Date: 11-23-2016

Case Style:

Case Number: SC 19499

Judge: Dennis G. Eveleigh

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Kevin T. Kane, chief state’s attorney, Michael Dearington, former state’s attorney, and Leah Hawley, supervisory assistant state’s attorney

Defendant's Attorney:

Paul A. Catalano

Description: This case is before us on a writ of error brought by the plaintiff in error, 3-D Bail Bonds, Inc. (plaintiff), who claims that the trial court improperly denied its motion seeking relief from its obligation on a surety bail bond (bond) pursuant to General Statutes§ 54-65c,whichthetrialcourthadorderedforfeited after the principal on that bond, Angel Agron, who is the criminal defendant in the underlying case, failed to appear for a scheduled court date. The defendant in error, the state of Connecticut, responds that the trial court properly denied the motion, claiming that the plaintiff had not satisfied the requirements of § 54-65c becauseAgronwasnot‘‘detained’’forpurposesof§ 5465c when he was personally confronted by fugitive recovery bail enforcement agents in Puerto Rico, and the state refused to extradite him to Connecticut. We conclude that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion and, therefore, dismiss the writ of error. The record reveals the following relevant facts. In 2006, Agron was arrested and charged with several offenses.1 The trial court set bail on these charges in an amount totaling $20,000. The plaintiff executed a bond in that amount and Agron was subsequently released from custody. Agron failed to appear for a scheduled court date on June 23, 2014, and the trial court ordered the total amountof thebondforfeited. Pursuantto GeneralStatutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-65a (a), the court ordered a six month stay of execution of the forfeiture. Upon being notified of Agron’s failure to appear, the plaintiff initiated an investigation that revealed that Agron fled to PuertoRicoandremainedthere.OnDecember17,2014, Agron was personally confronted by bail enforcement agents in Puerto Rico. The state’s attorney, however, declined to initiate extradition proceedings. On December 21, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion with the trial court to release the plaintiff from its obligation on the bond pursuant to § 54-65c. In support of its motion, the plaintiff filed an affidavit from one of its employees, Andrew J. Bloom, who attested that he spokewiththeState’sAttorney’sOfficeandinformedit thatbailenforcementagentshadpersonallyconfronted Agron. Bloom further averred that, although he requestedanauthorizationforextradition,arepresentative of the state’s attorney had declined his request. The plaintiff also submittedan affidavit in which Agron attested that he was ‘‘detained’’ in Puerto Rico by bail enforcementagentsandmadeawareofhiswarrantsfor failure toappear inConnecticut. Agronfurther attested that he was told that the state was not authorizing extradition and that he was free to go. A photocopy of Agron’s identification card and a photograph of him holding a Puerto Rican newspaper dated December 17,
2014, were also attached to the motion. The trial court denied the motion and the plaintiff sought reconsideration. After considering briefs from both parties and conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court reasoned as follows: ‘‘[Agron] has not been proven to be in custody of the authorities in Puerto Rico; rather, bail enforcement agents made contact with him and he refused to consenttoreturn.The[plaintiff]hasnotmettheburden placed upon it by the statute, namely that [Agron] be detainedorincarcerated.’’(Emphasisadded.)Theplaintiff thereafter filed a writ of error. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly denied its motion for relief from bond under § 54-65c because the trial court incorrectly interpreted the term ‘‘detained’’asusedinthestatute.Specifically,theplaintiff asserts that the legislature intended the term ‘‘detained’’toincludeactionbyabailenforcementagent to capture the principal.2 In response, the state asserts that for the purposes of § 54-65c, the term ‘‘detained’’ requiresstateaction.Specifically,thestateassertsthat, to satisfy the ‘‘detained’’ requirements of § 54-65c, a surety holder must show that the principal is detained bythegovernmentofanotherstate,territoryorcountry, notsimplythepersonalcontact madebyabailenforcement agent. We agree with the state and conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff had not met the requirements of § 54-65c. At the outset, we set forth the standard of review that applies to the plaintiff’s claim. The question of whether § 54-65c affords relief for a surety holder upon demonstrating that the principal has been located and personally confronted by a bail enforcement agent presents a question of statutory construction. ‘‘Whenconstruingastatute,[o]urfundamentalobjectiveistoascertainandgiveeffecttotheapparentintent of the legislature. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,extratextual evidence ofthe meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when readincontext,issusceptibletomorethanonereasonable interpretation. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, wealso lookfor interpretiveguidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding itsenactment,tothelegislativepolicyitwasdesignedto implement,andtoitsrelationshiptoexistinglegislation andcommonlawprinciplesgoverningthesamegeneral subject matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining
Board v. Freedom of Information Commission, 310 Conn.276,283,77A.3d121(2013).Theissueofstatutory interpretation presented in this case is a question of law subject to plenary review. See id., 282–83. We begin with the text of the statute. Section 5465c provides as follows: ‘‘A court shall vacate an order forfeiting a bail bond and release the professional bondsman, as defined in section 29-144, or the surety bail bond agent and the insurer, as both terms are defined in section 38a-660, if (1) the principal on the bail bond (A) is detained or incarcerated (i) in another state, territory or country, or (ii) by a federal agency, or (B) has been removed by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and (2) the professional bondsman, the surety bail bond agent or the insurer provides satisfactory proof of such detention, incarceration or removal to the court and the state’s attorney prosecutingthecase,and(3)thestate’sattorneyprosecuting the case declines to seek extradition of the principal.’’ Resolutionoftheplaintiff’sclaimrequiresustodetermine whether Agron was ‘‘detained’’ for purposes of § 54-65c when the bail enforcement agents personally located him and confronted him in Puerto Rico. ‘‘Detained’’ is not defined in § 54-65c. In accordance with General Statutes § 1-1 (a), we, therefore, look to the common usage of the word ‘‘detain’’ to discern the definition intended by the legislature in § 54-65c. See, e.g., Potvin v. Lincoln Service & Equipment Co., 298 Conn. 620, 633, 6 A.3d 60 (2010). ‘‘In the absence of a definition of terms in the statute itself, [w]e may presume . . . that the legislature intended [a word] to have its ordinary meaning in the English language, as gleaned from the context of its use. . . . Under such circumstances, it is appropriate to look to the common understandingofthetermasexpressedinadictionary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saturno, 322 Conn. 80, 90, 139 A.3d 629 (2016). The term ‘‘detain’’ is defined with substantial similarity in a number of dictionaries. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) defines ‘‘detain’’ as, inter alia, ‘‘to hold or keep in or as if in custody . . . .’’ The American Heritage College Dictionary (4th Ed. 2007) similarly defines ‘‘detain’’ as, inter alia, ‘‘[t]o keep in custody or temporary confinement.’’ Finally, the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th Ed. 2011) also defines ‘‘detain’’ as, inter alia, ‘‘[t]o keep in custody or confinement . . . .’’ Applying the dictionarydefinitionof‘‘detain’’ supportsthatthelegislatureintended§ 54-65ctorequiregovernmentalaction. ‘‘When determining the legislature’s intended meaningofastatutoryword,italsoisappropriatetoconsider the surrounding words pursuant to the canon of construction noscitur a sociis.3 McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 300 Conn. 144, 159, 12 A.3d 948 (2011).
Byusingthisinterpretiveaid,themeaningofastatutory word may be indicated, controlled or made clear by the words with which it is associated in the statute. State v. Roque, 190 Conn. 143, 152, 460 A.2d 26 (1983).’’ (Footnote in original.) State v. LaFleur, 307 Conn. 115, 133, 51 A.3d 1048 (2012). In § 54-65c, the legislature chose to use the word ‘‘detained’’ in association with the term ‘‘incarcerated.’’ ‘‘Incarcerated’’ necessarily indicates confinement by government. See The AmericanHeritageCollegeDictionary,supra(defining‘‘incarcerate’’ as ‘‘[t]o put into jail’’); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, supra (defining ‘‘incarcerate’’ as ‘‘to put in prison: imprison’’). A review of other statutes in which the legislature has used the term ‘‘detained’’ in connection with the term ‘‘incarcerated’’ demonstrates that in using the two words together, the legislatureintendedtorefertocustodybyagovernment agent. See General Statutes § 54-142g (d) (4) (all persons‘‘detainedorincarceratedinanycorrectionalfacility in this state’’); General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 1881cc (a) (‘‘[a]ny agency of the state or any political subdivision of the state that incarcerates or detains adult or juvenile offenders, including persons detained forimmigrationviolations,shall,withinavailableappropriations, adopt and comply with the applicable standards recommended by the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission for the prevention, detection and monitoring of, and response to, sexual abuse in adult prisons and jails, community correction facilities, juvenile facilities and lockups’’). Therefore, the legislature’suseoftheterm‘‘incarcerated’’inconnectionwith ‘‘detained’’in§ 54-65cisfurtherindicationthatthelegislature intended ‘‘detained’’ to require governmental action. Furthermore, a review of other statutes reveals that the legislature has repeatedly used the term ‘‘detained’’ torefertogovernmentalaction.Forinstance,inGeneral Statutes § 46b-133, the term ‘‘detain’’ or ‘‘detained’’ is used throughout the statute to refer to the process by which a governmental authority may hold a child in custody when a child is arrested. See General Statutes § 46b-133 (c) (‘‘[u]pon the arrest of any child by an officer, such officer may [1] release the child to the custody of the child’s parent or parents, guardian or some other suitable person or agency, [2] at the discretion of the officer, release the child to the child’s own custody, or [3] seek a court order to detain the child in a juvenile detention center’’). In General Statutes § 54-108d, the term ‘‘detain’’ is used to describe the processbywhichaprobationofficermayholdaperson incustody.SeeGeneralStatutes§ 54-108d(a)(‘‘[a]probation officer may, in the performance of his or her official duties, detain for a reasonable period of time and until a police officer arrives to make an arrest [1] any person who has one or more unexecuted state or federal arrest warrants lodged against him or her, and
[2] any person who such officer has probable cause to believe has violated a condition of probation and is the subject of a probation officer’s authorization to arrest pursuant to subsection [a] of section 53a-32’’). In General Statutes § 14-12h, the legislature used the term ‘‘detain’’ to describe the process by which a police officer may address an unregistered motor vehicle being driven on the highway. See General Statutes § 14-12h (b)(1)(‘‘[i]fanypoliceofficerobservesamotorvehicle being operated upon the public highway, and such motor vehicle is displaying registration number plates identified as suspended . . . such police officer may . . . stop or detain such vehicle and its occupants’’); see also General Statutes § 54-126 (‘‘the [Chairman of the Board of Pardons and Paroles] may detain any convict or inmate pending approval by the panel of such retaking or reimprisonment’’); General Statutes § 54192h(b)(addressingrequirementsforlawenforcement officertodetainindividualpursuanttocivilimmigration detainer); General Statutes § 54-53a (addressing detention of individuals accused of crimes who have not made bail in community correction centers); General Statutes § 7-135a (addressing reimbursement for town operating lockup ‘‘wherein prisoners are detained for arraignment before, or trial by, the Superior Court’’). Anexamination ofthesestatutesdemonstrates thatthe legislature has consistently used the term ‘‘detain’’ to require governmental action.4 It is axiomatic that, when interpreting the terms of one statute, ‘‘we are guided by the principle that the legislatureisalwayspresumedtohavecreatedaharmonious and consistent body of law . . . . Legislation never is written on a clean slate, nor is it ever read in isolation or applied in a vacuum. Every new act takes its place as a component of an extensive and elaborate system of written laws. . . . Construing statutes by reference to others advances [the values of harmony and consistency within the law]. In fact, courts have been said to be under a duty to construe statutes harmoniously where that can reasonably be done. . . . Moreover, statutes must be construed, if possible, such that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Standard Oil of Connecticut, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 320 Conn. 611, 645, 134 A.3d 581 (2016). Applying this principle to the terms of § 54-65c, we conclude that the plain language of § 54-65c, as read in connection with other statutes, demonstrates that the legislature intended the word ‘‘detained’’ as used in that statute to require custody by a governmental entity. The plaintiff seems to assert, however, that reading § 54-65c so as to require custody by a governmental entity leads to absurd or unworkable results. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that such an interpretation of the statute prevents a surety from obtaining recourse
under§ 54-65cbasedonthestate’sdecisionnottoextradite the principal. We disagree. First, the plaintiff’s bail contract was between itself and Agron. The state was not a party to that contract and has no responsibilities under that contract. The plaintiff does not assert that the state or any other governmental entity promised that it would extradite Agron in the event that he fled to another country. As we explained in State v. Sheriff, 301 Conn. 617, 628, 21 A.3d 808 (2011), ‘‘even if we assume that the chief state’s attorney could have extradited [the principal] from Jamaica, in the absence of any promise by the chief state’s attorney that he would seek extradition of [the principal] in the event that he fled, the chief state’s attorney had no obligation to [the surety] to extradite [the principal] from Jamaica in order to fulfill the obligations that [the surety] willingly undertook. As one court has observed, ‘[t]he state is not the surety’s surety.’ Umatilla County v. Resolute Ins. Co., 8 Or. App. 318, 322, 493 P.2d 731 (1972). . . . The fact that [the surety] cannot compel [the principal] to return to this state so that [the surety] can fulfill its obligation is primarily the result of [the principal’s] decisiontofleetoJamaica,and[thesurety]mustaccept the consequences of that decision.’’ Similarly, in the present case, we are not persuaded that our interpretation of § 54-65c leads to absurd or unworkable results merely because the plaintiff is required to forfeit the bond when Agron fled to a United States territory and the state decided not to extradite him. Instead, we conclude that our interpretation of § 54-65c requires the plaintiff to abide by the terms of the bond agreement, namely, to forfeit the bond if Agron did not appear in court.

Outcome:

On the basis of our conclusion that § 54-65c requires thatAgronbeincarceratedordetainedbyagovernmental entity, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for relief from bond in the present case. It is undisputed that Agron was not incarcerated or detained by any governmental entity in the present case, accordingly, the plaintiff did not meet the requirements of § 54-65c. The writ of error is dismissed.

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