State of Vermont v. Mark Sterling

Burlington, Vermont, criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with stalking.

Reported by Kent Morlan

Mark Sterling was charged with one count of aggravated stalking while possessing a deadly weapon under 13 V.S.A. § 1063(5). Additionally, he was charged with violation of an abuse prevention order, aggravated stalking in violation of a court order, unlawful possession of a firearm, and aggravated operation of a motor vehicle without the owner's consent. The State moved to hold defendant without bail under § 7553a on the basis of the aggravated-stalking-with-a-deadly-weapon charge.[1] The trial court held a hearing on the State's motion and determined to hold defendant without bail. Defendant timely requested a new evidentiary hearing before this Court. See 13 V.S.A. § 7556(d) ("A person held without bail under section 7553a of this title prior to trial shall be entitled to an independent, second evidentiary hearing on the merits of the denial of bail, which shall be a hearing de novo by a single Justice of the Supreme Court forthwith"); V.R.A.P. 9(b) (outlining procedures for review of denial of release under 13 V.S.A. § 7553a).

In the Court's view, this question is largely resolved and controlled by the Court's prior ruling in State v. Beldiman, No. 25-AP-211,2025 WL 1993825 (Vt. July 16,2025) (unpub. mem.), https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/media/19213. There, a single justice concluded that the crime of aggravated stalking was not a felony that involves an act of violence. Id. at *7. The Court reviewed earlier decisions, including State v. Perron, No. 24-AP-163, 2024 WL 3416096 (Vt. July 12, 2024) (unpub. mem.), https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/media/18069, and determined that, even using the broad definition of "violence" defined therein, aggravated stalking would not suffice. Beldiman, 2025 WL 1993825, at *6-7. Key aspects of the ruling focused on the fact that the crime of aggravated stalking can be established by a defendant engaging in a course of conduct that solely interferes with property and that the mens rea of the crime could be satisfied by proof that a defendant "knew or reasonably should have known" that such interference would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. Id. The Court concluded that those aspects of the crime precluded a finding that the elements of aggravated stalking required there to have been the type of" 'abusive or unjust use of power'" towards another person identified by Perron as a basis for finding an act of violence. Id. (quoting Perron, 2024 WL 3416096, at *4, 6) (noting that the negligence standard established by the stalking statute "is a considerably lesser standard than other situations where the Court has found attempts or threats sufficient to constitute acts of violence"); c.f. Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 79-80 (2023) (finding negligence standard insufficient to provide adequate protection of First Amendment interests in stalking case involving threats made by defendant).

The court ordered that he be held without bail.

Reversed and remanded.