State of Oklahoma v. Brian Keith Byrd

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant in a revocation proceeding.

On April 4, 2001, Petitioner filed an application in this Court challenging an order of the District Court of Oklahoma County, entered April 3, 2001, denying his motion to dismiss or application to stay revocation proceedings in that Court in Case No. CF-00-320. This Court stayed the proceedings below and directed a response from the Respondent, the Honorable Susan P. Caswell, District Judge, or her designated representative.1

On July 14, 2000, Petitioner pled guilty to felony Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and Driving Under Suspension in Oklahoma County Case No. CF-2000-320. He received a five-year suspended sentence, with the first year to be served in the Work Habilitation Inpatient Program (WHIP). On October 10, 2000, the State filed an application to revoke Petitioner's suspended sentence, alleging he (1) tested positive for cocaine, and (2) was not in compliance with the WHIP program. Petitioner was arraigned on this application on December 15, 2000. The courthouse was closed on his first court date and the case was rescheduled for January 3, 2001. At that time Petitioner refused to waive his statutory right to have a hearing on the application to revoke within twenty days of his arraignment on the charges.2 The State asked the District Court to dismiss the application without prejudice, the Court dismissed the case, and the State indicated it would re-file the application. The State filed an Order of Dismissal on January 12, 2001. The State re-filed the application to revoke Petitioner's suspended sentence on January 24, 2001. Petitioner was arraigned on March 22, 2001, and given a court date of April 3, 2001. On that date he moved to dismiss the application as being outside the original twenty-day limit, running from the December 15, 2000, arraignment on the original application.

The crux of this case is the appropriate use of the twenty-day rule.

The statute does not suggest the State may evade its responsibility to prove its case within twenty days by dismissal and re-filing, using the same charges as the basis for the revocation. Under this practice this State may postpone the hearing date for months, as was done here. On the record before us it is clear that the second application filed here was based on the same violations which were used to support the first application.

We hold that the State may not file an application to revoke based on specific charges, fail to hold a timely hearing, dismiss that application, and re-file another application to revoke based on the same charges. This contravenes the Legislature's purpose and intent, and is an abuse of the explicit statutory time limitation.

Nothing in this opinion precludes the State from dismissing the original application and subsequently filing a new application, as long as the new application to revoke alleges new violations as the basis for revocation. That is, the State is prohibited from filing subsequent applications to revoke based on the same specific charges. However, the State may file subsequent applications based on different charges. That is true in this case as in any other.

We have determined that the State improperly violated the twenty-day rule by re-filing the application to revoke Petitioner's suspended sentence. Petitioner's Application for Writ of Prohibition is GRANTED. The case is DISMISSED.