State of Oklahoma v. Victor Don Acosta

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma criminal defense lawyers represented the Defendant seeking post conviction relief.

Was found guilty by a jury and was sentenced to CT1: (25) YEARS TO DO IN DOC, CT2: (5) YEARS TO DO IN DOC. COUNTS TO RUN C/S WITH NO CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. DEFT IS ORDERED TO PAY $100 FINES, $100 VCA, $150 MHAF, $150 DA FEE, $150 DNA FEE AND COURT COSTS, ALL COSTS DUE INSTANTER. COURT REPORTER DEBBIE TORBERT PRESENT. ANY BOND NOT IN FORFEITURE, EXINERATED. COMMITMNENT ISSUED

Victor Don Acosta, made application for post-conviction relief.

Title 22, Section 1080.1(A)(1) states:

A. A one-year period of limitation shall apply to the filing of any application for post-conviction relief, whether an original application or a subsequent application. The limitation period shall run from the latest of:

1. The date on which the judgment of conviction or revocation of suspended sentence became final by the conclusion of the direct review by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals or the expiration of the time for seeking such review by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.

Section 1080.1 appears to be modeled after 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2023), which provides a limitations period for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal courts. The language employed in both statutes is similar but not identical. However, this Court need not consider the similarities between the two statutes because the plain language in Section 1080.1(A)(1) indicates the clear intent of the Legislature, that for purposes of imposing the one-year statute of limitation, a state judgment and sentence is considered final upon the conclusion of direct review by this Court.

¶5 This Court construes statutes according to the plain and ordinary meaning of their language. Newlin v. State, 2015 OK CR 7, ¶ 8, 348 P.3d 209, 211. "[W]here the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and the meaning is clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and no justification exists for interpretative devices to fabricate a different meaning." Barnard v. State, 2005 OK CR 13, ¶ 7, 119 P.3d 203, 205--06 (citing McBrain v. State, 1988 OK CR 261, ¶ 11, 764 P.2d 905, 908). We must hold a statute to mean what it plainly expresses, and no room is left for construction and interpretation where the language employed is clear and unambiguous. Johnson v. State, 2013 OK CR 12, ¶ 10, 308 P.3d 1053, 1055. See also State v. Farthing, 2014 OK CR 4, ¶ 5, 328 P.3d 1208, 1210. ("We must hold a statute to mean what it plainly expresses and cannot resort to interpretive devices to fabricate a different meaning.")

Denied

Affirmed