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Date: 03-08-2019
Case Style:
Christopher Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corporation
Case Number: 17-0936-CV
Judge: Hall
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on appeal from the Eastern District of New York (Kings County)
Plaintiff's Attorney: Jonathan A. Tand
Defendant's Attorney: Lorie E. Almon, Paul H. Galligan, Ephraim J. Pierre
Description:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on March 9, 2017, in the
Eastern District of New York (Hurley, J.), granting summary judgment in
favor of Defendant‐Appellee Costco Wholesale Corp. (“Costco”) in toto.
3
Plaintiff‐Appellant Christopher Fox (“Fox”) has worked at Costco for 21
years. He has suffered from Tourette’s Syndrome (“Tourette’s”) and
Obsessive‐Compulsive Disorder (“OCD”) since birth.
Fox brought claims against Costco under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq., and New York State
Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq., alleging
hostile work environment, disparate treatment, failure to accommodate,
and retaliation. The district court determined that a rational fact‐finder
could not find evidence in the record to support sufficiently any of Fox’s
theories of recovery. We affirm the district court’s judgment as to Fox’s
disparate treatment, failure to accommodate, and retaliation claims. As to
Fox’s hostile work environment claim, we reach a contrary conclusion.
This Circuit has previously assumed, without deciding, that hostile
work environment claims are cognizable under the ADA. See, e.g., Robinson
v. Dibble, 613 F. App’x 9, 12 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (assuming
without deciding that plaintiff may bring a hostile work environment claim
under the ADA when, in any event, the claim could not survive summary
judgment). We now join our sister Circuits and hold that hostile work
4
environment claims are cognizable under the ADA. We also determine there
is adequate evidence in the record for Fox’s hostile work environment claim
to survive summary judgment. We thus affirm in part and vacate in part the
judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Fox started working for Costco’s Holbrook, New York warehouse in
1996. During his time with Costco, Fox worked on the floor crew, as an
Assistant Cashier, Cashier, and Greeter. In June 2013, the Holbrook Costco
got a new General Manager, Larry Resnikoff (“Resnikoff”). Assistant
Manager Glenn Johnson (“Johnson”) reported to Resnikoff. Fox’s
employment discrimination claims stem from the stress he suffered at
Costco during this change in management.
While working as a Greeter under the new management, Fox was
reprimanded twice by Johnson, who was not his supervisor. Johnson
reprimanded Fox for leaving the Costco entrance area when Fox went to
move a customer cart outside, and instructed Fox not to leave the entrance
area for any reason. Johnson also reprimanded Fox for leaving a cart
5
unattended in front of the freezers instead of taking it with him. Johnson,
however, took no formal disciplinary action against Fox.
Costco’s management received two customer complaints about Fox’s
behavior in 2013 and 2014. In 2013, a Costco member felt that Fox’s comment
that she looked beautiful with her pocketbook was inappropriate and called
Costco to report the incident. When Resnikoff addressed the incident with
him, Fox admitted to speaking to the Costco member but claimed that he
did not mean to offend her. Resnikoff informed Fox he would be terminated
if another similar complaint were received.
In 2014, Fox apparently told a different Costco member that she was
“the love of [his] life.” J. App’x at 210. Resnikoff spoke to Fox about this
complaint and asked him to write down what happened. Fox did not
confirm or deny that the incident occurred, but he wrote in his statement, “I
might on occasion say something nice that might offend someone regardless
if they are having a bad day or not. I can’t always help what I say.” Id. at
211. Resnikoff suspended Fox for three days without pay and transferred
him to an Assistant Cashier position, where he would have less direct
contact with members. Neither Fox’s pay nor his benefits were reduced as a
6
result. Fox understood that the change in his position was in lieu of
termination. During his deposition, Fox stated that prior to these two
investigations, Resnikoff made disparaging comments regarding Fox’s
disability, including “I cringe every time I walk by you” and “[Y]ou finally
did it.” Id. at 206–07.
Before starting as an Assistant Cashier, Fox was granted one month
of medical leave while his neurologist adjusted his medications. He started
as an assistant cashier after that leave. There is no evidence that positions
other than Assistant Cashier were available at the time Fox returned to
work. At some point in 2014, however, Resnikoff offered Fox a position as a
Stocker. Fox declined to take it.
As part of Fox’s neurological condition, he would often touch the
floor before moving and would cough when he would feel a verbal tic come
on in order to prevent others from hearing him swear. Fox testified that once
he began his position as an Assistant Cashier, other Costco employees
mocked him for his Tourette’s and OCD. In his deposition, Fox described
how certain Costco employees would make “hut‐hut‐hike” remarks to
mimic Fox’s verbal and physical tics. Fox also testified that these comments
7
“were audible to the managers of the Holbrook warehouse from their
position on the warehouse’s podium,” and “happened in plain view of the
Supervisors and the Front End Managers and nothing was ever said.” Id. at
189, 72; see also id. at 76, 112–13. Fox testified further that these types of
comments happened for “months and months” and “whenever” he would
experience tics. Id. at 112–13. Johnson, on the other hand, testified that he
was unaware of anyone saying “hut‐hut‐hike.”
During March 2014, Fox asked his supervisor Janine DiCandia
(“DiCandia”) for a break to go home and take his medication. According to
Fox, DiCandia did not find him a replacement, and he had to ask again. It
took several hours from his initial request until he was permitted to go
home. Also during March, Fox asked his supervisor Colin Campbell
(“Campbell”) for permission to take his break so he could go to the
pharmacy and have a prescription re‐filled; Campbell told him he could not
because he had used his breaks for the day. Fox claims he never received his
last break that day.
Fox decided to e‐mail Costco’s CEO Craig Jelinek (“Jelinek”) on
March 29, 2014, to explain his conditions, his long‐time employment with
8
Costco, the change he had observed in the Holbrook Costco management
style, and the fact that the change in atmosphere at Costco caused him
“stress,” which “aggravate[ed] [his] tourettes,” requiring him to take a
month of medical leave. Id. at 169. Fox also wrote Jelinek about the two
incidents when he was denied his break. Fox did not mention the “hut‐huthike”
comments to Jelinek.
Although this was not the formal Costco complaint procedure
provided in the Costco employee handbook, Jelinek, nonetheless,
commenced an investigation into Fox’s complaints at the Holbrook store.
Pursuant to Jelinek’s investigation, Resnikoff met with Fox and all the other
employees involved in the break incidents. At the end of the investigation,
Campbell was transferred to another position. It is unclear if DiCandia
received any sanctions. Fox does not dispute that his “concerns were put at
ease” by this investigation. Id. at 216.
Nevertheless, Fox claims that after he sent the e‐mail to Jelinek and
that investigation took place, Costco employees continued to treat him
poorly because of his disability. These mistreatments included: being
deprived of his time sheets (which he needed to complete his job
9
responsibilities), although he was not reprimanded for not having them;
being reprimanded for leaving his work station to drink water, while
another employee in Fox’s position was not reprimanded for leaving his
work station; being later reprimanded for refusing to leave his work station;
cashiers complaining of their ring times “going down” when he was
assisting them, and one cashier complaining “[a]t least one of us is doing
our job” and that Fox was annoying her, id. at 112; being reprimanded for
waving customers to his register instead of calling to them and, when Fox
explained he had been instructed not to scream, the manager responding,
“You had no problems screaming earlier,” id. at 87. Management was made
aware of the comments made to Fox by cashiers. Afterwards, Fox was
instructed not to work with one of the complaining cashiers, and the other
apologized.
In November 2014, Fox had a panic attack while on the job and had
to be escorted out of the building by EMTs.1 Fox cannot recall much of what
happened. There is evidence in the record that he started acting incoherently
and was asked by a supervisor if he wanted to go to the hospital. He replied
1 Fox does not allege that his panic attack was caused by his co-workers’ comments or the
hostile work environment.
10
that he did. Since that anxiety attack, Fox has been on indefinite medical
leave.
Fox filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human
Rights in August 2014. It was later administratively closed because Fox
“wishe[d] to pursue [the] matter in Federal District Court.” Id. at 30. Fox
filed the instant lawsuit on January 22, 2015.
III.
“We review de novo the award of summary judgment, construing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing
all reasonable inferences and resolving all ambiguities in its favor.” Jaffer v.
Hirji, 887 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Summary judgment is appropriate so long as there is no genuine dispute of
material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
IV.
Applying this standard, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Costco with respect to Fox’s claims alleging
disparate treatment, retaliation, and failure to accommodate. We evaluate
disparate treatment discrimination claims under the McDonnell Douglas
11
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) burden shifting framework. McMillan v.
City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013). Under this standard, a
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
ADA, after which the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to “articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the” employer’s conduct.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer successfully meets its
burden, the plaintiff must then “demonstrate that [the employer’s] assigned
reason . . . was a pretext or discriminatory in its application.” Id. at 807. To
satisfy the first step of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework
and establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate
treatment, Fox “must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his
employer is subject to the ADA; (2) he was disabled within the meaning of
the ADA; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions
of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he suffered
adverse employment action because of his disability.” McMillan, 711 F.3d at
125. The parties do not dispute that Costco is subject to the ADA or that Fox
is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
12
An adverse employment action “must be more disruptive than a mere
inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities and might be indicated
by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in
wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,
significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices . . .
unique to a particular situation.” Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of N.Y.
v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2002) (alternation in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Harsh reprimands do not rise to the
level of an adverse employment action where there is no tangible effect on
employment. See Weeks v. New York State (Div. of Parole), 273 F.3d 76, 86 (2d
Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Natʹl R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002).
Fox first argues that four verbal reprimands—for leaving his post as
a greeter, leaving a custodial cart unattended, leaving his register to retrieve
water, and yelling—were adverse employment actions. We disagree. None
of those reprimands resulted in disciplinary action or a reduction in salary,
benefits, or other responsibilities.
13
Fox next argues that the terms and conditions of his employment
were affected by the systematic and continuous discrimination he suffered
at Costco which resulted in his transfer from Greeter to Assistant Cashier, a
job Fox could not perform because of his disability. Fox maintains that this
transfer significantly worsened his symptoms, making it impossible for him
to perform that job.
Fox has not adduced any evidence that he was demoted, received
decreased benefits, worse job duties, or anything else that affected his
employment with Costco. See id. Fox’s transfer from Greeter to Front‐End
Cashier did not constitute a demotion, decrease in benefits, or decrease in
salary. See id.
Finally, Fox’s claim that he was denied breaks to go home and take
his medicine and go to the pharmacy, even if related to his disability, do not
rise to the level of a material adverse employment action. See Galabya v.
N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that an adverse
employment action must be more than just disruptive). Being unable to take
a break twice is not the type of demotion, pay cut, or significantly
14
diminished responsibility that are the tell‐tale signs of material adverse
employment actions. See id.
Fox also has not demonstrated that he was constructively discharged.
His claim, therefore, does not satisfy the adverse employment action
requirement. See Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir.
1996) (explaining that “[c]onstructive discharge of an employee occurs
when an employer, rather than directly discharging an individual,
intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere that forces an
employee to quit involuntarily”); Spence v. Maryland Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 1147,
1156 (2d Cir. 1993). Fox has not shown that he “actually resigned,” but rather
he is on indefinite medical leave and has failed to make a prima facie case for
disparate treatment. See Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (2016).
Finally, Fox failed to introduce evidence that the alleged material
adverse employment actions he suffered (the reprimands, position transfer,
and lack of breaks) were the result of his disability.
V.
Fox’s retaliation claims were also properly dismissed because he has
not introduced evidence that he suffered an adverse employment action
15
after—and causally connected to—his engagement in a protected activity.
Sarno v. Douglas Elliman‐Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1999).
Fox must show that he engaged in a protected activity, that he suffered an
adverse employment action, and that a causal connection exists between
that protected activity and the adverse employment action. Id.
The parties do not dispute that Fox engaged in a protected activity
when he emailed Jelinek and filed a complaint with the New York State
Division of Human Rights. Nor do they dispute that Costco was aware of
both activities. Fox argues three adverse employment actions were taken
against him as a result of the email and administrative complaint. First, he
claims Resnikoff “laugh[ed]” and brushed off the email complaint to Jelinek.
J. App’x at 220. Second, he alleges his reassignment to Assistant Cashier was
an adverse employment action. And finally, Fox claims the hostile work
environment he was subjected to was an adverse employment action. For
the reasons explained above, however, none of this constitutes an adverse
employment action. But even if one did, Fox fails to provide sufficient
evidence of a causal nexus between Fox’s protected activity and the alleged
adverse employment actions he suffered.
16
VI.
Fox’s failure to accommodate claims were also properly dismissed by
the district court. In order for these claims to survive, Fox must demonstrate
that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) his employer is a
covered entity; (3) he could perform the essential functions of his job with
an accommodation; and (4) the defendants refused to provide such an
accommodation despite being on notice. McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods.
Mfg. Co., Inc., 583 F.3d 92, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2009).
Fox never asked for an accommodation while employed as a Greeter
or as an Assistant Cashier. Fox’s claim seems to be that Costco had to know
that his condition would be worsened by his job as Assistant Cashier. But,
Fox had previously served as an Assistant Cashier during his time at Costco.
There is no reason for Costco to have known Fox could not later perform
that same job. What is more, he has failed to introduce other evidence that
Costco knew or should have been aware that his condition would be
affected by that job transfer. Once in the Assistant Cashier position, Fox
never requested that he be transferred again. In fact, Costco offered Fox a
17
position in the stockroom and Fox declined it. Fox has not identified a
reasonable accommodation that Costco refused to provide.
VII.
Turning to Fox’s claim that he was subject to a hostile work
environment, we hold that hostile work environment claims are cognizable
under the ADA. We hold, moreover, that there was evidence in the record
before the district court sufficient to make out Fox’s hostile work
environment claim, such that his claim survives summary judgment.
A.
We have previously assumed without deciding that hostile work
environment claims are cognizable under the ADA. See, e.g., Fleiger v. E.
Suffolk BOCES, 693 F. App’x 14, 19 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order)
(assuming the plaintiff could bring a hostile work environment claim under
the ADA where such claims failed at summary judgment in any event).
Moreover, a number of courts that have considered this question have
found such claims to be cognizable under the ADA. See Lanman v. Johnson
Cty., 393 F.3d 1151, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2004); Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co., 350
F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 2003); Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physicians Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d
18
229, 232–35 (5th Cir. 2001); Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 175–76 (4th
Cir. 2001).
We are persuaded by our sister Circuits, which have reasoned that
claims for hostile work environment are actionable under the ADA. Under
the ADA, a covered employer “shall [not] discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). “Congress
borrowed this language from Title VII, which similarly provides that it ‘shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.’” Lanman, 393 F.3d at 1155 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(a)(1))
(emphasis in original). “Thus, when Congress included the phrase ‘terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment’ in the ADA, it was using a legal
term of art that prohibited a broad range of employment practices, including
workplace harassment.” Shaver, 350 F.3d at 720.
“[I]n construing a statute, we must look at how its text was
understood at the time that it was passed.” Id. When the ADA was enacted,
19
the Supreme Court had twice concluded that Title VII provided for hostile
work environment claims. See Lanman, 393 F.3d at 1155–56. By borrowing
Title VII’s language, Congress suggested that it intended for the ADA to be
coextensive, at least in this respect, with Title VII. This view is bolstered by
the shared purpose of Title VII and the ADA to prevent discrimination
against a defined class of people. See, e.g., id.
“Because the ADA echoes and expressly refers to Title VII, and
because the two statutes have the same purpose—the prohibition of illegal
discrimination in employment—” it follows that disabled Americans should
be able to assert hostile work environment claims under the ADA, as can
those protected by Title VII under that statute, Gen. Motors, 247 F.3d at 176,
and we here so recognize.
B.
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, Fox must show “(1)
that the harassment was ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working
environment,’ and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the
objectionable conduct to the employer.” Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373
20
(2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir.
1997)). Although the victim must subjectively perceive the conduct as
abusive, the misconduct shown also must be “severe or pervasive enough
to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment.” Id. at 374
(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). Even an isolated
act may be so serious that it requires the conclusion that the terms and
conditions of employment were altered. Id. A plaintiff alleging a hostile
work environment claim under the ADA, therefore, “must demonstrate
either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of
incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the
conditions of her working environment.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a plaintiff has met this burden, including proof of “the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it [was] physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interfere[d] with [the plaintiff’s] work performance.” Harris,
510 U.S. at 23.
21
The record here supports a finding that Fox believed the work
environment at the Holbrook Costco to be abusive. The parties do not
dispute that; the issue is whether the work environment was objectively
abusive, and, if so, whether the abusive conduct can be imputed to Costco.
The times Fox was reprimanded—for leaving the Costco
entranceway, leaving behind a cart, leaving his register to retrieve water,
and yelling—do not support his hostile work environment claims.
Legitimate reprimands by an employer are not abuse. Nor are the
disciplinary actions taken against Fox in response to complaints of Costco
members evidence supporting this claim. Resnikoff conducted his
investigation in accordance with Costco’s company policies, and he
concluded based on his interview with Fox that both customer complaints
constituted “major” violations.
Fox’s “hut‐hut‐hike” allegations and his descriptions of them,
however, raise a material issue of fact as to whether Costco employees
engaged in ongoing and pervasive discriminatory conduct. We disagree
with the district court’s assessment of that evidence because we must
consider it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jaffer, 887 F.3d at 114;
22
see J. App’x at 245 (opinion of the district court explaining that “the lack of
probative evidence regarding the alleged persistence of the ‘hut‐hut‐hike’
comments also means a rational fact‐finder would be unable to determine
whether they ‘amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and
conditions of employment sufficient to meet the threshold of severity or
pervasiveness’”). During Fox’s deposition he stated:
So instead of F‐word, I went like that (grunting) and they’d say
‘hut‐hut‐hike,’ and I heard from the indoor[s] so they were
mocking my disability. ‘Cause whenever I said it, they said ‘huthut‐
hike,’ so I don’t recall exactly who was saying it. I have good
idea of who was saying it, like Mike Smeja, the Fabianos, or I
knew who was saying it and was laughing. But I knew it was a
lot of the morning crew who was make fun of that . . . . You
know, this went on for months and months; it went on for a period of
time.
J. App’x at 112–13 (emphasis added). Fox also testified that the “hut‐huthike”
comments “were audible to the managers of the Holbrook warehouse
from their position on the warehouse’s podium,” J. App’x at 189, see also id.
at 112–13, and “happened in plain view of the Supervisors and the Front
End Managers and nothing was ever said,” id. at 72.
The district court had a different view of the record. To avoid
summary judgment, the court concluded that Fox needed to introduce
23
“evidence regarding the number of times the comments were made per
shift, week and/or month” to show that the “hut‐hut‐hike” comments
pervaded Fox’s working environment. Id. at 245.
The district court demanded too much of Fox. Fox is not required to
list the shift, week, or month to be able to present this issue to a jury. See
Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 2009).
Because Fox identified specific comments—his co‐workers mocking his
Tourette’s by repeating “hut‐hut‐hike,” presumably while touching the
floor—and because he testified that “whenever I said [the F word], they said
‘hut‐hut‐hike’” for “months and months,” Fox has provided evidence
sufficient to meet his burden to demonstrate pervasiveness. See id. On Fox’s
evidence at this stage, we hold, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that
the “hut‐hut‐hike” comments made for months by co‐workers when Fox
experienced verbal tics were sufficiently severe and pervasive to change the
conditions of Fox’s employment. See Perry, 115 F.3d at 149. Since the phrase
“hut‐hut‐hike” is borrowed from football, and Fox alleges that he often
touched the floor when he suffered from verbal tics, presumably resembling
a three‐point stance, we can fairly infer that the phrase “hut‐hut‐hike” was
24
mockery of his disability as opposed to, for example, discussing last night’s
game or motivating each other to get going.
In addition, and crucial to our analysis, Fox introduced evidence that
his supervisors witnessed this conduct for “months and months” and did
nothing, demonstrating a specific basis for imputing the objectionable
conduct to Costco. Alfano, 294 F.3d at 373. Thus, Fox has met his burden to
defeat Costco’s motion for summary judgment on his hostile work
environment claim.
We express no opinion as to the availability of Costco’s affirmative
defense to these claims, raised in a footnote in its appellate brief. See
Appellee’s Br. at 28 n.5 (“Even assuming Plaintiff could establish his claim
that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on his disability,
Costco has established an affirmative defense to the alleged hostile work
environment/harassment in that: (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any disability‐harassing behavior; and (2) Plaintiff
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective
opportunities provided by Costco to avoid harm.”). Fox acknowledges that
he did not follow formal Costco complaint procedures and that his email to
25
Jelinek did not even reference the “hut‐hut‐hike” comments. Arguments
raised only in footnotes, however, as Costco’s argument is here, are not
preserved. United States v. Restrepo, 986 F.2d 1462, 1463 (2d Cir. 1993).
In closing this analysis, we note that teasing in the workplace is not
uncommon, and in most instances probably not actionable. Stuttering is
mimicked; the overweight are called names; acne, baldness, and height are
mentioned for a laugh. All of this can be hurtful. But mockery of overt
features does not necessarily support damages, and the fact that Fox was
mocked for the manifestations of his disability rather than other overt
features does not bear on whether the workplace environment was
objectively abusive. Here, however, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Fox, Fox has raised an issue of fact as to whether the frequency
and severity of the mockery rise to the level of an objectively hostile work
environment.
VIII.
Because NYSHRL claims are analyzed as ADA claims, Fox’s state law
claims for disparate treatment, retaliation, and failure to accommodate were
26
properly dismissed. His state law hostile work environment claim is to be
reinstated on remand.
Outcome: For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: