Date: 10-31-2022

Case Style:

Thomas Huddleston, et al. v. John Christner Trucking, LLC

Case Number: 4:17-cv-00549

Judge: Gregory K. Frizzell

Court: United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (Tulsa County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: Carolyn Cottrell, Michelle Lim, Mira Karageorge, David Leimbach, Mike Blaschke, Rachel Mor

Defendant's Attorney: Alaina Hawley, Angela Case, Paul Root, Bobby Latham and James Colvin, and Robert Boulter

Description: Tulsa, Oklahoma employment law lawyers represented Plaintiffs who sued Defendant on Fair Labor Standards Act violation theories.


Huddleston filed this lawsuit against John Christner Trucking, LLC (JCT), alleging, inter alia, that it violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by misclassifying its employees as independent contractors and requiring them to work without compensation. JCT is a for-hire trucking company headquartered in Sapulpa, Oklahoma, which hauls products throughout the contiguous United States. Huddleston worked for JCT as a truck driver from May, 2016, through August, 2016.

Huddleston asks the court to conditionally certify a collective action under the FLSA and to facilitate notice. Huddleston proposes the following definition for the collective:

All current and former individuals who provide transportation services for John Christner Trucking, LLC ("JCT") within the United States at any time during the period beginning April 13, 2014, and continuing through the present, who entered into an Independent Contractor Operator Agreement with JCT, and entered into a Lease Agreement with either JCT or Three Diamond Leasing, LLC, who were classified as independent contractors.
[Doc. No. 73, p. 13].1 Four individuals have already elected to opt in by filing "Consent to Join Collective Action" forms: Robert Lewis; Roy Bittner; Douglas D. Burnett II; and John Henshaw. See [Doc. Nos. 44; 53; 70].

II. Standard

The Fair Labor Standards Act permits collective actions to be brought for and in behalf of similarly situated employees:

An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer . . . in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.

29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Granting conditional certification does not produce a class with an independent legal status or join additional parties. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 75 (2013). Rather, "[t]he sole consequence of conditional certification is the sending of court-approved written notice to employees, who in turn become parties to a collective action only by filing written consent with the court . . . ." Id.

District courts have discretion to determine whether to certify a § 216(b) collective. The "overriding question" is whether the original plaintiffs and the opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated. Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001). To answer this question, the Tenth Circuit has expressly authorized and endorsed a two-stage, ad hoc approach. See id. at 1105. During the first stage, plaintiffs face the relatively light burden of making "substantial allegations that the putative class members were together the victims of a
single decision, policy, or plan."2 Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102 (citing Vaszlavik v. Storage Tech. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 672, 678 (D. Colo. 1997)). "The court does not weigh the evidence, resolve factual disputes, or rule on the merits of plaintiffs' claims." Greenstein v. Meredith Corp., 948 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1267 (D. Kan. 2013) (citing Gieseke v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1166-67 (D. Kan. 2006)). If the court determines a collective action should be certified for notice purposes, potential collective members are given notice and the opportunity to opt in. The action then proceeds as a representative action throughout discovery. See Kaiser v. At the Beach, Inc., No. 08-CV-586-TCK-FHM, 2010 WL 5114729, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 9, 2010) (citing Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1995). The second stage occurs at the end of discovery, typically prompted by a motion to decertify. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102-03. At that time, the court "makes a second, stricter similarly-situated determination considering '(1) disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to defendant which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; (3) fairness and procedural considerations; and (4) whether plaintiffs made the filings required by the [FLSA] before instituting suit."' In re Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 17-1028, 2017 WL 4054144, at *1 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1103).
Huddleston v. John Christner Trucking, LLC (N.D. Okla. 2018)

* * *


Rule 23(a) sets forth four threshold requirements: "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." CGC Holding, 773 F.3d at 1086 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). "In other words, the class must demonstrate the requisite numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy to proceed with a class action." Id. (emphasis original).
Huddleston v. John Christner Trucking, LLC (N.D. Okla. 2020)

"The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a federal law that sets minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, and youth employment standards affecting full-time and part-time workers in the private sector and in federal, state, and local governments.

The FLSA requires employers to pay covered nonexempt workers:

A minimum wage of not less than $7.25 per hour effective July 24, 2009. Many states also have minimum wage laws, and in cases where an employee is subject to both state and federal minimum wage laws, the employee is entitled to the higher minimum wage.
Overtime pay at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for hours worked over 40 per workweek (any fixed and regularly recurring period of 168 hours – seven consecutive 24-hour periods). There is no limit on the number of hours employees 16 years or older may work in any workweek. The FLSA does not require overtime pay for work on weekends, holidays, or regular days of rest, unless overtime is worked on such days.

The FLSA also requires employers to keep accurate records of hours worked and wages paid to employees. These records must be kept for at least two years.

The FLSA does not apply to all workers. Some workers are exempt from the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime pay requirements. These exemptions include:

Executive, administrative, professional, outside sales, and computer employees who meet certain salary and duties tests.
Certain agricultural workers.
Certain seasonal workers.
Certain employees of small businesses.

Employees who are not sure whether they are covered by the FLSA or whether they are exempt from the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime pay requirements can contact the U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division for more information.

If you believe that your employer has violated the FLSA, you can file a complaint with the Wage and Hour Division. The Wage and Hour Division will investigate your complaint and may take action against your employer if it finds that the FLSA has been violated."

Google Bard

Outcome: Settled for an undisclosed sum.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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