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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONIO SHONTARI FARRAR
Date: 03-26-2017
Case Number: COA16-679
Judge: Richard Dietz
Court: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
Plaintiff's Attorney:
Assistant Attorney General
Joseph L. Hyde
Defendant's Attorney:
David Weiss
Description:
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On 1 January 2013, around 7:00 p.m. Defendant Anthonio Farrar and Dontae
Torrence met with Benjamin McDaniel, Jerik Simmons, and Wade Mosley, allegedly
so Torrence could purchase marijuana from McDaniel. Mosley and Simmons typically
accompanied McDaniel to drug sales to offer protection. McDaniel, Simmons, and
Mosley arrived in McDaniel’s car, while Torrence and Farrar arrived on foot. Torrence
entered McDaniel’s car and purchased the marijuana. After the purchase, while
Torrence and Farrar walked away, McDaniel realized that Torrence had given him
counterfeit money. Simmons rolled down the window and called out that the money
was fake. Torrence immediately ran away. Farrar did not run, but continued to walk
slowly away from Simmons and his colleagues.
McDaniel, Simmons, and Mosley then got out of their car and stopped Farrar,
insisting that he pay the money or return the drugs Torrence purchased. After a
scuffle, Farrar shot Simmons in the chest and McDaniel in the back. McDaniel died
from his injuries.
The State and Farrar offered competing versions of the events immediately
before the shooting. Simmons, testifying for the State, explained that he punched
Farrar because Farrar reached for a gun and that Farrar then shot Simmons in the
chest and shot McDaniel in the back. But Simmons admitted that he and his two
colleagues were trying to intimidate Farrar to force him to pay the money they
believed they were owed. The three men were larger than Farrar, and Simmons
admitted that he told Farrar they could “do [him] damage.”
Farrar testified that, when the three men approached him to demand the
money or return of the drugs, they threatened to injure him, McDaniel swung at him,
Simmons punched him, and then someone fired a gun at him. Farrar testified that he
then fired back in self-defense. Farrar testified that he had never fired a gun before.
The State indicted Farrar for first degree murder, attempted first degree
murder, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury.
The jury found Farrar guilty of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him
to 225 to 282 months in prison. Farrar timely appealed.
Analysis
Farrar argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that he had no
criminal record. Farrar contends that the State presented evidence creating an
inference he had a violent criminal history, and that he was entitled to introduce his
lack of a criminal record not as general character evidence, but to rebut the inference
the State created through its own evidence. As explained below, we agree that Farrar
had a right to introduce this evidence, and that its exclusion prejudiced him.
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.
Criminal defendants generally may not introduce evidence of a lack of any
criminal record to show their own good character. State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 200,
376 S.E.2d 745, 750–51 (1989). However, that evidence may be introduced if the State
first “opened the door” to admission of that evidence. State v. Albert, 303 N.C. 173,
177, 277 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1981). “Opening the door refers to the principle that where
one party introduces evidence of a particular fact, the opposing party is entitled to
introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though the rebuttal
evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially.” State v.
Sexton, 336 N.C. 321, 360, 444 S.E.2d 879, 901 (1994).
At trial, the State called Detective Kirk Bynoe of the Violent Criminal
Apprehension Team of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. Bynoe
described the VCAT as a special unit that locates and apprehends “violent criminals,”
“violent fugitives,” and “anybody who has a violent history,” such as “murder, robbery,
[or] rape.” Bynoe testified that when Farrar became a suspect he began to research
him. Bynoe testified that he did a “work up” on Farrar that included a federal
background investigation. Bynoe also prepared a wanted poster on Farrar that he
gave to the VCAT unit. Finally, Bynoe testified that he held a briefing with the VCAT
unit to review the case and inform the team of important information about the case,
including Farrar’s “background to be aware of.”
At the end of Bynoe’s testimony, Farrar sought permission from the trial court
to question Bynoe about Farrar’s lack of any criminal history. Farrar argued that
Bynoe’s testimony opened the door to this evidence. He asserted that, based on
Bynoe’s description of the work of the VCAT unit, his testimony about the background
check “work up” he did on Farrar, and his description of his briefing with the VCAT
unit about Farrar’s “background to be aware of,” the jury reasonably could infer that
Farrar had a criminal history and, in particular, a history of violent crimes that would
lead the VCAT unit to be involved with him. The trial court denied his request,
explaining that the probative value “was very, very de minimis at best . . . . For the
record, the value would be ever so de minimis on the legal probative value on cross
examination of the detective, and the prejudice would heavily outweigh . . . the utility
of that issue.”1
We recognize that the trial court has broad discretion to assess the potential
probative value and accompanying prejudicial effect of evidence. But because the
theme of Farrar’s defense turned so heavily on his argument that he had no
experience with guns, that he was scared, and that he ended up in this violent
confrontation essentially because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time, we
hold that the trial court erred by excluding this rebuttal evidence. We agree with
Farrar that the State’s evidence created an inference that he had a violent criminal
history, which in turn undercut his efforts to suggest to the jury that he was scared
and acted in self-defense when the three men attacked him. Because the inference
that he had a violent criminal history was so damaging to this central theme of his
defense, and because much of the State’s case depended on the credibility of that
defense, we hold that the exclusion of this evidence was prejudicial and entitles
Farrar to a new trial. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1443. Because we vacate and remand
on this ground, we need not address Farrar’s Batson challenge or his other remaining
arguments asserted on appeal.
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On 1 January 2013, around 7:00 p.m. Defendant Anthonio Farrar and Dontae
Torrence met with Benjamin McDaniel, Jerik Simmons, and Wade Mosley, allegedly
so Torrence could purchase marijuana from McDaniel. Mosley and Simmons typically
accompanied McDaniel to drug sales to offer protection. McDaniel, Simmons, and
Mosley arrived in McDaniel’s car, while Torrence and Farrar arrived on foot. Torrence
entered McDaniel’s car and purchased the marijuana. After the purchase, while
Torrence and Farrar walked away, McDaniel realized that Torrence had given him
counterfeit money. Simmons rolled down the window and called out that the money
was fake. Torrence immediately ran away. Farrar did not run, but continued to walk
slowly away from Simmons and his colleagues.
McDaniel, Simmons, and Mosley then got out of their car and stopped Farrar,
insisting that he pay the money or return the drugs Torrence purchased. After a
scuffle, Farrar shot Simmons in the chest and McDaniel in the back. McDaniel died
from his injuries.
The State and Farrar offered competing versions of the events immediately
before the shooting. Simmons, testifying for the State, explained that he punched
Farrar because Farrar reached for a gun and that Farrar then shot Simmons in the
chest and shot McDaniel in the back. But Simmons admitted that he and his two
colleagues were trying to intimidate Farrar to force him to pay the money they
believed they were owed. The three men were larger than Farrar, and Simmons
admitted that he told Farrar they could “do [him] damage.”
Farrar testified that, when the three men approached him to demand the
money or return of the drugs, they threatened to injure him, McDaniel swung at him,
Simmons punched him, and then someone fired a gun at him. Farrar testified that he
then fired back in self-defense. Farrar testified that he had never fired a gun before.
The State indicted Farrar for first degree murder, attempted first degree
murder, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury.
The jury found Farrar guilty of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him
to 225 to 282 months in prison. Farrar timely appealed.
Analysis
Farrar argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that he had no
criminal record. Farrar contends that the State presented evidence creating an
inference he had a violent criminal history, and that he was entitled to introduce his
lack of a criminal record not as general character evidence, but to rebut the inference
the State created through its own evidence. As explained below, we agree that Farrar
had a right to introduce this evidence, and that its exclusion prejudiced him.
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.
Criminal defendants generally may not introduce evidence of a lack of any
criminal record to show their own good character. State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 200,
376 S.E.2d 745, 750–51 (1989). However, that evidence may be introduced if the State
first “opened the door” to admission of that evidence. State v. Albert, 303 N.C. 173,
177, 277 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1981). “Opening the door refers to the principle that where
one party introduces evidence of a particular fact, the opposing party is entitled to
introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though the rebuttal
evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially.” State v.
Sexton, 336 N.C. 321, 360, 444 S.E.2d 879, 901 (1994).
At trial, the State called Detective Kirk Bynoe of the Violent Criminal
Apprehension Team of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. Bynoe
described the VCAT as a special unit that locates and apprehends “violent criminals,”
“violent fugitives,” and “anybody who has a violent history,” such as “murder, robbery,
[or] rape.” Bynoe testified that when Farrar became a suspect he began to research
him. Bynoe testified that he did a “work up” on Farrar that included a federal
background investigation. Bynoe also prepared a wanted poster on Farrar that he
gave to the VCAT unit. Finally, Bynoe testified that he held a briefing with the VCAT
unit to review the case and inform the team of important information about the case,
including Farrar’s “background to be aware of.”
At the end of Bynoe’s testimony, Farrar sought permission from the trial court
to question Bynoe about Farrar’s lack of any criminal history. Farrar argued that
Bynoe’s testimony opened the door to this evidence. He asserted that, based on
Bynoe’s description of the work of the VCAT unit, his testimony about the background
check “work up” he did on Farrar, and his description of his briefing with the VCAT
unit about Farrar’s “background to be aware of,” the jury reasonably could infer that
Farrar had a criminal history and, in particular, a history of violent crimes that would
lead the VCAT unit to be involved with him. The trial court denied his request,
explaining that the probative value “was very, very de minimis at best . . . . For the
record, the value would be ever so de minimis on the legal probative value on cross
examination of the detective, and the prejudice would heavily outweigh . . . the utility
of that issue.”1
We recognize that the trial court has broad discretion to assess the potential
probative value and accompanying prejudicial effect of evidence. But because the
theme of Farrar’s defense turned so heavily on his argument that he had no
experience with guns, that he was scared, and that he ended up in this violent
confrontation essentially because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time, we
hold that the trial court erred by excluding this rebuttal evidence. We agree with
Farrar that the State’s evidence created an inference that he had a violent criminal
history, which in turn undercut his efforts to suggest to the jury that he was scared
and acted in self-defense when the three men attacked him. Because the inference
that he had a violent criminal history was so damaging to this central theme of his
defense, and because much of the State’s case depended on the credibility of that
defense, we hold that the exclusion of this evidence was prejudicial and entitles
Farrar to a new trial. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1443. Because we vacate and remand
on this ground, we need not address Farrar’s Batson challenge or his other remaining
arguments asserted on appeal.
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Defendant's Experts:
Comments:
About This Case
What was the outcome of STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONIO SHONTARI FARRAR?
The outcome was: < We vacate Farrar’s conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial. >
Which court heard STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONIO SHONTARI FARRAR?
This case was heard in IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA, NC. The presiding judge was Richard Dietz.
Who were the attorneys in STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONIO SHONTARI FARRAR?
Plaintiff's attorney: Assistant Attorney General Joseph L. Hyde. Defendant's attorney: David Weiss.
When was STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONIO SHONTARI FARRAR decided?
This case was decided on March 26, 2017.