Kurt Stuhlmacher v. State of Indiana

In November 2014, Stuhlmacher and Kelly Wood had been married for over

thirty years.6 Wood was employed, but Stuhlmacher was unemployed because

of back injuries and disabilities. He was dependent on his wife for most things.

[3] On November 17, 2014, Wood went to work. Stuhlmacher called her at

lunchtime and yelled at her and then sent her numerous texts until she left



1 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. 2 I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5. 3 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1. 4 I.C. § 35-42-2-2. 5 Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2. 6 They have since divorced.

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work. After she left work, Stuhlmacher called her again, angry because he had

been prohibited from “deer camp” and believed it was her fault. Wood told

him that she was not going to come home unless he agreed to seek substance

abuse treatment. Stuhlmacher told Wood that if she did not come home, he

would hunt her down.

[4] Stuhlmacher eventually agreed to seek substance abuse treatment, so Wood

drove home. When she got there, Stuhlmacher was highly intoxicated and

issued multiple conditions for seeking substance abuse treatment; she concluded

that he had no intention of seeking such treatment. Eventually, Stuhlmacher

became enraged, and Wood felt unsafe and decided to leave.

[5] Wood drove away in her Mustang; Stuhlmacher drove after her in his pickup

truck at a high rate of speed. Wood was afraid and called 911. He chased her

for several miles at high speeds, ramming her car three times. The third time he

rammed her car, the Mustang hit a parked car and then crashed into a

telephone pole. During the chase, Wood believed that Stuhlmacher was trying

to kill her.

[6] After Wood called 911, several officers responded to the dispatch, and had

unsuccessfully attempted to stop Stuhlmacher before he rammed Wood’s car

into the telephone pole. After that final crash, Stuhlmacher continued driving,

leading officers on a chase through the streets of Rensselaer until officers were

able to box in the pickup truck and arrest him.

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[7] On November 24, 2014, the State charged Stuhlmacher with Level 1 felony

attempted murder and three counts of Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement.

The State later added charges of three counts of Level 6 felony criminal

recklessness, Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated

endangering a person, and Level 3 felony aggravated battery.7 Stuhlmacher’s

jury trial began on October 25, 2016. Following the trial, the jury found him

guilty of all charges except for one of the counts of Level 6 felony resisting law

enforcement. On January 17, 2017, the trial court sentenced Stuhlmacher to an

aggregate sentence of thirty years imprisonment.

[8] On February 6, 2017, Stuhlmacher filed a motion to correct error; the trial court

held a hearing on the motion on March 20, 2017. After denying the motion,

the trial court engaged in a discussion with Stuhlmacher about the appointment

of appellate counsel. During that discussion, Stuhlmacher made statements

regarding an alleged incident in which an unauthorized person entered the jury

room during deliberations and the judge followed her. The trial court

vehemently denied that it had occurred. Stuhlmacher now appeals.



7 The State also charged Stuhlmacher with Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of .08 or more but later dismissed that charge.

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Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[9] Stuhlmacher first argues that the trial court erroneously admitted certain

evidence. The admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the trial court’s

sound discretion, and we will reverse only if the decision is clearly against the

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Johnson v. State, 6

N.E.3d 491, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[10] Stuhlmacher contends that the trial court erroneously admitted two categories

of evidence: (1) evidence regarding Stuhlmacher having been barred from

hunting deer on a farmer’s land where he and others of his family had hunted

for years (the “deer camp” testimony); and (2) evidence regarding his

tumultuous relationship with Wood. According to Stuhlmacher, the admission

of this evidence violated Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), which provides

generally that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to

prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the

person acted in accordance with the character.” The primary purpose of the

rule is to protect the defendant from the forbidden inference that he acted badly

in the past and therefore the present charged offense conforms to his past bad

acts. Erickson v. State, 72 N.E.3d 965, 973-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

[11] The “deer camp” testimony can be summarized as follows: Stuhlmacher was

told that he could no longer hunt deer on the land of a family friend. The

farmer issued this prohibition because he feared liability based on

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Stuhlmacher’s mental health and prior suicide attempts. The facts that

Stuhlmacher had mental health issues, had attempted suicide in the past, and

was prohibited from hunting on the farmer’s property, do not qualify as crimes,

wrongs, or other bad acts evidence prohibited by Rule 404(b). Consequently,

the trial court did not err by admitting this evidence.

[12] With respect to evidence regarding his tumultuous relationship with Wood, we

note that evidence that would otherwise be excluded by Rule 404(b) may be

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive. Evid. R. 404(b)(2). It

is well accepted that evidence regarding the relationship between the defendant

and his victim, particularly where it demonstrates a hostile relationship, is

relevant to motive and therefore generally admissible over a Rule 404(b) claim.

See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. 1997) (holding that “hostility

is a paradigmatic motive for committing a crime”); Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d

339, 346 (Ind. 1996) (holding that a defendant’s prior bad acts are generally

admissible to show the relationship between the defendant and victim);

Whitham v. State, 49 N.E.3d 162, 166-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that

defendant’s prior acts against a spouse are admissible to show a hostile

relationship and are relevant to defendant’s motive and state of mind for the

charged offense), trans denied.

[13] Here, the evidence revealed a lengthy and hostile relationship between

Stuhlmacher and Wood. Their marriage was fraught with tension caused by

substance abuse, mental illness, suicidal ideations, an imbalance of household

and familial responsibilities, resentment, and anger management problems. We

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find that the trial court did not err by admitting this evidence, which

demonstrates a hostile relationship and is relevant to proving Stuhlmacher’s

motive in committing the charged offenses.

II. Jury Instruction

[14] Stuhlmacher next argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the

offense of attempted murder. Instructing the jury is within the discretion of the

trial court, and we will reverse only if a particular instruction is erroneous and

the instructions as a whole misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury.

Winkleman v. State, 22 N.E.3d 844, 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[15] To properly instruct a jury on an attempted murder charge, the instruction must

state that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant, with the specific intent to kill the victim, engaged in conduct that

constituted a substantial step toward such a killing. Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d

8, 11 (Ind. 2015). Jury instructions on attempted murder charges that refer to a

“knowing” or a “knowing or intentional” mens rea have generally been found

to be erroneous. E.g., Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ind. 2000);

Kadrovach v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1241, 1243 n.2. (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans denied.

[16] Here, the final instruction on the attempted murder charge reads as follows:

[T]he crime of the [sic] attempted murder is defined as follows: a person attempts to commit a murder when acting with the specific intent to kill another person, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step towards the killing of that person.

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Before you may convict the defendant of attempted murder, the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Number 1. The defendant,

2. Acting with a specific intent to kill Kelly [Wood],

3. Did knowingly and intentionally drive a Ford F -150 truck at a high rate of speed in excess of 90 miles per hour following Kelly Stuhlmacher in her Mustang and rammed her vehicle three separate times, the last incident causing her to lose control of the Mustang and crash into a utility pole.

[4.] Which was conduct constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the intended crime of killing Kelly Stuhlmacher. If the State []fails to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime of attempted [murder] a Level One Felony as charged in the amended count one.

Tr. Vol. III p. 92.

[17] At the outset, the instruction tells the jury that to convict Stuhlmacher of

attempted murder, it must find that he acted with the specific intent to kill

Wood. This is a correct recitation of the required mens rea. The confusion

arises from the phrase in part three instructing the jury that it must find that

Stuhlmacher “knowingly and intentionally” operated his truck in the manner

specified. We agree with the State that this was “an inartful choice of wording

because ‘knowingly’ should not have been included at all in this attempted

murder instruction . . . .” Appellee’s Br. p. 18. Nonetheless, here, the

conjunction “and” was used between “knowingly” and “intentionally,”

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meaning that the jury was not left with the choice to find Stuhlmacher guilty

based only on a knowing mens rea. Instead, the jury had to find that an

intentional mens rea was required. Under these circumstances, we find that the

instruction as a whole did not mislead the jury with respect to the elements

required for an attempted murder conviction.8

III. Assistance of Trial Counsel

[18] Finally, Stuhlmacher argues that he received the ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a

defendant must establish both deficient performance on the part of trial counsel

and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Pavan v. State, 64

N.E.3d 231, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[19] Here, Stuhlmacher contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

move for a mistrial regarding alleged extrajudicial contact with the jurors

during deliberations. To prevail on a mistrial motion, a defendant must

demonstrate that he was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should

not have been subjected. Bisard v. State, 26 N.E.3d 1060, 1067-68 (Ind. Ct. App.

2015), trans denied. When a claim of extrajudicial contact or communications

with the jury is made, a defendant has the initial burden of showing by a

preponderance of the evidence that (1) extrajudicial contact occurred; and



8 We do, however, encourage the trial court and counsel to omit the word “knowingly” from future attempted murder instructions.

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(2) the contact pertained to the matter before the jury. Wahl v. State, 51 N.E.3d

113, 115 (Ind. 2016).

[20] In this case, the only portion of the record relating to Stuhlmacher’s mistrial

argument is the discussion between Stuhlmacher and the trial court following

the hearing on his motion to correct error. They were talking about

appointment of appellate counsel, and Stuhlmacher questioned whether a new

attorney would be able to get up to speed on everything that happened at the

trial, including matters outside the record:

Stuhlmacher: Um, now there will be some things that won’t be . . . the person who was taking notes . . . for the court won’t know about. Like . . . Jen Rusk going back in the jury room after they’d been picked to deliberate and then you going back there to get her out of there. That’s not gonna be in the notes.

Trial court: I would deny your statement that at any time during the trial I entered the jury room. That is simply—

Stuhlmacher: You went back in—

Trial court: —stop talking for a moment. That is simply not true. And I will not allow you to try to redirect the record into facts that will never appear, did not happen and simply are unwarranted so—

***

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Trial court: Mr. Stuhlmacher . . . This is over. I’ll appoint a public defender. . . . I’m not going to argue with you without a lawyer here representing you. I’m not gonna try to have you make a record of what you believe the facts are. . . .

Tr. Vol. V p. 16-18.

[21] Stuhlmacher argues that, when this alleged incident occurred during the trial,

his attorney should have requested a mistrial. But Stuhlmacher’s own self

serving, after-the-fact statements, which were vehemently denied by the trial

court, do not amount to sufficient evidence for us to glean what, if anything,

actually occurred. We cannot discern who Jen Rusk is, when she allegedly

entered the jury room, what was allegedly discussed when she entered, or what

the trial court’s involvement allegedly was.

In other words, Stuhlmacher has not established that there was any extrajudicial contact with the jury at all. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial.



The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.