Shahid Iqbal v. State of Indiana

In July 2002, Iqbal and his wife Tammy were going through a divorce and were

living separately. However, on the morning of July 6, their daughter, A.I.,

awoke to find Iqbal in Tammy’s apartment. They were arguing, and Iqbal had

a gun in his hand. Tammy and A.I. attempted to leave the apartment, but Iqbal

physically prevented them from doing so. At one point, Tammy was able to get

the gun and unload it, but Iqbal then pulled Tammy’s fingers backwards, took

the gun back, and reloaded it. The arguing gradually subsided, and Iqbal and

Tammy were just talking, but then A.I., who was playing a game in an

adjoining room, heard a gunshot. Tammy had been shot in the middle of the

chest. When A.I. looked up, the gun was laying on the counter, and Iqbal was

walking to the couch and crying. A.I. ran outside screaming, and a neighbor

came to the apartment. Tammy was still alive at that point, but the neighbor

never saw Iqbal go near her, and Tammy eventually died. Iqbal later told

police that he did not intend to shoot Tammy and that the gun “went off by

itself.” Trial Ex. 29C, p. 71.

[3] The State charged Iqbal with murder, neglect of a dependent (for firing the gun

near A.I.), and several other crimes. Before trial, the State filed a motion

seeking permission to introduce evidence of prior misconduct by Iqbal pursuant

to Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b). The trial court granted the State’s motion

in part, allowing the State to present evidence of acts committed during the year

before the shooting (i.e., July 7, 2001, through July 6, 2002). Chief among

these was an incident on March 18, 2002, during which Iqbal placed a gun

against Tammy’s head and threatened to kill her.

[4] The trial was held in June 2003. During jury selection, the court and Iqbal’s

attorney questioned a potential juror whose wife worked in the child-support

division of the prosecutor’s office. He said he could be fair to both sides, and

Iqbal’s attorney did not move to strike him from the jury pool, either

peremptorily or for cause. He eventually became the foreman of the jury.

[5] The State presented more than thirty witnesses who testified about the

confrontation and arguing on the day of the shooting, the shooting itself, Iqbal’s

statements to police after the shooting, the March 18, 2002 incident, and other

pre-shooting conduct by Iqbal, including following Tammy, sitting outside her

place of employment, pushing and shoving her, and on one occasion starting to

grab her by the hair. Multiple witnesses also testified to having heard Iqbal say

something like, “If I can’t have her, no one will.” Tr. p. 842, 865. In addition



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to all of this evidence, the trial court, over numerous hearsay objections by

Iqbal’s attorney, allowed eleven witnesses to testify about things Tammy had

told them: that she was afraid of Iqbal, that he had threatened her, and that she

thought he was going to kill her. The trial court admitted this testimony under

Indiana Rule of Evidence 803(3), which establishes a state-of-mind exception to

the general prohibition against hearsay evidence.

[6] The trial court also allowed the State to present the testimony of an expert on

the behavior of victims of domestic violence, that is, Battered Woman

Syndrome. The expert did not testify about Tammy specifically or the facts of

this case. Rather, she testified, among other things, that victims of domestic

violence struggle to leave their abusers and that leaving is when they are most at

risk. The trial court allowed this testimony so that the jury could be “educated”

about domestic violence because domestic violence had “been an issue

throughout this case.” Id. at 999.

[7] Near the end of the prosecutor’s closing argument, he referred to Iqbal, who is

from Pakistan, as a “terrorist”:

PROSECUTOR: Why . . . if this is your wife and your daughter and there’s no outside protector, what’s the gun for? As a father, as a protector with an eight-year-old daughter, I have an absolute right to defend my daughter and my wife and myself and you do to[o]. But who’s he defending them from? Folks, he’s become the terrorist within. He’s become . . .

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I mean I object to the reference of terrorist.



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COURT: Sustained.

PROSECUTOR: He’s become the person who unlike the father and husband being the protector become the enemy [sic]. . . .

Trial Tr. p. 1128-29. Iqbal’s attorney did not ask the court to admonish the jury

regarding the “terrorist” comment, nor did he request a mistrial.

[8] The trial court instructed the jury on both murder and reckless homicide, but

the jury found Iqbal guilty of murder and on all of the other counts. After

sentencing Iqbal to 58 years, the trial court appointed Iqbal’s trial attorney to

represent him on appeal.

[9] In his brief on appeal, Iqbal’s attorney did not challenge the hearsay evidence to

which he had repeatedly objected during trial. Instead, he argued that the trial

court abused its discretion by admitting (1) the 404(b) evidence (primarily the

March 18, 2002 incident) and (2) the testimony of the domestic violence expert.

We rejected both arguments and affirmed Iqbal’s convictions. Iqbal v. State, 805

N.E.2d 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Iqbal’s attorney did not petition for transfer

to the Indiana Supreme Court.

[10] Ten years later, Iqbal filed a petition for post-conviction relief. He claimed that

his attorney provided ineffective assistance in a variety of ways, including: (1)

failing to challenge for cause the potential juror who was married to an

employee of the prosecutor’s office; (2) failing to request an admonishment and

a mistrial after the prosecutor referred to Iqbal as a “terrorist”; (3) failing to

challenge the admission of the hearsay evidence on appeal; and (4) failing to file



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a petition to transfer regarding the admission of the Battered Woman Syndrome

evidence.

[11] In an affidavit executed before the post-conviction hearing, and again at the

hearing, Iqbal’s attorney stated that most of the issues complained of by Iqbal

were the result of sloppiness and personal issues, not strategy. In a post-hearing

memorandum, Iqbal added a claim that his convictions for murder and neglect

of a dependent violate the actual-evidence test under the Double Jeopardy

Clause of the Indiana Constitution. The post-conviction court adopted

verbatim the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and

rejected all of Iqbal’s claims.

[12] Iqbal now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Iqbal contends that the post-conviction court erred by rejecting both his

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims and his double jeopardy claim. A

person seeking post-conviction relief bears the burden of establishing grounds

for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263,

268-69 (Ind. 2014). When appealing from the denial of such relief, the

petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment. Id.

at 269. To prevail, the petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads

unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post

conviction court. Id. We review the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions



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de novo, but we will not reverse its factual findings or ultimate judgment unless

they are clearly erroneous, that is, unless they leave us with a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. The post-conviction court is the

sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 468

69 (Ind. 2006).

[14] Iqbal notes that the post-conviction court signed the State’s proposed findings of

fact and conclusions of law exactly as they were submitted. While this practice

erodes our confidence that the findings reflect the considered judgment of the

trial court, it is not prohibited. Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 709 (Ind. 2001).

The question remains whether the findings adopted by the court are clearly

erroneous. Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899, 940 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

[15] Iqbal first challenges the post-conviction court’s conclusion that his attorney did

not provide ineffective assistance of counsel, either at trial or on appeal. A

defendant claiming that his attorney was ineffective at trial must show by a

preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel’s performance fell below the

objective standard of reasonableness based on “prevailing” professional norms

and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by this substandard performance, i.e.,

there is a “reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s errors or omissions,

the outcome of the trial would have been different. Stephenson v. State, 864

N.E.2d 1022, 1031 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied. The same standard applies to the

performance of appellate counsel. Taylor v. State, 717 N.E.2d 90, 94 (Ind.



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1999). “We afford great deference to counsel’s discretion to choose strategy

and tactics, and strongly presume that counsel provided adequate assistance

and exercised reasonable professional judgment in all significant decisions.”

McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002).

A. No challenge for cause of the juror whose wife worked for the prosecutor’s office

[16] Iqbal contends that the post-conviction court erred by concluding that a

challenge for cause to the juror whose wife worked in the child-support division

of the prosecutor’s office would not have been granted and that Iqbal’s attorney

therefore was not ineffective for failing to make such a challenge. We agree

with Iqbal on the first point: he would have been entitled to have the juror

stricken for cause. Our Supreme Court has held that a prospective juror who is

related to an employee of the prosecutor’s office trying the case is presumed to

be biased in favor of that office and as such is subject to a challenge for cause.

See Haak v. State, 417 N.E.2d 321 (Ind. 1981) (holding that spouse of deputy

prosecutor was impliedly biased and should not have been allowed on jury);

Barnes v. State, 330 N.E.2d 743 (Ind. 1975) (explaining that if spouse of second

cousin of prosecutor’s employee was aware of relationship, “grounds for

challenge for cause will have been shown to have existed”).

[17] However, the fact that a challenge for cause would have been meritorious does

not mean that the decision of Iqbal’s attorney to forego such a challenge

constituted deficient performance. The dialogue with the juror during jury



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selection, read in its entirety, strongly suggests that Iqbal’s attorney’s choice to

refrain from making a challenge for cause was a strategic one:

COURT: [Juror], your wife works for the Prosecuting Attorney. How are you going to . . .

JUROR: Yes, Ma’am.

COURT: I know . . . I . . . I would imagine [defense counsel] will ask you a couple questions about that, but is that going to affect you knowing, you know, he is the head guy.

JUROR: No Ma’am, I . . . I don’t know him. I met him in a hallway once in all the time that my wife has worked under him and I know . . .

COURT: And child support doesn’t do criminal stuff. I don’t even think they do the criminal non-support for the dependent, do they?

PROSECUTOR: Not very often.

COURT: Okay.

PROSECUTOR: Bob does most of those.

COURT: All right. So you’re telling me you could be fair to both sides?

JUROR: Yes Ma’am, I believe I could.



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COURT: Okay, because . . . because that’s what I’ve got to have. Okay. [Defense counsel]?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Let’s . . . okay. I’ll . . . we’ll . . . we’ll talk about that secondly. All right. First thing and I . . . I don’t mean to . . . it’s not my intent to embarrass you so if I’m treading someplace you don’t want me to tread, you let me know. On question, let’s see, sixteen, it was all kinds of personal questions about have you ever served as a juror, or if you’ve ever been a witness, that sort of thing. Question asks then, have you ever been convicted of a crime. If yes, please list the crime, when and where a conviction lies. And you checked yes and then you crossed some stuff out.

JUROR: Yeah, I answer that my mistake [sic]. I haven’t served as a juror, but I will answer it if you want me to.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.

JUROR: I was convicted of DUI in Hancock County quite a number of years ago. I can’t remember, so I realized I wasn’t supposed to answer it so that was a freebee.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay, all right. Well again, sometimes you never know what you’re going to get when you ask that, so I did . . . it wasn’t my intent to embarrass you. The question . . . the key thing sir, from my perspective in terms of . . . of your wife’s job, it’s sort of a feeling or . . . or for example . . . let’s say you sit on this jury and you listen to everything and you decide as a juror that [Iqbal] is not guilty. Or you know, he’s guilty of something but not everything, whatever, so the question would be at that next Christmas party or next time in the hall or something like this, is there going to be that . . . when you bump into him or vice versa or something, is there going to be that, oh my God, you know, that . . . that look of disa . . . you know . . .



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you know what I’m talking about? That’s . . . that sort of in a nutshell with awkward way [sic] to say kind of what’s an issue here?

JUROR: I’m not a real people person. I doubt seriously . . . I avoid my wife’s office as much as I can. I don’t like being here.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: That’s . . . that’s one of the best things I’ve ever heard. Me too, I don’t like being here either.

JUROR: I try to . . . I don’t go to office parties, things like that. Frankly if he hadn’t been here, I don’t know if I would have recognized him second time [sic] if I had walked by and certainly wouldn’t have spoken. I’m just not a real personable [sic].

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well . . . well again I . . . I don’t mean to make a mountain out of this molehill, but it’s just something that we had to explore so I thank you for your honesty.

Trial Tr. p. 224-26. Several parts of this exchange could have convinced Iqbal’s

attorney that the juror would be fair, and perhaps even defense-friendly: (1) the

juror did not “know” the prosecutor; (2) the juror had met the prosecutor only

once; (3) the child-support division of the prosecutor’s office does not do

“criminal stuff” very often; (4) the juror said he believed he could be fair to both

sides; (5) the juror had himself been convicted of a crime; (6) the juror avoided

his wife’s office as much as possible; (7) the juror did not like being in court;

and (8) the juror is not personable and would not have spoken to the prosecutor

if they had crossed paths.



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[18] Furthermore, in the affidavit he executed shortly before the post-conviction

hearing, Iqbal’s attorney explained why he was comfortable with the juror:

I did not strike the juror because his comments regarding his lack of knowledge about the prosecutor made me feel he would not try to influence the other jurors and would keep to himself. Also, the fact that his wife worked in the child support division, which had less of a criminal bent than the rest of the prosecutor’s office, reduced my concern I had about the juror’s wife’s employment.

P-C Ex. E, ¶27. It is true, as Iqbal points out, that the attorney later testified

that his failure to challenge the juror for cause was the result of “sloppiness,”

not strategy, and “wasn’t a good decision.” P-C Tr. p. 39. Of course, the post

conviction court was not obligated to credit that testimony, especially in light of

the attorney’s own pre-hearing affidavit. See Hall, 849 N.E.2d at 468-69.

[19] Iqbal has not convinced us that his attorney performed deficiently when he

failed to challenge the juror for cause.

B. No request for an admonishment and a mistrial after the prosecutor called Iqbal a “terrorist”

[20] Iqbal also argues that the post-conviction court should have found his attorney

to have been ineffective for only objecting to the prosecutor’s use of the term

“terrorist” and failing to also request an admonishment and a mistrial. We

agree with Iqbal that referring to a person of Middle Eastern descent as a

“terrorist,” especially post-9/11, constitutes inexcusable prosecutorial

misconduct. In fact, the post-conviction judge, who also presided over the trial,

stated that she remembered the comment and was “shocked” that she had not



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admonished the jury even without a request from Iqbal’s attorney. P-C Tr. p.

103.

[21] However, even if we assume that Iqbal’s attorney performed deficiently by

failing to request an admonishment and then a mistrial, there is not a

reasonable probability that an admonishment would have changed the jury’s

verdict, that the trial court would have granted a mistrial, or that this Court or

our Supreme Court would have reversed his convictions on direct appeal. The

evidence that Iqbal intended to shoot Tammy was overwhelming. Four months

before the shooting, Iqbal had held a gun to her head and threatened to kill her.

Multiple witnesses testified that Iqbal had said something like, “If I can’t have

her, no one will.” The same witnesses testified that they personally saw Iqbal

follow Tammy, sit outside her place of employment, and physically abuse her.

Iqbal’s own daughter testified that in the hours leading up to the shooting, Iqbal

was arguing with Tammy, physically prevented her from leaving the apartment,

and aggressively took the gun from her after she had gotten ahold of it and

unloaded it. Tammy was shot in the middle of the chest. Iqbal did not attempt

to save her. Given all of this evidence, the post-conviction court correctly ruled

that the failure to request an admonishment and a mistrial did not amount to

ineffective assistance of counsel.

C. No hearsay challenge on appeal

[22] Next, Iqbal asserts that the testimony regarding Tammy’s statements that she

feared Iqbal would kill her was inadmissible hearsay, that the trial court abused

its discretion by allowing the testimony, and that the post-conviction court erred



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when it concluded that Iqbal’s attorney was not ineffective for failing to raise

the issue on appeal. We agree with Iqbal on the first two points. Because

Iqbal’s attorney conceded the turbulent nature of the relationship and did not

otherwise place Tammy’s state of mind at issue during trial, the trial court

abused its discretion by admitting the testimony pursuant to the state-of-mind

exception (Evidence Rule 803(3)) to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Bassett v. State,

795 N.E.2d 1050, 1051-52 (Ind. 2003) (holding that where defendant had not

placed murder victim’s state of mind in issue, trial court abused its discretion by

allowing witnesses to testify that victim had told them that she feared defendant

and that defendant had threatened her); Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 443-44

(Ind. 1999) (same).

[23] That said, even assuming that Iqbal’s attorney performed deficiently by failing

to raise the hearsay issue on appeal, raising the issue would not have resulted in

the reversal of Iqbal’s convictions. In light of the abundant evidence of Iqbal’s

guilt, as detailed in the preceding section, the trial court’s error in admitting the

evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the failure to raise the

issue on appeal did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

D. No petition to transfer on Battered Woman Syndrome

[24] Iqbal’s final ineffectiveness claim is that his attorney should have filed a petition

to transfer asking our Supreme Court to consider the Battered Woman

Syndrome issue. He argues that there is a reasonable probability that the

Supreme Court would have granted transfer and reversed his convictions. We

acknowledge that the use of Battered Woman Syndrome evidence is a thorny



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issue and that the use of it in this case—to explain the actions of a victim who

did not testify and whose state of mind was not at issue—presented unique and

close questions of law. As such, there is a fair chance that our Supreme Court

would have granted transfer.1 Again, though, given the overwhelming evidence

of Iqbal’s intent to shoot Tammy, even if we assume that Iqbal’s attorney

performed deficiently by failing to seek transfer, we are fully confident that our

Supreme Court would have found any error to be harmless and affirmed Iqbal’s

convictions. For this reason, we cannot say that the failure to request transfer

represented ineffective assistance of counsel.

II. Double Jeopardy

[25] Iqbal’s last argument is that the post-conviction court should have found that

his convictions for murder and neglect of a dependent violate the actual

evidence test under Indiana’s Double Jeopardy Clause, since they “are

predicated on the firing of the same shot.” Appellant’s Br. p. 37. The State

argues that we should not address this issue because Iqbal could have raised it,

but did not, on direct appeal. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1163

(Ind. 2001) (explaining that issues available but not raised on direct appeal are

waived for purposes of post-conviction proceeding), reh’g denied. The State did



1 As Iqbal notes, Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 57(H) lists the “principal considerations governing the Supreme Court's decision whether to grant transfer,” including, “(4) Undecided Question of Law. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of law or a case of great public importance that has not been, but should be, decided by the Supreme Court.”



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not make this waiver argument below, and the post-conviction court addressed

the merits of Iqbal’s claim. We will do the same.

It is undisputed that Iqbal’s murder and neglect-of-a-dependent convictions

were based on the same gunshot. However, they involved two separate victims

(Tammy and A.I.). Our Supreme Court has held that multiple convictions

based on a single act do not violate the actual-evidence test when there are

multiple victims. Bald v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (Ind. 2002) (affirming

arson and felony murder convictions based on one fire but involving multiple

victims). Iqbal bases his actual-evidence claim entirely on the fact that his

convictions arose from a single gunshot and does not address the fact that they involved separate victims. Therefore, we will not disturb the post-conviction court’s rejection of his double-jeopardy claim.



Affirmed.