Gary J. Wilson v. City of Stamford

The plaintiff, Gary J. Wilson, appeals
from the decision of the workers' compensation review
board (board) reversing the determination by the workers'
compensation commissioner for the seventh district
(commissioner) that the plaintiff was entitled to
health insurance while he was receiving medical benefits
for a compensable injury. On appeal, the plaintiff
claims that the board improperly determined that he
was not entitled to benefits pursuant to General Statutes
§ 31-284b (a). We affirm the decision of the board.
The commissioner found the following facts. The
plaintiff was a member of the Stamford police department.

On approximately July 8, 1991, the plaintiff suffered
from a heart condition commonly referred to as
a myocardial infarction. The plaintiff established his
claim pursuant to General Statutes § 7-433c1 and began
receiving benefits pursuant to § 31-284b.2 At the hearing
before the commissioner, the parties narrowed the
issue to whether the plaintiff was eligible to receive
benefits pursuant to § 31-284b when the plaintiff was
receiving medical benefits, but not indemnity benefits.

The commissioner determined that the plaintiff was
entitled to receive benefits pursuant to § 31-284b while
he was receiving either indemnity or medical benefits,
as a result of his compensable injury of July 8, 1991.

The board reversed the commissioner's determination
on the basis of its holding in Graham v. University of
Connnecticut Health Center, 4418 CRB-6-01-7 (July 23,
2002), and our holdings in Kelly v. Bridgeport, 61 Conn.
App. 9, 762 A.2d 480 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn.
933, 767 A.2d 104 (2001), and Auger v. Stratford, 64
Conn. App. 75, 779 A.2d 773 (2001). The board held that
the plaintiff was not entitled to benefits pursuant to
§ 31-284b while receiving only medical benefits. This
appeal followed.

‘‘As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of
review applicable to workers' compensation appeals.

‘The principles that govern our standard of review in
workers' compensation appeals are well established.

The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from
the facts found must stand unless they result from an
incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts
or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn
from them. . . . Besade v. Interstate Security Services,
212 Conn. 441, 449, 562 A.2d 1086 (1989). . . .

It is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we
accord great weight to the construction given to the
workers' compensation statutes by the commissioner
and review board. . . . A state agency is not entitled,
however, to special deference when its determination
of a question of law has not previously been subject to
judicial scrutiny. . . . Duni v. United Technologies
Corp., 239 Conn. 19, 24–25, 682 A.2d 99 (1996); Davis v.
Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995). . . .'

‘‘The interpretation of § 31-284b is a matter of statutory
construction. ‘Statutory construction is a question
of law and therefore our review is plenary. . . . [O]ur
fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to
the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In seeking
to discern that intent, we look to the words of the
statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances
surrounding its enactment, to the legislative
policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship
to existing legislation and common law principles
governing the same general subject matter.' . . . General
Motors Corp. v. Dohmann, 247 Conn. 274, 286, 722
A.2d 1205 (1998); Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development
Associates, 244 Conn. 189, 195, 708 A.2d 1371 (1998).''
(Citation omitted.) Kelly v. Bridgeport, supra, 61 Conn.
App. 13–14.

The plaintiff argues that the board improperly interpreted
the statutes. Section 31-284b provides in relevant
part that an employer ‘‘shall provide to the employee
equivalent insurance coverage or welfare plan payments
or contributions while the employee is eligible
to receive or is receiving compensation pursuant to this
chapter . . . .'' The plaintiff contends that the word
‘‘compensation,'' as it is used in § 31-284b, is defined
by General Statutes § 31-275 (4). Section 31-275 (4) provides
in relevant part that ‘‘ ‘[c]ompensation' means
benefits or payments mandated by the provisions of
this chapter, including, but not limited to, indemnity,
medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service
required under section 31-294d and any type of payment
for disability . . . or any adjustment in benefits or payments
required by this chapter.'' The plaintiff's argument
is that under § 31-275 (4), compensation includes
medical benefits and because he was receiving medical
benefits, he qualified for benefits under § 31-284b.

In Kelly v. Bridgeport, supra, 61 Conn. App. 9, we
held that an employee who is receiving only medical
benefits is not eligible for benefits pursuant to § 31-
284b. Part of our holding in Kelly was premised on the
language of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 31-284b,
which contained language different from the current
statute. Section 31-284b was revised in July, 1991, by
Public Acts 1991, No. 91-32, § 8 (P.A. 91-32). Prior to
the revision, ‘‘the employer's obligation to provide
insurance coverage'' was conditioned on the ‘‘employee's
receipt of . . . ‘workers' compensation payments
pursuant to this chapter.' '' Kelly v. Bridgeport, supra,
14 n.4. Section 8 of P.A. 91-32 eliminated the phrase
‘‘workers' compensation payments pursuant to this
chapter'' and substituted ‘‘compensation pursuant to
this chapter . . . .'' In Kelly, ‘‘we [concluded] that the
term ‘compensation payments' as used in § 31-284b (a)
does not include payments for medical care after the
indemnity compensation period has ceased. The statute
mandates that an employer is required to continue
insurance benefits only while an employee is receiving
‘compensation payments' for disability under the Workers'
Compensation Act [(act), General Statutes § 31-275
et seq.].'' Kelly v. Bridgeport, supra, 16–17.

The Supreme Court has, in Weinberg v. ARA Vending
Co., 223 Conn. 336, 612 A.2d 1203 (1992), interpreted
the importance of the changes wrought by P.A. 91-32.
In an illuminating opinion, the Supreme Court stated
that the ‘‘legislative history of No. 91-32 of the 1991
Public Acts indicates that it was intended to be a technical
amendment. In commenting on the bill on the floor
of the Senate, Senator James H. Maloney, senate chairman
of the joint standing committee on labor and public
employees, described the bill as ‘the bill that makes
technical recodification of the Workers' Compensation
statute' and that ‘cleans up the statute in regard to
Workers' Compensation.' 34 S. Proc., Pt. 3, 1991 Sess.,
p. 836. Similarly, in presiding over a hearing of the joint
standing committee, Maloney described the bill as ‘a
technical revision in [e]ffect to the existing statute.'
Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Labor and
Public Employees, 1991 Sess., p. 16. He went on to
state: ‘So we're not really dealing with changes in the
substantive legislation today. If there are substantive
changes that are made because of the draft, we do want
to hear about that because that's not what's supposed to
have occurred with this instrument.' Id. Commissioner
John Arcudi of the compensation review division, who
participated in formulating the proposed revisions, also
testified at the hearing that ‘the purpose of the bill [was]
not to change substance, but to try to simplify language
and eliminate archaic language, reduce language if possible
. . . .' Id., p. 17. Finally, in commenting on the bill
on the House floor, Representative Joseph A. Adamo,
house chairman of the joint standing committee on
labor and public employees, stated that the bill ‘brings
into focus a new section of describing all the definitions
that were utilized and sprinkled throughout the entire
chapter.' 34 H.R. Proc., Pt. 5, 1991 Sess., pp. 1959–60.

When viewed together, the foregoing statements make
clear that the definition of ‘compensation' provided in
the 1991 amendment merely clarified the term as it
had already been used throughout the act and did not
enact any substantive change in the law.'' (Emphasis
added.) Weinberg v. ARA Vending Co., supra, 346–47;
see also Luce v. United Technologies Corp., 247 Conn.
126, 136–37, 717 A.2d 747 (1998) (P.A. 91-32 was technical
amendment that did not change substantive law).
Because our Supreme Court has determined that P.A.
91-32 was a technical amendment, P.A. 91-32 did not
change the law, but merely clarified the law. See Greenwich
Hospital v. Gavin, 265 Conn. 511, 520–24, 829
A.2d 810 (2003). On the basis of the doctrine of stare
decisis, we stand by our holding in Kelly v. Bridgeport,
supra, 61 Conn. App. 16, that compensation ‘‘does not
include payments for medical care after the indemnity
compensation period has ceased.''3 The plaintiff accordingly
was not entitled to benefits pursuant to § 31-284b.