Date: 05-16-2017

Case Style: Debra Hatten-Gonzales v. Brent Earnest

Case Number: 16-2064

Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on appeal from the District of New Meixco (Bernalillo County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: Daniel Yohalem, Jane Yohalem, Gail Evans, Sovereign Hager, Adrianne R. Turner

Defendant's Attorney: Natalie A. Bruce, Christopher P. Collins, George F. Heidke, Jr, Paul J. Kennedy

Description: New Mexico appeals the district court’s grant of Debra Hatten-Gonzales’s
motion for a preliminary injunction preventing the New Mexico Human Services
Department from implementing NMAC § 8.139.410.14, a regulation
implementing federal restrictions on food stamp benefits, until December 31,
2016. Hatten-Gonzales filed the motion pursuant to a consent decree that has
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
been in effect since 1998. The parties agree New Mexico’s appeal from the grant
of the preliminary injunction is now moot, because the injunction has expired by
its own terms. We therefore dismiss the appeal from the order granting a
preliminary injunction. We also dismiss as untimely New Mexico’s appeal from
an earlier district court order in which the court found it had jurisdiction to hear
Hatten-Gonzales’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
I. Background
In New Mexico, the federal food stamp program, now known as the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), is administered by the
Income Support Division of the Human Services Department (HSD). In 1988,
Debra Hatten-Gonzales filed suit against the Secretary of HSD, challenging the
way HSD processed applications for SNAP and other benefits. Hatten-Gonzales
sought and was granted certification of a class of SNAP applicants. The parties
ultimately agreed to a consent decree (Decree), which specifies how HSD must
process applications. The Decree, with minor modifications to reflect changes in
federal law, was adopted as an injunction in 1998. See Hatten-Gonzales v. Hyde,
579 F.3d 1159, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009). The Decree permits the class of plaintiffs
to seek a ruling from the district court to enforce HSD’s compliance with the
Decree’s terms.
This appeal arose after HSD began implementing federal restrictions on
SNAP benefits for Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs).
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ABAWDs are adults ages 18 through 49 who do not live in a household with a
minor, are not pregnant, and are mentally and physically fit to work. Under
federal law, unless exempt from the requirements, ABAWDs may not receive
SNAP benefits for more than three months in a three-year period unless they are
engaged in work or other authorized activities for 80 hours each month. In 2015,
HSD promulgated new rules to implement the ABAWD time limits. On
January 1, 2016, HSD began implementing its new regulation, NMAC
§ 8.139.410.14.

On January 27, 2016, Hatten-Gonzales filed a motion asking the district
court to enjoin the Secretary of HSD, Brent Earnest, from implementing the
regulation, alleging HSD had violated the terms of the Decree by failing to
provide sufficient training on the ABAWD requirements and by failing to provide
accurate information to SNAP recipients. Hatten-Gonzales asked the court to
preliminarily enjoin HSD from implementing the regulation until it was ready to
process the applications of ABAWDs and potential ABAWDs in compliance with
the Decree. The district court ordered supplemental briefing on whether the
requested relief fell within the scope of the Decree. In a February 18, 2016 order,
the court determined it had jurisdiction to hear the motion. On March 18, 2016,
after hearing evidence and argument, the court issued an order granting Hatten-
Gonzales’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The injunction prevented HSD
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from implementing its new rule until December 31, 2016. Earnest then filed this
interlocutory appeal.1
II. Analysis
Earnest appeals from both the district court’s March 18, 2016 order
granting a preliminary injunction and its earlier February 18, 2016 order finding
jurisdiction to hear Hatten-Gonzales’s motion. We dismiss the appeal from the
former as moot, and we dismiss the appeal from the latter as untimely.
A. The March 18, 2016 Order
In its March 18, 2016 order, the district court granted Hatten-Gonzales’s
motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined HSD from implementing its
ABAWD time limit and work requirements until December 31, 2016. Because the
injunction expired by its own terms, on April 6, 2017, we asked the parties to file
written responses showing why the appeal from the grant of the preliminary
injunction should not be dismissed as moot. In their responses, both parties
agreed the appeal from the March 18 order is moot and need not be heard. We
agree, because the expiration of the preliminary injunction “makes it impossible
for [us] to grant ‘any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party.’” See Prier
1 On July 18, 2016, Hatten-Gonzales filed a motion to dismiss Earnest’s
interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the district court in its March
18 order merely interpreted, clarified, and interpreted the Decree, rather than
granting or modifying an existing injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). This
motion was referred to the merits panel. Because we dismiss the appeal on other
grounds, we deny Hatten-Gonzales’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
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v. Steed, 456 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Church of Scientology of
Ca. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)). Accordingly, we dismiss as moot
Earnest’s appeal from the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction.
B. The February 18, 2016 Order
In its February 18, 2016 order, the district court found it had jurisdiction to
hear Hatten-Gonzales’s motion for injunctive relief, concluding the motion fell
within the scope of the Decree. Earnest now contends we have jurisdiction to
hear his appeal from the February 18 order, notwithstanding our dismissal of his
appeal from the March 18 order, because the earlier order remains in effect, and
Hatten-Gonzales has relied on it to seek jurisdiction over additional aspects of
HSD’s operations. Hatten-Gonzales, on the other hand, argues we must dismiss
the appeal from the February 18 order for two reasons: (1) the order interprets and
clarifies the Decree but does not modify it, and (2) because the injunction granted
in the March 18 order has expired, our review of the February 18 order would
amount to an advisory opinion about the district court’s jurisdiction to issue an
order that is now moot.
We decline to reach the merits of the parties’ arguments, because we
dismiss Earnest’s appeal from the February 18 order for a third, different reason:
the appeal is untimely. In a civil case, a notice of appeal “must be filed with the
district clerk within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.”
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Fed. R. App. P. 4. Earnest filed his notice of appeal on April 18, 2016, well
outside the 30-day deadline. We therefore dismiss his appeal as untimely.

Outcome: Because the appeal from the March 18 order is moot, and the appeal from
the February 18 order is untimely, we DISMISS this appeal in its entirety.

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