James Timothy Spears v. State of Indiana

On October 31, 2000, Spears got into an argument with his wife, Kimberly.

The argument escalated into a “shoving match,” and Spears grabbed

Kimberly’s neck, dragged her to the door, and kicked her out. Tr. Vol. II p.

139. She had red marks on her neck and shoulder and scraped her arm on the

door during the incident. On December 5, 2000, the State charged Spears with

Class B misdemeanor battery and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct.

On January 23, 2001, and July 25, 2001, the trial court issued arrest warrants

for Spears’s failure to appear.

[4] On October 20, 2016, the trial court issued an order for Spears to appear on

November 17, 2016, and he again failed to appear. The trial court issued

another arrest warrant, and he was arrested in Kentucky. Spears filed a motion

to dismiss the charges, arguing that the almost sixteen-year delay violated his

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speedy trial rights. At a hearing on the motion, Spears clarified that his

argument was based on the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

and Article One Section Twelve of the Indiana Constitution, not Indiana

Criminal Rule 4. Spears testified that he had moved to Kentucky shortly after

the charges were filed in 2000, that he thought Kimberly had taken care of the

charges, and that before he moved he had given the court an updated address

on Sales Lane, Cave City, Kentucky. He claimed that he was prejudiced by

the delay because he had lost a business opportunity. The State asked the trial

court to take judicial notice that the record did not indicate that Spears had

updated the court with an address change. The trial court concluded that the

length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial and that the delay was

attributable to Spears because he left the jurisdiction. The trial court denied

Spears’s motion.

[5] At the jury trial, Sergeant Andrew Richmond with the North Vernon Police

Department testified that Spears informed him that he got mad at Kimberly and

grabbed her on her shoulder and neck. Sergeant Richmond saw redness on

Kimberly’s neck and shoulder and abrasions on her right forearm. However,

photographs of the injuries were no longer available. The jury found Spears

guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to ninety days in jail. Spears

now appeals.

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Analysis

I. Speedy Trial

[6] “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section

12 of the Indiana Constitution guarantee the right to a speedy trial.” Wilkins v.

State, 901 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. The standard of

review for a speedy trial issue, which is a pure question of law, is de novo.

Johnson v. State, 83 N.E.3d 81, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[7] Spears claims that the almost sixteen-year delay between his arrest and trial

violated his right to a speedy trial under the United States and Indiana

Constitutions. The analysis of a claim involving a speedy trial right is the same

under both the state and federal constitutions. Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86,

102 (Ind. 1998), cert. denied. The inquiry into whether there was a speedy trial

violation involves “a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the

prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,

530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2191-92 (1972). The Barker analysis considers four factors:

1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant’s

assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and 4) prejudice to the defendant. Id.

[8] “The length of the delay acts as a triggering mechanism; a delay of more than a

year post-accusation is ‘presumptively prejudicial” and triggers the Barker

analysis.” Johnson, 83 N.E.3d at 85 (quoting Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d

1201, 1206 (Ind. 1999)). “If the length of the delay meets this threshold, ‘the

court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the

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delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial

examination of the claim.’” Id. (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647,

652, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2691 (1992)). Here, the length of the delay—almost

sixteen years—is excessive and clearly qualifies as presumptively prejudicial.

This factor weighs in favor of Spears.

[9] We next consider the reason for the delay. “When considering the reason for

delays, we look at ‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more

to blame for that delay.’” Id. (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651, 112 S. Ct. at

2690). Spears blames the delay on the State, arguing that he gave his new

address to the trial court before he moved to Kentucky and that his new address

was publicly discoverable. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Spears

testified that he thought Kimberly had taken care of the charges, that he moved

to Kentucky, and that he gave the trial court his new address. In support of his

argument, he submitted a list of addresses found online. However, he claimed

to have given the trial court an address on Sales Lane in Cave City, Kentucky,

but that address was not listed on the document. Further, he claimed that his

last address was in Park City, Kentucky, and that address was not listed on the

document either. There is no evidence that Spears’s new address was

discoverable as a public record. Moreover, the trial court records do not reflect

that Spears provided a new address. The trial court found that the delay was

attributable to Spears because he left the jurisdiction and because “we . . . don’t

want to make a precedent of rewarding . . . people who abscond . . . .” Tr. Vol.

II p. 31. Although the record does not reflect any efforts on the part of the State

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to locate Spears, the record does demonstrate that Spears absconded to

Kentucky shortly after the charges were filed in 2000. We cannot conclude that

the State’s delay in looking for Spears excuses his conduct in absconding. This

factor weighs against Spears.

[10] Next, we consider Spears’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial. “In order to

claim a constitutional violation of the right to a speedy trial, defendant must

assert such right.” Lee v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (Ind. 1997). Spears did

not assert his right to a speedy trial until his motion to dismiss in 2017. Spears

delayed this case himself by absconding to Kentucky. His actions “show that

he did not desire a speedy trial.” Johnson, 83 N.E.3d at 87. This factor weighs

against Spears.

[11] Finally, we consider prejudice to Spears as a result of the delay.

“The final factor in the Barker test, prejudice, is assessed in light of the three interests which the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 103 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. 2182). The most important of the three is limiting the possibility of defense impairment. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. 2182. The burden is on the defendant to show actual prejudice to prove a speedy trial deprivation. Sturgeon v. State, 683 N.E.2d 612, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied.

Johnson, 83 N.E.3d at 87. Oppressive pretrial incarceration is not an issue here

as Spears was not incarcerated during the delay. Further, Spears makes no

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argument that the delay caused him anxiety or concern and, as the State argues,

“[a]ny anxiety or concern was due to his own criminal behavior and . . . his

unannounced departure and fugitive status.” Appellee’s Br. p. 14. Rather,

Spears argues that his defense was impaired because the investigating officer did

not specifically recall the incident and refreshed his recollection with his report.

The State points out that the passage of time was “actually beneficial to

Defendant’s defense” because the pictures of Kimberly’s injuries were missing

and Spears “capitalized” on the passage of time in his attempted impeachment

of Kimberly and the officer.” Appellee’s Br. p. 14. We agree with the State

that Spears “suffered no identifiable prejudice.” Id. This factor also weighs

against Spears.

[12] Each of the factors except the length of the delay weighs against Spears.

Although the almost sixteen-year delay is clearly excessive, the reason for the

delay due to Spears’s absconding, the late assertion of the right to a speedy trial,

and the lack of prejudice all weigh in favor of finding no violation of Spears’s

constitutional right to a speedy trial. We conclude that the trial court properly

denied Spears’s motion to dismiss.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[13] Next, Spears argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence

nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind.

2015). We only consider “the evidence supporting the judgment and any

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence.” Id. A conviction

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will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting

each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “‘It is the job of the fact

finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves

each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence most

favorably to the trial court’s ruling.’” Id. at 1066-67 (quoting Wright v. State, 828

N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind. 2005)).

[14] Spears was convicted of Class B misdemeanor battery and Class B

misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The offense of Class B misdemeanor battery

is governed by Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1, which required that Spears

knowingly or intentionally touched Kimberly in a rude, insolent and angry

manner. The offense of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct is governed

by Indiana Code Section 35-45-1-3, which required that Spears knowingly or

intentionally engaged in fighting.

[15] Spears argues that “any instance of Spears making contact with Kimberly

Spears was accidental and was not an intentional act of battery or a reckless act

of disorderly conduct.” Appellant’s Br. p. 14. The State presented evidence

that Spears got into an argument with Kimberly and grabbed her neck, dragged

her to the door, and kicked her out of the house. As a result, Kimberly had red

marks on her neck and shoulder and abrasions to her arm. Spears’s argument is

a request to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses,

which we cannot do. The evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions.

The trial court properly denied Spears’s motion to dismiss, and the evidence is

sufficient to sustain his convictions. We affirm.