Sate of Oklahoma v. Michael David Randolph

Tulsa, Oklahoma, criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with trafficking in illegal drugs, after former conviction of two or more felonies in violation of 63 O.S. 2-415 and 63 O.S. 2-402.

Reported by: Kent Morlan

In March, 2007, Tulsa police officers Ludwig and Beaty received information that someone was dealing drugs to a pregnant black female at a particular apartment in Tulsa. In response to that information, the officers initiated an investigation of an apartment on East Fifth Place. They arrived at the residence around 6:00 p.m. on March 22, 2007. The officers knocked on the apartment door. A man later identified as Robert Benson answered. The officers, who were dressed in police uniforms, told Benson the reason for their visit and asked if they could enter the apartment. Benson stepped to the side and told them to “Come on in.”

The determination of when evidentiary errors have denied a fair trial and doomed a case to reversal is rarely a clear cut matter. Ozbun v. State, 1983 OK CR 29, ¶ 3, 659 P.2d 954, 956, n. 1 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring mistrial; witness’ non-responsive comment about “two ex-cons running around with shotguns” provided a “very cogent and compelling reason”). A trial court has both the power and the duty to declare a mistrial when misconduct or other evidentiary errors have compromised the right to a fair trial. Edwards v. State, 1947 OK CR 123, 85 Okla. Crim. 125, 130-32, 186 P.2d 333, 335-36 (improper comment on defendant’s failure to testify resulted in duty to declare mistrial); Mendenhall v. State, 1946 OK CR 39, 82 Okla. Crim. 220, 224, 168 P.2d 138, 140 (trial court has duty to ensure defendant receives a fair trial). The exercise of this power necessarily involves considerable legal judgment, requiring the application of sometimes complex legal rules and a broad array of factors unique to the trial court setting, including the demeanor of witnesses, the reactions of the jury, the perceived efficacy of admonitions, the cumulative impact of prejudicial errors, and other intangibles.

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Under the Fourth Amendment and Article II, section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, absent a recognized exception. A warrantless police intrusion into a protected area is reasonable, and thus constitutionally permissible, if preceded by free and voluntary consent. Burkham v. State, 1975 OK CR 150, 538 P.2d 1121, 1123. Any person with common authority over jointly occupied premises may consent to a warrantless search. Smith v. State, 1979 OK CR 142, 604 P.2d 139, 140. Whether a voluntary consent was given is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. This Court will defer to the trial court’s finding of voluntary consent where competent evidence reasonably tends to support it. Sullivan v. State, 1986 OK CR 39, ¶ 12, 716 P.2d 684, 687. Concerning the scope of a voluntary consent, the authorities show that



[w]hen the police are relying upon consent as the basis for their warrantless search, they have no more authority than they have apparently been given by the consent . . . But, the question is not to be determined on the basis of the subjective intentions of the consenting party or the subjective interpretation of the searching officer. As the Supreme Court concluded in Florida v. Jimeno, the standard is “that of ‘objective’ reasonableness--what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the [consenting party]?”

Consents to search are not given in the abstract; the police are interested in searching a particular place, and thus it is the practice for them to specify a certain place, such as a residence or vehicle. If, as is likely, the consent given in response is general and unqualified, then the police may proceed to conduct a general search of that place.

W. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 8.1(c), 610 (3d ed., West 1996) (emphasis in original; internal references omitted), quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991).

Decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment have also recognized that “[u]nder appropriate circumstances police officers, in the course of their duty, may approach and question suspicious individuals in order to determine their identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, even though there are insufficient grounds for arrest.” Prock v. State, 1975 OK CR 213, ¶ 18, 542 P.2d 522, 526, citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In Prock, this Court found that when an officer “was in a place he had a right to be” while investigating a report of suspicious behavior, the officer’s seizure of a gun that was in plain view in the defendant’s waistband during the encounter was reasonable; and the evidence was admissible in a prosecution for unlawful possession of a firearm. Id., ¶¶ 18-19, 542 P.2d at 526-27. Under this “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement, an officer may always confiscate “what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be.” Lyons v. State, 1989 OK CR 86, ¶ 7, 787 P.2d 460, 463.

The Defendant was sentenced to life without parole.

Affirmed