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Powder Run at Deer Valley Owner Association v. Black Diamond Lodge at Deer Valley Association of Unit Owners and Park City Municipal Corporation

Date: 02-21-2014

Case Number: 2014 UT 43

Judge: Bench

Court: The Utah Court of Appeals on appeal from the Third District Court, Silver Summit Department

Plaintiff's Attorney: Eric P. Lee and Kathleen E. McDonald, Attorneys for Appellant

Defendant's Attorney: Laura S. Scott, Elizabeth A. Schulte, and Joseph E. Tesch, Attorneys for Appellee Black Diamond Lodge at Deer Valley Association of Unit Owners Mark D. Harrington and Polly Samuels McLean, Attorneys for Appellee Park City Municipal Corporation

Description:
¶1 This case involves a challenge to the dedication of an

easement as a public street in Park City. The easement crosses

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

2. In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, we

view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the

light most favorable to Powder Run, the nonmoving party. Orvis

v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600.

3. Two other entities joined Black Diamond in offering to dedicate

the easement. Because the other entities are not party to this suit,

we refer only to Black Diamond for convenience.

20120611-CA 2 2014 UT App 43

property owned by Powder Run at Deer Valley Owner Association

(Powder Run). Powder Run appeals the district court's ruling that

the statute of limitations in Utah Code section 10-9a-801 bars its

quiet title action and declaratory judgment claim. See Utah Code

Ann. § 10-9a-801 (LexisNexis 2012). We affirm.

BACKGROUND2

¶2 In June 2001, Black Diamond Lodge at Deer Valley

Association of Unit Owners (Black Diamond) submitted a letter to

Park City Municipal Corporation (the City) offering to dedicate as

a public street a portion of a seventy-eight-foot-wide easement that

crossed Powder Run's property.3 On the day of the public hearing,

Powder Run submitted a letter to the City stating that it was "not

going to oppose” the dedication but requesting that the City defer

action while Powder Run considered its options. The City Council

acknowledged the request for delay at the hearing but proceeded

to consider the dedication. The City Council then adopted an

ordinance, published June 27, 2001, accepting the limited

dedication of a thirty-foot-wide portion of the easement as a public

street. Among other things, the ordinance required Black Diamond

to pave and maintain the public street.

¶3 In the fall of 2001, Black Diamond built a road across the

easement and had underground utilities installed within the

easement. In late 2002 or early 2003, Black Diamond had a

monument sign erected on the easement. Since late 2001, the public

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

4. The complaint also alleged trespass, but Powder Run later

stipulated that its trespass action was barred by the applicable

statute of limitations.

5. On appeal, the parties treat the district court's ruling on the

City's motion to dismiss as a ruling on a motion for summary

judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) ("If, on a motion . . . to dismiss

(continued...)

20120611-CA 3 2014 UT App 43

has used the road to access the Black Diamond Lodge and another

adjoining development.

¶4 On September 15, 2010, over nine years after the ordinance

became effective, Powder Run filed a complaint against Black

Diamond and the City. The complaint was styled as a quiet title

and declaratory judgment action.4 Powder Run alleged that Black

Diamond and the City "claim a right or interest in the Easement

Parcel adverse to the rights and interests of [Powder Run].”

Powder Run later moved to amend the complaint by adding as

defendants the individual unit owners of the Black Diamond

Lodge. The City moved to dismiss the action and Black Diamond

moved for summary judgment, both on the basis of the thirty-day

statute of limitations in Utah Code section 10-9a-801(2)(a). The

district court granted the defendants' motions and denied Powder

Run's motion to amend as futile. Powder Run appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶5 Powder Run contends that the statute of limitations in Utah

Code section 10-9a-801 does not bar its quiet title action and that

the district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment in

favor of Black Diamond and in dismissing the suit against the City.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, "[a]n appellate court

reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or

denial of summary judgment for correctness.” Orvis v. Johnson, 2008

UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).5

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

5. (...continued)

for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not

excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for

summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 . . . .”).

We do likewise.

20120611-CA 4 2014 UT App 43

¶6 Powder Run also contends that given the district court's

allegedly erroneous ruling on the statute of limitations issue, the

district court erred in denying, on the basis of futility, Powder

Run's motion for leave to amend its complaint. While we review

for abuse of discretion a ruling on a motion for leave to amend a

pleading, we review a futility determination for correctness. Shah

v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT App 261, ¶ 6, 314 P.3d

1079.

ANALYSIS

I. Statute of Limitations

¶7 Powder Run advances four arguments challenging the

district court's ruling that its quiet title action was barred by section

10-9a-801. First, it argues that the statute, by its terms, does not

apply to this case. Second, Powder Run argues that regardless of

the limitations period in the statute, a void ordinance may be

challenged at any time. Third, Powder Run argues that its quiet

title action is a true quiet title action to which statutes of limitations

do not apply. Fourth, Powder Run argues that the statute of

limitations does not apply, because Powder Run is in actual

possession of the easement under a claim of ownership.

A. Applicability of the Statute

¶8 The Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management

Act (MLUDMA) places a thirty-day limit on challenges to

municipal land use decisions:

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

6. The statute also states, "If the municipality has complied with

[the notice provisions of] Section 10-9a-205, a challenge to the

enactment of a land use ordinance or general plan may not be filed

with the district court more than 30 days after the enactment.”

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(5) (LexisNexis 2012) (emphasis

added). Whichever thirty-day limit we apply, our conclusion

would be the same. Therefore, we apply the provision addressed

by the district court and the parties, and we need not determine

whether the ordinance in question qualifies as "a land use

ordinance.” See id. § 10-9a-103(24) (Supp. 2013) (defining "land use

ordinance” as "a planning, zoning, development, or subdivision

ordinance of the municipality, but . . . not includ[ing] the general

plan”).

20120611-CA 5 2014 UT App 43

Any person adversely affected by a final decision

made in the exercise of or in violation of the

provisions of this chapter may file a petition for

review of the decision with the district court within

30 days after the local land use decision is final.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). "Based on

[MLUDMA's] plain language, a party is affirmatively entitled to

judicial review of any final [municipal] land use decision whenever

(A) the decision adversely affects the party's interests, (B) the

decision was made in the exercise of or in violation of provisions of

[MLUDMA], and (C) the party files a petition for review within

thirty days of the date the [municipality's] decision is final.” Gillmor

v. Summit County, 2010 UT 69, ¶ 18, 246 P.3d 102 (interpreting a

parallel provision in the County Land Use, Development, and

Management Act (CLUDMA)).6

¶9 Powder Run does not argue that the ordinance is not a

"decision made in the exercise of or in violation of the provisions

of [MLUDMA].” See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(2)(a). Rather,

Powder Run argues that the statute should not apply to its suit

because it is not seeking "review” of the City's decision to accept

the dedication. See id. As Powder Run has characterized its claim,

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

20120611-CA 6 2014 UT App 43

it argues that because Black Diamond did not have any legal right

to dedicate the easement to the City, the district court should

"conclude that in fact no dedication occurred,” declare the

dedication void ab initio, and quiet title to the easement in Powder

Run.

¶10 Powder Run's argument ignores the fact that the City

accepted the allegedly invalid dedication and passed an ordinance

making a portion of the easement a public street. In its complaint,

Powder Run acknowledges that the City, and not only Black

Diamond, "claims a right or interest in the Easement Parcel adverse

to the rights and interests of [Powder Run].” Powder Run asks for

an order quieting title in Powder Run and decreeing that Black

Diamond, the City, "and all persons or entities claiming by,

through or under them have no rights or interest in or to the

Easement Parcel.” Powder Run also alleges that it is entitled to a

"declaration establishing that the public dedication by Park City was

void ab initio, and that Black Diamond, its members, the public and

all persons or entities claiming by, through or under them have no

right to traverse or otherwise occupy the Easement Parcel.”

(Emphasis added.) We see no way to read Powder Run's complaint

other than as a request for the district court to review the City's

decision to accept the dedication of a portion of the easement as a

public street.

¶11 Powder Run also argues that the statute does not apply to

its suit because Powder Run is not "adversely affected” by the

City's ordinance. See id. § 10-9a-801(2)(a). Powder Run argues that

because the dedication is invalid, it had no impact on Powder

Run's property rights.

¶12 Regardless of the validity of Black Diamond's offer to

dedicate, the City's decision to accept that dedication adversely

affected Powder Run. The City enacted an ordinance making a

portion of the easement a public street. Black Diamond built a road

across that portion of the easement in 2001, and since that time, the

public has continually used that road to access the Black Diamond

Lodge and another adjacent development. As mentioned above,

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

20120611-CA 7 2014 UT App 43

Powder Run alleges in its complaint that the City claims a right

adverse to Powder Run. It asks the district court for a declaration

that those using the public street have no right to do so. Powder

Run's complaint thus belies the argument that Powder Run is not

adversely affected by the ordinance.

B. Void Ordinance Exception

¶13 Next, Powder Run argues that statutes of limitations do not

apply to void ordinances. Powder Run relies on cases holding that

challenges to void judgments are not subject to time limitations.

See, e.g., Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290–91 (Utah 1986) (per

curiam). Powder Run argues that "[t]here is no meaningful

difference between the application of a time bar to the void

judgment of a district court and the void action of a municipal

body.”

¶14 Our supreme court was presented with a similar argument

in Gillmor v. Summit County, 2010 UT 69, 246 P.3d 102, but the court

did not resolve the issue. See id. ¶ 17. We need not determine

whether the rule governing void judgments applies to void

ordinances in general, because we conclude that section 10-9a-801

contemplates a limitation on the type of suit brought by Powder

Run in this case.

¶15 In addition to setting forth exhaustion requirements and

time limitations, section 10-9a-801 states that courts are limited to

determining "only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or

regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.” Utah Code Ann.

§ 10-9a-801(3)(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2012). The statute further provides

that courts must "presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation

made under the authority of this chapter is valid.” Id.

§ 10-9a-801(3)(a)(i). The statute then specifies ways in which

validity may be determined:

(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation

involving the exercise of legislative discretion is valid

if it is reasonably debatable that the decision,

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

20120611-CA 8 2014 UT App 43

ordinance, or regulation promotes the purposes of

this chapter and is not otherwise illegal.

(c) A final decision of a land use authority or

an appeal authority is valid if the decision is

supported by substantial evidence in the record and

is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.

(d) A determination of illegality requires a

determination that the decision, ordinance, or

regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in

effect at the time the decision was made or the

ordinance or regulation adopted.

Id. § 10-9a-801(3).

¶16 Powder Run's request for a "declaration establishing that

the public dedication by Park City was void ab initio” and an order

quieting title in Powder Run on that basis falls within the scope of

this statute. Powder Run is essentially arguing that the ordinance

is of no effect—that the City had no legal authority to declare the

easement a public road—because Black Diamond had no right to

offer the easement to the City. Arguing that the ordinance is void

and of no effect is a direct challenge to the validity of the ordinance.

Section 10-9a-801 governs challenges to the validity of a

municipality's land use decisions, ordinances, and regulations.

Regardless of whether Powder Run would be able to successfully

overcome the presumption of validity under the standards in

subsection 10-9a-801(3), its challenge to the allegedly void

ordinance must satisfy the time limitations of section 10-9a-801. Cf.

Branting v. Salt Lake City, 153 P. 995, 1000–01 (Utah 1915) (applying

a statute of limitations to a claim asking a court "to declare certain

proceedings whereby a certain tax was assessed and levied against

[the plaintiff's] property void and of no effect and to annul said

proceedings”); Gillmor v. Blue Ledge Corp., 2009 UT App 230, ¶ 24,

217 P.3d 723 (stating that under the statute of limitations governing

suits by the United States to vacate and annul land patents, "it is

irrelevant if the patent at issue is void” because "'[i]f [the statute of

limitations] were confined to valid patents it would be almost or

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

20120611-CA 9 2014 UT App 43

quite without use'” (quoting United States v. Chandler–Dunbar Water

Power Co., 209 U.S. 447, 450 (1908))).

C. True Quiet Title Exception

¶17 Powder Run further argues that the statute of limitations

does not apply to true quiet title actions and that its suit qualifies

as a true quiet title action.

¶18 Nearly a century ago, the Utah Supreme Court "established

the general rule that where 'the action is purely one to remove a

cloud or to quiet the title [to real property], the statute of

limitations has no application.'” Bangerter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67, ¶ 12,

225 P.3d 874 (alteration in original) (quoting Branting v. Salt Lake

City, 153 P. 995, 1001 (Utah 1915)). However, the supreme court

qualified this general rule by holding that "'all actions in which the

principal purpose is to obtain some affirmative relief . . . clearly

come within the [statute of limitations].'” Id. (alteration and

omission in original) (quoting Branting, 153 P. at 1001). The court

has clarified this standard as follows:

If the action is a true quiet title action, meaning an

action merely to "quiet an existing title against an

adverse or hostile claim of another,” then the statute

of limitations will not bar the claim. However, "[i]f

the party's claim for quiet title relief can be granted

only if the party succeeds on another claim, then the

statute of limitations applicable to the other claim

will also apply to the quiet title claim.”

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT

53, ¶¶ 26–27, 144 P.3d 1129). Thus, to determine whether the

statute of limitations applies, "a court must examine the relief

sought” and "assess on what basis the party would be entitled to

have title quieted.” Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, ¶ 27.

¶19 We conclude that Powder Run's suit does not qualify as a

true quiet title action. As mentioned above, Powder Run seeks an

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

20120611-CA 10 2014 UT App 43

order quieting title as against Black Diamond and the City.

However, the basis of Powder Run's claim is its argument that the

ordinance is void. Powder Run thus could not succeed on its quiet

title claim without first striking down the ordinance. Therefore,

Powder Run's "claim for quiet title relief can be granted only if [it]

succeeds on another claim”—its claim for review of the validity of

the City's land use decision. See id.

¶20 This conclusion is illustrated by the cases addressing the true

quiet title exception. In Branting v. Salt Lake City, 153 P. 995 (Utah

1915), a plaintiff filed an action asking the court to annul municipal

ordinances and proceedings approving the construction of a sewer

and levying a special tax on abutting property. Id. at 996. Our

supreme court rejected the plaintiff's argument that his challenge

to the tax was a quiet title action to which no statute of limitations

applied. Id. at 1000–01. The court acknowledged that the tax

constituted a lien but stated that the validity of the tax did not

depend on the validity of a competing claim of title—the city never

asserted title or questioned the soundness of the plaintiff's title. Id.

at 1000. Rather, the court stated, the validity of the tax "depends

entirely upon whether the proceedings of [the city] by which it

undertook to assess and levy the same are legal or illegal.” Id. "The

relief that [the plaintiff] sought by bringing the action was to have

those proceedings declared illegal.” Id. Because the action was

"commenced for the purpose of invoking the aid of a court of

equity to declare certain proceedings whereby a certain tax was

assessed and levied against [the plaintiff's] property void and of no

effect and to annul said proceedings,” the statute of limitations

applied. Id. at 1000–01.

¶21 Although Powder Run alleges that the City claims an

interest in the easement adverse to Powder Run's interest, the basis

of the relief sought by Powder Run is essentially the same as that

sought in Branting. Powder Run is asking the court to "declare [the

ordinance] void and of no effect,” and success in Powder Run's

quiet title action depends entirely upon the validity of the

ordinance. See id.

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

20120611-CA 11 2014 UT App 43

¶22 In Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 81 P.2d 374 (Utah 1938), a

plaintiff delivered to the city a deed for a strip of land. Id. at 374.

The plaintiff later asked the district court to set aside the deed for

fraud and to quiet title in him. Id. at 376. Our supreme court held

that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 377. The

court acknowledged that the request to quiet title and to cancel the

deed for fraud were two separate claims, but it stated that relief on

the quiet title action depended on success on the fraud claim:

"unless his right to have the deed cancelled is established he is not

entitled to have his title quieted nor to have judgment for

possession of the property.” Id. at 376–77. The court concluded that

because "his relief in each case depends . . . upon the cancellation

of a deed for fraud or mistake, he must bring his action within the

period provided by law for an action based upon that ground.” Id.

at 377.

¶23 Again, despite Powder Run's attempts to characterize its

action otherwise, this suit involves a challenge to the validity of the

ordinance. See supra ¶ 16. As with Davidsen, Powder Run's success

on its quiet title action depends on the validity of the ordinance.

Unless its right to have the ordinance set aside is established, it is

not entitled to have title quieted in its favor.

¶24 In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, 144 P.3d 1129, provides

further illustration. In Hoopiiaina Trust, a settlor placed real

property in two irrevocable trusts for the benefit of the plaintiffs,

but over twenty years later, he devised some of that same property

by will to the defendants. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 6–7, 10. The personal

representative of the estate distributed the property under the

terms of the will and also conveyed other property covered by the

trust to herself. Id. ¶ 10. When the plaintiffs discovered the trust

documents, they requested an order quieting title to the trust

property. Id. ¶¶ 7–11, 13. The supreme court held that the suit

presented a true quiet title action that was not barred by the statute

of limitations. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. The court explained that because the

settlor had no ability to devise what he did not own and the

personal representative had no basis to claim an ownership interest

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

20120611-CA 12 2014 UT App 43

in the trust property, the defendants had "nothing more than an

adverse claim” to the trust property, backed up by "no more than

a wild deed.” Id. Because it was unnecessary to rule in the

plaintiffs' favor "on any other legal issue” in order to quiet title, no

statute of limitations applied. Id.

¶25 Powder Run argues that its quiet title action is like that in

Hoopiiaina Trust. It argues that Black Diamond had no ability to

dedicate the easement to the City and that Black Diamond's offer

is "directly analogous to the giving of a wild deed.” It argues,

therefore, that Black Diamond's offer and the City's acceptance of

that dedication are nothing more than adverse claims.

¶26 We acknowledge some similarities between Hoopiiaina Trust

and the present case. However, we distinguish this case because of

the legislative action following Black Diamond's allegedly

ineffective offer to dedicate the easement to the City. Even if Black

Diamond's offer were directly analogous to a wild deed, it was

followed by the adoption of an ordinance making a portion of the

easement a public street. Whatever interest Black Diamond had in

the easement before adoption of the ordinance, its interest and the

City's interest are now based in an ordinance that Powder Run

seeks to invalidate. Because that ordinance also affects Powder

Run's interest, Powder Run's quiet title action against Black

Diamond and the City cannot succeed unless the court first

determines that the ordinance is invalid. See Church v. Meadow

Springs Ranch Corp., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048–49 (Utah 1983) ("To

succeed in an action to quiet title to real estate, a plaintiff must

prevail on the strength of his own claim to title and not on the

weakness of a defendant's title or even its total lack of title.”);

Department of Soc. Servs. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337–38 (Utah

1979) (stating that as an element of a quiet title action, a plaintiff

must establish "entitlement to possession”). Therefore, the statute

of limitations governing challenges to the City's land use decision

applies to Powder Run's quiet title action. See Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006

UT 53, ¶ 27.

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

20120611-CA 13 2014 UT App 43

D. Actual Possession Exception

¶27 Finally, Powder Run argues that the statute of limitations

does not apply to a party in actual possession under a claim of

ownership.

¶28 In Bangerter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67, 225 P.3d 874, the Utah

Supreme Court held that even if a plaintiff seeking to quiet title

does not qualify under the true quiet title exception, a statute of

limitations may be inapplicable on the basis of actual possession. Id.

¶¶ 14, 16. The court held that "the statute of limitations does not

bar an individual or entity from bringing an action to quiet title to

real property when that individual or entity is (1) in actual

possession of property and (2) under a claim of ownership.” Id.

¶ 16. The court explained the policies behind this exception as

follows:

"In many instances one in possession would not

know of dormant adverse claims of persons not in

possession. Moreover, even if . . . the party in

possession knows of such a potential claimant, there

is no reason to put him to the expense and

inconvenience of litigation until such a claim is

pressed against him.”

Id. (omission in original) (quoting Muktarian v. Barmby, 407 P.2d

659, 661 (Cal. 1965) (en banc)).

¶29 We conclude that Powder Run is not in actual possession of

that portion of the easement dedicated as a public street. Black

Diamond installed underground utilities and a monument sign on

the easement. It built a road that the public has used to access the

Black Diamond Lodge and another adjoining development since

late 2001. This cannot qualify as actual possession by Powder Run.

See id. (suggesting that actual possession must be "'undisturbed'”

(quoting Mayer v. L&B Real Estate, 185 P.3d 43, 46 (Cal. 2008))).

Concluding otherwise would not serve the purposes of the

exception. Powder Run was aware of the offer to dedicate and

Powder Run v. Black Diamond

20120611-CA 14 2014 UT App 43

participated in the public hearing by submitting a letter stating that

it would not oppose the action but would like the City to delay

action to allow Powder Run to further consider its options. Thus,

Powder Run had notice of the adoption of the ordinance, Black

Diamond's construction of the road, and the public's use of the

easement. These competing claims cannot be characterized as

"dormant adverse claims of persons not in possession.” See id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶30 In sum, Powder Run's suit falls within the purview of

section 10-9a-801, and none of the exceptions asserted by Powder

Run apply to this case.

II. Denial of Motion for Leave to Amend

¶31 Finally, Powder Run contends that the district court erred in

denying it leave to amend its complaint to add as defendants the

unit owners of the Black Diamond Lodge. The basis for the district

court's denial was that given its ruling on the statute of limitations

issue, any motion to amend would be futile. Powder Run's

challenge to the district court's futility determination assumes that

the district court erred in its ruling on the statute of limitations

issue. Because we affirm the district court's ruling on the statute of

limitations issue, and because Powder Run makes no argument

independent of that ruling in challenging the district court's denial

of its motion for leave to amend, we affirm the district court's

decision.

Outcome:
¶32 By its terms, Utah Code section 10-9a-801 applies to Powder

Run’s quiet title action, which challenges the validity of a municipal

ordinance. Powder Run’s characterization of the ordinance as void

does not save Powder Run’s claims from the statute of limitations.

Because success on Powder Run’s quiet title action depends on a

successful challenge to the validity of the ordinance, Powder Run’s

suit does not qualify as a true quiet title action to which no statute

Powder Run v. Black Diamond of limitations applies. Furthermore, Powder Run is not in actual possession of that portion of the easement dedicated as a public

street. Therefore, the district court properly determined that

Powder Run’s suit was barred because it was not filed within the

thirty-day limit set forth in section 10-9a-801. Given this conclusion,

Powder Run’s motion for leave to amend its complaint would have

been futile.



¶33 Affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:

About This Case

What was the outcome of Powder Run at Deer Valley Owner Association v. Black Diam...?

The outcome was: ¶32 By its terms, Utah Code section 10-9a-801 applies to Powder Run’s quiet title action, which challenges the validity of a municipal ordinance. Powder Run’s characterization of the ordinance as void does not save Powder Run’s claims from the statute of limitations. Because success on Powder Run’s quiet title action depends on a successful challenge to the validity of the ordinance, Powder Run’s suit does not qualify as a true quiet title action to which no statute Powder Run v. Black Diamond of limitations applies. Furthermore, Powder Run is not in actual possession of that portion of the easement dedicated as a public street. Therefore, the district court properly determined that Powder Run’s suit was barred because it was not filed within the thirty-day limit set forth in section 10-9a-801. Given this conclusion, Powder Run’s motion for leave to amend its complaint would have been futile. ¶33 Affirmed.

Which court heard Powder Run at Deer Valley Owner Association v. Black Diam...?

This case was heard in The Utah Court of Appeals on appeal from the Third District Court, Silver Summit Department, UT. The presiding judge was Bench.

Who were the attorneys in Powder Run at Deer Valley Owner Association v. Black Diam...?

Plaintiff's attorney: Eric P. Lee and Kathleen E. McDonald, Attorneys for Appellant. Defendant's attorney: Laura S. Scott, Elizabeth A. Schulte, and Joseph E. Tesch, Attorneys for Appellee Black Diamond Lodge at Deer Valley Association of Unit Owners Mark D. Harrington and Polly Samuels McLean, Attorneys for Appellee Park City Municipal Corporation.

When was Powder Run at Deer Valley Owner Association v. Black Diam... decided?

This case was decided on February 21, 2014.