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Defendant's Attorney: Daniel Benjamin Chammas

Description: Los Angeles, California personal injury lawyers represented Plaintiff, who sued defendant on a negligence theory.

This case comes from a construction site at the California
Flats Solar Project (“the Project”), a solar power facility in
Monterey County, California, located on private property
called Jack Ranch. The owner of the facility, First Solar
Electric, Inc., retained CSI Electrical Contractors (“CSI”) for
“procurement, installation, construction, and testing services
on Phase 2 of the Project.”

Appellant George Huerta worked for CSI through the
subcontractor Milco National Constructors, Inc. Two
collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) governed his
employment: the Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 of
the International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO’s
CBA, and the Project Labor Agreement specific to the
Project.

For the Project, First Solar Electric was required to
obtain and follow an Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”) from
the California Department of Fish and Wildlife, which
imposed specific rules regarding the presence of local
endangered species. The CBA required workers to comply
with the permit. The ITP imposed speed limits and other
restrictions on the work site. A biologist also monitored the
site to minimize disturbances to the species’ habitats and
cleared the road each morning before anyone could enter.

Workers commuted to the site via personal vehicles,
carpools, and buses. The Project had one entrance, requiring
workers to first pass a guard shack at the entrance, and then
to stop at the Security Gate several miles down the road.
Sometimes workers waited outside the entrance before the
sun rose or the road was cleared by the biologist.

After passing through the entrance, CSI workers stopped
at the Security Gate miles down the road, where a guard
scanned each worker’s badge and sometimes peered inside
vehicles or truck beds. CSI told workers that the Security
Gate was the first place they “were required to be at the
beginning of the day in order to work.” The same badging-
out process at the Security Gate was used to exit the site.
Since many workers exited the Project around the same time
each day, lines at the Security Gate often were five to twenty
minutes long.

On their way to work, once through the Security Gate,
employees drove ten to fifteen more minutes to the parking
lots down the road. On the drive, they had to follow various
rules and restrictions regarding speed limits and passing;
prohibitions on smoking, gambling, drinking, using drugs or
firearms, and creating dust; and general precautions about
the endangered species. CSI told workers that
noncompliance could result in suspension or termination.
CSI also informed workers they “were required to stay
on the job Solar Site during the entire workday” including
“during [their] meal periods.”

The district court granted CSI’s first motion for partial
summary judgment on April 28, 2021, and its second on June
25, 2021. The district court ruled that CSI’s requirements
that workers undergo the exit process and drive between the
Security Gate and the parking lots before and after each shift
did not rise to the level of control sufficient to require
compensation. The district court also determined that the
Security Gate was not the “first required location” as defined
by Wage Order No. 16, and that Huerta’s meal period claims
were statutorily exempted because he worked under a
qualifying CBA. The district court relied on its decisions in
two earlier class actions arising from the same site. See
Griffin v. Sachs Elec. Co., 390 F. Supp. 3d 1070 (N.D. Cal.
2019), aff’d, 831 F. App’x 270 (9th Cir. 2020)
(unpublished); Durham v. Sachs Elec. Co., No. 18-cv-
04506-BLF, 2020 WL 7643125 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2020).
The parties stipulated to the judgment, which reserved
Huerta’s right to appeal. Huerta timely appealed to our
court.

Outcome: The panel certified to the Supreme Court of California
the following questions:

(1) Is time spent on an employer’s premises
in a personal vehicle and waiting to scan
an identification badge, have security
guards peer into the vehicle, and then exit
a Security Gate compensable as “hours
worked” within the meaning of California
Industrial Welfare Commission Wage
Order No. 16?

(2) Is time spent on the employer’s premises
in a personal vehicle, driving between the
Security Gate and the employee parking
lots, while subject to certain rules from
the employer, compensable as “hours
worked” or as “employer-mandated

(3) Is time spent on the employer’s premises,
when workers are prohibited from
leaving but not required to engage in
employer-mandated activities,
compensable as “hours worked” within
the meaning of California Industrial
Welfare Commission Wage Order No.
16, or under California Labor Code
Section 1194, when that time was
designated as an unpaid “meal period”
under a qualifying collective bargaining
agreement?

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: