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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MACK CHASON GLISSON
Date: 03-27-2017
Case Number: COA16-517
Judge: J. Douglas McCullough
Court: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
Plaintiff's Attorney:
Assistant Attorney General Jess D. Mekeel
Defendant's Attorney:
Sarah Holladay
Description:
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On 3 February 2014, defendant was indicted for first-degree murder of his wife,
Crystal Dawn Coomer-Glisson (the “victim”), with a superseding indictment issued
7 April 2014.
Attorney Faye Burner (“Burner”) had been appointed to represent defendant
on 29 May 2013. At a 19 May 2014 hearing, Burner informed the trial court that she
had a conflict of interest and filed a motion to withdraw. On 27 May 2014, the trial
court allowed Burner to withdraw as defendant’s counsel.
On 27 May 2014, Susan Ciaravella (“Ciaravella”) was appointed as counsel for
defendant. On 2 June 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion for Court to Set on
Administrative Calendar Opportunity for Defense Counsel to be Heard and Motion
to Continue States Proposed Trial Date.” Ciaravella stated that she had interviewed
defendant on 29 May 2014, was in the process of obtaining discovery from the State,
and objected to “any trial setting” until she could hire an expert to examine defendant,
review discovery, and have an opportunity to secure records. The trial court denied
her motion to continue and agreed to the State’s proposed dates of 4 August 2014 for
the motion and plea deadline and 6 October 2014 for the trial date. By an order
entered 3 June 2014, Burner was to provide Ciaravella with her complete file by
5 June 2014.
On 11 June 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion for Extension of Deadlines
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-905(c)(1)” to extend the deadline for giving notice of
defenses to the State until thirty days prior to trial currently set on 6 October 2014.
On 4 August 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion to Continue Pretrial Motions and
Trial Date.” Ciaravella stated that she was still in the process of obtaining defense
discovery, needed to subpoena additional records and conduct an ongoing defense
investigation, and was still investigating the mental health history of defendant.
Ciaravella requested a status conference in 60 days to determine if the defense had
adequate time to explore the facts, prepare a defense, interview witnesses, and
prepare defense experts. The trial court denied this second motion to continue.
On 7 August 2014, the State filed a discovery request. On the same date,
Ciaravella filed a “Motion & Order to Produce Information Necessary to Adequately
Prepare for Trial & Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-903.” Ciaravella sought the results
of the medical examinations of defendant and the victim’s two children.
On 7 August 2014, the trial court entered an order finding as follows:
defendant’s trial is scheduled for 6 October 2014; defendant permits the State to
inspect the evidence in its possession and which defendant intends to introduce as
evidence at trial; defendant shall produce for the State’s inspection and photocopying,
all results or reports of physical and mental examinations made in connection with
the case which defendant intends to introduce into evidence at trial; defendant shall
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 4 -
permit the State to inspect, examine, and test any physical evidence if defendant
intends to offer such evidence as an exhibit or evidence; defendant shall notify the
State of his intent to offer a defense of alibi, mental infirmity, diminished capacity,
self-defense, voluntary intoxication, and accident; defendant shall disclose to the
State the identity of all alibi witnesses if using an alibi defense; defense shall notify
the State of his intent to offer a defense of duress, entrapment, insanity, automatism,
involuntary intoxication, and specification information as to the nature and extent of
the defense; defendant shall notify the State of any expert defendant expects to call
as a witness; and defendant shall give the State a list of the names of all witnesses
defendant expects to call during trial.
On 19 August 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion to Discover Department of Social
Services Records.” Ciaravella sought records regarding defendant and the victim.
On 27 August 2014, the trial court entered an order requiring Buncombe County
Department of Social Services to disclose all records pertaining to defendant, the
victim, and the victim’s two minor children.
On 8 September 2014, Ciaravella filed a motion entitled “Request for
Disclosure of Witness Bias & Conflicts with Buncombe County Government[,]”
stating that the victim was a former employee of the Buncombe County Sheriff’s
office, the victim had personal relationships with potential witnesses, defendant had
conflicts with Burner, several members of the victim’s family were Buncombe County
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 5 -
employees, and that one of the lead detectives had a personal relationship with one
or more of the victim’s children. By an order entered 16 September 2014, the trial
court denied Ciaravella’s motion.
At a hearing held on 11 September 2014, Ciaravella made a motion to continue
the trial, which was denied in open court.
On 16 September 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion to Recuse Judge Marvin
Pope” stating that Judge Marvin Pope and his wife had a relationship with one or
more of the victim’s family members and that this created “a significant appearance
of impropriety in this case which would tend to undermine the judicial process.” In
an order filed 25 September 2014, Judge Bradley B. Letts denied Ciaravella’s motion
to recuse Judge Marvin Pope and “formally notified and cautioned” Ciaravella that
“the filing of frivolous motions in the future will result in the imposition of sanctions
against her[.]”
On 23 September 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion to Continue Trial
Alternatively, Motion to Withdraw as Counsel.” Ciaravella stated that she conducted
her first interview of defendant on 29 May 2014 and discovered that he had a
“significant mental health history[.]” On 5 June 2014, Ciaravella hired Dr. James
Bellard (“Dr. Bellard”), a forensic psychiatrist, to evaluate defendant for capacity to
proceed, capacity to waive Miranda rights, and his state of mind at the time of the
offense. Ciaravella indicated that Burner had failed to have defendant evaluated by
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 6 -
a mental health professional. Dr. Bellard had not completed his evaluation of
defendant and needed psychological testing to be conducted on defendant, additional
time interviewing defendant, interviews with defendant’s family members, and a
more thorough review of recently received discovery documents. Ciaravella also
stated that on 5 June 2014, she had hired Dr. Wilkie Wilson (“Dr. Wilson”), a
neurpharmacology expert, to assist in her defense due to the fact that defendant was
under the influence of several drugs at the time of the offense. By 17 June 2014,
Ciaravella hired a private investigator to complete a fact investigation and interview
necessary witnesses. The private investigator had not completed the fact
investigation. Ciaravella maintained that Burner had not conducted a fact
investigation in defendant’s case. On 19 September 2014, Ciaravella hired a
psychologist, Dr. James Noble (“Dr. Noble”), to conduct psychological testing on
defendant. Ciaravella stated that Burner failed to conduct psychological testing on
defendant, Dr. Noble had not completed his evaluation, and Dr. Noble had not begun
testing on defendant.
Furthermore, Ciaravella asserted that she made a request for outstanding
discovery on the State to include “DSS Records,” “CME Videos,” and “911 Calls; both
from the defendant’s Involuntary Commitment and his escape from Copestone
Mission Hospital after commitment.” Burner had failed to make these requests.
Ciaravella claimed that she received the foregoing records on 11 September 2014 and
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 7 -
had not had an opportunity to review them. In addition, Ciaravella stated that she
had made several other records requests that were necessary to the defense and that
she had not yet completed review of recently provided discovery by the State.
Ciaravella claimed that the following work remained in order for her to competently
and adequately represent defendant: outstanding records/discovery requests;
outstanding fact investigation; and outstanding trial preparation.
On 24 September 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Notice of Defenses.” She listed the
defenses as mental infirmity, diminished capacity, and voluntary intoxication and
stated that she reasonably expected to call Dr. Bellard, Dr. Noble, and Dr. Wilson as
witnesses at trial.
Following a hearing held on 25 September 2014, the trial court filed an order
on 29 September 2014. The trial court granted Ciaravella’s 23 September 2014
motion to continue, continuing defendant’s trial to the 8 December 2014 term of
Buncombe County Superior Court. The trial court ordered that “[t]his matter shall
not be continued again for any reason other than those proscribed by the North
Carolina General Statutes.” Reports from Dr. Bellard, Dr. Noble, and Dr. Wilson
were ordered to be submitted to defendant and the State on or before
17 November 2014 at 9:30 a.m. Ciaravella’s alternative motion to withdraw as
counsel was denied.
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 8 -
On 25 November 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion to Continue Trial.”
Ciaravella provided that: she had issued a subpoena to Cindy McJunkin, a forensic
interviewer who was a necessary witness for the defense, and had been informed that
she was on extended medical leave and unable to testify at trial on 8 December 2014;
she had only recently, in the past week, received discovery from the State and needed
additional time to interview a State’s witness – inmate Warren Newell; and she
needed to obtain data from defendant’s phone, to obtain data from a computer drive,
and to view the evidence in the case.
By an order filed 4 December 2014, the trial court denied Ciaravella’s motion
to continue, concluding that defendant would not be prejudiced and that Ciaravella
had adequate time to prepare for trial. The trial court concluded that defendant
received original discovery prior to 17 November 2014, including interviews
conducted by Cindy McJunkin, “who defense counsel reports is out on ‘extended leave’
and ‘unavailable’, the defendant having subpoenaed her on November 7, 2014.”
Furthermore, the trial court held that Cindy McJunkin was not a necessary witness
and the State did not intend to offer evidence concerning inmate Warren Newell.
Regarding the cell phone and computer drive data, the trial court held that Ciaravella
knew of her alleged need of possible information from these sources early on and prior
to 17 November 2014 and there was no effort on her part to obtain these items prior
to her latest motion to continue.
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 9 -
Defendant’s trial commenced at the 8 December 2014 criminal session of
Buncombe County Superior Court, the Honorable J. Thomas Davis presiding. The
State’s evidence tended to show that defendant and the victim (the “Glissons”) were
married and lived together with two daughters. At approximately 5:00 a.m. on
22 May 2013, Boyce Hollifield (“Hollifield”), a neighbor, heard arguing coming from
the Glisson’s home. Shortly thereafter, he heard two gunshots. Hollifield went
outside and saw a white truck leaving the Glissons’ driveway. Adrian King (“King”),
a neighbor of the Glissons, testified that in the early morning hours of 22 May 2013,
she went out on her porch and heard the Glissons’ alarm clock. King noticed that the
white truck was gone. King went back into her house and the Glissons’ two daughters
came into her bedroom “screaming, you know, and hollering that their mother was
dead.” King called 911.
The victim was found lying face down on the master bedroom bed. The victim
sustained two gunshot wounds; one on the outside of her upper right arm and the
other towards the back of the neck. The cause of death for the victim was the two
gunshot wounds. Blood testing revealed the presence of methamphetamine,
oxycodone, oxymorphine, and phentermine in the victim’s body at the time of her
death.
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
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Officers searched the Glissons’ home and found pill bottles in several locations
of the house. In the master bedroom, officers discovered shell casings, a box of
ammunition, and a rifle. A bullet was found lodged in the mattress.
Around 6:30 a.m. on 22 May 2013, defendant stopped at a convenience store in
Fairview, North Carolina, and shoplifted food and cigarettes. The location of
defendant’s cell phone was tracked to McDowell County by officers from the McDowell
County Sheriff’s Office. The officers located defendant’s vehicle, a white Chevrolet
pickup truck, abandoned. There was a lever action rifle with two live rounds and one
fired casing found under the seat of the truck. The rifle’s class characteristics
matched the bullet found in the mattress at the Glissons’ residence.
On 24 May 2013, after receiving a call that a “suspicious person” was sitting
behind a convenience store in Old Fort, North Carolina, officers located defendant.
Defendant was secured with handcuffs and patted down. Officers located marijuana,
two pill bottles, wire, keys, a lighter, and cigarettes on defendant’s person. Defendant
informed officers that his name was “Terry” and that he was from Tennessee.
Defendant was taken to the Buncombe County Sheriff’s Office where he
provided officers with a statement. Defendant admitted that he and the victim had
been taking pain pills and smoking methamphetamine. At about 10:00 p.m., he had
heard noises near his window and walked outside with his rifle. He checked around
his residence, but did not find anything. Defendant and the victim started arguing
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 11 -
about whether defendant was the father of one of their daughters when he closed his
eyes and “pulled the trigger twice” while the victim was in the bed. After he shot the
victim, defendant grabbed a few of his belongings, got into his pickup truck, and drove
to a convenience store. Defendant stated that he was eventually caught by a
McDowell County deputy.
On 18 December 2014, a jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder.
Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appeals.
II. Discussion
Defendant presents two issues on appeal. First, defendant contends that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to continue. Second, defendant argues that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. We address each argument in turn.
A. Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Continue
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his rights to present a defense,
due process, confrontation, and effective assistance of counsel when it denied his
motion to continue.
Ordinarily, a motion to continue is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and absent a gross abuse of that discretion, the trial court’s ruling is not subject to review. When a motion to continue raises a constitutional issue, the trial court’s ruling is fully reviewable upon appeal. Even if the motion raises a constitutional issue, a denial of a motion to continue is grounds for a new trial only when defendant shows both that the denial was erroneous and that he suffered prejudice as a result of the error.
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 12 -
State v. Taylor, 354 N.C. 28, 33-34, 550 S.E.2d 141, 146 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
The right to present evidence in one’s own defense is protected under both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. . . [T]he right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one’s own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process. In addition, the right to face one’s accusers and witnesses with other testimony is guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the federal constitution, applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, and by Article I, sections 19 and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. Improper denial of a motion to continue in order to prepare a defense may also constitute violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
State v. Barlowe, 157 N.C. App. 249, 253, 578 S.E.2d 660, 663 (2003) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Our review “requires scrutiny of the record and
consideration of the circumstances of the individual case.” Id.
First, we note that although defendant contends that the trial court denied his
motion to continue, there were a total of five motions to continue made in his case:
2 June 2014; 4 August 2014; 11 September 2014; 23 September 2014; and
25 November 2014. The 11 September 2014 motion was made in open court. The
2 June 2014, 4 August 2014, 11 September 2014, and 25 November 2014 motions to
continue were denied. The fourth motion to continue, made on 23 September 2014,
was granted and continued the trial from 6 October 2014 to 8 December 2014.
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 13 -
Here, defendant claims that his motions to continue should have been granted
under the test discussed in Barlowe because Ciaravella was given “an unreasonably
short period of time” in which to investigate, prepare and present a defense and that
defendant was materially prejudiced by the denial of his motions to continue. We
disagree.
In Barlowe, the defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of her
mother and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Barlowe, 157 N.C. App.
at 249, 578 S.E.2d at 660-61. The evidence at trial indicated that the defendant’s
mother’s was murdered in the garage of her home by the defendant’s then-boyfriend,
that the defendant was present at the house at the time of the murder, and that the
defendant participated in the cleaning of the garage and disposal of her mother’s
body. Id. at 250, 578 S.E.2d at 661. The evidence conflicted as to whether the
defendant joined the defendant’s then-boyfriend in planning and committing the
murder. Id. The State presented expert testimony from a bloodstain expert that the
defendant’s pants tested positive for blood and appeared to be spatter stains, “created
when blood is impacted and sprays out from the point of impact[,]” instead of transfer
stains. Id. at 252, 578 S.E.2d at 662.
The defendant’s counsel in Barlowe made a motion to continue, asserting that
the State had produced a bloodstain pattern report containing the expert’s findings
nine days before trial was to commence. The defendant’s counsel stated that it had
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 14 -
contacted an expert but that the expert would not be able to do an analysis, prepare
counsel for cross-examination, or be able to testify on the scheduled trial date. Id. at
255, 578 S.E.2d at 664. The trial court denied the motion to continue. Id. Two days
prior to trial, the defendant’s counsel submitted a renewed motion to continue, stating
that no expert witnesses were reasonably available to become prepared to testify on
behalf of the defendant on such short notice. This was also denied. Id. at 255-56, 578
S.E.2d at 664-65.
The Barlowe Court stated that some of the factors considered by North
Carolina courts in determining whether a trial court erred in denying a motion to
continue have included:
(1) the diligence of the defendant in preparing for trial and requesting the continuance, (2) the detail and effort with which the defendant communicates to the court the expected evidence or testimony, (3) the materiality of the expected evidence to the defendant’s case, and (4) the gravity of the harm defendant might suffer as a result of a denial of the continuance.
Id. at 254, 578 S.E.2d at 663 (citations omitted).
The Court then held that the denial of the defendant’s motion to continue was
error and violated her constitutional rights to confront her accusers, effective
assistance of counsel, and due process. Id. at 257, 578 S.E.2d at 665. Our Court
provided as follows: that it did not appear that the defendant unreasonably delayed
discovery efforts; the defendant showed that none of the experts contacted by her
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 15 -
counsel would have been available for trial; the three day delay between when the
defendant claimed to have received the State’s expert witness report and filing of the
motion to continue was not unreasonable; that the defense counsel provided the
names of witnesses and substance of testimony they hoped to obtain by virtue of a
continuance; and it was “clear that the blood spatter evidence was critical” to the
State’s case because it was the only physical evidence potentially placing the
defendant at the scene at the time of the murder. Id. at 257-58, 578 S.E.2d at 665.
Defendant contends that because Ciaravella “immediately” filed a motion to
continue after she was appointed and renewed it throughout her representation, the
first factor in Barlowe was satisfied. Next, defendant asserts that the second factor
in Barlowe was satisfied because Ciaravella identified three necessary expert
witnesses by name and profession and laid out the specific tasks these experts would
need to complete, questions they would address, and the time required to do so. As
to the third factor in Barlowe, defendant argues that because the question before the
jury was “what type of homicide he had committed,” a material determination would
turn on defendant’s mental state at the time of the victim’s murder. For the final
factor, defendant argues that like the Barlowe defendant, defendant faced life without
the possibility of parole, “no greater penalty in our criminal justice system short of
execution.”
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 16 -
After thorough review, we find the circumstances of defendant’s case to be
distinguishable from those found in Barlowe. In Barlowe, the defendant’s counsel
received a bloodstain pattern report just nine days before trial and attempted
unsuccessfully to obtain its own expert. Here, Ciaravella was appointed to serve as
defendant’s counsel on 27 May 2014 and had approximately six months to prepare
for trial. There was no last minute evidence presented by the State that defendant
needed to refute. In Barlowe, the defendant demonstrated that none of the experts
she had contacted would have been available for trial. In the present case, Ciaravella
asserted in her fourth motion to continue that necessary expert witnesses, Dr.
Bellard, Dr. Noble, and Dr. Wilson, had not completed their evaluations of defendant
and that Ciaravella needed additional time to receive and review discovery requests,
complete her fact investigation, and complete trial preparation. The trial court
granted this motion, continuing the matter from 6 October 2014 to 8 December 2014,
and ordered that reports from Dr. Bellard, Dr. Noble, and Dr. Wilson be submitted to
counsel for defendant and to the State on or before 17 November 2014 at 9:30 a.m.
Significantly, the trial court also included as follows: “This matter shall not be
continued again for any reason other than those ‘proscribed’ by the North Carolina
General Statutes.” In her fifth and final motion to continue, Ciaravella stated that a
forensic interviewer, Cindy McJunkin, was a necessary witness, was on extended
medical leave, and was unavailable to testify on 8 December 2016. She also argued
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 17 -
that she needed additional time to investigate and interview Warren Newell, an
inmate, whose audio interviews were turned over to the defense on
17 November 2014. However, the trial court concluded that Cindy McJunkin was not
a necessary witness in the defense, that the State would not be relying on or offering
evidence concerning Warren Newell, and that defendant would not be prejudiced by
the denial of this motion to continue.
Defendant was persistent in that five separate motions to continue were made.
Yet, we are mindful that defendant’s fourth motion to continue was granted,
providing defendant with a two month continuance. Defendant also provided detail
in the communications to the court regarding the expected evidence or testimony but
defendant was ultimately unable to establish the materiality of the expected evidence
to defendant’s case. Defendant argues that he was prevented from establishing a
mental health defense absent expert testimony. However, the record shows that
Ciaravella submitted a completed report to the State from Dr. Bellard on
16 November 2014. In the last motion to continue, made on 24 November 2014,
defendant did not indicate that Dr. Bellard’s report was incomplete or that Dr. Noble
and Dr. Wilson needed additional time for evaluations and reports. At trial, Dr.
Bellard was on defendant’s proposed witness list and Ciaravella stated in her opening
statement that Dr. Bellard would testify. Ciaravella’s decision in not calling Dr.
Bellard to testify appears to have been a strategic one. Defendant was also unable to
demonstrate how he would be prejudiced as a result of the denial of the motions to
continue.
Considering the factors our courts have said are relevant to a determination of
whether the denial of a motion to continue implicates constitutional guarantees, we
hold that the denial of defendant’s motions to continue did not amount to error.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Defendant argues that his conviction should be vacated because his first
appointed counsel, Burner, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically,
defendant contends that the year in which she served as defense counsel, she failed
to conduct an investigation, interviewed no witnesses, and did not consult with
mental health experts. Defendant asserts that when Burner withdrew, “it was for
reasons she would have been aware shortly after her appointment[]” and that she did
not provide effective assistance of counsel because “she was paralyzed by her conflict
of interest.” Moreover, citing to United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 80 L. Ed. 2d
657 (1984), defendant argues prejudice is presumed because Burner’s deficient
performance rendered Ciaravella “unable to subject the State’s case to a meaningful
adversarial testing.”
To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and then that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Deficient performance may be established by showing that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Generally, to establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316, 626 S.E.2d 271, 286 (2006) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). “This Court has held that [c]ounsel is given wide latitude in matters
of strategy, and the burden to show that counsel’s performance fell short of the
required standard is a heavy one for defendant to bear. Moreover, this Court indulges
the presumption that trial counsel’s representation is within the boundaries of
acceptable professional conduct.” State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 690, 617 S.E.2d 1,
30 (2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In Cronic, the United States Supreme Court identified three instances “so
likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular
case is unjustified.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 667. Such circumstances
include when (1) there is a “complete denial of counsel”; (2) “counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing”; and (3) “when
although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that
any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small
that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct
of the trial.” Id. at 659-60, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 668-69.
Reviewing the record, we reject defendant’s argument that his case falls under
any of the circumstances enumerated in Cronic where prejudice is presumed.
Defendant was not under a complete denial of counsel; there was evidence that at the
very least, Burner met with defendant multiple times and had requested and
reviewed discovery; and defendant’s situation was not one in which any lawyer could
not provide effective assistance. Accordingly, defendant must show that his defense
was prejudiced, but merely argues that six months was insufficient for Ciaravella to
investigate and prepare a mental health defense with experts and that he was “forced
to trial with no experts[.]” As previously discussed, the record demonstrated that
although Ciaravella was prepared to submit testimony from Dr. Bellard and stated
the intent to do so, she abstained from calling him as a witness. Thus, we hold that
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail.
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On 3 February 2014, defendant was indicted for first-degree murder of his wife,
Crystal Dawn Coomer-Glisson (the “victim”), with a superseding indictment issued
7 April 2014.
Attorney Faye Burner (“Burner”) had been appointed to represent defendant
on 29 May 2013. At a 19 May 2014 hearing, Burner informed the trial court that she
had a conflict of interest and filed a motion to withdraw. On 27 May 2014, the trial
court allowed Burner to withdraw as defendant’s counsel.
On 27 May 2014, Susan Ciaravella (“Ciaravella”) was appointed as counsel for
defendant. On 2 June 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion for Court to Set on
Administrative Calendar Opportunity for Defense Counsel to be Heard and Motion
to Continue States Proposed Trial Date.” Ciaravella stated that she had interviewed
defendant on 29 May 2014, was in the process of obtaining discovery from the State,
and objected to “any trial setting” until she could hire an expert to examine defendant,
review discovery, and have an opportunity to secure records. The trial court denied
her motion to continue and agreed to the State’s proposed dates of 4 August 2014 for
the motion and plea deadline and 6 October 2014 for the trial date. By an order
entered 3 June 2014, Burner was to provide Ciaravella with her complete file by
5 June 2014.
On 11 June 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion for Extension of Deadlines
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-905(c)(1)” to extend the deadline for giving notice of
defenses to the State until thirty days prior to trial currently set on 6 October 2014.
On 4 August 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion to Continue Pretrial Motions and
Trial Date.” Ciaravella stated that she was still in the process of obtaining defense
discovery, needed to subpoena additional records and conduct an ongoing defense
investigation, and was still investigating the mental health history of defendant.
Ciaravella requested a status conference in 60 days to determine if the defense had
adequate time to explore the facts, prepare a defense, interview witnesses, and
prepare defense experts. The trial court denied this second motion to continue.
On 7 August 2014, the State filed a discovery request. On the same date,
Ciaravella filed a “Motion & Order to Produce Information Necessary to Adequately
Prepare for Trial & Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-903.” Ciaravella sought the results
of the medical examinations of defendant and the victim’s two children.
On 7 August 2014, the trial court entered an order finding as follows:
defendant’s trial is scheduled for 6 October 2014; defendant permits the State to
inspect the evidence in its possession and which defendant intends to introduce as
evidence at trial; defendant shall produce for the State’s inspection and photocopying,
all results or reports of physical and mental examinations made in connection with
the case which defendant intends to introduce into evidence at trial; defendant shall
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 4 -
permit the State to inspect, examine, and test any physical evidence if defendant
intends to offer such evidence as an exhibit or evidence; defendant shall notify the
State of his intent to offer a defense of alibi, mental infirmity, diminished capacity,
self-defense, voluntary intoxication, and accident; defendant shall disclose to the
State the identity of all alibi witnesses if using an alibi defense; defense shall notify
the State of his intent to offer a defense of duress, entrapment, insanity, automatism,
involuntary intoxication, and specification information as to the nature and extent of
the defense; defendant shall notify the State of any expert defendant expects to call
as a witness; and defendant shall give the State a list of the names of all witnesses
defendant expects to call during trial.
On 19 August 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion to Discover Department of Social
Services Records.” Ciaravella sought records regarding defendant and the victim.
On 27 August 2014, the trial court entered an order requiring Buncombe County
Department of Social Services to disclose all records pertaining to defendant, the
victim, and the victim’s two minor children.
On 8 September 2014, Ciaravella filed a motion entitled “Request for
Disclosure of Witness Bias & Conflicts with Buncombe County Government[,]”
stating that the victim was a former employee of the Buncombe County Sheriff’s
office, the victim had personal relationships with potential witnesses, defendant had
conflicts with Burner, several members of the victim’s family were Buncombe County
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 5 -
employees, and that one of the lead detectives had a personal relationship with one
or more of the victim’s children. By an order entered 16 September 2014, the trial
court denied Ciaravella’s motion.
At a hearing held on 11 September 2014, Ciaravella made a motion to continue
the trial, which was denied in open court.
On 16 September 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion to Recuse Judge Marvin
Pope” stating that Judge Marvin Pope and his wife had a relationship with one or
more of the victim’s family members and that this created “a significant appearance
of impropriety in this case which would tend to undermine the judicial process.” In
an order filed 25 September 2014, Judge Bradley B. Letts denied Ciaravella’s motion
to recuse Judge Marvin Pope and “formally notified and cautioned” Ciaravella that
“the filing of frivolous motions in the future will result in the imposition of sanctions
against her[.]”
On 23 September 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion to Continue Trial
Alternatively, Motion to Withdraw as Counsel.” Ciaravella stated that she conducted
her first interview of defendant on 29 May 2014 and discovered that he had a
“significant mental health history[.]” On 5 June 2014, Ciaravella hired Dr. James
Bellard (“Dr. Bellard”), a forensic psychiatrist, to evaluate defendant for capacity to
proceed, capacity to waive Miranda rights, and his state of mind at the time of the
offense. Ciaravella indicated that Burner had failed to have defendant evaluated by
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 6 -
a mental health professional. Dr. Bellard had not completed his evaluation of
defendant and needed psychological testing to be conducted on defendant, additional
time interviewing defendant, interviews with defendant’s family members, and a
more thorough review of recently received discovery documents. Ciaravella also
stated that on 5 June 2014, she had hired Dr. Wilkie Wilson (“Dr. Wilson”), a
neurpharmacology expert, to assist in her defense due to the fact that defendant was
under the influence of several drugs at the time of the offense. By 17 June 2014,
Ciaravella hired a private investigator to complete a fact investigation and interview
necessary witnesses. The private investigator had not completed the fact
investigation. Ciaravella maintained that Burner had not conducted a fact
investigation in defendant’s case. On 19 September 2014, Ciaravella hired a
psychologist, Dr. James Noble (“Dr. Noble”), to conduct psychological testing on
defendant. Ciaravella stated that Burner failed to conduct psychological testing on
defendant, Dr. Noble had not completed his evaluation, and Dr. Noble had not begun
testing on defendant.
Furthermore, Ciaravella asserted that she made a request for outstanding
discovery on the State to include “DSS Records,” “CME Videos,” and “911 Calls; both
from the defendant’s Involuntary Commitment and his escape from Copestone
Mission Hospital after commitment.” Burner had failed to make these requests.
Ciaravella claimed that she received the foregoing records on 11 September 2014 and
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 7 -
had not had an opportunity to review them. In addition, Ciaravella stated that she
had made several other records requests that were necessary to the defense and that
she had not yet completed review of recently provided discovery by the State.
Ciaravella claimed that the following work remained in order for her to competently
and adequately represent defendant: outstanding records/discovery requests;
outstanding fact investigation; and outstanding trial preparation.
On 24 September 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Notice of Defenses.” She listed the
defenses as mental infirmity, diminished capacity, and voluntary intoxication and
stated that she reasonably expected to call Dr. Bellard, Dr. Noble, and Dr. Wilson as
witnesses at trial.
Following a hearing held on 25 September 2014, the trial court filed an order
on 29 September 2014. The trial court granted Ciaravella’s 23 September 2014
motion to continue, continuing defendant’s trial to the 8 December 2014 term of
Buncombe County Superior Court. The trial court ordered that “[t]his matter shall
not be continued again for any reason other than those proscribed by the North
Carolina General Statutes.” Reports from Dr. Bellard, Dr. Noble, and Dr. Wilson
were ordered to be submitted to defendant and the State on or before
17 November 2014 at 9:30 a.m. Ciaravella’s alternative motion to withdraw as
counsel was denied.
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 8 -
On 25 November 2014, Ciaravella filed a “Motion to Continue Trial.”
Ciaravella provided that: she had issued a subpoena to Cindy McJunkin, a forensic
interviewer who was a necessary witness for the defense, and had been informed that
she was on extended medical leave and unable to testify at trial on 8 December 2014;
she had only recently, in the past week, received discovery from the State and needed
additional time to interview a State’s witness – inmate Warren Newell; and she
needed to obtain data from defendant’s phone, to obtain data from a computer drive,
and to view the evidence in the case.
By an order filed 4 December 2014, the trial court denied Ciaravella’s motion
to continue, concluding that defendant would not be prejudiced and that Ciaravella
had adequate time to prepare for trial. The trial court concluded that defendant
received original discovery prior to 17 November 2014, including interviews
conducted by Cindy McJunkin, “who defense counsel reports is out on ‘extended leave’
and ‘unavailable’, the defendant having subpoenaed her on November 7, 2014.”
Furthermore, the trial court held that Cindy McJunkin was not a necessary witness
and the State did not intend to offer evidence concerning inmate Warren Newell.
Regarding the cell phone and computer drive data, the trial court held that Ciaravella
knew of her alleged need of possible information from these sources early on and prior
to 17 November 2014 and there was no effort on her part to obtain these items prior
to her latest motion to continue.
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 9 -
Defendant’s trial commenced at the 8 December 2014 criminal session of
Buncombe County Superior Court, the Honorable J. Thomas Davis presiding. The
State’s evidence tended to show that defendant and the victim (the “Glissons”) were
married and lived together with two daughters. At approximately 5:00 a.m. on
22 May 2013, Boyce Hollifield (“Hollifield”), a neighbor, heard arguing coming from
the Glisson’s home. Shortly thereafter, he heard two gunshots. Hollifield went
outside and saw a white truck leaving the Glissons’ driveway. Adrian King (“King”),
a neighbor of the Glissons, testified that in the early morning hours of 22 May 2013,
she went out on her porch and heard the Glissons’ alarm clock. King noticed that the
white truck was gone. King went back into her house and the Glissons’ two daughters
came into her bedroom “screaming, you know, and hollering that their mother was
dead.” King called 911.
The victim was found lying face down on the master bedroom bed. The victim
sustained two gunshot wounds; one on the outside of her upper right arm and the
other towards the back of the neck. The cause of death for the victim was the two
gunshot wounds. Blood testing revealed the presence of methamphetamine,
oxycodone, oxymorphine, and phentermine in the victim’s body at the time of her
death.
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 10 -
Officers searched the Glissons’ home and found pill bottles in several locations
of the house. In the master bedroom, officers discovered shell casings, a box of
ammunition, and a rifle. A bullet was found lodged in the mattress.
Around 6:30 a.m. on 22 May 2013, defendant stopped at a convenience store in
Fairview, North Carolina, and shoplifted food and cigarettes. The location of
defendant’s cell phone was tracked to McDowell County by officers from the McDowell
County Sheriff’s Office. The officers located defendant’s vehicle, a white Chevrolet
pickup truck, abandoned. There was a lever action rifle with two live rounds and one
fired casing found under the seat of the truck. The rifle’s class characteristics
matched the bullet found in the mattress at the Glissons’ residence.
On 24 May 2013, after receiving a call that a “suspicious person” was sitting
behind a convenience store in Old Fort, North Carolina, officers located defendant.
Defendant was secured with handcuffs and patted down. Officers located marijuana,
two pill bottles, wire, keys, a lighter, and cigarettes on defendant’s person. Defendant
informed officers that his name was “Terry” and that he was from Tennessee.
Defendant was taken to the Buncombe County Sheriff’s Office where he
provided officers with a statement. Defendant admitted that he and the victim had
been taking pain pills and smoking methamphetamine. At about 10:00 p.m., he had
heard noises near his window and walked outside with his rifle. He checked around
his residence, but did not find anything. Defendant and the victim started arguing
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 11 -
about whether defendant was the father of one of their daughters when he closed his
eyes and “pulled the trigger twice” while the victim was in the bed. After he shot the
victim, defendant grabbed a few of his belongings, got into his pickup truck, and drove
to a convenience store. Defendant stated that he was eventually caught by a
McDowell County deputy.
On 18 December 2014, a jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder.
Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appeals.
II. Discussion
Defendant presents two issues on appeal. First, defendant contends that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to continue. Second, defendant argues that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. We address each argument in turn.
A. Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Continue
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his rights to present a defense,
due process, confrontation, and effective assistance of counsel when it denied his
motion to continue.
Ordinarily, a motion to continue is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and absent a gross abuse of that discretion, the trial court’s ruling is not subject to review. When a motion to continue raises a constitutional issue, the trial court’s ruling is fully reviewable upon appeal. Even if the motion raises a constitutional issue, a denial of a motion to continue is grounds for a new trial only when defendant shows both that the denial was erroneous and that he suffered prejudice as a result of the error.
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
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State v. Taylor, 354 N.C. 28, 33-34, 550 S.E.2d 141, 146 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
The right to present evidence in one’s own defense is protected under both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. . . [T]he right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one’s own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process. In addition, the right to face one’s accusers and witnesses with other testimony is guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the federal constitution, applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, and by Article I, sections 19 and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. Improper denial of a motion to continue in order to prepare a defense may also constitute violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
State v. Barlowe, 157 N.C. App. 249, 253, 578 S.E.2d 660, 663 (2003) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Our review “requires scrutiny of the record and
consideration of the circumstances of the individual case.” Id.
First, we note that although defendant contends that the trial court denied his
motion to continue, there were a total of five motions to continue made in his case:
2 June 2014; 4 August 2014; 11 September 2014; 23 September 2014; and
25 November 2014. The 11 September 2014 motion was made in open court. The
2 June 2014, 4 August 2014, 11 September 2014, and 25 November 2014 motions to
continue were denied. The fourth motion to continue, made on 23 September 2014,
was granted and continued the trial from 6 October 2014 to 8 December 2014.
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 13 -
Here, defendant claims that his motions to continue should have been granted
under the test discussed in Barlowe because Ciaravella was given “an unreasonably
short period of time” in which to investigate, prepare and present a defense and that
defendant was materially prejudiced by the denial of his motions to continue. We
disagree.
In Barlowe, the defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of her
mother and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Barlowe, 157 N.C. App.
at 249, 578 S.E.2d at 660-61. The evidence at trial indicated that the defendant’s
mother’s was murdered in the garage of her home by the defendant’s then-boyfriend,
that the defendant was present at the house at the time of the murder, and that the
defendant participated in the cleaning of the garage and disposal of her mother’s
body. Id. at 250, 578 S.E.2d at 661. The evidence conflicted as to whether the
defendant joined the defendant’s then-boyfriend in planning and committing the
murder. Id. The State presented expert testimony from a bloodstain expert that the
defendant’s pants tested positive for blood and appeared to be spatter stains, “created
when blood is impacted and sprays out from the point of impact[,]” instead of transfer
stains. Id. at 252, 578 S.E.2d at 662.
The defendant’s counsel in Barlowe made a motion to continue, asserting that
the State had produced a bloodstain pattern report containing the expert’s findings
nine days before trial was to commence. The defendant’s counsel stated that it had
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 14 -
contacted an expert but that the expert would not be able to do an analysis, prepare
counsel for cross-examination, or be able to testify on the scheduled trial date. Id. at
255, 578 S.E.2d at 664. The trial court denied the motion to continue. Id. Two days
prior to trial, the defendant’s counsel submitted a renewed motion to continue, stating
that no expert witnesses were reasonably available to become prepared to testify on
behalf of the defendant on such short notice. This was also denied. Id. at 255-56, 578
S.E.2d at 664-65.
The Barlowe Court stated that some of the factors considered by North
Carolina courts in determining whether a trial court erred in denying a motion to
continue have included:
(1) the diligence of the defendant in preparing for trial and requesting the continuance, (2) the detail and effort with which the defendant communicates to the court the expected evidence or testimony, (3) the materiality of the expected evidence to the defendant’s case, and (4) the gravity of the harm defendant might suffer as a result of a denial of the continuance.
Id. at 254, 578 S.E.2d at 663 (citations omitted).
The Court then held that the denial of the defendant’s motion to continue was
error and violated her constitutional rights to confront her accusers, effective
assistance of counsel, and due process. Id. at 257, 578 S.E.2d at 665. Our Court
provided as follows: that it did not appear that the defendant unreasonably delayed
discovery efforts; the defendant showed that none of the experts contacted by her
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 15 -
counsel would have been available for trial; the three day delay between when the
defendant claimed to have received the State’s expert witness report and filing of the
motion to continue was not unreasonable; that the defense counsel provided the
names of witnesses and substance of testimony they hoped to obtain by virtue of a
continuance; and it was “clear that the blood spatter evidence was critical” to the
State’s case because it was the only physical evidence potentially placing the
defendant at the scene at the time of the murder. Id. at 257-58, 578 S.E.2d at 665.
Defendant contends that because Ciaravella “immediately” filed a motion to
continue after she was appointed and renewed it throughout her representation, the
first factor in Barlowe was satisfied. Next, defendant asserts that the second factor
in Barlowe was satisfied because Ciaravella identified three necessary expert
witnesses by name and profession and laid out the specific tasks these experts would
need to complete, questions they would address, and the time required to do so. As
to the third factor in Barlowe, defendant argues that because the question before the
jury was “what type of homicide he had committed,” a material determination would
turn on defendant’s mental state at the time of the victim’s murder. For the final
factor, defendant argues that like the Barlowe defendant, defendant faced life without
the possibility of parole, “no greater penalty in our criminal justice system short of
execution.”
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 16 -
After thorough review, we find the circumstances of defendant’s case to be
distinguishable from those found in Barlowe. In Barlowe, the defendant’s counsel
received a bloodstain pattern report just nine days before trial and attempted
unsuccessfully to obtain its own expert. Here, Ciaravella was appointed to serve as
defendant’s counsel on 27 May 2014 and had approximately six months to prepare
for trial. There was no last minute evidence presented by the State that defendant
needed to refute. In Barlowe, the defendant demonstrated that none of the experts
she had contacted would have been available for trial. In the present case, Ciaravella
asserted in her fourth motion to continue that necessary expert witnesses, Dr.
Bellard, Dr. Noble, and Dr. Wilson, had not completed their evaluations of defendant
and that Ciaravella needed additional time to receive and review discovery requests,
complete her fact investigation, and complete trial preparation. The trial court
granted this motion, continuing the matter from 6 October 2014 to 8 December 2014,
and ordered that reports from Dr. Bellard, Dr. Noble, and Dr. Wilson be submitted to
counsel for defendant and to the State on or before 17 November 2014 at 9:30 a.m.
Significantly, the trial court also included as follows: “This matter shall not be
continued again for any reason other than those ‘proscribed’ by the North Carolina
General Statutes.” In her fifth and final motion to continue, Ciaravella stated that a
forensic interviewer, Cindy McJunkin, was a necessary witness, was on extended
medical leave, and was unavailable to testify on 8 December 2016. She also argued
STATE V. GLISSON
Opinion of the Court
- 17 -
that she needed additional time to investigate and interview Warren Newell, an
inmate, whose audio interviews were turned over to the defense on
17 November 2014. However, the trial court concluded that Cindy McJunkin was not
a necessary witness in the defense, that the State would not be relying on or offering
evidence concerning Warren Newell, and that defendant would not be prejudiced by
the denial of this motion to continue.
Defendant was persistent in that five separate motions to continue were made.
Yet, we are mindful that defendant’s fourth motion to continue was granted,
providing defendant with a two month continuance. Defendant also provided detail
in the communications to the court regarding the expected evidence or testimony but
defendant was ultimately unable to establish the materiality of the expected evidence
to defendant’s case. Defendant argues that he was prevented from establishing a
mental health defense absent expert testimony. However, the record shows that
Ciaravella submitted a completed report to the State from Dr. Bellard on
16 November 2014. In the last motion to continue, made on 24 November 2014,
defendant did not indicate that Dr. Bellard’s report was incomplete or that Dr. Noble
and Dr. Wilson needed additional time for evaluations and reports. At trial, Dr.
Bellard was on defendant’s proposed witness list and Ciaravella stated in her opening
statement that Dr. Bellard would testify. Ciaravella’s decision in not calling Dr.
Bellard to testify appears to have been a strategic one. Defendant was also unable to
demonstrate how he would be prejudiced as a result of the denial of the motions to
continue.
Considering the factors our courts have said are relevant to a determination of
whether the denial of a motion to continue implicates constitutional guarantees, we
hold that the denial of defendant’s motions to continue did not amount to error.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Defendant argues that his conviction should be vacated because his first
appointed counsel, Burner, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically,
defendant contends that the year in which she served as defense counsel, she failed
to conduct an investigation, interviewed no witnesses, and did not consult with
mental health experts. Defendant asserts that when Burner withdrew, “it was for
reasons she would have been aware shortly after her appointment[]” and that she did
not provide effective assistance of counsel because “she was paralyzed by her conflict
of interest.” Moreover, citing to United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 80 L. Ed. 2d
657 (1984), defendant argues prejudice is presumed because Burner’s deficient
performance rendered Ciaravella “unable to subject the State’s case to a meaningful
adversarial testing.”
To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and then that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Deficient performance may be established by showing that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Generally, to establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316, 626 S.E.2d 271, 286 (2006) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). “This Court has held that [c]ounsel is given wide latitude in matters
of strategy, and the burden to show that counsel’s performance fell short of the
required standard is a heavy one for defendant to bear. Moreover, this Court indulges
the presumption that trial counsel’s representation is within the boundaries of
acceptable professional conduct.” State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 690, 617 S.E.2d 1,
30 (2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In Cronic, the United States Supreme Court identified three instances “so
likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular
case is unjustified.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 667. Such circumstances
include when (1) there is a “complete denial of counsel”; (2) “counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing”; and (3) “when
although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that
any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small
that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct
of the trial.” Id. at 659-60, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 668-69.
Reviewing the record, we reject defendant’s argument that his case falls under
any of the circumstances enumerated in Cronic where prejudice is presumed.
Defendant was not under a complete denial of counsel; there was evidence that at the
very least, Burner met with defendant multiple times and had requested and
reviewed discovery; and defendant’s situation was not one in which any lawyer could
not provide effective assistance. Accordingly, defendant must show that his defense
was prejudiced, but merely argues that six months was insufficient for Ciaravella to
investigate and prepare a mental health defense with experts and that he was “forced
to trial with no experts[.]” As previously discussed, the record demonstrated that
although Ciaravella was prepared to submit testimony from Dr. Bellard and stated
the intent to do so, she abstained from calling him as a witness. Thus, we hold that
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:
About This Case
What was the outcome of STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MACK CHASON GLISSON?
The outcome was: < For the reasons discussed above, we hold that defendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error. >
Which court heard STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MACK CHASON GLISSON?
This case was heard in IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA, NC. The presiding judge was J. Douglas McCullough.
Who were the attorneys in STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MACK CHASON GLISSON?
Plaintiff's attorney: Assistant Attorney General Jess D. Mekeel. Defendant's attorney: Sarah Holladay.
When was STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MACK CHASON GLISSON decided?
This case was decided on March 27, 2017.