Rico Eugene Mallard v. State of Tennessee

Nashville, Tennessee civil rights lawyer represented the Plaintiff seeking post-conviction relief.

In January 1997, Larry Huber died after being shot multiple times. Mr. Huber's vehicle was also stolen. Petitioner, who was seventeen years old, and co-defendant Terreance McLaurine, who was twelve years old, were arrested and charged with the offenses.[2] Following his transfer from Davidson County Juvenile Court, Petitioner was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury with one count each of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. On June 29, 1999, a jury convicted Petitioner of all charged offenses. The trial court imposed an automatic life sentence on each of the murder convictions and merged the first degree premeditated murder conviction with the felony murder conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Petitioner as a violent offender to a term of twenty-two years at 100% service for especially aggravated robbery and ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to his life sentence.[3] Id.



On November 18, 2022, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued Booker, a plurality opinion holding "that an automatic life sentence when imposed on a juvenile homicide offender with no consideration of the juvenile's age or other circumstances violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Booker, 656 S.W.3d at 52. The court specifically limited the application of its ruling "to juvenile homicide offenders." Id. at 53. The court reasoned that "in juvenile first-degree murder cases, and only in these cases, a sentence is automatically imposed without considering age, the nature of the crime, or any other factors." Id. at 63 (emphasis added). The Booker court fashioned the following remedy for cases where a juvenile homicide offender was automatically sentenced to life:



In remedying this constitutional violation, we exercise judicial restraint. We need not create a new sentencing scheme or resentence Mr. Booker-his life sentence stands. Rather, we follow the policy embodied in the federal Constitution as explained in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) and grant Mr. Booker an individualized parole hearing where his age and other circumstances will be properly considered. The timing of his parole hearing is based on release eligibility in the unrepealed version of section 40-35-501(h)(1), previously in effect, that provides for a term of sixty years with release eligibility of sixty percent, but not less than twenty-five years of service. Thus, Mr. Booker remains sentenced to sixty years in prison, and after he has served between twenty-five and thirty-six years, he will receive an individualized parole hearing where his age and other circumstances will be considered. Our limited ruling, applying only to juvenile homicide offenders, promotes the State's interest in finality and efficient use of resources, protects Mr. Booker's Eighth Amendment rights, and is based on sentencing policy enacted by the General Assembly.



Id. at 53.



On November 17, 2023, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief ("the Petition"). Petitioner acknowledged that the Petition was filed "outside the initial limitations period" but argued that the Petition was timely because it was filed within one year of the final ruling in Booker, in which the supreme court established "a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at the time" of Petitioner's trial. Petitioner asserted that Booker established a constitutional "right of a juvenile to be sentenced by a judge or jury that exercises discretion that takes into account the mitigating qualities of youth."



The post-conviction court found that Booker was silent as to consecutive sentencing and that "no new and applicable constitutional right [was] conferred upon Petitioner." The court found that the Petition was not timely filed and summarily dismissed the Petition.



Mallard v. State, M2024-00265-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov 27, 2024)

Affirmed