STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN JOSEPH LEPESKA

. The defendant argues, ‘‘[a]ll of the conduct set forth by the state amounts to an attempt to reconcile by a man who did not know that his relationship was over.’’ We disagree. The defendant, John Joseph Lepeska, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of stalking in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181d (b) (1).1 On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence to prove that the victim’s2 fear for her physical safety was objectively reasonable and (2) the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of two defense witnesses. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. Thedefendantandthevictimmetin1978.InDecember, 2011,theyreconnectedandbegandating.Shortlythereafter, in February, 2012, they began living together at the victim’s residence. During their relationship, there were incidents of domestic violence.3 On August 3, 2013, at approximately 3:30 a.m., the victim was arrested after a domestic violence incident between her and the defendant.4 The victim was releasedlater thatdayat approximately7a.m.; acondition of her release was that she could not have contact with the defendant.5 An officer drove the victim from the police station to her house so that she could pick up her vehicle. The victim proceeded to the residence ofherfriend,JosephGorman,becauseshehadamobile home parked on his property. While driving to Gorman’s house, the victim noticed the defendant driving up behind her in his van at a high rate of speed. As a result, she ‘‘froze’’ and stopped her vehicle. The defendant, who appeared very agitated, jumped out of his van, started shaking his fist, and screamed that the victim ‘‘better not be going to Joey’s house because if [she] was . . . he was going to do something . . . .’’ As the defendant began to walk towardher,thevictimrealizedthatsheshouldnothave stoppedhervehicle,andshedroveawayfromthedefendant and called 911. The defendant did not follow her. The victim met with state police troopers alongside the road to report the incident, and then she proceeded to Gorman’s house. That same day, at approximately 1 p.m., the victim, her daughter, and another friend went to a Verizon store. While at the Verizon store, the victim noticed the defendant driving back and forth, sounding his horn, and waving at her.6 The victim estimated that he drove backandforthapproximatelyfourorfivetimes,sounding the horn and waving at her each time. The victim did not report this incident to the police at that time.

Thatevening,thevictimreturnedtohermobilehome on Gorman’s property. While the victim and Gorman were sitting in his garage, the defendant drove up in his van. When the victim heard a vehicle approaching, she asked Gorman to see if it was the defendant. When she saw the defendant approaching her, she ran back into her mobile home, locked the doors, and called 911 because she was ‘‘petrified,’’ ‘‘terrified that [the defendant]wouldharm[her].’’Thevictimdidnotspeak with the defendant that evening. Instead, Gorman approached thedefendant and toldhim that hewas not welcome on the property and needed to leave. The defendant then left Gorman’s property. When the officers arrived, the victim provided them with an account of the incident. On August 5, 2013, the victim went to the courthouse with her daughter for a court hearing relating to her August 3 arrest. Upon arrival, they went to speak with a family services officer. While they were waiting, the defendant repeatedly called the cell phone of the victim’s daughter, insisting that she relay messages to the victimorputthevictimonthephone.Thevictimrefused to speak with the defendant. Shortly thereafter, the defendantarrivedatthecourthouse,satdowninachair across from the victim, and began motioning for the victim to go down the hallway with him. When the victim refused to go with him, the defendant moved next to her and began to talk to her about reconciling. When the family services officer came out into the hallway, she reminded them that they were not permitted tointeractwitheachotherasaconditionofthevictim’s release. The victim then waited for her court appearance down the hall with her daughter. The defendant remained at the courthouse as well. When court resumed, the defendant sat across the courtroom from the victim. Duringtheluncheonrecess,thevictimandherdaughterwenttoputmoremoneyintheirparkingmeterafter the defendant called the victim’s daughter to tell her that the meter was running out. The defendant again called the victim’s daughter to ask her and the victim to drive to a gas station down the street so that they could talk. Shortly thereafter, the defendant approached them at the vehicle while they were sitting inside of it. He began yelling through the passenger’s side window, where the victim’s daughter was sitting. Thedefendantwantedthevictimtogotothegasstation with him so that they could reconcile, and he told her that if they did reconcile, he would tell the judge that he did not want the no contact order in place anymore. The victim refused to go with the defendant, and, instead, she and her daughter got out of her vehicle and proceeded down the street, away from the defendant. The defendant chased the victim, yelling at her in an attempt to get her to talk to him and reconcile.

The victim and her daughter attempted to get away fromthedefendantbycrossingseveralstreetsandgoing into a cafe ´ for lunch. The victim and her daughter eventually returned to the courthouse. While there, the victim’s daughter called her father, the victim’s former husband, to pick her up from the courthouse because it was getting to be late in the afternoon. While the victim’s daughter metwiththevictim’sformerhusbandoutsidethecourthouse, the victim initially stayed inside the courthouse. When the victim exited the courthouse, the defendant again tried to confront her, and she attempted to evade him by going to different locations around the courthouse. When the defendant continued to run after her, the victim went to her former husband’s vehicle. At that point, the victim’s former husband told their daughter to call 911 because the defendant’s behavior was ‘‘ridiculous, there’s a protective [condition] in place, [and]he shouldn’tbe tryingto go afterher.’’7 The victim’s former husband advised the victim to go back inside the courthouse because it would be safe for her in there. The victim then ran back into the courthouse, and the defendant followed her up to the courthouse doors. Once inside the building, the victim told the marshalswhathadhappened,andtheytoldhertospeak with a family services counselor. Unable to meet with a family services counselor before court resumed, the victim returned to the courtroom and reported the defendant’s conduct to the court when her case was called. After her appearance in court, the victim left the courthouse. Later that day, the victim began receiving phonecallsfromablockedphonenumber.Initially,the victim answered the phone, but when she recognized the defendant’s voice, she stopped answering the calls. The defendant’s persistent calls continued throughout the night. The next morning, on August 6, 2013, the victim discovered that she had voice mails from the defendant, who was, again, begging her to reconcile. The victim called the police department to report the calls, and she was instructed to go to the nearest police station to fill out a report of the incident, which she did. After making the report, the victim went to work. When she arrived at work, the victim’s supervisor informed the victim that she had received a voice mail from the defendant stating that the victim would not be at work that day because she had been arrested and was in court. The defendant further stated in the voice mail that ‘‘he personally had witnessed [the victim] taking a cash bribe of at least two thousand dollars from a supplier. That [the victim] had done so in exchange for [her] having been awarded some work to that supplier. He also stated that [she] had shared company secrets with him. And that if [her] boss did not tell [the victim]

to call him and reconcile with him and turn his . . . fuckin’ phone back on,8 that he was going to call Sikorsky Corporate United Technologies and report the same.’’ (Footnote added.) The victim called the police department to report the incident, but the defendant was not arrested because of that report. The next day, August 7, 2013, the victim was scheduled to play pool at a local pool club as a member of her weekly pool league. The defendant was also a member of thepool league. Prior tothe victim’s arrival, the defendant approached one of the victim’s teammates, Jan King, and asked her to call the victim. The defendant, who appeared ‘‘frustrated,’’ told King to tell the victim to call him or else ‘‘he was going to make [her] life so miserable that [she] would have no choice but to call him.’’ King then called the victim to tell her what had happened, but King emphasized that the victim should not contact the defendant and that she shouldcontinuetokeepherdistancefromhimbecause of the no contact order. From August 8, 2013 until the defendant’s arrest in October9,2013,thevictimcontinuedtoreceiveblocked calls on her cell phone.9 Sometimes she would receive dozensofcallsfromthedefendantwithinashortperiod of time.10 On August 9, 2013, in addition to receiving phone calls from a blocked number, the victim found flowers on her vehicle in the morning. A few days later, on the victim’s birthday, she did not awake to find any missed phone calls. She believed that she wasfinally getting a ‘‘reprieve’’from the defendant, but later she saw that someone had painted ‘‘happy birthday XO’’ in bright white paint across the street outside of the property where she was now staying with her father. At approximately 7 a.m., she began receivingmorephonecallsfromablockednumber.She received approximately forty-three calls that day. The victim notified the police about what happened that day, and the police contacted the defendant, but did not arrest him. Because of the defendant’s conduct on her birthday, the victim decided to leave the spotlights on at night, and her father began leaving his gun safe unlocked. On August 15, 2013, the defendant continued to attempt to contact the victim, now through Facebook’s message system. The victim received numerous Facebook messages from the defendant. OnAugust28,2013,thevictimappliedforaprotective order against the defendant. That same day, she was scheduled to play in her weekly pool league. Prior to thematch,thevictim’spoolteamdecidedtochangethe location of the match with the hope that the defendant would not show up and the victim would be able to play.Nevertheless,thedefendantshowedupatthenew location. Upon arriving at the pool hall, the defendant

approachedoneofthevictim’steammates,JamesBradley, and told him to call the victim and tell her that she could not play because of the no contact order. When Bradley stepped outside to call her, the ‘‘irate’’ defendant came ‘‘storming out of the bar, screaming and yellingobscenitiesandeverything.’’Thevictimrecalled hearing through the phone the defendant screaming something to the effect of ‘‘tell her I’ll fucking kill her, how dare she serve a restraining order paperwork on me . . . .’’ Bradley told the defendant to back off, hung up the phone, and went back inside the bar. Ultimately, the pool team elected to forfeit the last two games of the night so that they would not have to continue to play pool with the defendant, which rendered them ineligible for the regional tournament in Las Vegas, Nevada. On September 6, 2013, the victim’s daughter made a comment on Facebook that she and her mother were planningto gotoalocal festivalthefollowing day.That night, the victim’s daughter received a phone call from the defendant, who told her, ‘‘I’m coming there after your mother, I’m going to fuck her up.’’11 Because the victim and her daughter were not at the festival that day,theywerenotworriedaboutrunningintothedefendant and hoped that he would continue to think that the victim was at the festival. On September 16, 2013, the victim approached the Office of the State’s Attorney about the defendant’s conduct, and she met with four officers to provide a statement about the defendant’s conduct. The detectivesassigned toinvestigatethecase subsequentlycontacted the defendant about the victim’s allegations. When one of the detectives met with the defendant, the defendant informed him ‘‘that this is a free country and that he didn’t feel that a judge could issue a protective order to stop him from seeing the person that he loved. That there was recently a restraining order placed that he was having a hard time not violating.’’ On September 2, 2014, a jury trial commenced on a onecountlongforminformationchargingthedefendant withstalkingintheseconddegree,inviolationof§ 53a181d (b) (1), for his conduct between August 3, 2013 and September 8, 2013. On September 5, 2014, the jury found the defendant guilty of the charged crime. That same day, the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a partBinformationcharginghimwithbeingapersistent offender pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-40d. This appeal followed. I The defendant’s first claim on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of stalking in the second degree. In his view, ‘‘[a]ll of theconductsetforthbythestateamountstoanattempt to reconcile by a man who did not know that his rela

tionship was over’’; therefore, no reasonable jury could have concluded that the victim’s fear of the defendant during the time in question was objectively reasonable. We disagree. ‘‘Thestandardofreviewweapplytoaclaimofinsufficientevidenceiswellestablished.Inreviewingthesufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction weapplyatwo-parttest.First,weconstruetheevidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . ‘‘Wenotethatthejurymustfindeveryelementproven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permittedtoconsiderthefactprovenandmayconsider itincombinationwithotherprovenfactsindetermining whetherthecumulativeeffectofalltheevidenceproves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . [A]s we haveoftennoted,proofbeyondareasonabledoubtdoes not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendantthat,haditbeenfoundcrediblebythe[finder of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesisofinnocence.Weask,instead,whetherthere is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of fact’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Crespo, 317 Conn. 1, 16–17, 115 A.3d 447 (2015). To obtain a conviction under § 53a-181d (b) (1), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant‘‘knowinglyengage[d]in acourseofconduct directedataspecificpersonthatwouldcauseareasonable person to fear for such person’s physical safety or the physical safety of a third person . . . .’’ ‘‘The standard to be applied in determining the reasonableness ofthevictim’sfearinthecontextofthecrimeofstalking is a subjective-objective one . . . . As to the subjective test, the situation and the facts must be evaluated from the perspective of the victim, i.e., did she in fact fear for her physical safety? . . . If so, that fear must be objectively reasonable, i.e., a reasonable person under the existing circumstances would fear for his or her physical safety.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arthurs, 121 Conn. App. 520, 526–27, 997 A.2d

568, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 957, 82 A.3d 626 (2013). The defendant challenges only the objective reasonableness of the victim’s fear. In this case, the recited testimony clearly provided an adequate basis for the jurytofindthatthevictim’sfearwasobjectivelyreasonable. Between August 3, 2013 and September 8, 2013, the defendant engaged in obsessive behaviors, such as calling the victim dozens of times a day, including duringthenight,andsendinghernumerousFacebookmessages.Heengagedinthisconducteventhoughheknew that a no contact order was in place, even though the victim told him that she did not wish to speak with him, and even though he knew that the victim had ignored his prior attempts to contact her. On three occasions, he attempted to approach the victim in persontodiscusstheirrelationship,andthevictimtestified thateachtime,shepromptlymadeanefforttogetaway from the defendant. The victim further testified that duringthoseincidentsinwhichthedefendantwasphysically present, she felt ‘‘terrified for [her] life.’’ The defendant’s obsessive, stalking conduct infiltratedthevictim’spersonalandprofessionallifeaswell. The defendant repeatedly called the victim’s friends and family in an attempt to talk to her. On August 6, 2013, the victim’s supervisor received a voice mail in whichthedefendantaccusedthevictimoftakingbribes and sharing company secrets and threatened to report this conduct to the corporate office if the victim did not call him and reconcile with him. The following day, the defendant told King that ‘‘he was going to make [the victim’s] life so miserable that [she] would have no choice but to call him.’’ On August 28, 2013, the defendant screamed thathe was going tokill the victim for seeking a protective order. Finally, on September 6, 2013, the defendant told the victim’s daughter that ‘‘I’m coming there [to the festival] after your mother, I’m going to fuck her up.’’ Whenotherindividualsobservedthedefendant’sconduct, they did not merely shrug off the behavior as that of a man attempting to patch things up with his girlfriend. On August 3, 2013, when the defendant attempted to talk to the victim at Gorman’s house, Gorman told the defendant he was not welcome on the property and had to leave. When the defendant continued to stalk the victim at the courthouse on August 5, 2013, the victim’s former husband and daughter called 911 to report the defendant’s behavior and waited approximately one hour for an officer to respond so that they could file a complaint. The following week, thedefendant’sconductonthevictim’sbirthdaycaused thevictim’sfather,withwhomshewasstaying,toleave his gun safe unlocked. ‘‘Thestalkingstatutewasenactedtoaddressthesituation where the criminal does not physically take an act against the person or does not verbally make a

directan[d]immediatethreatofharm,butmerelystalks the victim. . . . The statute can be violated without a defendant’s uttering a syllable, writing a word, or making a gesture. . . . [D]efendants’ obsessive behaviors, even in the absence of threats of physical violence, [can] reasonably [cause] their victims to fear for their physical safety.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Russell, 101 Conn. App. 298, 320–21, 922 A.2d 191, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 934 (2007). In sum, the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the lightmostfavorabletosustainingthejury’sverdict,was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s entire course of conduct caused the victim to reasonably fear for her physical safety. Accordingly, the defendant’s first claim fails. II The defendant next claims that (1) the trial court abuseditsdiscretionbyexcluding thetestimonyoftwo defense witnesses and that (2) the exclusion of this testimony violated his right to present a defense as guaranteedbythesixthamendmenttotheUnitedStates constitution. We disagree. The sixth amendment to the United States constitution guarantees ‘‘the right to offer the testimony of witnesses,andtocompeltheirattendance,ifnecessary, [and] is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so that it may decide where the truth lies.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cerreta, 260 Conn. 251, 260–61, 796 A.2d 1176 (2002). The defendant’s right to present a defense, however, ‘‘does not compel the admission of any and all evidence offered in support thereof. . . . The trial court retains the discretion to rule on the admissibility, under the traditional rules of evidence, regarding the defense offered.’’ (Citations omitted; internalquotationmarksomitted.)Statev.DeJesus,260 Conn. 466, 481, 797 A.2d 1101 (2002). ‘‘[W]e will set aside an evidentiary ruling only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. . . . The trial court has wide discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence . . . and [e]very reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has beenanabuseofdiscretion.’’(Internalquotationmarks omitted.)Id.‘‘If,afterreviewingthetrialcourt’sevidentiary rulings, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded the proffered evidence, then the defendant’s constitutional claims necessarily fail.’’ State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 11, 1 A.3d 76 (2010). After the state rested its case-in-chief, the defendant indicated that he wished to call two officers to testify about prior domestic incidents involving the defendant

and the victim. The state objected on the grounds that the testimony was irrelevant and related to collateral matters. The court, after offers of proof, sustained the state’s objections. We will address the testimony of each officer in turn. A The defendant first sought to present evidence about a domestic incident that occurred on August 2, 2013, the day before the defendant’s stalking commenced. Followingadisagreementthatoccurredoverlunch,the defendant drove away with the victim’s purse, and the victim and the defendant exchanged text messages abouthowheshouldreturnherpurse.Thevictimsubsequently went to the police station claiming that the defendant was sending her threatening text messages. Officer Alexia Castro reviewed the text messages sent by the defendant and determined that they were not threatening in nature. Attrial,thedefendantcross-examinedthevictimconcerning this incident and the fact that the defendant was not arrested because of her allegation.12 During cross-examination, the victim disagreed with defense counsel that the basis for her complaint was text messages rather than threatening phone calls. After the state rested its case-in-chief, the defendant indicated thathewishedtocallCastrototestifyfurtheraboutthis incident. The court permitted the defendant to present Castro’s testimony outside the presence of the jury. Castrotestifiedthatsherecalledthevictimcominginto the police station to make a complaint about threatening text messages, that she reviewed the text messages anddeterminedthattheywerenonthreatening,andthat she called the defendant to get his version of events. The court sustained the state’s objection, holding that the proffered testimony was irrelevant, related to a collateral matter, and was insufficient to establish bias, prejudice, or interest on the part of the victim to testify falsely. On appeal, the defendant argues, as he did before the trial court, that Castro’s testimony was admissible to show the victim’s bias and motive as well as to show that the victim’s fear of the defendant was not objectivelyreasonable.ThestaterespondsthatCastro’stestimony was irrelevant and related to a collateral matter. We agree with the state. ‘‘[I]thaslongbeentheruleinConnecticutthatextrinsic evidence may not be used to contradict the testimony of a witness with regard to a particular act of misconduct. . . . [I]f the witness stands his ground and denies the alleged misconduct, the examiner must take his answer not that he may not further cross-examine toextractanadmission,butinthesensethathemaynot call other witnesses to provide the discrediting acts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jose G.,

290 Conn. 331, 345, 963 A.2d 42 (2009). ‘‘Extrinsic evidence may be admitted, however, if the subject matter of the testimony is not collateral, that is, if it is relevant to a material issue in the case apart from its tendency to contradict the witness. . . . Evidence tending to show the motive, bias or interest of an important witness is never collateral or irrelevant. It may be . . . the very key to an intelligent appraisal of the testimony of the [witness].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 345 n.11; see also Conn. Code Evid. § 6-5, commentary. ‘‘The determination of whether a matter is relevant or collateral . . . generally rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.’’ State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 248, 630 A.2d 577 (1993), on appeal after remand, 234 Conn. 683, 663 A.2d 339 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1140, 116 S. Ct. 972, 133 L. Ed. 2d 892 (1996). ‘‘The [trial] court [is] in the best position to determine whether the proffered testimony pertained to a collateralmatterorwhetheritwasrelevant.The[trial]court’s evidentiary rulings are given great deference precisely because the [trial] court [is] in the best position to hear and to assess the witnesses’ testimony in the context of the entire trial.’’ State v. Reyes, 81 Conn. App. 612, 620, 841 A.2d 237 (2004). Oneoftheissuesattrialwaswhetherthedefendant’s conductbetweenAugust3,2013 andSeptember8,2013 wouldcauseareasonablepersontofearforherphysical safety. The proffered testimony about an allegation made by the victim on August 2, 2013 had no bearing on that issue. The only potential value of Castro’s testimonywasitsabilitytocontradictthevictim’stestimony thathercomplaintwasbasedonthedefendant’shaving made threatening phone calls rather than having sent threatening text messages. Thus, the evidence constituted improper impeachment through extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter. Moreover, the testimony was insufficient to showany bias, prejudice, or interest on the part of the victim that might cause her to testify falsely. Consequently, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the court’s disallowing the testimony, and,therefore,thedefendant’sconstitutionalclaimnecessarily fails as well. See State v. Davis, supra, 298 Conn. 11. B The defendant also sought to present evidence of a secondincidentthatoccurredinFebruary2013inwhich thevictimandthedefendantraisedcompetingdomestic violence claims against one another. The victim asserted that the defendant had thrown a work boot at her, which hit her hand, while the defendant asserted thatthevictimhadthrowncoffeeathim.Theinvestigating officer, Charles Schofield, decided to arrest the vic

tim for disorderly conduct because there was physical evidence at the home of coffee being thrown, i.e., a coffee-soaked couch and T-shirt. At trial, the defendant cross-examined the victim about the fact that she was arrested because of that incident.13Thecourtpermittedthedefendanttosummarize Detective Schofield’s proposed testimony, outside the presence of the jury. In essence, the defendant offered that, if permitted to testify, Schofield would testifyabouthisrecollectionofthecoffee-throwingincident. His testimony would provide more detail about the incident, but not contradict the victim’s testimony about it. The defendant argued that Schofield’s testimony demonstratedthevictim’sbiastowardormotiveagainst the defendant as well as her willingness ‘‘to make a report to the police that doesn’t necessarily pan out.’’ Upon inquiry from the court, however, the defendant acknowledgedthatthevictimwasquestionedaboutthe coffee-throwing incident during cross-examination and that the victim ‘‘admitted she was arrested as a consequenceofthatincident.’’Thecourtspecificallyinquired astowhetheranyoftheinformationthatthedefendant was seeking to elicit from Schofield was not already before the jury. The defendant responded that the specific allegation that the victim had thrown coffee at the defendant during the incident was not before the jury14 as well as the fact that Schofield found evidence of coffeebeingthrown.Whenthestatefurtherarguedthat the evidence was irrelevant and addressed a collateral matter, the defendant responded that the specific details of the incident were relevant because they demonstrated ‘‘the nature of the relationship between [him and the victim]’’ and assisted the jury in evaluating whetherthevictim’sfearwasreasonable.Thetrialcourt ultimately sustained the state’s objection, ruling that the evidence was irrelevant and collateral to the issues at trial. On appeal, the defendant again argues that Schofield’s testimony was admissible to show the victim’s bias and motive and to show that the victim’s fear of thedefendantwasnotobjectivelyreasonable.Thestate again responds that Schofield’s testimony was irrelevant and related to a collateral matter. We agree with the state.