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State of Utah v. Adam Howard Jones

Date: 06-10-2014

Case Number: 2014 UT App 142

Judge: Greenwood

Court: The Utah Court of Appeals on appeal from the Third District Court, Silver Summit Department

Plaintiff's Attorney: Sean D. Reyes and John J. Nielsen, Attorneys for Appellant

Defendant's Attorney: Ronald J. Yengich, Attorney for Appellee

Description:
¶1 The State appeals from the magistrate's dismissal of criminal

charges against defendant Adam Howard Jones. The State charged

Jones with one count of official neglect and misconduct, a class A

misdemeanor, see Utah Code Ann. § 10‐3‐826 (LexisNexis 2012);

one count of official misconduct, a class B misdemeanor, see id. §

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by

special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code

Jud. Admin. R. 11‐201(6).

State v. Jones

76‐8‐201; and one count of tampering with a witness, a third degree

felony, see id. § 76‐8‐508(1). The magistrate dismissed all three

counts after a preliminary hearing, determining that there was

insufficient evidence to bind Jones over for trial on any of the three

counts. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 At the time of the events giving rise to this case, Jones was

the police chief of Kamas, Utah. Jones's brother, Travis, lived in

Kamas with his girlfriend (Girlfriend). Jones knew that Travis had

a history of alcohol abuse and resulting violent behavior and that

Travis's alcohol abuse had led to incidents of domestic violence

with Girlfriend. In the past, Girlfriend had called Jones for help

with Travis when Travis was drunk, although these calls had

previously occurred only when Jones was off duty. Some of these

calls occurred as much as six years earlier, when Travis and

Girlfriend lived in West Valley City. Girlfriend had not called Jones

about problems with Travis for approximately one year.

¶3 On February 15, 2011, Jones was on duty in his office. His

shift was to end at 10:00 p.m. At about 9:45 p.m., Girlfriend called

Jones on his personal cell phone and asked him to come to the

house that she shared with Travis. Jones later told the State's

investigator that he asked Girlfriend why she wanted him to come

over, but she did not give him a reason, and that he assumed the

call was about problems concerning her son. In any event, Jones

immediately left his office, in uniform, and drove his police cruiser

the four blocks to Travis's house.

¶4 When Jones arrived at the house, he was met by a drunken

Travis clad only in his underwear. Travis was calm, although

inebriated. Travis pointed to scratch marks on his chest and told

Jones, "[L]ook what [Girlfriend] did to me.” Jones then located

Girlfriend in the garage, where she told Jones, "[Travis] can't do

this to me anymore,” that Travis was "out of control,” and that he

20120754‐CA 2 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

had kicked her in the leg. Jones examined Girlfriend's leg but

observed no injury or impairment in her ability to walk.

¶5 While Jones and Girlfriend were talking, Travis entered the

garage and again accused Girlfriend of scratching his chest.

Girlfriend told Jones that Travis had scratched himself and asked

Jones to calm Travis down. Jones responded that he could not deal

with Travis because the two were brothers and asked Girlfriend if

she wanted to call the Summit County Sheriff's Office to file a

report. She declined, telling Jones that she was not afraid of Travis.

Jones then spoke with Travis alone, and Travis admitted that he

had scratched himself in an effort to get Girlfriend arrested.

¶6 Travis appeared to be on the verge of passing out, so Jones

put him to bed and told the couple to stay away from each other.

Jones also told them that if they wanted to make a police report

they would have to call the sheriff's office because Jones could not

become professionally involved in his own family matters. Jones

left Travis's house after being there a total of fifteen to twenty

minutes and clocked out from his shift a little after 10:00 p.m. Jones

did not arrest or cite Travis, write a report about the incident, or

give Girlfriend written notice of her rights as a domestic violence

victim.

¶7 A short time later, Jones observed on his home computer

that sheriff's deputies had been dispatched to Travis's house. When

the deputies arrived there, they found Girlfriend crying and

obviously distraught, with injuries that included bruising on her

leg. Girlfriend's ten‐year‐old son had also suffered injuries. The

deputies arrested Travis, who was loud, vulgar, and very

aggressive. Deputies also learned that Jones had been at the house

earlier. Jones monitored the situation on his police radio, but the

details of what he may have heard are unknown. Later that night,

Girlfriend called Jones again. Jones assumed that Girlfriend was

calling about Travis and did not answer his phone.

¶8 The next morning, Jones went to visit Travis in jail. Travis

was in a holding cell near the booking counter, and the sheriff's

20120754‐CA 3 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

deputy working at the counter overheard parts of their

conversation. Jones told Travis that Jones had been at Travis's

house the night before, that Travis was passed out in his bed while

Jones was there, and that Travis needed to do something about his

drinking. As Jones was leaving, he spoke with the deputy directly

about the prior evening's events and repeated his statement that

Travis was passed out while Jones was at the house. He also told

the deputy that Girlfriend had indicated in the phone call that he

needed to come over to "talk or take care of” Travis.

¶9 As a result of these incidents, the State charged Jones with

official neglect and misconduct—or, in the alternative, the lesser

offense of official misconduct—for his handling of the incident

between Travis and Girlfriend on the night of February 15. The

State's theory of misconduct under both counts was that Jones had

failed to comply with the requirements imposed on law

enforcement officers by Utah's Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act,

see Utah Code Ann. §§ 77‐36‐1 to ‐10 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp.

2013). The State also charged Jones with witness tampering because

of his statements to Travis during the jail visit the next morning,

where he told Travis that he had been passed out during Jones's

visit.

¶10 At Jones's preliminary hearing, the State called only three

witnesses. Craig Gibson, the State's investigator, testified about his

March 7, 2011 interview of Jones, a transcript of which was

admitted into the record.2 Sheriff's Deputy Richard Jones described

his response to the dispatch call from Travis's house on the night

of February 15 after Jones had been there. And Sheriff's Deputy

Trace Thomsen testified about statements that Jones made to both

him and Travis at the jail on the morning of February 16.

¶11 After the preliminary hearing, Jones filed a motion to

dismiss, which the magistrate granted as to all three counts. In its

2. The interview focused on Jones's actions on the night of February

15, and there were no questions or discussions about his visit to

Travis in jail the next morning.

20120754‐CA 4 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

dismissal order, the magistrate ruled that the State had failed to

demonstrate probable cause to believe that Jones had committed

any of the three charged crimes. As to the official neglect and

misconduct charge, the magistrate ruled that Jones was only

alleged to have violated his duty as a police officer, not as a

municipal officer as required by Utah Code section 10‐3‐826, and

that the appropriate misconduct charge was therefore official

misconduct pursuant to section 76‐8‐201. As to the official

misconduct charge, the magistrate ruled that Jones was under no

obligation to comply with the duties imposed upon police officers

responding to domestic violence incidents because he went to

Travis and Girlfriend's house as a family member, Girlfriend's call

did not mention domestic violence, and there was no altercation

occurring when Jones arrived at the house. Finally, as to the charge

of witness tampering, the magistrate ruled that there was no

evidence of one of the elements of the crime: that Jones believed

that an official proceeding relating to his actions was pending or

about to be initiated at the time he spoke to Travis in the jail. The

State appeals from the magistrate's dismissal order.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 The State argues that the magistrate erred in dismissing each

of the three charges against Jones at the bindover stage. The

magistrate's bindover decision "is a mixed determination that is

entitled to some limited deference.” State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37,

¶ 12, 305 P.3d 1058; see also State v. Machan, 2013 UT 72, ¶ 18, 322

P.3d 655 (describing the magistrate's discretion at the bindover

stage as "limited discretion”). The State is entitled to have a

defendant bound over for trial if it presents "evidence sufficient to

support a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the

charged crime,” and in making its bindover determination the

magistrate "must view all evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of the prosecution.” Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ¶ 14 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).

20120754‐CA 5 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

ANALYSIS

¶13 The magistrate dismissed the three counts against Jones on

three distinct rationales. We examine each of the magistrate's

rulings in turn and determine that each ruling was an appropriate

exercise of the magistrate's "limited discretion.” See Machan, 2013

UT 72, ¶ 18.

I. Official Neglect and Misconduct

¶14 The magistrate first addressed the charge of official neglect

and misconduct. Official neglect and misconduct, a class A

misdemeanor, occurs when "any municipal officer shall at any time

wilfully omit to perform any duty, or wilfully and corruptly be

guilty of oppression, malconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance in

office.” Utah Code Ann. § 10‐3‐826 (LexisNexis 2012).3 The State

charged Jones with one count of official neglect and misconduct,

alleging that, as the Kamas police chief, Jones was a municipal

officer and that he failed to perform his duties when he did not

comply with the requirements of the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures

Act (the Act) while responding to an incident of domestic violence

at Travis's house.4

3. In addition to constituting a class A misdemeanor, conviction of

a municipal officer for official neglect and misconduct also

mandates removal from office and ineligibility "for any municipal

office thereafter.” See Utah Code Ann. § 10‐3‐826 (LexisNexis 2012).

4. The Act imposes various duties on law enforcement officers

responding to reports of domestic violence. Among these duties are

that "[a] law enforcement officer who responds to an allegation of

domestic violence shall use all reasonable means to protect the

victim and prevent further violence,” Utah Code Ann. § 77‐36‐

2.1(1) (LexisNexis 2012), and "shall give written notice to the victim

in simple language, describing the rights and remedies available”

to the victim under Utah statutes addressing cohabitant abuse and

child protective orders, id. § 77‐36‐2.1(2)(a). The Act requires that

(continued...)

20120754‐CA 6 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

¶15 In dismissing the official neglect and misconduct charge, the

magistrate concluded that Utah Code section 10‐3‐826 "talks about

official neglect and misconduct and encompasses the special

functions of the municipal officer” and that "[t]hose types of

functions do not relate to the general duties of a police officer.” The

magistrate also referred to Kamas City Ordinance #02‐1, which

governs the Kamas police department,5 to determine that Jones was

alleged to have violated not his duties as the police chief but rather

his general duties as a police officer under paragraph 3 of the

ordinance. See Kamas, Utah, Ordinance #02‐1, para. 03 (May 28,

2002) (enumerating the additional powers and duties of

policemen). Accordingly, the magistrate concluded that the

4. (...continued)

a law enforcement officer responding to a domestic violence call

"shall arrest without a warrant or shall issue a citation to any

person that the peace officer has probable cause to believe has

committed an act of domestic violence.” Id. § 77‐36‐2.2(2)(a) (Supp.

2013). The Act also imposes certain reporting requirements,

including the requirement that an officer "who does not make an

arrest after investigating a complaint of domestic violence . . . shall

submit a detailed, written report specifying the grounds for not

arresting any party.” Id. § 77‐36‐2.2(5)(a). Additionally, "[a] law

enforcement officer responding to a complaint of domestic violence

shall prepare an incident report that includes the officer's

disposition of the case.” Id. § 77‐36‐2.2(6)(a). It is undisputed in this

case that Jones did not give Girlfriend written notice of her rights

and remedies, did not arrest or cite Travis for domestic violence,

and did not file either a failure‐to‐arrest report or an incident

report.

5. Kamas City Ordinance #02‐1 establishes both the Kamas Police

Department and the position of chief of police. See Kamas, Utah,

Ordinance #02‐1, para. 01 (May 28, 2002). Certain duties under the

ordinance are exclusive to the municipal office of police chief,

including the duty to "organize, supervise, and be responsible for

all the activities of the police department” and to "execute all

lawful orders of the Mayor and City Council.” See id. para. 02.

20120754‐CA 7 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

appropriate charge was official misconduct under Utah Code

section 76‐8‐201 and declined to bind Jones over on official neglect

and misconduct under section 10‐3‐826.

¶16 We agree with the magistrate's legal ruling regarding the

meaning of the statute and ordinance. There was no evidence that

Jones was acting in his capacity as the police chief—i.e., failing to

perform a duty arising exclusively from his status as the police

chief—when he went to Travis's house on the night of February 15.

Cf. State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

(interpreting official misconduct statute to apply only to public

servants acting in their capacity as public servants). Any duties

under the Act arose only due to Jones's general status as a police

officer. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77‐36‐2.1(1) (LexisNexis 2012)

("A law enforcement officer who responds to an allegation of

domestic violence shall use all reasonable means to protect the

victim . . . .” (emphasis added)). Further, to the extent that Kamas

City Ordinance #02‐1 imposed an independent duty on Jones to

comply with the Act, that duty applied to all Kamas police officers

and not exclusively to the police chief. See Kamas, Utah, Ordinance

#02‐1, para. 03 ("The chief of police and all police officers of the

City shall have the following powers and duties . . . .”).

¶17 In sum, the magistrate correctly interpreted Utah Code

section 10‐3‐826 as being limited to acts or omissions relating to the

special functions of a municipal officer in his or her capacity as a

municipal officer. The magistrate also properly determined that

there is no evidence that Jones failed to perform any duty imposed

upon him by virtue of his status as the Kamas police chief, as

opposed to his status as a Kamas police officer or a police officer

generally. Accordingly, the magistrate appropriately declined to

bind Jones over for trial on the charge of official neglect and

misconduct under Utah Code section 10‐3‐826.

II. Official Misconduct

¶18 The magistrate next addressed the State's alternative charge

of official misconduct, a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann.

§ 76‐8‐201 (LexisNexis 2012). Official misconduct is committed

20120754‐CA 8 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

when "[a] public servant . . . knowingly refrains from performing

a duty imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of

his office” and does so "with an intent to benefit himself or another

or to harm another.” See id. The State's theory of official misconduct

against Jones was that he was a public servant by virtue of his

status as a police officer, that he failed to comply with his law

enforcement duties under the Act when he responded to

Girlfriend's allegation of domestic violence against Travis, and that

he did so to benefit either himself or Travis.

¶19 The magistrate dismissed the official misconduct charge,

stating that a police officer's duties under the Act "are predicated

on the . . . officer responding to an allegation of domestic violence.”

The magistrate determined that Jones was not responding to an

allegation of domestic violence because Girlfriend called him as

Travis's brother, not as a police officer; Girlfriend's call did not

mention domestic violence; and there was no ongoing altercation

when Jones arrived at Travis's house. The magistrate concluded

that "[t]here is no showing that [Jones] was responding to an

allegation of domestic abuse, [and] therefore the [Act] and the

duties arising under it have no application to [Jones] in this

incident.”

¶20 Again, we agree with the magistrate. The Act does not

impose its duties on all police officers at all times but rather on

police officers who are responding to allegations of domestic

violence. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77‐36‐2.1(1) (LexisNexis 2012)

("A law enforcement officer who responds to an allegation of domestic

violence shall use all reasonable means to protect the victim . . . .”

(emphasis added)). Further, this court has previously determined

that a public servant does not commit the crime of official

misconduct unless he or she acts in the "capacity” of a public

servant. See State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

("[T]he prosecution was required to prove that Tolman . . . acted in

his capacity as a public servant . . . .”). Thus, Jones committed

official misconduct under Utah Code section 76‐8‐201 only if he

failed to perform a duty in his "capacity” as a police officer. See id.

20120754‐CA 9 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

¶21 Although the Act does not provide a definition of the type

of police response that triggers the Act's various duties, a reading

of the Act as a whole indicates that it is intended to apply only to

official police responses to domestic violence. For example, the Act

refers variously to "respond[ing] to an allegation of domestic

violence,” Utah Code Ann. § 77‐36‐2.1(1); "domestic violence

call[s],” id. § 77‐36‐2.2(1) (Supp. 2013); and "complaints of domestic

violence,” id. § 77‐36‐2.2(3). Read in the context of a statute

governing the activities of law enforcement officers, the language

employed by the legislature indicates that the Act's duties apply

only when a police officer is making an official police response to

a domestic violence incident.6

¶22 The State argues that the circumstances surrounding Jones's

visit to Travis's house give rise to a reasonable inference that Jones

was responding in a law enforcement capacity. These

circumstances include the facts that Jones was on duty, in uniform,

and driving a police vehicle; responded immediately to Girlfriend's

call rather than waiting the fifteen minutes until he went off duty;

and investigated the incident at Travis's house "as a police officer

would.” We must accept an inference as reasonable "unless it falls

to a level of inconsistency or incredibility that no reasonable jury

could accept it.” State v. Machan, 2013 UT 72, ¶ 8, 322 P.3d 655

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, we

evaluate proposed inferences under the totality of the

circumstances, not just those circumstances that support the

inference. See State v. Graham, 2013 UT App 109, ¶ 9, 302 P.3d 824

(stating that inferences to support a bindover must be evaluated

"under the totality of the circumstances”).

6. Although we determine that the Act's duties are triggered only

by official responses to domestic violence, we agree with the State

that the Act is not limited to situations where a call to authorities

specifically alleges domestic violence. Police officers have many

different types of official interactions with the public, and whether

any particular incident triggers the Act's duties depends on the

circumstances.

20120754‐CA 10 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

¶23 The totality of the circumstances of the February 15 incident

includes undisputed evidence that Girlfriend called Jones on his

personal cell phone and that Jones responded to that personal call

solely in his capacity as Travis's brother. Gibson, the State's

investigator, testified that he interviewed both Jones and Girlfriend

and that both of them indicated that Jones was not called there in

his police capacity. Thus, neither Jones nor Girlfriend believed

Jones was present as a police officer. The evidence further indicates

that Jones informed Girlfriend at the scene that he could not

become professionally involved because he was Travis's brother

and that Jones repeatedly offered to contact the sheriff's office if

Girlfriend desired official law enforcement involvement.

¶24 Under the totality of the circumstances, we cannot accept as

reasonable the State's proposed inference that Jones responded to

Girlfriend's personal call as a police officer making an official

response to a domestic violence call. The undisputed evidence is

that Jones was summoned and responded solely as a family

member. The evidence that the State relies on—Jones's police

uniform and other accoutrements of official involvement—are

consistent with an inference of official capacity when viewed in

isolation but not when viewed in light of the undisputed testimony

that Jones's visit to Travis's house was purely an unofficial family

matter. In other words, in light of all of the evidence presented to

the magistrate, the inference presented by the State "falls to a level

of inconsistency or incredibility that no reasonable jury could

accept it.” Machan, 2013 UT 72, ¶ 8 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

¶25 In reaching this conclusion, we take some guidance from

two Utah cases addressing the crime of assaulting a peace officer

and, in particular, that crime's element that an assaulted officer be

"acting within the scope of authority as a peace officer” at the time

of the assault. See Utah Code Ann. § 76‐5‐102.4(2)(a) (LexisNexis

Supp. 2013). In State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), a divided

supreme court affirmed the defendant's conviction despite the fact

that the assault occurred as the defendant was resisting an illegal

search by the officer. See id. at 570–75. The court held that, despite

the illegality of the search the officer was still acting within the

20120754‐CA 11 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

scope of his authority at the time of the assault. See id. at 575. In

analyzing the scope of authority question, the court employed the

test of "whether an officer is doing what he or she was employed

to do or is 'engaging in a personal frolic of his [or her] own.'” Id. at

574 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Heliczer, 373

F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1967)).

¶26 In Salt Lake City v. Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, 167 P.3d

496, this court affirmed a conviction for assaulting a peace officer

that arose from a uniformed officer's off‐duty employment as a

hospital security guard. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. The court concluded that the

officer was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace

officer at the time of the assault despite his private employment

status, explaining,

It is true that upon Defendant's arrival at the

emergency room, [the officer] was acting as [a

hospital] employee and not as a peace officer. But

when Defendant took a defensive stance, clenched

his fists, and made verbal threats of physical

violence, [the officer's] primary role shifted from that

of a security guard to that of a peace officer. It was in

his law enforcement capacity that [the officer] took

Defendant under control and prevented the

escalation of further violence.

Id. ¶ 14. The court ultimately held that "when a law enforcement

officer responds to preserve law and order or to detect and deter

crime, he is acting 'within the scope of his authority as a peace

officer' even though he may be working at another job.” Id.

(citation omitted).

¶27 Thus, at least for purposes of the crime of assaulting a peace

officer,7 we know that even a uniformed, on‐duty police officer is

7. In Christensen, the court expressly stated,

Questions about the scope of a peace officer's

(continued...)

20120754‐CA 12 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

not acting within the scope of his law enforcement capacity while

he engages in a "personal frolic.” Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, even off‐duty

officers may act within the scope of their law enforcement capacity

when they act "to preserve law and order or to detect and deter

crime.” Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, ¶ 14; see also id. ("[E]ven

peace officers who are 'off duty' will typically spring into action

when circumstances so require, i.e., when the law has been or is

about to be broken.”).

¶28 Analyzing the evidence presented below through the lenses

of Gardiner and Christensen, Jones's initial decision to go to Travis's

house in response to Girlfriend's personal call can be reasonably

characterized only as a personal frolic to attend to family matters.

When Jones arrived at the house and became aware of Girlfriend's

allegation of domestic violence, he declined to "spring into action”

and treat the situation as a law enforcement matter. See Christensen,

2007 UT App 254, ¶ 14. To the contrary, Jones advised Girlfriend

that he could not become professionally involved because of his

relationship to Travis, and he repeatedly offered to involve the

sheriff's office to respond to the incident in an official law

enforcement capacity. Girlfriend did not object to Jones's

statements and, in fact, endorsed those statements. Furthermore,

Jones observed no visible signs of domestic abuse—other than

Travis's self‐inflicted scratches—and, when Jones left the house, all

was calm and Travis was sleeping in his bed. In short, nothing

7. (...continued)

authority arise in many different contexts, including

respondeat superior, workers' compensation, and

civil rights cases. We specifically note that our

analysis and holding in this case should not be

construed as applying in all contexts in which the

question of an officer's authority may arise.

Salt Lake City v. Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, ¶ 13 n.3, 167 P.3d

496.

20120754‐CA 13 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

occurred during Jones's visit to the house to convert the incident

from a purely personal incident into a law enforcement matter.8

¶29 For all of these reasons, we agree with the magistrate that it

cannot be reasonably inferred from the State's evidence that Jones's

interaction with Travis and Girlfriend on the night of February 15

was anything other than a family matter. Because the evidence

below, presented as a whole, does not support a reasonable

inference that Jones was responding to a domestic violence

allegation in his official capacity, we affirm the magistrate's refusal

to bind Jones over for trial on the charge of official misconduct.

III. Witness Tampering

¶30 Finally, the magistrate addressed the charge of witness

tampering.

A person is guilty of the third degree felony of

tampering with a witness if, believing that an official

proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be

instituted, or with the intent to prevent an official

proceeding or investigation, he attempts to induce or

otherwise cause another person to . . . testify or

inform falsely . . . .

8. We note that the officer in Christensen was not deemed to be

acting in a law enforcement capacity until he reacted to the

defendant's threat of immediate physical violence. See 2007 UT

App 254, ¶ 14. The officer initially remained in his unofficial,

security guard capacity despite his knowledge that the defendant

was a suspect in a recent and serious domestic violence incident. Id.

¶ 3. The officer also remained in his unofficial capacity as he

endured fifteen to twenty minutes of the defendant's "obscene

outbursts,” twice heard the defendant threaten to kill his brother

upon being released from the hospital, and requested police

backup due to the defendant's "large size, belligerent behavior, and

the fact that he was a suspect in a domestic violence incident.” Id.

¶ 4.

20120754‐CA 14 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

Utah Code Ann. § 76‐8‐508(1) (LexisNexis 2012). The State's theory

of witness tampering against Jones was that Jones believed that

there would be an official investigation into his handling of the

incident with Girlfriend and Travis. Jones then attempted to get

Travis to cover up the events of that incident by telling Travis the

next morning that he had been passed out during the time that

Jones was at his house.

¶31 The magistrate dismissed the witness tampering charge after

determining that there was no evidence that an official

investigation into Jones's actions was pending or about to be

instituted at the time he spoke with Travis. Perhaps more

importantly, the magistrate found no evidence that Jones believed

such an investigation was pending. See Melessa v. Randall, 121 F.

App'x 803, 807 (10th Cir. 2005) (interpreting Utah Code section 76‐

8‐508(1) as requiring a defendant's subjective belief "that an official

proceeding or investigation is currently pending or will be initiated

in the future”); State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876–77 (Utah 1985)

(per curiam) ("The statute requires no more than that a defendant

believe an official proceeding or investigation to be underway.”). In

the absence of evidence that Jones believed that an official

investigation into his actions at Travis's house was underway or

would be initiated in the future, the magistrate concluded that the

State had failed to adequately establish an element of the crime of

witness tampering and declined to bind Jones over on that charge.9

¶32 On appeal, the State argues that Jones knew that Travis had

been arrested for domestic violence shortly after Jones left the

house. The State asks us to draw a reasonable inference that the

9. The magistrate also ruled that Travis's potential testimony

would have been irrelevant to any investigation into Jones's actions

because Girlfriend was the only witness to Jones's allegedly

improper response to her allegation of domestic violence against

Travis. We do not address this portion of the magistrate's ruling,

but we note that Girlfriend and Jones both told the State's

investigator that Travis was awake when Jones arrived at the

house.

20120754‐CA 15 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

resulting investigation of Travis would have necessarily led to an

investigation of Jones's actions. The State also argues that the

evidence that Jones "falsely told a certainly hung over and possibly

memory‐impaired Travis” that he was passed out during the

incident gives rise to a reasonable inference that Jones wanted

Travis to repeat the lie to investigators. We cannot accept either of

the State's proposed inferences.

¶33 As discussed above, the totality of the evidence presented at

the preliminary hearing shows that Jones went to Travis's house on

the evening of February 15 solely on a family matter or "personal

frolic” that did not constitute an official response to a domestic

violence allegation. See State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah

1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further,

there is nothing in the evidence to support an inference that, at any

time during Jones's visit, his "primary role shifted from that of a

[family member] to that of a peace officer.” See Salt Lake City v.

Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, ¶ 14, 167 P.3d 496. Thus, the mere

fact that Jones knew of both his own actions and Travis's domestic

violence arrest provided Jones with no reason to believe that his

actions were likely to be the subject of any sort of official

investigation. We cannot infer Jones's belief of an official

investigation from his actions when—based on the evidence

presented below—those actions did not constitute a crime or

otherwise suggest the likelihood of an investigation.

¶34 We also cannot agree that the mere fact that Jones told

Travis that he was passed out gives rise to a reasonable inference

that Jones believed an investigation was impending. See generally

State v. Garcia‐Vargas, 2012 UT App 270, ¶ 17 n.5, 287 P.3d 474

("[A]n inference is a deduction as to the existence of a fact which

human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be

drawn from proof of other facts.” (alteration in original) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)). If there was some

independent reason for Jones to believe that there would be an

investigation, then his statement to Travis might give rise to an

inference that he lied to Travis in order to impede that

investigation. But in the absence of other evidence that Jones

believed an investigation was likely, we cannot "reasonably and

20120754‐CA 16 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

logically” deduce that Jones believed that an investigation was

pending merely from the evidence that he told Travis that he was

passed out. See id.

¶35 "Under Utah law, a magistrate is 'free to decline bindover

where the facts presented by the prosecution provide no more than

a basis for speculation—as opposed to providing a basis for a

reasonable belief.'” State v. Graham, 2013 UT App 109, ¶ 17, 302

P.3d 824 (quoting State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 21, 137 P.3d 787).

"[S]peculation is defined as the 'act or practice of theorizing about

matters over which there is no certain knowledge.'” State v. Hester,

2000 UT App 159, ¶ 16, 3 P.3d 725 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary

1407 (7th ed. 1999)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Clark, 2001

UT 9, 20 P.3d 300. In the absence of any other evidence that Jones

believed that he would be subject to an official investigation, the

State's proposed inference of Jones's belief from his alleged

falsehood to Travis constitutes such speculation.

¶36 The State's proposed inference is also not the only possible

explanation of Jones's statement such that the inference might be

supported as the only explanation available. Indeed, it seems just

as likely that Jones visited Travis in jail simply to check on his

condition and told Travis that he had passed out—which Travis

had apparently done before Jones left the house—so as not to

prompt a discussion of the prior evening's events. If there was

independent evidence to support the State's proposed inference,

then there would be a question for a jury to resolve. See State v.

Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ¶¶ 15–21, 305 P.3d 1058. But we see no other

evidence to support the theory that Jones sought to impede an

investigation of his actions.10 In the absence of such evidence, the

State's proposed inference asks us to infer Jones's belief in an

investigation merely from the allegation that Jones told a falsehood

about the past event that would have been the subject of the

purported investigation. This represents speculation rather than

10. To the contrary, Jones freely discussed the events at Travis's

house with the State's investigator, including the fact that Travis

was not passed out when Jones arrived at the house.

20120754‐CA 17 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

reasoned and logical deduction. See generally Garcia‐Vargas, 2012 UT

App 270, ¶ 17 n.5 (recognizing the "difference between drawing a

reasonable inference and merely speculating about possibilities”).

¶37 For these reasons, the magistrate appropriately determined

that the State failed to produce evidence that Jones believed that

there was, or would be, any official investigation into his actions at

the time he made the alleged false statement to Travis. Because

belief in a present or pending investigation is an element of the

crime of witness tampering as charged against Jones, the

magistrate properly declined to bind Jones over for trial on the

witness tampering charge.

CONCLUSION

¶38 The magistrate appropriately concluded that the State did

not present "evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief” that

Jones violated any official duties during his visit to Travis's house

on February 15 or that he believed that he would face official

investigation when he falsely told Travis the next morning that

Travis had been passed out during the visit. See Maughan, 2013 UT

37, ¶ 14 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

magistrate therefore acted within its "limited discretion” in

dismissing the charges of official neglect and misconduct, official

misconduct, and witness tampering against Jones. See State v.

Machan, 2013 UT 72, ¶ 18, 322 P.3d 655. Accordingly, we affirm the

magistrate's dismissal order.

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge (concurring in part, concurring in the

result in part, and dissenting in part):

¶39 I concur in the lead opinion's analysis in Section I regarding

official neglect and misconduct in violation of Utah Code section

10‐3‐826 and concur in the result as to the conclusion reached in

Section III regarding witness tampering in violation of Utah Code

section 76‐8‐508(1). I disagree, however, with the lead opinion's

20120754‐CA 18 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

determination in Section II that the magistrate correctly dismissed

the charge of official misconduct in violation of Utah Code section

76‐8‐201, which provides that "[a] public servant is guilty of a class

B misdemeanor if, with an intent to benefit himself or another,

he . . . knowingly refrains from performing a duty imposed on him

by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his office.” Utah Code

Ann. § 76‐8‐201 (LexisNexis 2008). The magistrate determined, and

the lead opinion agrees, that because Jones did not initially respond

as a police officer to his brother's house on a domestic‐violence call

but rather as Travis's brother, and because no altercation occurred

in Jones's presence between Travis and Girlfriend, Jones was not

acting in his official capacity as a law enforcement officer and was

thus not required to perform the duties imposed on law

enforcement officers by the Act. See id. § 77‐36‐2.1(1) ("A law

enforcement officer who responds to an allegation of domestic

violence shall use all reasonable means to protect the victim and

prevent further violence . . . .”); id. § 77‐36‐2.2(2)(a) (providing that

an officer responding to a domestic violence call "shall arrest

without a warrant or shall issue a citation to any person that the

peace officer has probable cause to believe has committed an act of

domestic violence”). I respectfully dissent as to Section II.

¶40 To begin, I agree that the Act "does not impose its duties on

all police officers at all times, but rather on police officers who are

responding to allegations of domestic violence.” See supra ¶ 20. I

also agree that the circumstances that prompted Jones's visit to

Travis and Girlfriend's house on February 15, 2011, even while he

was on duty, in uniform, and traveling in his police vehicle, do not

alone give rise to a reasonable inference that Jones was responding

in a law enforcement capacity to a domestic‐violence call. And I

agree that Jones's visit to Travis's house was initially "a purely

unofficial family matter.” See supra ¶ 24. However, I disagree with

the magistrate's and the lead opinion's conclusion that, once he

arrived at his brother's house and was informed of the situation for

which it turns out he had been summoned, Jones did not at that

point have a duty to officially respond as a law enforcement officer

to Girlfriend's allegation of domestic violence. See id. § 77‐36‐2.1(1).

20120754‐CA 19 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

¶41 In my view, the lead opinion incorrectly concludes that

"nothing occurred during Jones's visit to the house to convert the

incident from a purely personal incident into a law enforcement

matter.” See supra ¶ 28. Rather, what admittedly started out as a

"personal frolic” turned into a situation requiring Jones to respond

as a law enforcement officer once he discovered the situation at

Travis and Girlfriend's house. Specifically, Jones arrived at his

brother's residence armed with the knowledge of the violent

history between Travis and Girlfriend and of Travis's tendency to

become violent after consuming alcohol. Upon his arrival, Jones

observed that Travis was intoxicated, found Girlfriend in her car

talking on the phone, and learned from Girlfriend that "Travis was

out of control,” had allegedly kicked Girlfriend in the leg,11 and had

harmed himself.12 Once he received Girlfriend's statement that

Travis had allegedly assaulted her, Jones had a duty as a sworn

peace officer "to preserve law and order [and] to detect and deter

crime, [and act] within the scope of his authority as a peace

officer.” Salt Lake City v. Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, ¶ 14, 167

P.3d 496 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Jones was

therefore obligated to discharge his duties under the Act. See Utah

Code Ann. §§ 77‐36‐2.1, ‐2.2.

¶42 In passing the Act, our legislature has removed some of the

discretion a police officer has in responding to allegations of

11. A criminal assault is, among other things, "an act, committed

with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to

another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.”

Utah Code Ann. § 76‐5‐102(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2012). An allegation

of a kick in the leg can therefore constitute an allegation of assault.

12. It is less clear what duty Jones may have had in response to

Travis's initial allegation of domestic abuse against Girlfriend,

given Travis's later admission that the allegation was false. See

supra ¶ 5. However, because Girlfriend's allegation was sufficient

to trigger Jones's duties under the Act, I express no opinion as to

whether Travis's initial allegations would have also triggered those

duties.

20120754‐CA 20 2014 UT App 142

State v. Jones

domestic violence and has statutorily mandated certain procedures

on the part of those police officers. "[B]ecause domestic violence is

serious in nature and has a high likelihood of repeated violence,

incidents of domestic abuse require the mandatory and immediate

attention of law enforcement.” State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 54 (Utah

Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the policy underlying the legislature's

enactment of Utah Code title 77, chapter 36, then called the Spouse

Abuse Procedures Act); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77‐36‐2.2(1)

("The primary duty of law enforcement officers responding to a

domestic violence call is to protect the victim and enforce the

law.”). Given the mandatory response required by law, once he

became aware of Girlfriend's allegation of domestic violence, Jones

had a duty to use all reasonable means to protect her and to

prevent further violence between Travis and Girlfriend that night.

Whether Jones failed to comply with his law enforcement duties as

required by the Act, and whether such failure was committed

knowingly and with the intent to benefit himself or Travis, see Utah

Code Ann. § 76‐8‐201, are ultimately questions for the fact‐finder.

Consequently, I would reverse the magistrate's dismissal of the

official misconduct charge and remand for further proceedings. I

therefore dissent from the lead opinion on this point.

20120754‐CA 21 2014 UT App 142
Outcome:
Affirmed
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:

About This Case

What was the outcome of State of Utah v. Adam Howard Jones?

The outcome was: Affirmed

Which court heard State of Utah v. Adam Howard Jones?

This case was heard in The Utah Court of Appeals on appeal from the Third District Court, Silver Summit Department, UT. The presiding judge was Greenwood.

Who were the attorneys in State of Utah v. Adam Howard Jones?

Plaintiff's attorney: Sean D. Reyes and John J. Nielsen, Attorneys for Appellant. Defendant's attorney: Ronald J. Yengich, Attorney for Appellee.

When was State of Utah v. Adam Howard Jones decided?

This case was decided on June 10, 2014.