Description: New Haven, Connecticut civil rights lawyer represented Plaintiff who sued the Defendants on a civil rights violation theory under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

In June 1998, GBTA hired Perkins, who identifies as African American, as a bus operator. L.R. 56(a)2 Statement of Facts ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 47 (“Pl.'s SMF”); L.R. 56(a)1 Statement of Facts ¶ 1, ECF No. 36-2 (“Defs.' SMF”). Bus operators at GBTA are a part of a collective bargaining agreement between GBTA and the union. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 3.

On or about November 5, 2019, Perkins drove a bus owned by GBTA with three passengers on it. Pl.'s SMF ¶¶ 5, 8. While on Main Street in Bridgeport, Connecticut, Perkins had to slow suddenly for a road construction site. Id. While Perkins slowed his bus, a passenger fell to the floor. Id. ¶ 7; Defs.' SMF ¶ 10. Perkins stopped the bus and reported the incident to the GBTA dispatcher, who told Perkins to return to the bus terminal. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 8. An ambulance was dispatched for the passenger who fell, and the two remaining passengers got off the bus. Id.

Allegedly unknown to Perkins, he hit a sign located in the construction site. Id. ¶ 9. So, Perkins reported the incident as a “passenger occurrence” rather than a collision. Id. A collision requires bus operators to report an “accident” rather than an “incident.” Defs.' SMF ¶ 15.

In his capacity as assistant manager of transportation operation, O'Keefe suspended Perkins on November 6, 2019, pending an investigation into the accident. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 11; Defs.' SMF ¶ 16. On November 8, 2019, Perkins received a notice that a termination hearing would be held on November 13, 2019. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 13.

GBTA buses, including the one operated by Perkins on November 5th, have video cameras that record onboard and outside activity. Id. ¶ 10. Perkins alleges that, to no avail, he requested to view the footage from the accident twice before his termination hearing. Id. ¶¶ 1213.

On November 13, 2019, Perkins attended his termination hearing with a union representative, Mustafa Salahuddin. Id. ¶ 15. O'Keefe and Engram were present as well. Id. At the hearing, Perkins allegedly could not view the video footage from the accident because there was no video equipment present. Id.

During the termination hearing, O'Keefe provided Salahuddin and Perkins with documents pertaining to the accident and a list of Perkins's past disciplinary history, which included one counseling, seven verbal warnings, nine written warnings, eight suspensions, and one “last chance” agreement in lieu of termination. Defs.' SMF ¶ 57; Defs.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Mem.”), Ex. 8 to Ex. C, ECF No. 36-5. Perkins also spoke on his own behalf and stated that he would have reported an accident had he known about having hit the construction sign. Defs.' SMF ¶¶ 62-63. O'Keefe and Engram then allegedly asked Perkins and his representative to step out of the room. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 17. When they returned, Perkins received notice, by letter, of his termination. Id.

Following Perkins's termination, the union unsuccessfully grieved the termination. Defs.' SMF ¶ 78. During the grievance process, GBTA allegedly offered to allow Perkins to return to work on a “last chance” agreement in exchange for the withdrawal of his grievance, and Perkins allegedly declined the offer. Id.

* * *

A court will grant a motion for summary judgment if the record shows no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-moving party may defeat the motion by producing sufficient evidence to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247-48.

“[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id.; see Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[M]ateriality runs to whether the dispute matters, i.e., whether it concerns facts that can affect the outcome under the applicable substantive law.” (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248)).

“The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. When a motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary evidence and sworn affidavits and “demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” the non-moving party must do more than vaguely assert the existence of some unspecified disputed material facts or “rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The party opposing the motion for summary judgment “must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 (1967) and First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)).

A court must view any inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion. See Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338, 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2017) (“On a motion for summary judgment, the court must ‘resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.'”). A court will not draw an inference of a genuine dispute of material fact from conclusory allegations or denials, see Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011), and will grant summary judgment only “if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

Outcome: Defendant's motion for summary judgment granted.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: