Jack Oltman v. Holland America Line USA, Inc.

Petitioners Jack Oltman and his mother Bernice Oltman1

were passengers who became ill on a cruise ship sailing from Chile to San Diego.

They filed suit against respondents Holland America Cruise Line USA, Inc. and

Holland America Line, Inc. (hereafter Holland America) in King County Superior

Court, asserting several causes of action. Petitioner Susan Oltman, who was not a
passenger on the ship, asserted a claim for loss of consortium. The trial court

granted summary judgment to the respondents on the basis that a forum selection

clause in the cruise contracts requires that suit be brought in the United States

District Court for the Western District of Washington. The Court of Appeals

affirmed. We conclude that summary judgment was improperly granted on the

loss of consortium claim, but in other respects we affirm the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

Jack Oltman booked a cruise on the luxury cruise ship ms Amsterdam

through Vacations to Go in Houston, Texas, on March 18, 2004, 13 days before

the ship was to sail from Valparaiso, Chile, to San Diego, California. Jack and
Bernice each received a Cruise and "CruiseTour Contract," and a "Cruise Ticket."2

Jack stated in his declaration that they received their travel documents either

approximately six days before boarding or at the time they boarded. The Oltmans

contend that they had no "opportunity to review the fine print in the travel

documents." Pet. for Review at 5. Uncontroverted evidence shows that Jack and

Bernice could not have boarded the ms Amsterdam without presenting their Cruise

and CruiseTour Contracts (with their Cruise Tickets).

Although Jack and Bernice have not submitted complete copies of their

travel documents, they did submit copies of their Cruise Tickets. An exemplar of

the complete travel documents was submitted by Holland America.3 The cruise

ticket is denominated as a Cruise and CruiseTour Contract and contains a forum

selection clause designating the federal district court in western Washington as the

chosen forum, with the sole exception being that King County courts are the

chosen forum where the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The

contract also contains contractual limitations periods, providing that notice of

injury must be provided to Holland America within six months of the injury, and

providing a one-year limitations period in which to file a lawsuit, running from the

date of injury.

The ms Amsterdam was scheduled to depart from Valparaiso on March 31,

2004, and arrive in San Diego at 8 a.m. on April 17, 2004. Jack and Bernice

boarded the ship March 31. Sometime after they boarded, a severe gastrointestinal

disease broke out and infected a number of passengers on board, resulting in an

announcement about the illness by the ship's captain and issuance of a health

notice. The Oltmans maintain that because none of the passengers were

quarantined, the virus continued to be transmitted from passenger to passenger.

Toward the end of the cruise, Jack and Bernice allege, they contracted the

gastrointestinal illness and began to experience severe symptoms. Although the

exact dates of the onset of their illnesses have not been established, the record

shows that on April 16, 2004, each consulted with the ship's medical staff.

Insurance claim forms in connection with these consultations show that Jack's visit

was a "followup exam" for gastritis, Clerk's Papers (CP) at 45, and that Bernice's

visit was a "consult -- no exam" and that she was diagnosed with gastroenteritis,

CP at 46.

On March 30, 2005, plaintiffs Jack, Bernice, and Susan Oltman filed suit in

King County Superior Court against Holland America. Jack and Bernice asserted

claims of negligence, breach of contract, and fraud. Susan asserted a claim for

loss of consortium. The plaintiffs served Holland America on April 1, 2005.

Thirty-one days after service of the complaint, on May 2, 2005, Holland America

served their answer (filed April 29, 2005) on the Oltmans, past the 20-day time

limit of CR 12(a)(1) for serving an answer. In the answer, Holland America

asserted the forum selection clause, improper venue, and other contract limitations

as affirmative defenses. The plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the affirmative

defenses, claiming that an affirmative defense is waived when asserted in an

untimely answer. The trial court denied the motion. Holland America then moved

for summary judgment based solely on the forum selection clause. The trial court

granted the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Oltman v. Holland Am. Line

USA, Inc., 136 Wn. App. 110, 148 P.3d 1050 (2006). The Oltmans' petition for

review was granted.

ANALYSIS

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Beaupre v. Pierce

County, 161 Wn.2d 568, 571, 166 P.3d 712 (2007). Summary judgment is

appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). Some of the

issues involve discretionary rulings by the trial court, such as a ruling on a motion

to strike an attorney's declaration, and these are generally reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard.4

The first issue is whether, as the Oltmans claim, Holland America waived

its affirmative defenses. There is no dispute that Holland America's answer to the

complaint was served 31 days after service of the complaint, 11 days beyond the

20-day period allowed under CR 12(a)(1). The Oltmans ask the court to hold that

affirmative defenses are waived if they are asserted in an untimely answer and the

late assertion causes actual prejudice to the plaintiff. They claim they were

prejudiced because if the forum selection clause defense had been raised in a

timely answer, then they would have been able to refile their complaint in federal

court in conformity with the forum selection clause within the one-year contractual

limitations period.

The Court of Appeals held that the waiver issue was not preserved because

the plaintiffs did not claim prejudice in the trial court. Oltman, 136 Wn. App. at

115. However, contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, the Oltmans did claim

prejudice in response to Holland America's motion for summary judgment. Then,

as now, they argued prejudice resulting from assertion of the forum selection

clause defense in the late answer.

A trial court's denial of a motion to strike an affirmative defense is a

discretionary ruling that we review for abuse of discretion. Phillips v. Richmond,

59 Wn.2d 571, 574-75, 369 P.2d 299 (1962); see King County Fire Prot. Dist. No.

16 v. Hous. Auth., 123 Wn.2d 819, 826, 872 P.2d 516 (1994). A defendant shall

serve the answer no more than 20 days after service of the complaint. CR

12(a)(1). Affirmative defenses "shall be asserted in the responsive pleading," or,

alternatively, a defendant may assert lack of subject matter or personal

jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient process, insufficient service, failure to

state a claim, or failure to join a party in a motion filed under CR 12(b). CR

12(b). An affirmative defense of improper venue is waived if not made by motion

under the rule or included in a responsive pleading. CR 12(h)(1).

Conceding that there is no state case law holding that an affirmative defense

is waived if not asserted in the answer, the Oltmans nonetheless rely on CR(h)(1),
viewing the forum selection clause defense as the same thing as improper venue

and citing Washington appellate cases holding that a defense is waived if not

included in the answer. But here Holland America did assert its affirmative

defenses in its answer. Nothing in the rule or the state cases supports the

conclusion that asserting an affirmative defense in an untimely answer constitutes

waiver.

As Holland America maintains, a number of federal courts hold that an

affirmative defense is not waived merely because it is asserted in a late response.

E.g., Breland v. ATC Vancom, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 475, 477 (E.D. Pa. 2002)

(rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the defendant waived the right to assert a

defense of improper venue when the defendant filed its response to the complaint

11 days late); Foss v. Klapka, 95 F.R.D. 521, 522 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (defense of lack

of personal jurisdiction is not waived when asserted in the first response to a

complaint filed over 20 days after service of the complaint). Some courts have

concluded, to the contrary, that an affirmative defense is waived if asserted in an

untimely response. E.g., Granger v. Kemm, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Pa.

1966) (answer under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a) is required within 20 days after service

of the complaint and unless an objection to venue is made either in the answer or

by motion within this 20-day period, the objection to venue is waived; defendant's

motion to dismiss on improper venue grounds was waived where it was filed 55

days after service of the complaint). But a leading treatise notes that the

conclusion that a defense of improper service or venue is waived if asserted in an

untimely response "is premised on an overly strict interpretation" of the rules,

which do not provide for waiver in these circumstances. 5C Charles Alan Wright

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1391, at 519 (3d ed. 2007).

Nevertheless, Amicus Curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Association

Foundation (WSTLAF) argues, in support of the Oltmans' claim, that waiver

should be found if an affirmative defense is filed in a late answer and the delay

causes actual prejudice to the plaintiff, adding that this principle should be applied

where the defendant knows or should know that prejudice would result. WSTLAF

premises its argument on Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wn.2d 29, 1 P.3d 1124

(2000), where the plaintiffs properly filed a summons and complaint, but failed to

serve it correctly on the defendant Grant County.

We reasoned that under the common law doctrine of waiver, waiver of

affirmative defenses can occur under certain circumstances in two ways: if the

defendant's assertion of the defense is inconsistent with the defendant's previous

behavior and if defendant's counsel has been dilatory in asserting the defense. Id.

at 38-39. We found waiver of the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service

of process because the county engaged in conduct inconsistent with asserting the

defense and was dilatory in filing its answer. Id. at 41-45; see also King v.

Snohomish County, 146 Wn.2d 420, 424, 47 P.3d 563 (2002).

WSTLAF argues the dilatory defense prong of Lybbert should be applied

here and Holland America should be deemed to have waived the forum selection

clause defense if its delayed answer resulted in actual prejudice to the Oltmans.

We need not decide whether an affirmative defense raised in an untimely

answer is waived if the delay in raising the defense causes prejudice to the plaintiff

because no prejudice is established in this case. As noted, the Oltmans claim

prejudice resulted from the late assertion of the forum selection clause defense

because, if it had been asserted in a timely fashion, then, they argue, they would

have been able to refile their suit in federal court in conformity with the clause.

But the forum selection clause appears in the cruise contracts that Jack and

Bernice received in March 2004.

Moreover, as Holland America correctly argues, the timing of the complaint

in state court left too little time to correct the filing mistake in any event. The 20-

day period to file the answer ended April 21, 2005, since the complaint was served

April 1. Even if the alleged injuries did not occur until the very last day of the
cruise, April 17,7 the one-year limitation period would have expired Monday,

April 18, 2005. See CR 6.8 Holland America could have filed a timely answer on

April 19, 20, or 21 -- already too late for the Oltmans to refile in federal court.

Thus, the Oltmans cannot show prejudice resulting from the untimely answer.

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motion to strike the affirmative defenses.

The next issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

the Oltmans' motion to strike a declaration submitted by one of Holland America's

attorneys. The attorney stated that he had been counsel or cocounsel in a number

of cases where the same forum selection clause at issue here was found valid by

the courts. He cited the cases and appended copies of the decisions as evidence

that other courts had found the clause valid. Some of the decisions were orders

from King County Superior Court, which are unpublished, and others were

unpublished decisions from federal district court. The Oltmans contend citation

and inclusion of the unpublished decisions was improper and prejudicial because

they were meant to influence the trial judge to take the same position as her

judicial colleagues. They seek reversal and remand.

The abuse of discretion standard applies to review of a trial court's decision

on a motion to strike a declaration or affidavit allegedly containing inadmissible

evidence. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 137 Wn.2d 580, 591, 973 P.2d

1011 (1999).

The Oltmans rely on former RAP 10.4(h) (2006), but this rule does not

apply here because it barred citing unpublished Court of Appeals opinions in the

appellate courts and Holland America cited unpublished decisions of trial courts in

trial court. The Oltmans also rely on Johnson v. Allstate Insurance Co., 126 Wn.

App. 510, 108 P.3d 1273 (2005) and St. John Medical Center v. Department of

Social & Health Services, 110 Wn. App. 51, 61 n.5, 38 P.3d 383 (2002). Each is

distinguishable. In Johnson, 126 Wn. App. at 519, the court said that the

defendant and the trial court improperly relied on an unpublished Court of Appeals

opinion, but the only remedy available to the plaintiffs was sanctions and because

the unpublished decision was not cited to the Court of Appeals it was unable to

impose sanctions. In St. John Medical Center, 110 Wn. App. at 61 n.5, the court

refused to consider an unpublished trial court decision. Neither case involved

citation of unpublished trial court decisions to a trial court.

Like the Court of Appeals, we have disapproved citing unpublished

decisions. Kitsap County v. Allstate Ins. Co., 136 Wn.2d 567, 577 n.10, 964 P.2d

1173 (1998) (trial court decisions cited to this court); Dahl-Smyth, Inc. v. City of

Walla Walla, 148 Wn.2d 835, 839 n.4, 64 P.3d 15 (2003) (unpublished Court of
Appeals opinions are not precedential in the appellate courts).9

Plaintiffs cite no relevant authority for the proposition that it is improper to

cite unpublished opinions to a trial court. Insofar as the analysis in another trial

judge's decision might be helpful, there is no rule or precedent that bars its

consideration by a trial judge. Further, trial judges can be presumed to know that

other trial court rulings are not precedential.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to strike the

declaration citing unpublished trial court decisions.

We turn to the question whether Susan Oltman's loss of consortium claim

was properly dismissed on summary judgment. The Oltmans maintain that

because she was not a party to the contract, did not sign it, and was not a

passenger on the cruise, the trial court erred in dismissing Susan Oltman's loss of
consortium claim on summary judgment.10 They point out that under Washington

law a loss of consortium claim is a separate, not a derivative, claim.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal, reasoning that

although loss of consortium is not a derivative claim, an element of the loss of

consortium cause of action is the tort committed against the spouse who was

injured. Oltman, 136 Wn. App. at 126 (citing Conradt v. Four Star Promotions,

Inc., 45 Wn. App. 847, 853, 728 P.2d 617 (1986)). The court also reasoned that

the cruise contract states that it applies to any dispute or matter arising under or in

connection with or incident to the contract and the cruise, and said that Susan's

claim is not separate from the alleged injury to Jack Oltman while on the cruise

but instead arises under and in connection with the cruise. Id. The court held the

contract, and thus the forum selection clause, applies to her. Id.

The contract to which Susan is allegedly bound expressly states it is a

"legally binding contract between you and us." CP at 109 (emphasis added)

(capitalization omitted). The contract defines "the words 'we' and 'us'" as "the

owner, HAL[] and the other HAL companies." Id. The contract defines "the word

'you'" as "all persons traveling under this contract including their heirs, successors

in interest and personal representatives." Id. Susan Oltman did not travel under

the contract nor is she an heir, successor in interest, or personal representative of a

person traveling under the contract. By its express terms, the cruise contract does

not apply to nor purport to bind her. A forum selection clause is not binding on a

third party who did not agree to the contract in which the clause is found. Am.

Mobile Homes of Wash., Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 115 Wn.2d 307, 321-22,

796 P.2d 1276 (1990); State ex rel. Elec. Prods. Consol. v. Superior Court, 11

Wn.2d 678, 679, 120 P.2d 484 (1941); State ex rel. Lund v. Superior Court, 173

Wash. 556, 558, 24 P.2d 79 (1933). Susan Oltman did not sign the cruise contract,

nor did she agree to its terms. Nor has any argument been made, and none appears

from the record, that there is an alternative basis for her to be subjected to the

contract, such as a third party beneficiary theory.

Susan Oltman is simply not bound by the contract and therefore is not

bound by the forum selection clause. The fact that Jack's injury, and the

wrongdoing of Holland America in connection with that injury, are components of

Susan's loss of consortium claim makes no difference. In Lund v. Caple, 100

Wn.2d 739, 744, 675 P.2d 226 (1984), we held that the "deprived" spouse may sue

for loss of consortium by either joining in a lawsuit with the injured spouse, or by

bringing an independent suit. The loss of consortium claim is separate and

independent rather than derivative. Green v. A.P.C., 136 Wn.2d 87, 101, 960 P.2d

912 (1998); Reichelt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wn.2d 761, 776, 733 P.2d 530

(1987). Under state law, a loss of consortium claim is not barred simply because

no claim can be brought based on the injury of the injured spouse. For example,

the statute of limitations begins to run on a loss of consortium claim when the

deprived spouse experiences injury, not when the injured spouse is injured.

Reichelt, 107 Wn.2d at 776. Timeliness of the injured spouse's claim does not

necessarily determine the deprived spouse's loss of consortium claim. Id.

Holland American relies, however, on federal cases holding that spouses of

passengers injured on a ship were bound by the terms of cruise contracts. All of

the cases that Holland America relies on rest on the analysis in Miller v. Lykes

Brothers Steamship Co., 467 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1972), in which the court held that

a one-year contractual time bar in a passenger contract that barred a wife's claim

operated equally to bar the husband's claim for loss of consortium. The court

noted that the husband's losses may have conceptually occurred subsequent to his

wife's injuries, and that courts have found a spouse's loss of consortium claim to

be separate from the other spouse's physical injury, i.e., a distinct cause of action.

Id. at 466. But the court's analysis centered on contract interpretation of the term

"injury" in the contractual limitation provision that was at issue. The court

reasoned that, under a commonsense reading, claims for bodily injury as well as

claims derivative of that bodily injury must be filed within a year from "'such

injury.'" Id. at 467. The court said that "[f]ine distinctions between claims for

bodily injury and claims for loss of services caused by the injury only obscure the

plain meaning of the contract and leave the parties in doubt as to their contractual

rights." Id.

However, in Miller, both spouses were passengers subject to the contract.11

Cases that Holland America cites to this court also involve both spouses as

passengers subject to the passenger contract. See Lieb v. Royal Caribbean Cruise

Lines, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 232, 235 (S.D. N.Y. 1986); Mem. & Order, Natale v.

Regency Maritime Corp., No. 94 CIV. 0256, 1995 WL 117611, at *3 (S.D. N.Y.

Mar. 17, 1995). In another case relied on by Holland America, Schenck v. Kloster

Cruise Ltd., 800 F. Supp. 120, 124 (S.D. N.J. 1992), it is not clear whether both

spouses were passengers, but the court treated the husband's claim as derivative

and, insofar as the limitations period was concerned, relied completely on the

analysis in Miller.

Because all of the cases ultimately rest on Miller, and all but one involve

situations where both spouses were parties to the passenger contracts, they are not

persuasive on the issue here -- whether a spouse who is a third party vis-á-vis a

cruise contract and who asserts a separate, independent claim (not a derivative

claim) for loss of consortium is bound to the forum selection clause in the contract.

We hold that Susan Oltman's loss of consortium claim is not subject to the

forum selection clause and therefore the trial court erred in dismissing on summary

judgment her claim based on the forum selection clause. We express no opinion

on the issue whether the loss of consortium claim is nevertheless barred under

federal maritime law because the issue whether loss of consortium damages is a

cognizable claim under federal law was not part of the summary judgment

proceedings.

Susan Oltman's loss of consortium claim is remanded to the trial court for

further proceedings.

The Oltmans next maintain that the forum selection clause in the cruise ship

contract is invalid and unenforceable. We agree with the Court of Appeals that

federal maritime law controls these questions. Article III, section 2 of the United

States Constitution extends federal judicial power "to all cases of admiralty and

maritime jurisdiction." A case involving a forum selection clause in a passenger

cruise line ticket contract is "a case in admiralty, and federal law governs the

enforceability of the forum-selection clause." Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.

Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 113 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1991); see The

Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 427, 18 L. Ed. 397 (1867); Effron v. Sun

Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995); Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed

Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 909 (3d Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by

Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 109 S. Ct. 1976, 104 L. Ed. 2d 548

(1989); Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 2002). Such

a clause is prima facie valid. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10,

92 S. Ct. 1907, 32 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1972). A party challenging the enforceability of

a forum selection clause bears the heavy burden of establishing enforcement would

be unreasonable. Id. at 17.

Although the Oltmans complain that the forum selection clause was not the

subject of negotiation, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the argument

that a nonnegotiated forum selection clause is never enforceable simply because it

was not negotiated. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595. A forum selection

clause in a form passage contract is, however, "subject to judicial scrutiny for

fundamental fairness." Id. Some factors to consider in assessing for fundamental

fairness are whether there is any indication the selected forum was chosen to

discourage legitimate complaints, whether there was any evidence of fraud or

overreaching, and whether the passengers were sufficiently on notice of the clause

and had the option of rejecting it. Id. In Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 826,

834-35, 161 P.3d 1016 (2007), this court provided a typical synthesis of the

Bremen and Carnival Cruise Line line of cases, which also establish, in relevant

part, that a forum selection clause can be found to be unenforceable if the party

challenging enforceability establishes that the contractually selected forum is so

unfair and inconvenient that the plaintiff is essentially denied his day in court or

that enforcement would contravene strong public policy of the state where the

action is filed.

Turning first to the question of the fundamental fairness of contractual

limitations in cruise ship contracts, many federal courts, including the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals, employ a "reasonable communicativeness" test to

determine if a clause is fundamentally fair. Wallis, 306 F.3d at 835-36. Under

this two-part analysis, the court considers (1) whether the physical characteristics

of a cruise ship contract reasonably communicate the existence of the terms and

conditions at issue and (2) whether the circumstances surrounding the purchase of

the ticket contract and subsequent retention of it allowed the passenger to become

meaningfully informed of its contents. E.g., Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A.,

722 F.2d 861, 864-66 (1st Cir. 1983); Ward v. Cross Sound Ferry, 273 F.3d 520,

524-25 (2d Cir. 2001); Barbachym v. Costa Line, Inc., 713 F.2d 216, 219 (6th Cir.

1983); Dillon v. Admiral Cruises, Inc., 960 F.2d 743, 744-45 (8th Cir. 1992);

Wallis, 306 F.3d at 835-36. Whether a contractual provision in a cruise ship

contract is reasonably communicated is a question of law for the court. Ward, 273

F.3d at 523; Valenti v. Home Lines Cruises, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.N.J. 1984).

Considerations under the first prong of this test include the conspicuousness

of the clause at issue, font size, clarity of the term, and the ease with which a

passenger can read the provisions. Wallis, 306 F.3d at 836.

Here, the index to the travel documents lists "contract" and directs the

passenger to read it. The first page of the contract itself conspicuously states in

large, bold capital letters that the document is a binding contract. The same

designation appears later in the document. The designated "Passenger's Copy"
states that it embodies "Terms and Conditions." CP at 304.12 Immediately below

the passenger's cabin number on the copy is stated in capital letters:

"ISSUED

SUBJECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON THIS PAGE AND THE

FOLLOWING PAGES. READ TERMS AND CONDITIONS CAREFULLY."

Id. The terms and conditions that follow include the forum selection clause and

the limitations period clause. The forum selection clause is printed in capital

letters on the same page that is headed "IMPORTANT NOTICE TO

PASSENGERS." CP at 109. In addition, the contract explicitly directs the

passenger's attention to certain paragraphs that limit legal rights. Also, the forum

selection clause is the first substantive term following the itinerary.

The first prong of the test is satisfied. The second prong concerns

circumstances surrounding the passenger's purchase of the ticket and subsequent

retention. The question here is whether the passenger had the opportunity to

become meaningfully informed of the contractual limitations. Wallis, 306 F.3d at

836. For example, in a case where the passenger was issued a ticket bearing the

terms of limitations just moments before boarding and then the entire ticket was

collected upon boarding, the court held that possession of the ticket for such a

short time was insufficient to give reasonable notice that the ticket contained

important contractual limitations. Ward, 273 F.3d at 524-25.

The Oltmans maintain that viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

them, the nonmoving parties, Jack and Bernice did not receive their travel

documents, including the cruise contracts, until they boarded the ship for

departure. The fact that the passenger held the ticket a short time before boarding

is not dispositive, however. Courts have held that passengers had sufficient notice

of limitations clauses in cruise contracts where the passenger received them a short

time before sailing provided they had the opportunity to review them. E.g.,

Roberson v. Norwegian Cruise Line, 897 F. Supp. 1285 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Hodes,

858 F.2d 905. The focus is not so much on the length of time the passenger had

before or after the cruise, but instead on whether the passenger had a reasonable
time to review the ticket contract terms.13 Retention of the ticket and time to

review it have been considered significant. In Kendall v. American Hawaii

Cruises, 704 F. Supp. 1010, 1016 (D. Haw. 1989), passengers who held the

contract over a year from the date of the injury had ample time to familiarize

themselves with the terms of the ticket contract and its one-year limitation on the

time to sue. See also Marek v. Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242, 247 (3d Cir.

1987) (passenger received ticket moments before boarding and failed to read

within six months of injury).

Both Bernice and Jack declared they had no opportunity to review the

documents, however. But no explanation is offered as to why they had no

opportunity. Moreover, the Oltmans have offered no objective evidence that if

they had read the contract, they would have canceled their cruise. And most

significantly, as Holland America contends, the Oltmans' argument that the second

prong of the test is not met is based on circumstances of their own creation. Jack
Oltman did not book the cruise until 13 days before the ship sailed.14

Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 63 Mass. Ct. App. 785, 829

N.E.2d 1171 (2005), on which the Oltmans heavily rely, is distinguishable. In

Casavant the plaintiffs bought their tickets a year before departure, but the cruise

line delayed sending the tickets and the plaintiffs received them 13 days before

sailing. The cruise line caused the delay, not, as in this case, the plaintiffs. Also,

in Casavant the plaintiffs cancelled the trip under extraordinary circumstances

because they were scheduled to depart right after the September 11 terrorist attacks

and reasonably feared traveling. Id. at 799. Here, in contrast, Jack and Bernice

Oltman took the cruise and now seek to set aside the contact after it has been fully

performed.

The second prong of the reasonable communicativeness is satisfied,

especially because delay in obtaining the tickets was plaintiffs' doing.

The Oltmans also contend that the forum selection clause is against public
policy and so seriously inconvenient as to deprive them of their day in court.15 In

Dix, as mentioned, the court concluded that a forum selection clause may be found

unreasonable if the contractually selected forum is so unfair and inconvenient that,

for all practical purposes, it deprives the plaintiff of his day in court, or if

enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of this state. The Oltmans

reason that (1) they were dismissed on summary judgment in state court due to the

forum selection clause, (2) then the federal court dismissed their action because

the contractual limitations period had run, and (3) the forum selection clause does

not satisfy any of the rationales given in Carnival Cruise Lines for the Court's

holding there that the forum selection clause in a cruise line passage contract ticket

was reasonable and enforceable.

However, at the heart of this complaint is the contractual one-year

limitations period in the cruise contract. It is not the forum selection clause so

much as the shortened time limit that prevented the Oltmans from proceeding in

federal court after their dismissal in state court.

Moreover, the Oltmans' argument that the forum selection clause here does

not satisfy the rationales in Carnival Cruise Lines is not persuasive. In Carnival

Cruise Lines the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that a nonnegotiated

forum selection clause in a cruise contract is never enforceable because it is not

the subject of bargaining. The Court identified three rationales that supported

enforcing forum selection clauses despite the lack of negotiation. The Court first

observed that a cruise line has a special interest in limiting the forums in which it

could be sued because a cruise ship typically carries passengers from many

locations and following a mishap could be subjected to suit in several forums.

Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 594. The Oltmans say, however, that Holland

America would have no financial savings because both forums mentioned in the

forum selection clause are in the same city. But this argument fails to account for

the fact that there are innumerable other potential forums, such as the home states

of all the other passengers and foreign countries such as Chile.

The Court also reasoned in Carnival Cruise Lines that a forum selection

clause eliminates confusion about where suit must be brought, thus saving time

and expense and conserving judicial resources. Id. The Oltmans say that the

forum selection clause makes things more confusing, not less, because it attempts

to limit plaintiffs to one city, and requires claims to first be filed in federal court

and then, only if the federal court lacks jurisdiction, filed in state court. But the

"confusion" that the Oltmans refer to is of their own doing. They failed to comply

with the forum selection clause and failed to file in the federal court in the first

place.

Finally, the Court in Carnival Cruise Lines reasoned that passengers benefit

because reduced fares reflect savings enjoyed by the cruise line as a result of

limiting the forums in which it could be sued. Id. The Oltmans say, however, that

by filing in state court and abiding by the contract they kept the cruise line's costs

down. This argument reflects the Oltmans' erroneous view that they were entitled

to file in state court under the savings to suitors clause and could do so and still

comply with the forum selection clause. The savings to suitors clause, discussed

below, does generally permit a plaintiff to bring in personam admiralty claims in

state court, but the forum selection clause did not give the Oltmans the option of

suing in state court at the outset. The Oltmans also seem to believe that Holland

America must prove it is financially less burdensome to be sued in federal court

than in state court. But again this reasoning overlooks the fact that the more

relevant comparison comes from all of the potential forums in which Holland

America might be sued. In short, the Oltmans have not shown that the Court's

rationales in Carnival Cruise Lines are inapplicable here.

The Oltmans have not established that the forum selection clause deprives

them of their day in court and is against public policy.

We hold that the forum selection clause is valid and enforceable. The

Oltmans have not overcome the presumptive validity of the clause.

The Oltmans contend that under the federal savings to suitors clause they

were entitled to file in state court, and that when they did so, the federal court was

deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. That being the case, they reason, they

were entitled to file in state court under the exception in the forum selection clause

permitting suit to be brought in King County courts if the federal district court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Their argument is circular.

The savings to suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), states that "[t]he district

courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1)

[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases

all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." This provision enables a

plaintiff to bring an admiralty or maritime claim in state court, i.e., the state and

federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has

explained that "[t]racing the development of the clause since the Judiciary Act of

1789, it appears that the clause was designed to protect remedies available at

common law . . . . Trial by jury is an obvious, but not exclusive, example of the

remedies available to suitors." Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438,

454-55, 121 S. Ct. 993, 148 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2001). Federal maritime law applies in

state court, however. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358

U.S. 625, 628, 79 S. Ct. 406, 3 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1959). "[T]he 'saving to suitors'

clause allows state courts to entertain in personam maritime causes of action, but

in such cases the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime

injuries is constrained by a so-called 'reverse-Erie' doctrine which requires that

the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to governing federal

maritime standards." Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-23,
106 S. Ct. 2485, 91 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1986).16 The savings to suitors clause does not

guarantee a nonfederal forum. Morris v. T E Marine Corp., 344 F.3d 439, 444

(5th Cir. 2003). If a maritime action is filed in state court, the defendant can

remove it to federal court if there is an alternate basis for the federal court to assert

jurisdiction, such as diversity. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061,

1069 (9th Cir. 2001).

While the savings to suitors clause allows for concurrent state and federal

jurisdiction over admiralty matters, the Oltmans cite no authority that supports

their claim that they were entitled to file in state court under the savings to suitors

clause despite the forum selection clause in the cruise contract. The forum

selection clause required them to file in federal court in the first instance. Had

they done so, the federal court would have jurisdiction and the exception in the

forum selection clause providing for suit in the King County courts would simply

16 An in rem action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.

not apply. The only way they make their argument at all is because they failed to

comply with the contractual forum selection clause in the first place.

The Oltmans also contend that Holland America has the burden of

establishing that federal jurisdiction is proper and that Holland America has not

met this burden. They cite no authority that supports this assertion. In any event,

as Holland America maintains, admiralty law applies in personal injury and

contract disputes between passengers injured on cruise ships and the cruise ship

companies. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 589; Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions,

Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1403 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994); Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc.,

867 F.2d 1318, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 1989); Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,

741 F.2d 1332, 1334 (11th Cir. 1984). When an alleged tort is committed and

injury occurs solely at sea, federal courts have admiralty jurisdiction. Guidry v.

Durkin, 834 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1987); see E. River S.S. Corp. v.

Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864, 106 S. Ct. 2295, 90 L. Ed. 2d 865

(1986). Had the Oltmans filed in federal court first as the forum selection clause

requires, the federal court would have had jurisdiction.

We hold that the Oltmans were required under the forum selection clause to

bring their suit in federal court, which has subject matter jurisdiction over

admiralty claims. We reject their contention that they could ignore the forum

selection clause and file in state court under the savings to suitors clause, and by

this device take advantage of the exception in the forum selection clause

permitting them to file in state court if the federal court lacked jurisdiction.17

* * *

http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/index.cfm?fa=opinions.showOpinion&filename=795291MAJ

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to strike the answer and affirmative defenses and in refusing

to strike the declaration of Holland America's attorney that contained citations to

unpublished trial court decisions and copies of the decisions. We affirm the Court

of Appeals' holding that the forum selection clause is valid and enforceable, and

that the Oltmans could not file their suit in state court under the savings to suitors

clause and thereby deprive the federal court of jurisdiction when the forum

selection clause required them to file in federal court in the first place. We reverse

the Court of Appeals' holding that Susan Oltman's loss of consortium claim is

governed by the forum selection clause.

Accordingly, we affirm summary judgment in favor of Holland America on

all issues except the loss of consortium claim. We reverse summary judgment on

the loss of consortium claim and remand this claim to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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