Rud Okeson, et al. v. City of Seattle

n this class action on behalf of Seattle City Light

ratepayers, we are asked to decide whether a municipal utility may mitigate the effects

of its greenhouse gas emissions by paying public and private entities to reduce those

entities' emissions. We hold that combating global warming is a general government

purpose, albeit a meritorious one, and not a proprietary utility purpose. Therefore,

such mitigation expenses must be borne by general taxpayers rather than utility

ratepayers. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment

to Seattle.

I

Seattle City Light (City Light) is an electric utility owned and operated by the City

No. 77888-4 -- 2

of Seattle. On April 10, 2000, the Seattle City Council adopted Resolution 30144 in

honor of the 30th anniversary of Earth Day. The resolution proclaimed in relevant part:

The City of Seattle supports the Earth Day 2000 initiative to focus

attention on one of the world's most urgent environmental challenges:
reducing greenhouse gases to help mitigate global warming . . . . The City
of Seattle will reduce greenhouse gas emissions in its own operations and
through community actions by:
1. Establishing a long-range goal of meeting the electric energy needs of
Seattle with no net greenhouse gas emissions . . . . Immediately, City
Light will meet growing demand with no net increase in greenhouse gas
emissions by:
. . . .
. . . . Mitigating or offsetting greenhouse gas emissions associated with
any fossil fuels used to meet load growth.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 530.

Also in 2000, the City of Seattle negotiated to buy power from a gas-fired

cogeneration plant owned by the City of Klamath Falls, Oregon. The City of Seattle

estimated that its purchase of Klamath Falls power would be associated with up to

272,727 tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per year. Accordingly, the Seattle City

Council adopted Resolution 30256, which cited the "no net impact" policy and directed

City Light to "fully mitigate or offset" the emissions associated with the Klamath Falls

contract. CP at 551, 552.

The following spring, City Light hired Climate Trust of Portland, Oregon, to solicit

and evaluate proposals for "offset acquisition." CP at 660. Then in another step in the

"no net increase" plan, the council adopted Resolution 30359, which stated:

WHEREAS, global warming represents a clear and increasingly imminent
danger to the economic and environmental health of the world, and to
specific qualities of life for the Seattle area including water supply,

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No. 77888-4 -- 3

hydroelectric energy production, air quality, forest health, species
protection and recreational activities; and
WHEREAS, local action to reduce greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions is
consistent with Seattle's environmental commitments and its other high
priority policy objectives . . .; and
WHEREAS, energy production and consumption accounts for the vast
majority of human-caused GHG emissions, and Seattle has an
extraordinary opportunity to control its own electric energy future by virtue
of its ownership of Seattle City Light; and
. . . .
. . . City Light, in consultation with the Advisory Committee comprised of
experts from academic institutions, state and regional agencies, private
business, City Light customers, and public interest organizations reached
consensus on a method for calculating City Light's current and likely
future GHG emissions and a process for mitigating those emissions; . . .
. . . .
. . . BE IT RESOLVED . . . THAT:
. . . .
. . . City Light will expeditiously execute commitments to mitigate for all of
the GHG emissions attributable to it.

CP at 560-61.

Resolution 30359 estimated that greenhouse gas emissions associated with City

Light's power purchases and internal operations would total 362,976 metric tons a year
from 2003 through 2005.1 The resolution stated that it is more expensive to reduce

emissions locally than in other areas. The resolution directed City Light to "immediately

pursue the possibility of" paying others to reduce their emissions in order to offset City

Light's own contributions to global greenhouse gas. CP at 562. The resolution also

directed City Light to give priority to local emission-reduction projects "as long as they

allow the total average cost to remain within $5/ton and preserve[] enough funds to

1City Light later estimated that its purchases and operations in 2003 actually
contributed from 222,756 to 290,239 metric tons of CO2 to the atmosphere.

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No. 77888-4 -- 4

meet the full mitigation obligation for that year." CP at 563.

Pursuant to the 2000 and 2001 resolutions, City Light entered a series of

agreements to pay other entities to use cleaner fuels and, in return, to receive credit for
the resulting greenhouse gas reductions.2 Most of these agreements were with local

entities such as King County Metro and the Washington State Ferries. An exception

was a $650,000 contract with the DuPont Company to buy 300,000 tons of emission

offsets from a DuPont plant in Kentucky. According to a City Light press release issued

in November 2005, the contract made City Light "the first large electric utility in the

country to effectively eliminate its contribution of harmful greenhouse gas emissions

into the environment." Appellants' Br. at App. B-1.

While this greenhouse gas program was evolving, Rud Okeson, Doris Burns,

Walter Williams and Arthur Lane (the ratepayers) brought a series of claims against the

City of Seattle, alleging various misuses of City Light funds. They filed the first of

several complaints in King County Superior Court in February 2002, challenging a 1999

ordinance that shifted responsibility for lighting Seattle streets from the city's general

2For example, in August 2003, City Light agreed to pay half of the cost of
converting the 900 vehicles of the City of Seattle's Fleets and Facilities Department to
20 percent biodiesel fuel. In May 2004, City Light agreed to pay the Washington State
Ferries up to $635,600 to start using 20 percent biodiesel fuel on its West Seattle-
Vashon route. The agreement stated that biodiesel, made with alcohol and vegetable
oils, is more expensive than petroleum fuel but "results in fewer GHG emissions." CP
at 571. In September 2004, City Light agreed to pay King County up to $200,000 to
use a mix of biodiesel and low-sulfur fuel in the county's Metro buses in 2004 and
2005. In May 2005, City Light agreed to pay Princess Cruise Lines up to $10,000 a
year to use "Shore Power" (electricity provided by City Light) instead of diesel marine
fuel while docked in Seattle on cruise-season weekends. CP at 692. City Light
reimbursed Seattle Public Utilities for paying its contracted garbage haulers to use
biodiesel fuel.

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No. 77888-4 -- 5

taxpayers to City Light ratepayers. This court agreed with the ratepayers that the shift

was unlawful. See Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 Wn.2d 540, 78 P.3d 1279 (2003)

(Okeson I). The ratepayers then filed an amended complaint in December 2003,

adding certain other claims that City Light improperly spends ratepayer money on

nonutility purposes. In the second phase of the case, the trial court concluded that City

Light could buy art to beautify its own facilities but not to benefit the general public.

The Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling in Okeson v. City of Seattle, 130 Wn. App.

814, 125 P.3d 172 (2005) (Okeson II).

The ratepayers first challenged the legality of City Light's greenhouse-gas offset

contracts in a second amended complaint filed in the fall of 2004. The ratepayers

asked the trial court to: (1) prohibit City Light from spending any more funds on the

biodiesel conversion programs, (2) order reimbursement of City Light for its funding of

the programs, and (3) require refunds to ratepayers. On June 27, 2005, the city listed

21 possible witnesses related to the greenhouse gas claims. About a month later, over

the city's objections, the ratepayers filed a third amended complaint purporting to be

based on events that happened after the second amended complaint was filed. The

third amended complaint alleged that City Light was negotiating or considering new

GHG mitigation contracts that would: (1) constitute illegal gifts of public funds or,

alternatively, unconstitutional taxes and (2) violate the local government accounting

statute, RCW 43.09.210. In response to that broadening of claims, on August 26,

2005, Seattle disclosed additional possible witnesses. Both sides moved for summary

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No. 77888-4 -- 6

judgment on the legality of the GHG offset contracts. On September 22, 2005, the

ratepayers moved to strike declarations of six possible witnesses "because of Seattle's

failure to make timely disclosure of those witnesses." CP at 1161.

On September 30, 2005, the trial court granted summary judgment to Seattle on the

offset issue. In doing so, the trial court said:

I think that City Light has the authority to reduce its own emissions. It can
do that by managing its own facilities, its own producing facilities, or it can
spend money to have its emissions, its contribution reduced by someone
else. This all makes sense only because of the unusual nature of the
greenhouse gas canopy; the fact that it is an envelope around the entire
globe; that it's not localized.

Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 32-33. Nearly a month later, the trial court

granted the ratepayers' motion to strike the Seattle witness declarations as untimely

disclosed.

The ratepayers appealed the summary judgment order. Seattle cross-appealed

the order striking witness declarations. We accepted direct review of both of the

challenged orders. Amici curiae King County, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research

Center, and a coalition consisting of Climate Solutions, Global Warming Action,

National Resources Defense Council, Northwest Energy Coalition, and Washington

Environmental Council ("environmental groups") filed briefs supporting Seattle's

greenhouse gas emissions program.

The appellant ratepayers submitted a brief conceding that City Light has

statutory authority to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from its own facilities.

The

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No. 77888-4 -- 7

ratepayers contended, however, that paying to reduce emissions from other parties'

facilities serves a general government purpose -- improving the global

environment -- rather than a valid City Light purpose. They argued that the emission-

reduction payments are illegal because they lack a sufficient nexus to the utility's

statutorily prescribed purpose, which is to furnish people with electricity.

In response, Seattle argued that it has authority to choose the means of

achieving its goal of causing no net increase in the world's greenhouse gas emissions.

Seattle further argued that, in pursuit of that goal, it makes no difference whose

greenhouse gas emissions are reduced because any reduction anywhere in the world

has the same effect on global warming.

II

A trial court shall grant summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits on file "show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law." CR 56(c). On appeal from a summary judgment order, "the appellate court

engages in the same inquiry as the trial court." Key Tronic Corp. v. Aetna (CIGNA) Fire

Underwriters Ins. Co., 124 Wn.2d 618, 623-24, 881 P.2d 201 (1994) (citing Our Lady of

Lourdes Hosp. v. Franklin County, 120 Wn.2d 439, 451, 842 P.2d 956 (1993)). The

issues in this case pertain to the statutory authority of a municipal utility and therefore

are issues of law to be determined de novo. Okeson I, 150 Wn.2d at 548-49.

III

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No. 77888-4 -- 8

This court has been asked repeatedly over the last century to define the powers

of public utilities. Our long-standing rule for determining the bounds of a utility's

authority first appeared in Farwell v. City of Seattle, 43 Wash. 141, 86 P. 217 (1906), a

case in which a Seattle resident sought to stop Seattle from supplying water to another

city. We said in that case, "A municipal corporation is limited in its powers to those

granted in express words, or to those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the

powers expressly granted, and also to those essential to the declared objects and

purposes of the corporation." Id. at 144 (citing 1 John W. Smith, Commentaries on the

Modern Law of Municipal Corporations § 562 (1903); 1 John F. Dillon, Commentaries

on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 89 (4th ed. 1890); L.A. City Water Co. v. City of

Los Angeles, 88 F. 720 (1898)); accord City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108

Wn.2d 679, 692, 743 P.2d 793 (1987). Thus, in applying this rule, we must first

determine whether the legislature expressly authorized city utilities to purchase

greenhouse-gas offsets. If not, then we must examine whether authority for the City

Light offset program is nevertheless "necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to" the

express powers of city utilities. Finally, if authority for the greenhouse gas program is

neither expressly granted nor fairly implied, we must determine if the program is

permissible nonetheless as an activity "essential to" the declared objects and purposes

of city utilities.

A. Express powers

City utilities derive their powers from RCW 35.92.050. That enabling statute

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No. 77888-4 -- 9

expressly authorizes cities to: (1) operate works or plants for the purpose of furnishing

persons with electricity or power-related facilities, (2) regulate and control the use,

distribution, and price of the electricity or facilities furnished, (3) handle, sell, or lease

equipment needed for the use, distribution, and sale of electricity, and (4) buy power to
resell to city residents and businesses. RCW 35.92.050.3 The statute does not

specifically authorize city utilities to pay other entities to reduce their greenhouse gas

emissions. In fact, Seattle did not argue that its emission reduction program is

expressly authorized. Accordingly, in the absence of such an express power, we must

next analyze whether authority for the program is "necessarily or fairly implied in or

incident to" the powers expressly granted by the legislature.

B. Implied and incidental powers

Specifically, we must determine whether the legislature, in authorizing cities to

"operate" facilities for the purpose of furnishing electricity and to "handle" any

necessary equipment, impliedly authorized City Light to purchase greenhouse gas

offsets. The test for determining the implied powers of cities was spelled out at length

3"A city or town may . . . acquire, add to, alter, maintain and operate works,
plants, facilities for the purpose of furnishing the city or town and its inhabitants, and
any other persons, with . . . electricity, . . . and facilities for lighting, . . .heating, fuel,
and power purposes, public and private, with full authority to regulate and control the
use, distribution, and price thereof, together with the right to handle and sell or lease,
any meters, lamps, motors, transformers, and equipment or accessories of any kind,
necessary and convenient for the use, distribution, and sale thereof; . . . and purchase .
. . power from either within or without the city or town for its own use and for the
purpose of selling to its inhabitants and to other persons doing business within the city
or town and regulate and control the use and price thereof." RCW 35.92.050.

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No. 77888-4 -- 10

in Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 693-95, as follows:

Like other state supreme courts, we have historically taken
different approaches to construing municipal powers according to whether
the power exercised is governmental or proprietary in nature. When a
governmental function is involved, less opportunity exists for invoking the
doctrines of liberal construction and of implied powers. But when the
Legislature authorizes a municipality to engage in a business, "'[it] may
exercise its business powers very much in the same way as a private
individual.'" . . . Since 1910, we have broadly construed the means a
municipality may use to conduct a statutorily authorized business. We
have viewed the Legislature as implicitly authorizing a municipality to
make all contracts, and to engage in any undertaking necessary to make
its municipal electric utility system efficient and beneficial to the public.
. . . [M]unicipal utility authority has limits. In exercising its
proprietary power, [a city] may not act beyond the purposes of the
statutory grant of power, or contrary to express statutory or constitutional
limitations. Thus, if municipal utility actions come within the purpose and
object of the enabling statute and no express limitations apply, this court
leaves the choice of means used in operating the utility to the discretion
of municipal authorities. We limit judicial review of municipal utility
choices to whether the particular contract or action was arbitrary or
capricious, or unreasonable.

(Citations omitted; footnotes omitted.)

Thus, Taxpayers of Tacoma established that a city acts within its implied powers

if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the city is exercising a proprietary power,

(2) the action is within the purpose and object of the enabling statute, (3) the action is

not contrary to express statutory or constitutional limitations, and (4) the action is not

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Id. at 693-95, 700; accord Hite v. Pub. Util. Dist.

No. 2, 112 Wn.2d 456, 463, 772 P.2d 481 (1989).

1. Proprietary or general?

The ratepayers argued that City Light's GHG offset contracts serve a general

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No. 77888-4 -- 11

government function, not a proprietary function, and therefore are not impliedly

authorized by the utility's enabling statute, RCW 35.92.050. This court has said that

"[t]he principal test in distinguishing governmental functions from proprietary functions

is whether the act performed is for the common good of all, or whether it is for the

special benefit or profit of the corporate entity." Okeson I, 150 Wn.2d at 550. Here, the

ratepayers argue that City Light's offset contracts provide no "special benefit" to the

utility.

Cleaning up the utility's own emissions is an inherent part of the utility's
operations, and therefore serves a utility purpose, but cleaning up other
parties' emissions in order to combat global warming for the betterment
of everyone everywhere serves a general governmental purpose and is
not for the special benefit of the utility or its ratepayers.

Reply Br. of Appellants at 2.

Seattle responded that "buying greenhouse gas offsets from a third party is the

equivalent of reducing emissions from a utility's own operations." Br. of Resp't at 36.

Seattle also noted that the offset contracts "secure the GHG offset credit only for

Seattle City Light," suggesting that such credit is a special benefit for the utility. Id. at

39. The city also cited Taxpayers of Tacoma for the proposition that all utility

operations are proprietary in nature. In that case we said that "[a]ctions taken pursuant

to RCW 35.92.050 serve a business, proprietary function, rather than a governmental

function." Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 694. Similarly in Hite, 112 Wn.2d at

459, we said, "It is clear that in the production and sale of electricity, a municipal

corporation acts in its proprietary capacity." See also Okeson I, 150 Wn.2d at 550

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No. 77888-4 -- 12

("The electric utility operates for the benefit of its customers, not the general public.").

Distinguishing proprietary from government functions was a key issue in Okeson

I, the first phase of this case. There, we held that providing street lights is a general

government function rather than a proprietary utility function because, unlike furnishing

electricity, it is not for the "'comfort and use'" of individual utility customers who can

control their own usage but instead serves the "general public." Okeson I, 150 Wn.2d

at 550 (quoting in part Twitchell v. City of Spokane, 55 Wash. 86, 89, 104 P. 150

(1909)). We reached that conclusion although in 2002, before we issued the Okeson I

decision, the legislature had amended RCW 35.92.050 to specifically authorize cities to

operate streetlights "as part of their rate-based" electric utilities. Id. at 547 (quoting
Laws of 2002, ch. 102, § 1).4 Thus, in light of Okeson I, we cannot say today -- as we

did in Taxpayers of Tacoma in 1987 -- that all actions taken pursuant to RCW

35.92.050 are proprietary. Rather, an electric utility's action is proprietary only if: (a) it

is part of the production and sale of electricity and (b) it is for the "'comfort and use'" of

individual customers paying only for their own usage, not for general public use.

Okeson I, 150 Wn.2d at 550.

Applying the Okeson I standard to the current phase of the case, we conclude

4Although the 2002 amendment specifically authorized city utilities to charge
their ratepayers for streetlights, we concluded that City Light could not do so because:
(a) providing streetlights is a general government function, (b) streetlight-related
charges constituted taxes rather than fees because they were designed to raise
general revenue rather than to pay for specific customer services, (c) there must be
express statutory or constitutional authority for a local government to impose a tax, and
(d) the 2002 amendment did not include such taxing authority. Okeson I, 150 Wn.2d at
557-58.

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No. 77888-4 -- 13

that City Light's GHG offset contracts are not proprietary because they are not part of

the services for which individual customers are billed. Like the streetlights at issue in

Okeson I, the offset contracts are charged to City Light customers regardless of how

much electricity they use. In other words, there is no relationship between an

individual's power use and what that individual pays through City Light rates for the

GHG emission reduction program. While it is true that the program may be viewed as a

legitimate part of the utility's production of electricity because its purpose is to prevent

City Light's production from causing a net increase in global greenhouse gas

emissions, that is not enough to make the program a proprietary function.

Under Okeson I, there must also be a connection between the amount paid and

the benefit received by the ratepayer. The dissent contends that the requisite

connection is met because City Light's ratepayers "benefit specially from knowing the

electricity they consume is not contributing to anthropogenic climate change."

Dissent

at 4. We know of no authority for the proposition that a function performed by a public

utility is to be viewed as a proprietary function simply because some of the utility's

ratepayers feel good about a particular function a utility is performing. We also

disagree with the dissent's assertion that City Light's ratepayers benefit because "the

offset program allows City Light to operate more efficiently" and "saves the ratepayers

money." Dissent at 4, 5. While, as we have indicated, there may be legitimate reasons

for a government agency to encourage a worldwide reduction in greenhouse gas

emissions, it is a stretch to say that City Light's distribution of money to other entities

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No. 77888-4 -- 14

that have reduced their emissions allows City Light to produce electricity more

efficiently and provide that electricity to its customers at lower rates. The record simply

does not support this assertion. In sum, the contracts are of a general government

nature.

2. Statutory purpose?

The next part of the test for determining a utility's implied powers is whether an

action is "within the purpose and object of the enabling statute." Taxpayers of Tacoma,

108 Wn.2d at 695. A city program is impliedly authorized by RCW 35.92.050 if it

"bears a sufficiently close nexus to the purpose and object the Legislature intended to

serve in granting the power to operate an electric utility." Id. at 696. We have said that

the primary purpose of RCW 35.92.050 is "supplying electricity to the municipal

corporation and its inhabitants." Id. at 696. Thus, the question here is whether City

Light's offset contracts bear a "sufficiently close nexus" to its statutory purpose,

supplying electricity to its customers.

Here, the ratepayers argued that the required nexus is missing because global

warming has only a slight and speculative impact, if any, on City Light's ability to supply

electricity. They noted that the city is unable to quantify, for example, the extent to

which GHG reductions at the DuPont plant in Kentucky help to preserve the Cascades

snow pack, upon which the city relies for its hydropower. Seattle responded that it

need not prove a "precise correlation between saving one molecule of greenhouse gas

and saving snowpack in the Cascades." Br. of Resp't at 38 n.12. Rather, the city

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No. 77888-4 -- 15

argued that because reducing its own greenhouse gas emissions is a legitimate utility

purpose, it necessarily has a close nexus to the utility's mission of furnishing electricity.

We agree with the city that its authority for the offset contracts does not hinge on

proving that a specific emission reduction somewhere on the globe translates into more

snow melt flowing through the city's hydropower plants. It is not for us to evaluate the

scientific merit of the city's offset contracts. Rather, the question is whether the offset

contracts are closely related to the purpose of supplying electricity to City Light

customers. Here, the decision in Okeson II, the second phase of this case, is

instructive.

In that case the Court of Appeals concluded that there was an insufficient nexus

between City Light's statutory purpose and its funding of certain art projects. The court

essentially conflated the first two parts of the test for determining a utility's implied

powers, saying that a close nexus exists when a utility exercises its proprietary power

and does not exist when a utility exercises its governmental power. The court held that

City Light could buy art for its own facilities, and for conservation education, because

such expenses supported City Light's efficiency and therefore benefited the utility itself

rather than the general public. But the court also said City Light could not buy art for

public exhibitions, other city offices, or mitigation projects because such expenses were

primarily designed to benefit the public as a whole. In other words, a close nexus to

supplying electricity exists when the action benefits the utility and its customers, but not

when it benefits the general public.

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No. 77888-4 -- 16

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the nexus prong of the implied powers

test largely mirrors the proprietary prong, in that both prongs focus on whether a utility
action serves the general public or the individually billed customer.5 In this case, we

have already concluded that the offset contracts do not serve the individually billed

customer and therefore are not proprietary. Accordingly, we hold that the contracts

also lack the required nexus to the purpose of supplying electricity because, although

5There is one other published case in which the required nexus was found
to be lacking. In Kightlinger v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clark County, 119 Wn.
App. 501, 81 P.3d 876 (2003), taxpayers challenged a utility district's authority to
run an appliance repair business. The Court of Appeals held that a utility activity
bears the required close nexus to furnishing electricity only if that activity is "the
same as" producing, selling, or distributing electricity. Id. at 511. Based on that
rule, the court concluded that utility districts lack implied authority to repair
appliances. While we pass no judgment here on whether appliance repairs are an
authorized utility activity, we decline to embrace the reasoning of the Kightlinger
decision because it appears to be based on a misreading of our decision in
Taxpayers of Tacoma. In that case, we held that the City of Tacoma had implied
authority to install conservation measures in private homes and businesses.
Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 696. We noted that "in the world of electric
utility professionals an investment in conservation is considered the equivalent of
purchasing electricity." Id. at 693. The Kightlinger court apparently relied on that
language, saying the "[k]ey" to our decision "was the unchallenged factual finding
that conserving electricity was essentially the same as producing new electricity."
Kightlinger, 119 Wn. App. at 510. But that was not the only grounds cited by this
court in concluding in Taxpayers of Tacoma that a sufficiently close nexus existed
between conserving electricity and generating or selling it. Rather, we were also
concerned with whether Tacoma's activity served broader utility purposes of
efficiency, pollution and cost control, and planning for future needs. Thus,
Taxpayers of Tacoma did not establish a bright-line rule that a utility may only
engage in activities that are the "same as" furnishing electricity. Rather, as noted
above, Taxpayers of Tacoma stands for the proposition that a city utility's actions
are impliedly authorized as long as they comport with a utility's statutory purpose
of supplying electricity and are not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, in conflict
with express limitations, or of a general government nature. In sum, because
Kightlinger applied the wrong test, it is not instructive here.

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they are designed to clean up City Light's own emissions and therefore benefit the

utility, they also are designed to benefit the public as a whole. This broader public

purpose is evident in the City Council resolution that directed the utility to execute the

contracts. That resolution cited the threat that global warming poses to "the economic

and environmental health of the world" as well as to "specific qualities of life for the

Seattle area." CP at 560. In sum, the offset contracts are not within City Light's implied

powers because they do not fall within the object and purpose of the utility enabling

statute.

IV

Because we find that City Light's emissions offset contracts are neither

proprietary nor within the utility's statutory purpose, we need not reach the remaining
questions under the implied powers test.6 Nor do we reach the question of whether

declarations related to the ratepayers' offset claims were properly stricken.

That is

because the trial court stated that the declarations at issue in the motion to strike made

no difference in deciding the legal issue underlying summary judgment.

In conclusion, City Light lacked authority to use ratepayer money for the offset

contracts because they are neither proprietary in nature nor sufficiently related to the

purpose of supplying electricity. Therefore, we reverse the trial court order granting

summary judgment to the city and remand for entry of judgment consistent with this
opinion.