Janice Steidley, David Iski, and Bryce Lair v. John Singer

Claremore, Oklahoma, personal injury lawyers represented the Defendants on defamation theories (Libel/Slander).

On May 22, 2013, Singer filed grievance forms with the Oklahoma Bar Association against Steidley, Iski, Lair, and three other district attorneys from District 12. He attached to the grievances a 28-page document outlining his complaints about the district attorneys and a CD of materials to corroborate his allegations. Singer did not allege, as he did in his federal §1983 case, that the district attorney's office manufactured the evidence of his Giglio impairment, but instead he claimed the district attorneys had "maliciously manufactured a bogus perjury allegation against Singer as punishment for Singer's criticisms and for political benefit." Singer alleged the district attorneys had all violated various rules of professional responsibility, including Rule 8.4 (professional misconduct for engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation); Rules 3.6 and 3.8 (extrajudicial statements); Rule 1.1 (competence); Rule 3.3 (candor towards the tribunal); Rule 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions); and Rule 1.7 (conflict of interest). Singer admitted at trial that the Sunday case was "a central theme" behind his bar complaints and that he was alleging misconduct, not just seeking an investigation.

Singer filed a petition for grand jury investigation on August 26, 2013. In the petition, Singer requested the empaneling of a grand jury to investigate whether Steidley had conspired with others to commit witness tampering in violation of 21 O.S. §§421 and 452; whether Steidley and Lair conspired with others to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications by endeavoring to wiretap employee workspaces in the courthouse in violation of 21 O.S. §421 and 13 O.S. §176.3; whether Steidley had threatened a deputy sheriff with "war" in a text message in violation of 21 O.S. §1172(A)(2); whether Steidley and Lair conspired to falsely report a crime in violation of 21 O.S. §§421 and 589(A); whether Steidley and Iski conspired to willfully omit to perform their duties under the Oklahoma Records Management Act by ordering another person to destroy government emails in violation of 21 O.S. §§421 and 345; whether Steidley attempted to obtain money by false pretenses by using fraudulent data to obtain federal grant money in violation of 21 O.S. §1541.2; and whether Iski intentionally misled a judge in violation of 21 O.S. §554. 4 The petition ended by asking "whether Steidley should be removed from office, pursuant to 22 O.S. §1181, for oppression and corruption in office and willful maladministration" and "[w]hether each crime described above supports Steidley's removal from the office of District Attorney."

On August 29, 2013, a Rogers County district judge issued an order finding that Singer's petition for grand jury investigation "contained a reasonably specific identification of areas to be inquired into" and that it "contained sufficient general allegations to warrant a finding that such inquiry may lead to information which, if true, would warrant a true bill of indictment or action for removal." See 38 O.S. §§101 and 102. Accordingly, Singer and others circulating the petition had 45 days from the entry of the order to obtain a sufficient number of signatures to empanel a grand jury. See 38 O.S. §103. When the signatures were returned, they were not attached to the actual grand jury petition Singer had filed; instead, the signatures were submitted with a one-page summary drafted by Singer of the allegations in the grand jury petition. The court dismissed the petition, finding, "The signatures were contained on an unapproved form, not the judicially-approved petition for grand jury investigation."

Steidley, Iski, and Lair filed a lawsuit against Singer and the other individuals who pursued the grand jury petition, asserting claims for defamation and grand jury libel under 38 O.S. §108. 5 Lair settled his claims and dismissed his petition in 2019. The other defendants were dismissed throughout the pendency of the lawsuit, leaving Singer as the only defendant. After a six-day trial, the jury returned verdicts for Singer on the grand jury libel claims. The jury found in Steidley and Iski's favor, however, on defamation and awarded Steidley $250,000 and Iski $150,000. Singer filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts and a motion for new trial, both of which were denied.

A defamation claim has four elements: "(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either the actionability of the statement irrespective of special damage, or the existence of special damage caused by the publication." Yates v. Gannett Co., Inc., 2022 OK CIV APP 41, ¶14, 523 P.3d 69, 76 (citation omitted). A publication can be defamatory per se, which means "the language used is susceptible of but a single meaning that is opprobrious[,]" or a publication can be defamatory per quod, which means the words are reasonably susceptible of both a defamatory and an innocent meaning. Gaylord Entertainment Co. v. Thompson, 1998 OK 30, ¶35, 958 P.2d 128, 146-7 (providing that a publication is libelous per se if it "exposes any person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or which tends to deprive him of public confidence, or to injure him in his occupation"). If the plaintiff is a public official, he or she must also establish that the defamatory falsehood was made with "actual malice" -- i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Yates, ¶14, 523 P.3d at 76.

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[T]he defendant may deny and offer evidence to disprove the charges made, or he may prove that the matter charged as defamatory was true[.]" 12 O.S. §1444.1. He may also defend himself by proving that the statement, although false and defamatory, "was published or spoken under such circumstances as to render it a privileged communication." Id. A communication is "privileged" if it is made under one of the following circumstances:

First. In any legislative or judicial proceeding or any other proceeding authorized by law;

Second. In the proper discharge of an official duty;

Third. By a fair and true report of any legislative or judicial or other proceeding authorized by law, or anything said in the course thereof, and any and all expressions of opinion in regard thereto, and criticisms thereon, and any and all criticisms upon the official acts of any and all public officers, except where the matter stated of and concerning the official act done, or of the officer, falsely imputes crime to the officer so criticized.

12 O.S. §1443.1(A).

We do not agree. The First Amendment does not shield an individual from liability for defamation. "Although every person is free to speak, write, or publish his sentiments on all subjects, it must not be forgotten that every citizen is responsible for the abuse of that right. . . . Libel is one such abuse." SSS Fence, LLC v. Pendleton, 2023 OK CIV APP 11, ¶16, 528 P.3d 304, 309 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Steidley and Iski contended Singer violated their rights in two distinct ways: by libeling them with false allegations in the §108 judicially approved grand jury petition and by libeling them with false allegations in the unauthorized petition summary that Singer drafted and circulated for signatures. Singer emphasizes on appeal, as he did below, that he merely sought to determine "whether" a grand jury should be empaneled "to investigate" Steidley, Iski, and the others. But there is no question that his unauthorized petition imputed crimes to the persons named therein. And although he was privileged to seek a grand jury investigation, we reiterate that his privilege was a limited one. The Legislature decided, in the public's interest in seeking truth and accountability in public officials, to allow citizens to circulate petitions for the impaneling of a grand jury that contain false, defamatory, and even malicious allegations. It balanced that decision with a public official's interest in not being made to defend defamatory allegations that turn out to be false and malicious by requiring the public's allegations to be made and published in a petition that meets statutory requirements and receives judicial approval. Accordingly, Singer has not shown that his First Amendment rights were infringed upon by a defamation verdict based on publications he made outside of the grand jury process.

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Singer's claimed that he was absolutely privileged to circulate the unauthorized petition under §1443.1 or Kirschstein v. Haynes, 1990 OK 8, 788 P.2d 941. Singer may have drafted the unauthorized petition in connection with a legal proceeding that was "authorized by law" as contemplated by §1443.1, but he published the unauthorized petition outside of that proceeding. Only communications that are published "in any legislative or judicial proceeding or any other proceeding authorized by law" are privileged pursuant to §1443.1. Id. (emphasis added).

After a six-day trial, a jury returned favorable defamation verdicts for Plaintiffs/Appellees Janice Steidley and David Iski and found they were damaged in the respective amounts of $250,000 and $150,000. Defendant/Appellant John Singer (Singer) appeals from the trial court's Journal Entry of Judgment reflecting the verdicts, as well as the Order denying his post-trial motions. Singer claims the court erred by denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the allegedly defamatory publications in this case were privileged and/or were made without malice, and the jury's verdict therefore infringes on his First Amendment rights to free speech. Singer also contends he should have received a new trial because the court improperly instructed the jury about Iski's burden of proof; because there was an erroneous evidentiary ruling; and because the jury's verdicts were inconsistent. Finally, he alleges there are errors in the Journal Entry of Judgment that require correction. We agree the court erred by awarding Steidley and Iski prejudgment interest; post judgment interest was recalculated based on the erroneous inclusion of prejudgment interest. We otherwise identify no errors of law or abuses of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and modify in part.

The court's Journal Entry of Judgment and Order denying Singer's motions for JNOV and for new trial are AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND MODIFIED IN PART.