Justin Hooper v. The City of Tulsa

Justin Hooper and the City of Tulsa dispute whether the Curtis Act, 30 Stat. 495 (1898), grants Tulsa jurisdiction over municipal violations committed by all Tulsa's inhabitants, including Indians, in Indian country. Tulsa issued a traffic citation to Mr. Hooper, an Indian and member of the Choctaw Nation, and he paid a $150 fine for the ticket in Tulsa's Municipal Criminal Court ("municipal court”)



Following the Supreme Court's decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma,1 recognizing that the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation had never been disestablished, Mr. Hooper filed an application for post-conviction relief, arguing the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over his offense because it was a crime committed by an Indian in Indian

country. Tulsa countered that it had jurisdiction over municipal violations committed by its Indian inhabitants stemming from Section 14 of the Curtis Act ("Section 14”), an 1898 statute granting lawmaking authority and jurisdiction to municipalities in the Indian Territory that existed prior to the formation of the state of Oklahoma. The

municipal court agreed with Tulsa and denied Mr. Hooper's application.



On appeal, Mr. Hooper argues the district court erred by granting Tulsa's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss his declaratory judgment claim because Section 14 of the Curtis Act no longer grants power to Tulsa. Mr. Hooper contends the district court also erred in dismissing his appeal of the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief as moot based on the same analysis. Tulsa counters that Section 14 has never been repealed and still grants Tulsa jurisdiction over municipal violations committed by all its inhabitants.2 Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude the district court erred in granting dismissal of Mr. Hooper's declaratory judgment claim because even if the Curtis Act was never repealed, it is no longer applicable to Tulsa. We also agree with Mr. Hooper that the district court erred in dismissing his appeal from the municipal court as moot based on its analysis of Section 14, but we determine the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Hooper's appeal from the municipal court. We therefore reverse the district court's grant of Tulsa's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Mr. Hooper's declaratory judgment claim vacate the district court's dismissal of Mr. Hooper's appeal as moot, direct the district court to dismiss Mr. Hooper's appeal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.



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Mr. Hooper does not dispute that Section 14 provided Tulsa with jurisdiction over municipal violations committed by all its inhabitants, including Indians,11 at the time it was enacted, as Tulsa was a municipality in the Indian Territory, authorized and organized according to chapter twenty-nine of Mansfield's Digest.12See Reply at 2. Rather, Mr. Hooper argues that once Tulsa reorganized under Oklahoma law, Section 14 no longer applied to the city. We agree.

We REVERSE the district court’s grant of Tulsa’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Mr. Hooper’s claim for declaratory judgment, VACATE the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Hooper’s appeal as moot, DIRECT the district court to dismiss Mr. Hooper’s appeal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.