In re the Matter of Eric Campbell v. Rachel Ann Newell

Phoenix, Arizona divorce lawyers represented Plaintiff and Defendant.

¶2 The parties have one child "Leila" (a pseudonym), born in 2013. Leila has significant behavioral issues and has an individualized education plan ("IEP") at her school. She does not have any formal medical diagnosis, but several treating physicians have suggested that she has ADHD. Because of her behavior, she is in a general education classroom for approximately 80% of the day, and the remaining time she spends in special smaller classroom settings. Leila is intelligent but often is unable to regulate her emotions and physically lashes out at her teachers and peers. She sees a therapist on a regular basis.



¶3 In 2016, Father filed for divorce. In its judgment dissolving the marriage, the superior court awarded both parties joint legal decisionmaking authority. In 2019, Father petitioned to modify legal decisionmaking authority. He sought sole legal decision-making authority over Leila's medical and educational decisions because he alleged that Mother refused to co-parent with him and that the parties disagreed about the medical and education plans necessary to address Leila's behavioral issues. Mother in turn sought joint legal decision-making with final decisionmaking authority.



¶4 The court found that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred because the parties were unable to reach agreements on the proper medical and educational course necessary to treat Leila's behavioral issues. The court awarded Father final decision-making authority because it found that Father was more open to considering Mother's input when making decisions for Leila.



¶5 After the order, the parties continued to have frequent disputes about Leila's education and medical needs. Leila went several months with untreated cavities because the parties could not agree on a dentist. Father used his final decision-making authority over Mother's objections in many instances, including (1) choosing a dentist, (2) vaccinating Leila against Covid-19, and (3) continuing to send Leila to a therapist with whom Mother disagreed. During their disputes, Father often was dismissive or used disparaging language in his communications. When Mother objected to vaccinating Leila against Covid-19, Father responded by implying Mother's medical views were responsible for the recent death of her daughter from another relationship who suffered from a childhood illness. Father also would often not respond within 24 hours despite the 2019 order's requirement to do so. He scheduled meetings involving Leila and submitted a school program application without first seeking Mother's input.



¶6 In 2023, Mother petitioned to modify the 2019 order. She sought final authority to make educational and medical decisions for Leila when the parties could not agree. She alleged that Father "engaged in acts that discredit any form of decision-making authority to Mother," including switching Leila's dentist and scheduling appointments without her input, engaging in "verbally abusive" communications, and consistently making decisions Mother objected to. At trial, the parties principally disputed whether Leila should continue at her current school or move to a more restrictive environment and whether Leila should continue seeing her current therapist.



¶7 The court awarded Mother final decision-making authority when the parties could not reach an agreement after a "good faith effort." The court did not issue stand-alone change-in-circumstances findings. Rather, the court first found under A.R.S. § 25-403.01(B)(1) as to "[t]he agreement or lack of an agreement by the parents regarding joint legal decision-making" that "Father's utilization of final-say legal decisionmaking has been unreasonable." The court further found under A.R.S. § 25-403.01(B)(3) as to ability of the parents to cooperate in decision-making that "[t]he parties have a long history of difficulty in cooperating in legal decision making."



¶8 Then in its best-interests findings under A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(1) for the relationship between parents and child, the court found that "Father's derogatory communication is so significant that it justifies this Court's modification of legal decision-making." Specifically, the court found that "[t]he intervening four years [since the 2019 order] have not resulted in any appreciable improvement in the parties' ability to communicate. And the evidence presented at trial shows Father repeatedly degrading Mother and her parenting abilities and giving no degree of deference to Mother's opinions on medical care and educational decisions." Under the same factor, the court also found that both parties have close relationships with Leila.



¶9 On the other best-interests factors, the court found that either the evidence did not support the factors or the factors were positive or neutral as to both parties. As relevant, the court found under A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(3) that the parties disagreed whether Leila should continue at her school and that "testimony at trial indicated that she is not improving there as much as anyone would like." The court also found under A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(5) that Leila "has been diagnosed with Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyper Activity Disorder. Her issues have contributed to a significant period of time at her school in a special needs room." But the court did not find mental or physical health concerns for either parent under the same factor. The court did not make any findings about specific educational or medical decisions but found "based upon [all of] the above, it is in the child's best interest that [the parties] be awarded joint legal decision-making authority."...



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Campbell v. Newell, 1 CA-CV 24-0042 FC (Ariz. App. Sep 26, 2024)

Affirmed