Florence Krondes, et al. v. William O'Boy, Sr., et al.

The defendants William O’Boy, Sr.,
and his wife, Carmela B. O’Boy, appeal, and the plaintiff
Florence Krondes1 cross appeals from the judgment of
the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, awarding
damages to the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendants2
argue that the court improperly refused to set aside the
verdict because the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 362 voided any trial court action between the filing
for bankruptcy and the bankruptcy discharge.3 The dispositive
issue on appeal is whether the stay operated to void actions taken by, and the judgment of, the trial
court. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the case for a new trial.

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On May 14, 1993, Florence Krondes received
an award of $259,896 against William O’Boy, Sr., and
William O’Boy, Jr., for breach of contract. See Krondes
v. O’Boy, 37 Conn. App. 430, 656 A.2d 692 (1995). On
December 15, 1993, the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking
to set aside a fraudulent transfer by William O’Boy,
Sr., to Carmela O’Boy of property at 10 First Street,
Norwalk. William O’Boy, Sr., owned a one-half interest
in the subject property until he transferred that interest
to his wife by quitclaim deed dated December 5, 1990,
for the consideration of ‘‘love and affection.’’ The three
count complaint alleged fraudulent transfer, violations
of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA),
General Statutes 42-110a et seq., and violations of the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.

On April 4, 1997, William O’Boy, Sr., voluntarily filed
for relief under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 107 et seq., and filed a notice
of stay with the Superior Court on April 7, 1997. The
Bankruptcy Court granted William O’Boy, Sr., a discharge
by notice dated June 12, 1998.4 The defendants
filed a motion in limine in state court to remove William
O’Boy, Sr., as a party defendant, but the court denied
the motion.

A number of events transpired between the bankruptcy
filing and discharge. On June 30, 1997, the plaintiff
issued a notice of deposition of Carmela O’Boy. On
August 8, 1997, the plaintiff deposed Carmela O’Boy.
The court scheduled pretrial conferences on December
2, 1997, trial for November 25, 1997, and a continuance
of trial for June 15, 1998. The jury selection process
also took place at that time, and the jury was sworn in
on July 7, 1998. The record does not reflect precisely
how many jurors were selected prior to William O’Boy,
Sr.’s discharge in bankruptcy.

On July 10, 1998, the defendants filed a motion for
a directed verdict on all counts. On July 14, 1998, the
court denied the motion as to the fraudulent transfer
claim, but granted the motion as to the CUTPA and
RICO claims. The court did not issue a memorandum
of decision on the motion, nor did the plaintiff file a
motion for an articulation of the basis for the decision.

On July 14, 1998, the jury found that William O’Boy,
Sr., had transferred his one-half interest in the real
property at 10 First Street to Carmela O’Boy with intent
to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, including the
plaintiff. The jury further found that William O’Boy, Sr.,
had conveyed the interest without substantial consideration. The jury also found that the plaintiff had established
that William O’Boy, Sr., had conveyed his interest
in the property with the intent to defraud the plaintiff.
The jury awarded economic and punitive damages of
$341,314.54 against Carmela O’Boy. The jury awarded
no damages against William O’Boy, Sr.

The defendants filed motions to set aside the verdict
and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
ground that there was insufficient proof that the property
transfer rendered William O’Boy, Sr., insolvent and
that there was insufficient evidence that Carmela O’Boy
had the requisite intent to defraud when William O’Boy,
Sr., conveyed the property. The defendants also filed
motions for remittitur and to set aside the verdict as
excessive, claiming that on April 14, 1997, William
O’Boy, Sr., had filed for relief under chapter 7 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code and filed a notice of
stay dated April 4, 1997, with the Superior Court. William
O’Boy, Sr., in the bankruptcy proceeding, had listed
the plaintiff as a creditor and included a reference to
the verdict against him that was rendered on May 14,
1993, and the Bankruptcy Court granted him a discharge
under title 11 of the United States Code, § 727, on June
12, 1998. The trial court denied the motions on January
13, 1999. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

Our standard of review for a challenge to a denial of a
motion to set aside a verdict is as follows. ‘‘The evidence
must be considered, along with reasonable inferences,
in the light most favorable to the parties who were
successful at trial with weight given to the judgments
of the judge and jury. . . . The verdict will be set aside
and judgment directed only if we find that the jury
could not reasonably and legally have reached their
conclusion. . . . A trial court may set aside or direct
a verdict on a finding that the verdict is manifestly
unjust because the jury, on the basis of the evidence
presented, mistakenly applied a legal principle or
because there is no evidence to which the legal principles
of the case can be applied. . . . While we do not
attempt to substitute our judgment for that of the trial
judge, we must determine whether the jury award was
such that the trial judge could have properly substituted
his judgment for that of the jury. . . . To determine
whether the trial court abused its legal discretion, this
court must consider the entire record and all of the
evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium
Assn., Inc., 57 Conn. App. 12, 15–16, 747 A.2d 532,
cert. denied, 253 Conn. 923, 754 A.2d 797 (2000). ‘‘A
trial court’s ruling to set aside the verdict will not be
overturned on appeal unless the trial court abused its
discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tolbert
v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 58 Conn. App.
694, 698, 755 A.2d 293 (2000), aff’d, 257 Conn. 118, 778
A.2d 1 (2001). ‘‘In determining whether there has been
an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s
ruling. . . . Reversal is required only where an abuse
of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to
have been done.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Rivera v. St. Francis Hospital & Medical Center, 55
Conn. App. 460, 463–64, 738 A.2d 1151 (1999). ‘‘[W]e do
not . . . determine whether a conclusion different
from the one reached could have been reached.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Fracasso, 59
Conn. App. 291, 295, 756 A.2d 325 (2000).

The defendants claim that the court improperly
refused to set aside the verdict because a bankruptcy
stay voided all trial court action between the filing for
bankruptcy and the bankruptcy discharge, and those
void actions rendered the jury verdict void as well.
We agree.

‘‘In general, we look to the federal courts for guidance
in resolving issues of federal law.’’ Turner v. Frowein,
253 Conn. 312, 340, 752 A.2d 955 (2000). ‘‘[T]he decisions
of the federal circuit in which a state court is located
are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of a
federal statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 392, 734 A.2d
535 (1999).

The automatic stay provision in bankruptcy proceedings
is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 362.5 ‘‘Section 362 of
the Bankruptcy Code stays any and all postpetition
filing. Any filing constitutes a judicial act directed
toward the disposition of the case in violation of the
automatic stay. . . . The stay of section 362 is
extremely broad in scope and . . . should apply to
almost any type of formal or informal action against
the debtor or the [debtor’s] property . . . . 2W. Collier,
Collier on Bankruptcy (15th Ed. 1979) § 362.04.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Mehta, 39 Conn. App. 822,
830, 668 A.2d 729 (1995).

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Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's opinion.

On the defendants’ appeal, the judgment is reversed
and the case is remanded for a new trial; the plaintiff’s
cross appeal is dismissed.

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