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Date: 09-12-2020

Case Style:


Case Number: 28572

Judge: Jeffrey M. Welbaum


Plaintiff's Attorney: y LISA M. LIGHT

Defendant's Attorney:

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Description: Dayton, OH - Felony, Robbery, Burglary, Grand Theft of a Motor Vehicle

{¶ 2} On May 6, 2019, a Montgomery County grand jury returned a three-count
indictment charging Rice with robbery (physical harm) in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2),
a second-degree felony; burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(1), also a second-degree
felony; and grand theft of a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a fourthdegree felony. The charges were based on allegations that Rice entered the residence
of his ex-girlfriend, S.L., without permission by kicking down the front door during the early
morning hours of April 4, 2019. Once inside the residence, Rice allegedly shoved S.L.
to the ground, stole her car keys and cell phone, and then drove away in S.L.’s vehicle
without her permission.
{¶ 3} Rice pled not guilty to the charges and the matter proceeded to a two-day
jury trial. At trial, S.L. testified that she and Rice had been dating for one month but
ended their relationship via text message on April 3, 2019. S.L. testified that after ending
their relationship that day, Rice asked her to return some clothing that he had left at her
residence. S.L. claimed that she told Rice he could come over and retrieve the clothing
himself. According to S.L., Rice did not indicate when or if he was coming over, and S.L.
had no other contact with Rice for the rest of the day. S.L. testified that she spent the
evening at home watching television with her one-year old son, her sister, and a platonic
male friend. S.L. testified that after her sister left, and after her son went to bed, she and
her friend fell asleep on the couch.
{¶ 4} At 1:00 a.m. the next morning, S.L. woke up to a noise in her driveway and
to Rice knocking at her front door. S.L. testified that the noise in her driveway was a red
truck that had dropped Rice off at her residence. S.L. testified that she looked at her
phone and saw that Rice had been texting her while she was sleeping. When Rice
continued to bang on the door, S.L. told him that she was not going to let him inside
because it was too late. S.L. testified that Rice continued banging on her door until he
eventually kicked it open with such force that the door fell off the door frame. Once
inside the residence, S.L. testified that Rice started yelling and cussing at her. S.L.
testified that Rice then grabbed her arms and shoved her to the ground. Thereafter, S.L.
went to her son’s room; her son had been woken up by the incident. S.L. testified that
her friend was also in her son’s room at that time.
{¶ 5} S.L. testified that, after checking on her son, she and Rice argued while Rice
went through her house looking for his clothing. Rice then demanded that she drop him
off at his friend’s house. After refusing Rice’s repeated demands to drop him off at his
friend’s house, and after continually telling him to leave her home, S.L. saw Rice grab her
car keys from a key rack on the wall and drive away in her car. S.L. testified that, as
Rice left her residence, he screamed: “I’ll bring your car back.” Trans. Vol. I, p. 102.
However, S.L. testified that she did not give Rice permission to take her car keys and told
him not to take her car.
{¶ 6} During her testimony, S.L. also indicated that Rice took her and her friend’s
cell phones. Although S.L. did not actually see Rice take her phone, S.L. testified that
she threw her phone on the couch when Rice kicked down the door and that her phone
was missing from the couch after Rice left her residence. S.L. did, however, see Rice
take her friend’s phone. Specifically, S.L. testified that she had her friend’s cell phone
in her hand while she and Rice were arguing, and that Rice grabbed the phone from her
hand and put it in his pocket.
{¶ 7} Once Rice drove away in S.L.’s car, S.L. called 9-1-1 from a neighbor’s
phone to report the incident. The police thereafter arrived at S.L.’s residence and S.L.
spoke to an investigating officer. S.L. testified that while she was speaking to the
investigating officer, she saw the same red truck that had dropped Rice off at her
residence drive by. S.L. testified that she pointed the red truck out to the officer and that
the police pursued the vehicle.
{¶ 8} Deputy David Posma of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office testified to
seeing the red truck drive by as S.L. was being interviewed. Deputy Posma testified that
he conducted a traffic stop of the red truck after observing the truck’s license plate light
was burnt out. Deputy Posma testified that Rice was identified as a passenger in the
truck and that Rice matched S.L.’s description of the suspect who had entered her home.
Deputy Posma detained Rice in the back of his cruiser and transported him to the area of
S.L.’s residence, where Rice was Mirandized and interviewed by Montgomery County
Sheriff’s Deputy David Williams. Deputy Williams testified that he interviewed Rice, and
Rice told him he did not live at S.L.’s residence, but simply had some clothes at her house.
{¶ 9} S.L. testified that she later found her car a block away from her residence on
the side of the road. Because she did not have her car keys, she called the police, and
the police had her car towed to her driveway. S.L. testified that her car keys were
eventually found under the seat/side of her car. However, S.L. never found her cell
{¶ 10} When discussing her relationship with Rice, S.L. testified that Rice would
spend a few nights a week at her residence; however, Rice did not live at her residence
or receive mail there. S.L. also testified that she had helped Rice apply for food stamps
by writing a March 22, 2019 letter that falsely asserted Rice lived at her residence and
paid $700 a month in rent. The State submitted the letter as evidence and S.L.
confirmed that the statement in the letter was not true. On cross-examination, Rice’s
counsel chose not ask S.L. any questions about her living situation with Rice or the letter
she wrote.
{¶ 11} After the State rested its case, Rice indicated that it was his intent to present
testimony from a representative of Montgomery County Job and Family Services
(“MCJFS”) regarding certain public assistance records that Rice had subpoenaed. The
records included a correspondence to Rice from MCJFS that was addressed to S.L.’s
residence. Rice advised the trial court that he was going to use the records to establish
that he and S.L. had a live-in relationship. However, because the records were not
received by the parties until after the State had already rested its case, and because Rice
had the opportunity to cross examine S.L. about their living arrangement, the trial court
declined to let Rice use the MCJFS records at trial. After objecting to the trial court’s
decision, Rice called Deputy Williams to testify about the police report he authored. Rice
then rested his case and the matter was submitted to the jury.
{¶ 12} Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Rice guilty of
robbery and burglary, but not guilty of grand theft of a motor vehicle. Prior to sentencing,
both parties submitted sentencing memorandums in which they discussed the issue of
whether the robbery and burglary should merge as allied offenses at sentencing. Rice
argued for merging the sentences, while the State argued that the robbery and burglary
were not allied offenses that should merge. The parties raised their respective
arguments at the sentencing hearing as well.
{¶ 13} After listening to the parties’ arguments at the sentencing hearing and after
stating that it had considered the parties’ sentencing memorandums, the trial court
imposed separate sentences for Rice’s robbery and burglary offenses. For robbery, the
trial court imposed a mandatory indefinite term of 5 to 7.5 years in prison. For burglary,
the trial court imposed a mandatory definite minimum term of five years in prison. The
trial court further ordered the sentences for robbery and burglary to be served
consecutively for a total, indefinite term of 10 to 12.5 years in prison.
{¶ 14} Rice now appeals from his conviction, raising four assignments of error for
First and Second Assignments of Error
{¶ 15} Under his first and second assignments of error, Rice claims that his
sentence is contrary to law because the trial court failed to make an allied-offense
determination at his sentencing hearing and because the trial court failed to merge his
robbery and burglary offenses as required by R.C. 2941.25.
{¶ 16} Because he never objected to the trial court’s failure to make an alliedoffense determination at the sentencing hearing, Rice concedes that a plain-error
standard of review applies to that issue on appeal. “Plain error exists when the outcome
would clearly have been different if the error had not occurred and should only be
recognized with utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances, and only to prevent a
manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Skatzes, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 15848, 2003-Ohio-516, ¶ 53.
{¶ 17} Upon review, we do not find that the trial court erred, plainly or otherwise,
with regard to making an allied-offense determination. Although the trial court did not
announce its allied-offense determination at the sentencing hearing, the record indicates
that an allied-offense determination was in fact made. Prior to the trial court’s imposition
of separate sentences, both parties argued the allied-offense issue at the sentencing
hearing as well as in their sentencing memorandums. Because the trial court imposed
separate sentences after advising the parties that it had considered their sentencing
memorandums and after the parties had made their allied-offense arguments at the
sentencing hearing, we find that the trial court’s decision to impose separate sentences
was an implicit rejection of any contention that the offenses should merge for sentencing.
Simply put, the trial court’s allied-offenses determination was implied from its decision to
impose separate sentences. Moreover, as noted by the Supreme Court of Ohio, when
a trial court “fails to make any finding regarding whether the offenses are allied, imposing
a separate sentence for each offense is not contrary to law[.]” State v. Williams, 148
Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 26. Therefore, because the trial
court imposed separate sentences for Rice’s robbery and burglary offenses, the failure to
make any allied-offenses finding on the record at the sentencing hearing did not render
those sentences contrary to law.
{¶ 18} The second part of Rice’s argument—that his robbery and burglary offenses
should have merged pursuant to R.C. 2941.25—is reviewed de novo. State v. Hazley,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27107, 2016-Ohio-7689, ¶ 16, citing State v. Williams, 134 Ohio
St.3d 482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 28. “De novo appellate review means
that this court independently reviews the record and affords no deference to a trial court’s
decision.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Kennedy, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2017-CA-100, 2018-
Ohio-4997, ¶ 35.
{¶ 19} R.C. 2941.25 governs the merger of allied offenses and provides as follows:
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment
or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the
defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of
dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more
offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a
separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may
contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be
convicted of all of them.
{¶ 20} “ ‘[W]hen determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import
within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must ask three questions when defendant’s
conduct supports multiple offenses: (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or
significance? (2) Were they committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with
separate animus or motivation? An affirmative answer to any of the above will permit
separate convictions. The conduct, the animus, and the import must all be considered.’ ”
State v. Earley, 145 Ohio St.3d 281, 2015-Ohio-4615, 49 N.E.3d 266, ¶ 12, quoting State
v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 31.
{¶ 21} As to the question of import and significance, “two or more offenses of
dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s
conduct constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that results from
each offense is separate and identifiable.” Ruff at ¶ 23. “[A] defendant’s conduct that
constitutes two or more offenses against a single victim can support multiple convictions
if the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable from the harm of
the other offense.” Id. at ¶ 26. Burglaries and robberies “ ‘are often not allied offenses
of similar import because they involve two separate crimes; entering into the premises by
force, stealth or deception, and then committing a theft offense.’ ” State v. Terrel, 2d
Dist. Miami No. 2014-CA-24, 2015-Ohio-4201, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Kay, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 25761, 2014-Ohio-2676, ¶ 21.
{¶ 22} As previously noted, Rice contends that his robbery and burglary offenses
were allied offenses that should have merged at sentencing. We disagree. In
committing the burglary offense at issue, the record establishes that Rice trespassed in
the victim’s home while the victim was present by forcefully kicking down the front door
with the purpose to commit the crimes of assault and theft therein. See R.C.
2911.12(A)(1) (“[n]o person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall * * * [t]respass in an
occupied structure * * * when another person other than an accomplice of the offender is
present, with purpose to commit in the structure * * * any criminal offense”). In order to
commit burglary, Rice did not have to actually commit a criminal offense inside the victim’s
residence, as the intent to commit any criminal offense while trespassing constitutes the
commission of the burglary. State v. Chafin, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-69, 2020-
Ohio-3983, ¶ 35. Therefore, Rice completed the burglary once he entered the victim’s
residence by force with the intent to commit a criminal offense therein. See id. at ¶ 37.
{¶ 23} After the burglary was completed, Rice committed robbery. Specifically,
the record establishes that once Rice was inside the victim’s residence, Rice grabbed the
victim’s arms, shoved the victim to the ground, and then stole the victim’s car keys and a
cell phone from the victim’s hands. See R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) (“[n]o person, in attempting
or committing a theft offense or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall
* * * [i]Inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on another”). These
events occurred after the burglary had already been completed and involved the separate
elements of theft and physical harm/attempted physical harm against the victim.
{¶ 24} In State v. Jackson, 149 Ohio St.3d 55, 2016-Ohio-5488, 73 N.E.3d 414,
the Supreme Court of Ohio considered a similar factual scenario and held that:
The burglary was complete when Jackson entered Fingerhut’s
residence with the intent to commit murder, theft, or kidnapping. Jackson
committed aggravated robbery when he stole Fingerhut’s car after
murdering him. Thus, the aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery
were separate offenses, because they did not arise from the same act.
(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 129. See also State v. Champada, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F14-006, 2016-Ohio-7291, ¶ 24 (burglary attempt was complete upon breaking into door
on the premises and subsequent thefts of items were not allied offenses); State v. Evett,
9th Dist. Medina No. 14CA0008-M, 2015-Ohio-2722, ¶ 39 (burglary was accomplished
by defendant’s entrance into home with intent to steal when she knew she was not
welcome; theft occurred later).
{¶ 25} As in Jackson, the robbery and burglary in this case did not arise from the
same act. The burglary arose from Rice’s forcefully trespassing inside the victim’s home
with the purpose to commit a criminal offense therein, while the robbery arose from Rice’s
stealing the victim’s car keys and a cell phone while causing/attempting to cause the
victim physical harm. Because the robbery and burglary offenses did not arise from the
same conduct and involved separate, identifiable harm, those offenses were not allied
offenses within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25. Therefore, the trial court did not err by
failing to merge the offenses at sentencing.
{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, Rice’s first and second assignments of error are
Third Assignment of Error
{¶ 27} Under his third assignment of error, Rice contends that the trial court erred
by excluding evidence at trial that was relevant and material to his defense. The
evidence in question was public assistance records relating to Rice that Rice subpoenaed
from MCJFS. The records included a correspondence to Rice from MCJFS that was
addressed to the victim’s residence. Rice contends that this evidence was relevant and
material to his defense because it established that he had a live-in relationship with the
victim and received mail at the victim’s address. Rice claims that excluding the records
from MCJFS prejudiced him and prevented him from receiving a fair trial because it
denied him the ability to impeach the victim’s testimony that he did not live with the victim
or receive mail at her residence.
{¶ 28} “A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and its
exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Easterling, 2019-Ohio-2470, 139 N.E.3d 497,¶ 54 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Norris,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26147, 2015-Ohio-624, ¶ 14. “A trial court abuses its
discretion when it makes a decision that is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.”
State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34. “[M]ost
instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable,
rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River
Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597
(1990). “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would
support that decision.” Id.
{¶ 29} In this case, the record establishes that Rice subpoenaed the records from
MCJFS in advance of trial. The records, however, were not received by the parties until
after the State had rested its case. Since the State was not going to be able to use the
evidence from MCJFS, the trial court ruled that Rice would not be allowed to use the
evidence in his defense. In reaching this decision, the trial court confirmed that Rice had
planned on using the evidence to establish a live-in relationship with the victim and noted
that Rice had been given the opportunity to cross-examine the victim regarding that issue.
{¶ 30} Because the MCJFS records at issue were not admitted by the State at trial
and were favorable to Rice, we find that the trial court’s reasoning for excluding the
MCJFS records was erroneous. However, the trial court’s error was harmless because
the exclusion of the MCJFS records was otherwise appropriate under Evid.R. 403(B).
Pursuant to Evid.R. 403(B), the trial court has discretion to exclude relevant evidence if
the evidence’s probative value is outweighed by undue delay or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
{¶ 31} Here, the probative value of the MCJFS records was minimal because the
records were relevant only to the trespass element of burglary and there is an abundance
of evidence establishing that Rice trespassed in the victim’s residence when he kicked
down the victim’s front door. For example, the victim consistently testified that Rice did
not live at her residence and did not have permission to enter her home on the night in
question. The victim also testified to writing a letter that falsely asserted that Rice lived
at her residence so that Rice could apply for and receive food stamps. The victim’s
letter, which was admitted into evidence, tended to establish why MCJFS corresponded
with Rice using the victim’s address, i.e., not because Rice lived with the victim, but
because of the victim’s false statement in the letter. More importantly, Deputy Williams
testified that after Mirandizing Rice, Rice himself stated that he did not live at the victim’s
{¶ 32} Moreover, even if Rice had been permitted inside the victim’s residence,
once he committed an act of violence against the victim, i.e., assaulting her by grabbing
her and shoving her to the ground, his permission to remain at the victim’s residence was
presumably revoked. State v. Metcalf, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24338, 2012-Ohio6045, ¶ 20, quoting 2 Katz, Martin, Lipton & Crocker, Criminal Law, Section 104:6 (3d
Ed.) (“ ‘permission to enter a home is deemed terminated by the act of committing an
offense of violence against a person authorized to revoke the permission’ ”).
{¶ 33} Because there was an abundance of evidence indicating that Rice did not
live with the victim, and because Rice was otherwise not permitted in the victim’s
residence once he assaulted the victim, we find that the MCJFS records were needlessly
cumulative evidence concerning the trespass element of burglary. In addition to being
cumulative, the MCJFS records would have caused undue delay, as the record indicates
that the witness from MCJFS who was subpoenaed to testify regarding the records was
not present in court during Rice’s case in chief. Therefore, when applying Evid.R.
403(B), we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the MCJFS
records. Although the trial court excluded the records for a different, erroneous reason,
the trial court nevertheless reached the correct result, thus making the error harmless.
See State v. Hall, 2d Dist. Miami No. 97 CA 22, 1997 WL 691509, *1 (Oct. 24, 1997),
citing Newcomb v. Dredge, 105 Ohio App. 417, 152 N.E.2d 801 (2d Dist.1957), paragraph
seven of the syllabus (“[i]f a trial court has stated an erroneous basis for its judgment, an
appellate court will affirm the judgment if it is legally correct on other grounds, that is,
when it achieves the right result for the wrong reasons”). Accord State v. Handcock, 2d
Dist. Clark No. 2016-CA-3, 2016-Ohio-7096, ¶ 14; State v. Gibson, 2d Dist. Champaign
No. 2016-CA-12, 2017-Ohio-691, ¶ 19.
{¶ 34} Rice’s third assignment of error is overruled.
Fourth Assignment of Error
{¶ 35} Under his fourth assignment of error, Rice challenges the trial court’s
decision to impose consecutive sentences. Although Rice concedes that the trial court
made the consecutive-sentences findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), he claims that
those findings were unsupported by the record. We disagree.
{¶ 36} When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the standard
of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-
Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 7. Pursuant to the plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2),
this court may vacate or modify Rice’s sentence “only if it determines by clear and
convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under
relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” Id. at ¶ 1. One of
the relevant statutes referred to in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is the statute governing the
imposition of consecutive sentences, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Pursuant to R.C.
2929.14(C)(4), a trial court may impose consecutive sentences if it finds that: (1)
consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the
offender; (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public; and (3) one or more
of the following three findings are satisfied:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the
Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one
or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of
the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any
of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
offender's conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
future crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).
{¶ 37} “[A] trial court is required to make the findings mandated by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing
entry, but it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” State v. Bonnell,
140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, syllabus. “[W]here a trial court
properly makes the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), an appellate court may not
reverse the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences unless it first clearly and
convincingly finds that the record does not support the trial court’s findings.” State v.
Withrow, 2016-Ohio-2884, 64 N.E.3d 553, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.). This is a very deferential
standard of review, as “the question is not whether the trial court had clear and convincing
evidence to support its findings, but rather, whether we clearly and convincingly find that
the record fails to support the trial court’s findings.” (Citation omitted.) Id. In applying
that standard of review, “the consecutive nature of the trial court’s sentencing should
stand unless the record overwhelmingly supports a contrary result.” (Citation omitted.)
Id. at ¶ 39.
{¶ 38} In this case, there is no dispute that the trial court made the consecutivesentence findings required under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and in the
sentencing entry. Rice, nevertheless, claims that the trial court’s consecutive-sentence
finding concerning his history of criminal conduct was unsupported by the record because
the trial court did not refer to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) before imposing
consecutive sentences. The record, however, establishes that the trial court specifically
stated at the sentencing hearing that it had “reviewed the presentence investigation.”
Trans. Vol. II, p. 261. Contrary to Rice’s claim otherwise, “the trial court was not required
to set forth the findings of the presentence investigation report and was not required to
incorporate them into the sentencing journal entry.” State v. Sword, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 104477, 2017-Ohio-295, ¶ 14.
{¶ 39} Upon review, we do not find that the PSI clearly and convincingly failed to
support the trial court’s consecutive-sentences findings. The PSI indicated that Rice had
a lengthy criminal history. As a juvenile, Rice was adjudicated for aggravated menacing
in 2000 and assault in 2001. As an adult, Rice had acquired 16 misdemeanor
convictions and 6 felony convictions over a period of 13 years. The misdemeanors
included three convictions for criminal trespass, one conviction for assault, one conviction
for violating a protection order, and one domestic violence conviction. Rice’s felony
convictions included a burglary in 2010 and an aggravated robbery and intimidation of a
crime victim in 2014. The PSI also specifically stated that Rice had a history of violence
against his romantic partners. Given this information, we cannot say that the trial court’s
consecutive-sentences findings were unsupported by the record.
{¶ 40} For the foregoing reasons, Rice’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

Outcome: Having overruled all assignments of error raised by Rice, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.

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