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Date: 03-08-2002

Case Number: 5D00-3618

Judge: Frederick T. Pfeiffer

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District

Plaintiff's Attorney: Craig B. Willis of Fixel & Maguire, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida.

Defendant's Attorney: C. Ken Bishop and Richard N. Milian of
Broad & Cassel, P.A., Orlando, Florida.

Description:
Tilden Groves Holding Corporation (Tilden Groves) appeals from a non-final order
granting the Orlando/Orange County Expressway Authority’s (Expressway Authority) Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 motion to set aside a stipulated final judgment. This court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(5).

The Expressway Authority filed its petition in eminent domain seeking to condemn
certain real property owned by Tilden Groves. Tilden Groves leased the property to Manheim Remarketing Limited Partnership, a Florida Limited Partnership d/b/a Florida Auto
Auction of Orlando and Florida Auto Auction of Orlando, Inc. (Auto Auction). Tilden Groves
and the Expressway Authority stipulated to an order of taking which entitled the Expressway
Authority to take possession of Tilden Groves’s property rights. Auto Auction and the
Expressway Authority then entered a stipulated order of taking as to Auto Auction’s leasehold
rights to the property. This left the value of the parties’ interests to be determined. Tilden
Groves and Auto Auction were represented by separate counsel from the outset of this
proceeding.

Tilden Groves and the Expressway Authority reached a mediated settlement agreement
that read in part:

Petitioner [Expressway Authority] will pay to
Respondent, TILDEN GROVES HOLDING CORPORATION, a
Florida corporation, the sum of (2,378,350.00) two million
three hundred seventy eight [thousand] three hundred fifty, in
full settlement of all claims for compensation from Petitioner,
including statutory interest, but excluding attorney’s fees,
expert’s fees, costs and expenses.

That this settlement agreement and the resulting
proposed Stipulated Final Judgment referenced herein are based
on Petitioner’s construction plans and specifications . . . as said
plans so supplemented relate to parcel 61-152 and its
remainder, being implemented by Petitioner.

A stipulated final judgment was submitted to the trial court and entered. The judgment
reflected the terms of the settlement agreement. The judgment did not address Auto Auction
or its interest in the property.

Several months after the judgment was entered, the Expressway Authority filed its
“Motion to Require Apportionment of Funds or, in the Alternative, To Set Aside Final
Judgment.” The Expressway Authority contended that Auto Auction should be bound by the
settlement agreement and that a portion of the monies the Expressway Authority had agreed
to pay Tilden Groves should be set aside to satisfy the taking of Auto Auction’s interest. The
trial court granted the Expressway Authority’s Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)
motion. Tilden Groves appeals the order setting aside the final judgment.

Generally, the standard of review of an order entered pursuant to Rule 1.540(b)3 is gross abuse of discretion. See Bonizo Properties, N.V. v. Hanwood Investments, N.V., 528 So.
2d 1304, 1305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (quoting Schwab & Co. v. Breezy Bay, Inc., 360 So. 2d
117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)). There is a more stringent standard of review, however, when the
final judgment to be vacated follows a mediated settlement agreement:

[C]ases settled in mediation are especially unsuited for
the liberal application of a rule [Rule 1.540(b)]allowing
rescission of a settlement agreement based on unilateral mistake.
Mediation, like arbitration, is an alternative dispute resolution
device. It is not to be engaged in casually or carelessly.

Sponga v. Warro, 698 So. 2d 621, 625 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (emphasis in original); see also
Smiles v. Young, 271 So. 2d 798, 799 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (presuming that trial court
intended to vacate settlement agreement as well as final judgment, and noting that more
stringent principles of law apply in setting aside a contract than in setting aside a judgment). In the instant case, as in Smiles, it must be presumed that the trial court also was setting aside
the settlement agreement, thus the more stringent standard of review applies.

The Expressway Authority submits that when it negotiated this settlement, it believed
it was negotiating the entire value of the property, including the rights of both Tilden Groves
and Auto Auction.4 The language of the settlement agreement is clear, unambiguous, and
completely undercuts that assertion. The Expressway Authority expressly agreed to pay
Tilden Groves $ 2,378,350.00 and there was no reference to Tilden Groves then paying a
portion of that amount to Auto Auction. Obviously, this was a significant mistake.

In certain instances, Florida law allows agreements to be rescinded due to unilateral
mistake. See Md. Casualty Co. v. Krasnek, 174 So. 2d 541, 542 (Fla. 1965). This mistake,
however, does not allow for that resolution. Compare BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Krathen, 471 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). The order vacating the final judgment is
reversed and the final judgment is reinstated.

* * *

Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's opinion free.

Outcome:
REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent herewith.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Unavailable
Defendant's Experts:
Unavailable
Comments:
Reported by G. Davis

About This Case

What was the outcome of ?

The outcome was: REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent herewith.

Which court heard ?

This case was heard in District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, FL. The presiding judge was Frederick T. Pfeiffer.

Who were the attorneys in ?

Plaintiff's attorney: Craig B. Willis of Fixel & Maguire, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida.. Defendant's attorney: C. Ken Bishop and Richard N. Milian of Broad & Cassel, P.A., Orlando, Florida..

When was decided?

This case was decided on March 8, 2002.