resemblance to the adversarial

proceedings articulated in Franklin.” To be sure, section

1203.01, enacted in 1947, did not anticipate our 2016 Franklin

decision. Nonetheless, “[c]ourts have inherent power, as well as

power under section 187[4] of the Code of Civil Procedure, to



4 Code of Civil Procedure section 187 provides: “When

jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

14

adopt any suitable method of practice, both in ordinary actions

and special proceedings, if the procedure is not specified by

statute or by rules adopted by the Judicial Council. It is not only

proper but at times may be necessary for a court to follow

provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which are harmonious

with the objects and purposes of the proceeding although those

provisions are not specifically made applicable by the statute

which creates the proceeding.” (Tide Water, supra, 43 Cal.2d at

p. 825, fn. omitted.) While section 1203.01 does not mention a

Franklin proceeding to preserve evidence, neither does it

prohibit one.

People v. Superior Court (Morales) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523 is

instructive. That case considered whether the superior court

had jurisdiction to grant a motion to preserve evidence in

anticipation of a future hearing for postconviction discovery

under section 1054.9 in certain habeas corpus proceedings.

(Morales, at p. 526.) We concluded that the granting of such a

motion came within the trial court’s inherent authority under

Code of Civil Procedure section 187 to facilitate its discovery

jurisdiction. (Morales, at pp. 531–532.) We rejected the

Attorney General’s argument that section 1054.9 established an

exclusive procedure that excluded preservation motions,

labeling that interpretation of Code of Civil Procedure section

187 “unduly narrow in this context.” (Morales, at p. 532.)

Section 1054.9 simply did not speak to the situation where a



statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means

necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise

of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically

pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or

mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most

conformable to the spirit of this code.”

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

15

condemned inmate is prevented from filing a postconviction

discovery motion because he lacks counsel. (Morales, at p. 532.)

Accordingly, we concluded that trial courts, which have

jurisdiction to grant a condemned inmate’s motion for

postconviction discovery, “have the inherent power to protect

that jurisdiction by entertaining motions for the preservation of

evidence that will ultimately be subject to discovery under that

statute when the movant is appointed habeas corpus counsel.”

(Id. at p. 533.)

People v. Hyde (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 97 is similar. After

his conviction became final, Hyde filed a motion in the trial court

for an award of presentence custody credits, relying on recent

case authority entitling him to such credit. (Id. at pp. 99–100.)

The trial court denied the motion in a manner suggesting that

it lacked jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 99, fn. 2.) The Court of Appeal

reversed. It noted that the defendant was not seeking to amend

a final judgment; rather he was requesting that the court

“supplement its judgment and advise the Adult Authority of a

simple fact (how much presentence time in custody he has been

subjected to) in an official and authentic manner so that the

Adult Authority can take that action which the statutory law

(and the constitutional principles applicable thereto) obligates it

to take.” (Id. at p. 100.) Nonetheless, “[n]o precise statutory

remedy” was available to solve the problem. (Id. at p. 101.) The

court concluded that, although the Adult Authority ultimately

had responsibility for the custody credit calculations, “[t]here

must be a judicial process by which disputed facts may be

resolved when the defendant and the Adult Authority are

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

16

unable to agree on the correct answer.” (Ibid.)5

Relying on Code

of Civil Procedure sections 128 and 187, the court held that the

disputed question may be presented, on noticed motion, to the

sentencing court which possessed the necessary information.

(Hyde, at pp. 102–103.)

Although the circumstances of Morales and Hyde differ in

some respects from the case before us, their logic is persuasive.

Section 1203.01, augmented by the court’s inherent authority to

craft necessary procedures under Code of Civil Procedure

section 187, authorizes it to preserve evidence as promptly as

possible for future use by the Board. Transmission of that

record to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, in

turn, enables the Board to “discharge its obligation to ‘give great

weight to’ youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in

determining whether the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ . . . .”

(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.)

Our recent decision in Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1040,

does not compel a different result. There, a juvenile offender

filed a habeas corpus petition requesting resentencing because

the court did not give due consideration to the factors laid out in

Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460. (Kirchner, at pp. 1042–1043.)

Unlike this case, the petitioner in Kirchner did not qualify for a

later youth offender parole hearing. (Id. at p. 1049, fn. 4.)

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal denied habeas relief,

reasoning that the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law

under section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) (hereafter section



5 Section 2900.5 was subsequently amended to require the

trial court to calculate presentence custody credits. (See People

v. Mendoza (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 948, 951–952.)

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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

17

1170(d)(2)), which authorized recall of the sentence and

resentencing. (Kirchner, at p. 1043.)

We disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion,

observing, “Section 1170(d)(2) was not designed to address

Miller error, and its recall of sentence and resentencing

procedure is not well suited to remedy the constitutional error

of which petitioner complains.” (Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p.

1043.) Under the express terms of the statute, some juveniles

were categorically excluded from its reach without regard to

whether their sentences comported with Miller. (Id. at pp. 1049,

1053.) Eligible juveniles were required to submit a petition

describing their remorse, relating their efforts at rehabilitation,

and stating that at least one of four qualifying circumstances

applies. (Id. at pp. 1049 & fn. 6, 1053.) The sentencing court

was required to find at least one of these circumstances true by

a preponderance of the evidence before resentencing the minor.

(Id. at pp. 1050, 1053.) Finally, in considering the propriety of

resentencing, the court “ ‘may consider’ a set of enumerated

factors, which only partially overlap with those identified in

Miller.” (Id. at p. 1054.) Reviewing these criteria, we concluded

that section 1170(d)(2) did not provide an adequate remedy at

law for Miller error: “as a process designed to revisit lawful

sentences of life without parole, section 1170(d)(2) limits the

availability of resentencing under its terms, and the

resentencing inquiry it prescribes does not necessarily account

for the full array of Miller factors in the manner that a proper

resentencing under Miller would.” (Kirchner, at p. 1043.)

Kirchner is distinguishable. Cook is not seeking a

resentencing, but instead a chance to create a record relevant to

a parole hearing. Further, in Kirchner, both the express

language and legislative intent behind section 1170(d)(2) were

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

18

so specific as to preclude an effective Miller resentencing.

(Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1043, 1055.) No similar hurdle

blocks access to a Franklin proceeding under the authority of

section 1203.01, augmented as necessary by Code of Civil

Procedure section 187. In fact, section 1203.01’s framework

provides a more flexible, efficient, and suitable means of

collecting information for the benefit of the Board than the rigid

requirements of habeas corpus.

In exercising habeas jurisdiction, the courts “ ‘must abide

by the procedures set forth in . . . sections 1473 through 1508.’ ”

(People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 737, quoting Adoption of

Alexander S. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 857, 865.) Those procedures

include a petition alleging unlawful restraint, naming the

custodian, and specifying the facts on which the claim is based.

The petition must be verified and include reasonably available

documentary evidence supporting the claims. (§§ 1474–1475;

People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474; Romero, at p. 737.)

It must state whether any prior application has been made and

the result of those proceedings, and must allege that the petition

is timely or demonstrate good cause for delay. (§ 1475; In re

Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780–781, 805; In re Clark (1993)

5 Cal.4th 750, 783, 798, fn. 35.) When presented with a habeas

petition, the court must assess whether it states a prima facie

case for relief and whether the stated claims are procedurally

barred. (Romero, at p. 737.) If the petition meets these

requirements, the court must issue a writ of habeas corpus or

order to show cause, receive a return and traverse, and may, if

necessary, order an evidentiary hearing on the claims. (Id. at

pp. 738–740; Duvall, at pp. 475–478.) The purpose of the

evidentiary hearing is to make findings of fact and credibility

determinations necessary to adjudicate the petition. (In re

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

19

Hardy (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 993.) Finally, relief in habeas

corpus is granted by “an order or judgment directing the

petitioner’s release from custody or alteration of the conditions

of the petitioner’s confinement.” (Romero, at p. 743.)

As noted, Cook is not seeking release. Nor does he

challenge the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the

proceedings that led to his now final judgment and sentence.

The relief he seeks is entirely consistent with section 1203.01,

which has nothing to do with the validity of a trial court’s

judgment. The section does not define procedures that will

culminate in a new judgment and does not contemplate

modification of the original judgment. By its terms, the statute

addresses the filing of statements with the court “after judgment

has been pronounced.” (§ 1203.01, subd. (a).) Further, the

motion we recognize under section 1203.01 does not impose the

rigorous pleading and proof requirements for habeas corpus.

(See discussion, post, at pp. 20‒21.) Nor does it require the court

to act as a factfinder. Rather, it simply entails the receipt of

evidence for the benefit of the Board. (Franklin, supra, 63

Cal.4th at p. 284.) For these reasons, resort to the writ of habeas

corpus in the first instance would be unnecessarily cumbersome.

Not only is initial resort to section 1203.01, supplemented as

necessary by Code of Civil Procedure section 187, an adequate

remedy, it is superior in its efficiency and purpose to reliance on

the great writ.6



6 Nothing we say here forecloses an offender, after

exhausting the procedures outlined in this opinion, from filing a

petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus to compel the trial

court to perform its duties under Franklin. (See generally

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

20

Having recognized the opportunity for offenders with final

judgments to preserve evidence in the trial court, we need not

address arguments made by amicus curiae the Post-Conviction

Justice Project and the Pacific Juvenile Defender Center that

the procedures and resources available to inmates through the

parole process are inadequate to implement the statutory

mandates of sections 3051 and 4801. (See Rodriguez, supra, 4

Cal.5th at p. 1132; Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 286.) “[I]n

the absence of any concrete controversy in this case concerning

suitability criteria or their application by the Board or the

Governor, it would be premature for this court to opine on

whether and, if so, how existing suitability criteria, parole

hearing procedures, or other practices must be revised to

conform to the dictates of applicable statutory and

constitutional law.” (Franklin, at p. 286.)7

We offer no opinion

here whether the federal Constitution compels the Board to

consider individualized evidence bearing on youth-related

factors, or whether the unavailability of such information might

undermine the Board’s decision. Finally, as we have before, we

express no view on whether a Franklin proceeding is

constitutionally required. (Rodriguez, at p. 1132.)

C. Franklin Proceedings for Cases with Final Judgments

For inmates like Cook who seek to preserve evidence

following a final judgment, the proper avenue is to file a motion

in superior court under the original caption and case number,



Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 339–340; In re Gandolfo,

supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 899–900.) We express no opinion on the

propriety of a writ in that context.

7 We now have such a case before us. (In re Palmer, review

granted Jan. 16, 2019, S252145.)

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

21

citing the authority of section 1203.01 and today’s decision. The

motion should establish the inmate’s entitlement to a youth

offender parole hearing and indicate when such hearing is

anticipated to take place, or if one or more hearings have already

occurred. The structure for the proceeding is outlined in

Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at page 284, and further informed

by the youth-related factors set forth in section 4801,

subdivision (c). The proceeding is not limited to the filing of

statements referenced in section 1203.01. Rather, consistent

with Franklin and the court’s inherent authority, the offender

shall have the opportunity to “place on the record any

documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to crossexamination)

that may be relevant at his eventual youth

offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put

on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile

offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears

on the influence of youth-related factors.” (Franklin, at p. 284.)

Although Franklin mandates an opportunity for evidence

preservation, the trial court may “exercise its discretion to

conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information

introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord

with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.”

(Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1132.) The court may, for

example, require an offer of proof regarding the evidence the

offender seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such

evidence is relevant to youth-related factors and meaningfully

adds to the already available record. It may also determine

whether testimony is “appropriate” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th

at p. 284), or if other types of evidentiary submissions will

suffice. Finally, Franklin emphasized that the purpose of the

proceeding was to allow the offender to assemble evidence “at or

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

22

near the time of the juvenile’s offense rather than decades later

when memories have faded, records may have been lost or

destroyed, or family or community members may have relocated

or passed away.” (Id. at pp. 283–284.) Some offenders who file

these postjudgment motions in the trial court may have spent a

decade or more in prison. Some may have even come before the

Board for a youth offender parole hearing. The court may

consider whether a Franklin proceeding is likely to produce

fruitful evidence considering such factors as the passage of time

and whether the offender has already benefitted from the

factfinding procedures set forth in section 3051, subdivision

(f)(1) and (2) with the assistance of appointed counsel (§ 3041.7;

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2256, subd. (c)). Additionally, some

offenders may choose not to present certain forms of evidence,

such as live testimony, or to forgo a Franklin proceeding

altogether. Delving into the past is not always beneficial to a

defendant. The opportunity for a Franklin hearing is just that:

an opportunity.

It bears emphasis that the proceeding we outlined in

Franklin derives from the statutory provisions of sections 3051

and 4801. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283–284; see

Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1132 [“We expressed no view

in Franklin, and we need not express any view here, on whether

such a remand is constitutionally required”].) While we

unquestionably have the power to interpret these laws, the

Legislature is in a superior position to consider and implement

rules of procedure in the first instance. The Legislature remains

free to amend the pertinent statutes to specify what evidencegathering

procedures should be afforded to youth offenders,

taking into account the objectives of the youth offender parole

hearing and the burden placed on our trial courts to conduct

In re COOK

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

23

Franklin proceedings for the many thousands of offenders who

will be eligible for them under today’s decision.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal granting Cook’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to deny the petition. The denial order shall be without prejudice to Cook’s filing a motion in the trial court for a Franklin proceeding under the authority of section 1203.01 and today’s decision.