Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.
Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw
Date: 10-13-2020
Case Style:
Lonnie Gene Ragan v. The State of Texas
Case Number: 10-18-00366-CR
Judge: TOM GRAY
Court: TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
Plaintiff's Attorney: W. Coty Siegert
Defendant's Attorney:
OR
Just Call 855-853-4800 for Free Help Finding a Lawyer Help You.
Description:
Fairfield,TX - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant
Lonnie Gene Ragan charged with Assault.
Lonnie Gene Ragan was convicted of Assault Causing Bodily Injury-Family
Member/Impeding Breath or Circulation, TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B), and
sentenced to 15 years in prison. In his sole issue, Ragan contends his waiver of his right
to a jury trial did not meet constitutional requirements, in that, although he may have
voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial by signing a written waiver, the record did
not show he knowingly and intelligently waived that right. Because the waiver met
Ragan v. State Page 2
constitutional requirements, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
“A defendant has an absolute right to a jury trial." Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193,
197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15. A
defendant also has the right to waive his right to trial by jury. See Adams v. United
States, 317 U.S. 269, 275, 63 S. Ct. 236, 87 L. Ed. 268 (1942). In Texas, "the waiver must be
made in person by the defendant in writing in open court with the consent and
approval of the court, and the attorney representing the state." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 1.13(a). Further, a written jury waiver that complies with article 1.13 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure is sufficient to show that a defendant intelligently waived
his right to a jury trial. See Holcomb v. State, 696 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1985), aff'd as reformed, 745 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc). As a
matter of federal constitutional law, however, the State must establish, on the record, a
defendant’s express, knowing, and intelligent waiver of jury trial. Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at
197; Guillett v. State, 677 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). A waiver of a jury trial is
not to be presumed from a silent record. See Guillett, 677 S.W.2d at 49.
Questions involving legal principles, such as waiving the right to a jury trial, and
the application of that law to the established facts are properly reviewed de novo. See
Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Jackson v. State, Nos. 05-14-
00274-CR, 05-14-00275-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6126, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas June
17, 2015, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (waiver of jury trial). See also Maestas
Ragan v. State Page 3
v. State, 987 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (whether police honored right to
remain silent—de novo review); United States v. Perez, 356 F. App'x 770, 772 (5th Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (“Given the fundamental nature of
the right at issue [the right to a trial by jury], and given a jury trial's central place in our
criminal justice system, we apply de novo review to Perez's claim [that there was no
oral or written waiver of the right to jury trial].”).
Ragan contends the trial court was simply a spectator in the waiver process and
needed to do more so that the record could sufficiently establish an express, knowing,
and intelligent waiver by Ragan. We disagree with Ragan’s contention.
Initially, the trial court explained on the record that during voir dire, Ragan’s
counsel approached the bench and revealed to the court that Ragan, through a
handwritten note to counsel, indicated he wanted to waive a jury and go to the judge
“for the actual trial, and if needed, punishment.” Counsel confirmed the trial court’s
summary and informed the court that once the jury recessed, he spoke with Ragan.
Next, counsel confirmed on the record with Ragan that Ragan wanted “all of these
people to go home[.]” Counsel then explained to Ragan, again on the record, the
following:
You do have the right to a jury trial. The Judge will hear all the evidence.
We’re going to still enter a plea of not guilty, and the Judge will hear all
the evidence. The Judge will make a determination as to whether or not
you’re guilty, and if he does find you guilty, then he would assess your
punishment. Do you understand that? Is that what you want to do?
Ragan v. State Page 4
Ragan replied, “Yes, sir. Yes, sir.”
After counsel and the State began talking over each other, the trial court asked
everyone to start again, one at a time. Consequently, counsel again explained to Ragan,
on the record and before the trial court:
If you want to give up your right to a trial by jury, the Judge will listen to
all the evidence. He will determine whether or not he believes you are
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If he finds you “not guilty,” then it’s
over for this case. If he finds you guilty, then he will assess your
punishment somewhere within two years to 20 years. Is that what you
want to do?
Ragan replied, “Yes, sir.”
The trial court then asked Ragan whether his decision was made after consulting
with counsel and whether he waived the right to a jury trial freely and voluntarily “here
today.” Ragan replied affirmatively. When further questioned by the court whether
Ragan was under the influence of any type of medication or any foreign substance,
Ragan responded, “No.” After asking Ragan if he had any questions, which Ragan did
not, the trial court again confirmed with Ragan that Ragan wanted to waive his right to
a jury trial.
Ragan does not contest the statutory validity of the jury trial waiver he signed
which can be found in the record and which, he concedes, renders his waiver at least
voluntary. Rather, his only complaint is that the trial judge did not engage in a specific
“colloquy” used by some federal and state courts and the BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGES which, his argument continues, would ensure the jury
Ragan v. State Page 5
trial waiver was also intelligent and knowing. We decline to follow those courts and
the federal bench book.1
The waiver signed by Ragan complied with article 1.13 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure. Ragan admitted this waiver was voluntary, and according to
caselaw, compliance with article 1.13 is sufficient to show the waiver was intelligently
made as well. Further, after a review of the discussion between the trial court, Ragan’s
counsel, Ragan, and the State, the record established Ragan’s express, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial.
Accordingly, the trial court had authority to proceed with a bench trial because
Ragan waived his right to a jury trial, and Ragan’s sole issue is overruled.
Outcome: Having overruled the only issue raised on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: