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Date: 10-21-2020
Case Style:
Sharps Automotive v. Auston Prizevoits
Case Number: 20A-SC-524
Judge: John G. Baker
Court: COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Plaintiff's Attorney:
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Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
Indianapolis, IN - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant Rodney Dain Doster in his action against SharpÕs Automotive for storage fees, court costs, and lost time.
[2] Prizevoits, who lived in Bloomington, telephoned Sharp’s Automotive, an
Indianapolis-area business, for a free estimate to replace the engine in his car.
An employee from Sharp’s Automotive told Prizevoits that the cost would be
approximately $8,000, but that they would have to inspect the vehicle in order
to provide a more accurate estimate. So, on November 1, 2019, Prizevoits had
his car towed to Sharp’s Automotive.
[3] Prizevoits stopped by Sharp’s Automotive on November 4, 2019 and called on
November 7 to ask if they had inspected his vehicle. They had not, and on
November 11, 2019, Sharp’s Automotive called Prizevoits to advise him that
the estimate would be “around eighty-eight hundred dollars” for the work,
which would be either a custom engine or a rebuild. Tr. Vol. II, p. 7.
[4] On November 14, 2019, Prizevoits called Sharp’s Automotive, stating that he
was unsure if he would have the repairs done there. He called on November
18, 2019, to tell them that he was going to use a different mechanic and that he
had arranged for a tow truck to pick up his vehicle that day. During that call,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-SC-524 | October 14, 2020 Page 3 of 8
he was informed for the first time that he owed $200 for storage costs. Later
that same day within four minutes of closing time, he was first told that the
storage fee would be $230, calculated at $30 per each day the vehicle was on the
premises after the final estimate was provided,
1
and that he needed to pay the
storage fee in cash or otherwise they would place a mechanic’s lien on the
vehicle and dispose of it to satisfy the lien. Prizevoits went to Sharp’s
Automotive the next day, November 19, 2019, and paid $230 to get his vehicle
released and to mitigate his own damages.
[5] Prizevoits sued Sharp’s Automotive in small claims court on January 9, 2020.
He sought damages in the amount of $730; $230 for the storage fees, $102 in
court costs or filing fees, and the remainder for “the hassle of driving back and
forth from Bloomington[] [a]nd missing work.” Id. at 10. Dustin Lloyd
testified on behalf of Sharp’s Automotive, and Prizevoits presented his claim.
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the small claims court entered judgment in
favor of Prizevoits in the amount of $432: $230 for the storage fees; $102 for
the filing fee; and $100 for Prizevoits’ time. Sharp’s Automotive now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Our supreme court has stated the following as respects small claims actions:
1
Sharp’s Automotive acknowledges, and we agree, that there is nothing in the record to explain why the
total storage fee would not be a multiple of $30 based on the charge of $30 per day. See Appellant’s Br. p. 5,
n.1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-SC-524 | October 14, 2020 Page 4 of 8
Judgments in small claims actions are subject to review as
prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes. Ind. Small
Claims Rule 11(A). Under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), the clearly
erroneous standard applies to appellate review of facts
determined in a bench trial with due regard given to the
opportunity of the trial court to assess witness credibility. This
deferential standard of review is particularly important in small
claims actions, where trials are informal, with the sole objective
of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the
rules of substantive law. City of Dunkirk Water & Sewage Dep’t v.
Hall, 657 N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ind. 1995) (quoting S.C.R. 8(A)). But
this deferential standard does not apply to the substantive rules of
law, which are reviewed de novo just as they are in appeals from
a court of general jurisdiction. Lae v. Householder, 789 N.E.2d
481, 483 (Ind. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1067-68 (Ind. 2006). “A
judgment is clearly erroneous only if a review of the record leaves the court
with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Walker v. Elkin, 758
N.E.2d 972, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
[7] We note at the outset that Prizevoits has not filed an appellee’s brief. When an
appellee fails to submit an appellate brief, “‘we need not undertake the burden
of developing an argument on the [A]ppellee’s behalf.’” Front Row Motors, LLC
v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Trinity Homes, 848 N.E.2d at
1068). Rather, “‘we will reverse the trial court’s judgment if the appellant’s
brief presents a case of prima facie error.’” Id. “Prima facie error in this
context is defined as, at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.”
Front Row Motors, 5 N.E.3d at 758 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-SC-524 | October 14, 2020 Page 5 of 8
[8] Sharp’s Automotive presents two questions for our review and we address them
in turn. First, Sharp’s Automotive contends that the trial court erred by
entering judgment in favor of Prizevoits on the mistaken premise that there was
no written contract for a storage fee assessed against him. Stated differently,
Sharp’s Automotive asserts that the trial court erred by making the erroneous
assumption that the Indiana Statute of Frauds2
was applicable in this situation.
[9] The Indiana Statute of Frauds, in pertinent part, provides that “[n]o action shall
be brought . . . [t]o charge any person, upon any special promise, to answer for
the debt, default or miscarriage of another. . . [u]nless the promise, contract or
agreement. . . shall be in writing.” See Walker, 758 N.E.2d at 975 (quoting Ind.
Code § 32-2-1-1 (repealed by P.L. 2-2002, SEC. 128); but see, Ind. Code § 32-21-
1-1(b)(2) (2002).
[10] Assuming arguendo, that the Indiana Statute of Frauds is inapplicable, a
“contract is established by evidence of an offer, acceptance, consideration, and
a manifestation of a mutual assent.” Troutwine Estates Dev. Col, LLC v. Comsub
Design and Eng’g, Inc., 854 N.E.2d 890, 897 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
As stated in Ind. Dep’t of Corr. v. Swanson Servs. Corp., 829 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied:
To bring a contract into existence, an offer must be extended and
the offeree must accept it, the communication of acceptance
being crucial. Thus, a meeting of the minds between the
2
Ind. Code Chapter 32-21-1 (2002).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-SC-524 | October 14, 2020 Page 6 of 8
contracting parties is essential to the formation of a contract.
This meeting of the minds must extend to all essential elements
or terms for a contract to be binding. Likewise, for an oral
contract to exist, parties have to agree to all terms of the contract.
If a party cannot demonstrate agreement on one essential term of
the contract, then there is no mutual assent and no contract is
formed. Without an express contract, written or oral, a party
may recover under the theory of unjust enrichment, or quantum
meruit. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
[11] The trial court correctly observed that there was no meeting of the minds
regarding the storage fees. The record reflects that once Lloyd learned that
Prizevoits did not wish to have the work done at his shop, he told Prizevoits
that he owed the storage fees that were to be paid in cash. Lloyd testified that
there were signs posted on the property, but Prizevoits testified that he was
unaware of the signage and was unaware of the fees until Lloyd communicated
such.
[12] Here, the record supports the trial court’s judgment that there was no meeting
of the minds as respects the storage fee imposed by Sharp’s Automotive and
ultimately paid for by Prizevoits. Indeed, the record reflects that Prizevoits’
payment was more pragmatic than contractually obligatory as it was the sole
means of recovering possession of his vehicle. Thus, there was no evidence of a
written contract regarding the storage fees, nor was there a meeting of the
minds such that an oral contract existed. The trial court did not err.
[13] Next, Sharp’s Automotive contends that the trial court arrived at an improper
calculation of damages, specifically targeting the trial court’s award of $100 in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-SC-524 | October 14, 2020 Page 7 of 8
damages for “the hassle of driving back and forth from Bloomington[] [a]nd
missing work.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 10.
[14] “A damage award will not be reversed if it falls within the bounds of the
evidence.” Sims v. Pappas, 73 N.E.3d 700, 709 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Raess v.
Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Ind. 2008)). Stated differently, we will not
reverse so long as the damages award is within the scope of the evidence.
Manzo v. Estep, 689 N.E.2d 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “We look only to the
evidence and inferences therefrom which support [the factfinder’s decision], and
will affirm it if there is any evidence in the record which supports the amount of
the award, even if it is variable or conflicting.” Sims, 73 N.E.3d at 709 (quoting
Raess, 883 N.E.2d at 795). We will find an excessive judgment only if the
amount cannot be based on anything other than prejudice, passion, partiality,
corruption, or some other element of improper consideration. Id. (citing Parke
State Bank v. Akers, 659 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Ind. 1995)).
[15] The record reflects that Prizevoits sought damages in the amount of $730: $230
for the storage fees; $102 in court costs or filing fees; and the remainder for his
time off of work and for the extra trips back and forth between Bloomington
and Indianapolis to resolve the matter. Sharp’s Automotive offered no
evidence to contradict the amount sought by Prizevoits. Instead of awarding
the requested $398, the trial court only awarded $100, which falls squarely
within the range of the evidence and common knowledge. We thus conclude
that the trial court’s award was appropriate.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-SC-524 | October 14, 2020 Page 8 of 8
Conclusion
Outcome: For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the small claims court.
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Defendant's Experts:
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