Aaron Nelson and Charles Galaske v. Associates Financial Services Company of Indiana, Inc.

This case involves defendant's practice of charging its customers a mortgage prepayment
penalty "in an amount equal to six months interest on the amount prepaid in excess of 20% of the
original balance" when "an amount in excess of 20% of the original principal balance is prepaid
in any twelve-month period within five years of the loan date." According to plaintiffs' first
amended complaint, plaintiffs entered into separate loan agreements with defendant, and each
plaintiff secured the loan with a first mortgage on a parcel of real property. Each loan agreement
contained the following provision governing prepayment of the principal balance:

If I prepay early, no part of the loan fee will be refunded to me. Further, if
real estate is given as security for this loan, and if an amount in excess of 20% of
the original principal balance is prepaid in any twelve-month period within five
years of the loan date, I agree to a prepayment penalty in an amount equal to six
months interest on the amount prepaid in excess of 20% of the original balance.

Less than five years after executing these loan agreements, plaintiffs decided to prepay
their respective mortgages and requested prepayment "payoff confirmations" from defendant. In
each respective prepayment statement, defendant itemized the amount of the prepayment penalty
to be paid under the terms of the mortgage agreement. Each plaintiff paid the prepayment
penalty fee in addition to the principal due.

Subsequently, plaintiffs commenced the instant lawsuit on behalf of themselves and as
representatives of a class of defendant's customers who paid prepayment penalties in excess of
1% of the amount of the prepayment after the first three years of the loan had passed. In their
first amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged in count I that defendant violated MCL 438.31c(2)(c)
by charging a prepayment penalty in excess of one percent of the amount of any prepayment on a
first lien mortgage loan and/or more than three years from the date of the loan. Plaintiffs also
alleged in counts II and III that defendant is not licensed or registered with the Financial
Institutions Bureau of the Michigan Department of Commerce as required by the Michigan
Mortgage Brokers, Lenders, and Servicers Licensing Act, MCL 445.1651 et seq., and the
Consumer Financial Services Act, MCL 487.2051 et seq., and that defendant's prepayment
penalty charge violates these acts. In count IV, plaintiffs further alleged that the inclusion of the
prepayment provisions in the loan agreements executed between the parties and the collection of
the prepayment penalties pursuant to those provisions constitute unfair trade practices and are
unlawful under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA"), MCL 445.901 et seq.
Plaintiffs alleged that the prepayment penalty at issue is an unfair trade practice because it falls
under the description of three particular unfair trade practices listed in the MCPA, specifically
MCL 445.903(1)(n), (t) and (z).

In lieu of answering their complaint, defendant removed the case to federal district court
alleging federal question, i.e. federal preemption, and diversity jurisdiction. Nelson v Associates
Financial Services Co of Indiana Inc, 79 F Supp 2d 813, 815 (WD Mich, 2000). The federal
district court remanded the case to the Berrien Circuit Court after concluding that defendant's
preemption argument was insufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction and that the court
lacked diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 821.

On remand to the circuit court, defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(7) regarding plaintiff Nelson's complaint on the basis of a prior agreement to
arbitrate. Defendant also moved for summary disposition as to counts I and IV of plaintiff
Galaske's complaint on the grounds that the Michigan usury statute was preempted by § 501 of
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 ("DIDMCA"), 12
USC 17435f-7a (MCR 2.116(C)(4)), that plaintiff Galaske had waived the only remedy available
under the usury statute by voluntarily paying the penalty (MCR 2.116(C)(7)), and that
Michigan's usury statute does not create a cause of action for the alleged illegal prepayment
penalties (MCR 2.116(C)(8)).

Plaintiffs claimed that defendant's argument recognized that prepayment penalties are not
interest and therefore not preempted by federal law. Plaintiffs further argued that even if they
had waived the right to directly assert defendant's violation of MCL 438.31c(2)(c) by paying the
penalty, they could still assert their claim under the MCPA.

The court agreed with plaintiffs and denied defendant's motion for summary disposition
with respect to count IV (plaintiff Galaske's MCPA claim), reasoning in part:

Defendant Associate [sic] asserts that it is entitled to summary disposition
of counts one and four basically for three reasons, three grounds. The first, it
claims that it is entitled to summary disposition because this was not a (C)(2)(c)
loan under 438.31(C). The Court finds that the Defendant's argument in this
regard is strained, illogical, and does not comport with the statute as a whole which was – which is a remedial statute and it seeks to protect borrows –
borrowers, specifically borrowers who have mortgaged their real property, their
residential dwellings by adding these additional protections.

I believe that the section of the statute that applies to this case is 31(C), not
the general usury statute, 31. Therefore, the Court cannot use that as a basis for
granting the motion for summary disposition.

With regard to the second argument, it wasn't argued too much today, but
Associates argues in its brief that this area was preempted by the Federal
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monitory [sic] Control Act of 1980, 12
USC 1735(F)-(7)(a), which indicates according to citing the Shaunt (ph) case that
this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. The Court finds that this
Court does in fact have subject matter jurisdiction. As stated in 12 CFR 590.3(C),
which are the regulations authorized by 12 USC 1735(F)(7)(a) and (7)(f):

"Nothing in this section preempts limitation in state laws on prepayment
charges or other provisions designed to protect borrowers."

So the statute in question, the Michigan usury statute, is a statute designed
to protect borrowers. Therefore this Court does have subject matter jurisdiction,
and the motion for summary disposition cannot be granted on that ground.

* * *

With regard to the count four complaint, however, the Court agrees with
the Plaintiffs that a violation of the Michigan usury statute can in fact provide the
foundation for violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act. And the
Court finds that it must deny the motion for summary disposition with regard to
count four of the complaint.

The court further noted that because defendant's motion was brought and decided under
MCR 2.116(C)(8), it was premature to find whether as a matter of fact defendant engaged in any
unfair trade practice. The court found, however, "that the Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action
for such and the Defendants [sic] will have to file an answer to that count, and the case will go
from there."

But, regarding count I of plaintiff Galaske's complaint (using MCL 438.31c as a sword),
the court granted summary disposition to defendant finding that plaintiff Galaske's voluntary
payment of the prepayment penalty constituted a waiver of any right to a remedy under the usury
statute. The court further granted summary disposition in favor of defendant with regard to
plaintiff Nelson's complaint and directed that his claims be submitted to arbitration. Thereafter,
defendant filed an application for leave, which this Court granted.

II. ANALYSIS

A. MCL 438.31c

Defendant argues that MCL 438.31c(2)(c) does not independently limit prepayment
penalties on first mortgage loans; rather, it is only one of five criteria necessary to trigger MCL
438.31c(2), an exception to the main usury limits of seven percent or less found in MCL 438.31.
Defendant reads MCL 438.31c(2) and MCL 438.31c(5) together and asserts that the five criteria
are: (1) the mortgage loan bears a fixed rate of interest, MCL 438.31c(2); (2) the lender does not
require that the borrower maintain a deposit account, MCL 438.31c(2)(a); (3) the lender does not
require payment of discounts or points not authorized by federal law, MCL 438.31c(2)(b); (4) the
lender does not charge a prepayment penalty contrary to MCL 438.31c(2)(c); and (5) the lender
is approved as a mortgagee under state or federal law, MCL 438.31c(5). Defendant asserts that
when one or more of these criteria are not satisfied, MCL 438.31c(2) does not apply and either
the seven percent limit of MCL 438.31 or the eleven percent limit of MCL 438.31c(2)(7) would
apply. We conclude that the circuit court correctly found that MCL 438.31c(2)(c) is applicable
to plaintiff Galaske's loan from defendant and that defendant's strained construction of the
statute must be rejected as contrary to the intent of the Legislature.

At issue in this case is the construction of and interplay between MCL 438.31 and MCL
438.31c, which provide in pertinent part:

The interest of money shall be at the rate of $5.00 upon $100.00 for a year, and at
the same rate for a greater or less sum, and for a longer or shorter time, except
that in all cases it shall be lawful for the parties to stipulate in writing for the
payment of any rate of interest, not exceeding 7% per annum. This act shall not
apply to the rate of interest on any note, bond or other evidence of
indebtedness issued by any corporation, association or person, the issue and rate
of interest of which have been expressly authorized by the public service
commission or the securities bureau of the department of commerce, or is
regulated by any other law of this state, or of the United States, nor shall it
apply to any time price differential which may be charged upon sales of goods or
services on credit. […] [MCL 438.31; emphasis added.]

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
Legislature. In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164
(1999). The first step in determining the intent of the Legislature is to review the specific
wording of the statute itself. Id. Where the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted. Id. As
far as possible, effect should be given to every phrase, clause and word, Sun Valley Foods Co v
Ward, 460 Mich 230, 237; 596 NW2d 119 (1999), but parts of a statute must be read in the
context of the entire statute so as to produce a harmonious whole, Macomb Co Prosecuting Att'y
v Murphy, 464 Mich 149, 159; 627 NW2d 247 (2001). Where it is necessary to construe a
statute, the language should be construed reasonably to give effect to the intent of the
Legislature. Draprop Corp v Ann Arbor, 247 Mich App 410, 415; 636 NW2d 787 (2001). Thus,
the court must consider the object of the statute, the harm it is designed to remedy, and apply a
reasonable construction that best accomplishes the statute's purpose. Marquis v Hartford
Accident & Indemnity, 444 Mich 638, 644; 513 NW2d 799 (1994).

A statute is remedial if it is designed to correct an existing oversight in the law, redress an
existing grievance, introduce regulations conducive to the public good, or is intended to reform
or extend existing rights. Tobin v Providence Hosp, 244 Mich App 626, 665; 624 NW2d 548
(2001), quoting Rookledge v Garwood, 340 Mich 444, 453; 65 NW2d 785 (1954). Remedial
statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the persons intended to be benefited. Dudewicz v
Norris-Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68, 77; 503 NW2d 645 (1993).

MCL 438.31c(2) is plainly designed to facilitate the purchase of residential property by
allowing market forces to establish the interest rate for loans to acquire such property. At the
same time, the evident intent of the Legislature was to protect loan consumers, "if the security is
a single family dwelling unit," from being "locked in" to high interest rates by excessive
prepayment penalties. Borrowers may, then also follow the market if interest rates fall. Thus,
the statute is designed to "introduce regulations conducive to the public good," and is remedial
legislation, Tobin, supra at 665, quoting Rookledge, supra, which is entitled to a liberal
construction in favor of the class of persons intended to be benefited, Dudewicz, supra.

Defendant's effort to create an ambiguity by arguing that the statute's proscriptions are
criteria for its application fails because an ambiguity does not exist. As the trial court noted,
defendant's construction "does violence to the statute" and is contrary to the evident intent of the
Legislature to assist and to protect single-family dwelling loan consumers. The plain language
of the statute provides that its application depends on the identification of the lender, not by the
terms of its contracts and by what the loan security is. Thus, by the Legislature's plain words,
subsection (2) of section 31c "shall apply only to loans made by lenders … regulated by the state
or by a federal agency," MCL 438.31c(5), and for which "the bona fide primary security … is a
first lien against real property," MCL 438.31c(2). When these two elements are present, the
parties may agree in writing to any rate of interest less than criminal usury (i.e., twenty-five
percent). MCL 438.31c(4); MCL 438.41. Further, unless the loan is federally insured or
guaranteed, "if the security is a single family dwelling unit," then the prepayment penalty
provisions of MCL 438.31c(2)(c) apply.

Defendant's argument that its construction of the statute is correct because otherwise
MCL 438.31c(3) would be rendered meaningless is also without merit. That subsection merely
authorizes a lender and creditor to enter into another valid loan agreement at a legal interest rate.
That is, where either the lender does not fall within the meaning of MCL 438.31c(5), or where
the primary security is not the first lien on real property, then subsection (2) will not apply and
impair the otherwise lawful "transaction or rate of interest." This construction gives meaning to
subsections (2), (3), and (5), and best accomplishes the statute's purpose so as to produce a
harmonious whole from the context of the entire section. Macomb Co Prosecuting Atty, supra at
159; Marquis, supra at 644.

We disagree, however with plaintiffs' contention that subsection (2) would not apply if
the interest rate were less than that specified in MCL 438.31 (i.e., seven percent) even if the
transaction were otherwise within its terms. As plaintiff notes, MCL 438.31 expressly provides
that it applies only when no other state or federal law regulates the interest rate. Thus, if the
lender meets the definition of MCL 438.31c(5) and the bona fide primary security for the loan is
a first lien on real property, then a rate of interest agreed to by the creditor and lender below
seven percent is still "any rate of interest" within the plain language of MCL 438.31c(2).

For the foregoing reasons, the free market interest rate allowed by MCL 438.31c(2)
applies so long as subsections (2), (4), and (5) are satisfied. If these subsections are satisfied,
then the restrictions of subparagraphs (2)(a)-(c) apply, provided the security is a single-family dwelling, and the loan is not federally insured or guaranteed.1 The circuit court correctly reached
these conclusions; therefore, it did not err in rejecting defendant's construction of MCL 438.31c.

B. PREEMPTION

Defendant argues that the Michigan usury statute is preempted by section 501 of
DIDMCA, which applies to plaintiff Galaske's loan because it is a first lien on residential real
property, made after March 31, 1980, and is a "federally related mortgage loan" described in 12
USC 1735f-5(b) because defendant is a creditor as defined in 15 USC 1602(f) (regularly extends
credit payable in more than four installments and is the person to whom the debt is initially
payable). We disagree and conclude that the trial court did not err when rejecting defendant's
preemption challenge.

Section 501 of the DIDMCA, 12 USC 1735f-7a, provides in relevant part:

1) The provisions of the constitution or the laws of any State expressly limiting
the rate or amount of interest, discount points, finance charges, or other charges
which may be charged, taken, received, or reserved shall not apply to any loan,
mortgage, credit sale, or advance which is -

(A) secured by a first lien on residential real property […]

(B) made after March 31, 1980; and

(C) described in section 527(b) of the National Housing Act (12 USC 1735f-5(b))
[…] [12 USC 1735f-7a.]

The parties do not dispute that plaintiff Galaske's loan comes within the definition of
section 501 of the DIDMCA, 12 USC 1735f-7a. See, e.g., Shelton v Mutual Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 738 F Supp 1050, 1056-1057 (ED Mich, 1990). Here, plaintiff's loan is a "federally
related loan" because defendant is a "creditor" as defined in 15 USC 1602(f). Section 501 of the
DIDMCA does not preempt state regulation of prepayment penalty charges, which are not
considered interest or within the finance charge component of a loan. 12 CFR 590.3(c);
Grunbeck v Dime Savings Bank of New York, 74 F3d 331 (CA 1, 1996); see, also, Konynenbelt,
supra, 242 Mich App at 32-37. However, defendant does not directly argue that state
prepayment penalty limitations are preempted by DIDMCA. Instead, defendant relies on its state
statutory construction argument that MCL 438.31c(2)(c) does not apply to plaintiff's loan.
Having concluded that the trial court properly rejected defendant's construction of MCL
438.31c(2)(c), we now address defendant's issue of federal preemption.

There is no question that "[u]nder the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, US Const, art VI, cl 2, federal law preempts state law where Congress so intends."
Konynenbelt, supra at 25. In addition, as in section 501 of the DIDMCA, where Congress has
expressly provided that federal law preempts state law, the only question is the extent of that preemption. Grunbeck, supra at 336. Federal preemption analysis is guided by two
presumptions: first, that under principles of federalism, preemption is narrowly construed and,
second, that the purpose of Congress is "the ultimate touchstone" of interpretation of a federal
statute preempting state law. Brown v Investors Mortgage Co, 121 F3d 472, 475 (CA 9, 1997),
quoting Medtronic, Inc v Lohr, 518 US 470, 485; 116 S Ct 2240, 2250; 135 L Ed 2d 700 (1996);
see, also, Konynenbelt, supra at 35.

The scope of a federal preemption is determined "first and foremost, from the language
of the federal statute, employing traditional rules of statutory construction." Konynenbelt, supra
at 28, quoting Grunbeck, supra at 336. Thus, for section 501 of the DIDMCA to preempt MCL
438.31c(2)(c), prepayment penalty limitations must come within the meaning of a state law
"expressly limiting the rate or amount of interest, discount points, finance charges, or other
charges." 12 USC 1735f-7a(1).

The issue in Grunbeck, supra at 334-335, was whether DIDMCA preempted a state law
requiring lenders only to charge simple interest, i.e., prohibited compounding interest on interest.
The court found that under the plain language of section 501 of DIDMCA, the state statute in
question did not ‘"expressly' limit the ‘rate or amount of interest'" the lender could charge. Id.
at 338, n 6. Nonetheless, the court went on to address the issue as if an ambiguity existed by
examining the congressional history of DIDMCA, opining that

relevant legislative history clearly reflects a congressional intention to confine the
scope of section 501(a)(1) preemption to state laws which impose express ceilings
on the rate or amount of interest which may be charged, as distinguished from
bans against charging interest on interest or compounding. The legislative aim in
enacting section 501 focused on "state usury ceilings," S. Rep. No. 368, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 254-55 (emphasis
added), with particular emphasis on state usury laws which restrict interest rates
to below-market levels and result in artificial disruptions in the supply of homeloan
mortgage funds. [Id. at 339; emphasis in original.]

The Grunbeck court further noted that Congress did not intend preemption to apply to
prepayment penalties and other limitations designed to protect borrowers, but rather, preemption
applied only to usury limits considered within the "annual percentage rate." The court stated:

Congress also signaled its narrow preemptive intent under section 501(a)(1) by
insulating these mortgage loans from state usury limitations only, and not from
other state-law limitations encompassed within the "annual percentage rate" nor
other state-law limitations designed to protect borrowers:

In exempting mortgage loans from state usury limitations, the Committee
intends to exempt only those limitations that are included in the annual
percentage rate. The Committee does not intend to exempt limitations
on prepayment charges, attorney fees, late charges or similar limitations
designed to protect borrowers. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 255 (emphasis
added). [Id. at 340, emphasis in opinion.]

In Konynenbelt, supra, this Court considered whether the DIDMCA preempted MCL
565.41, which requires that upon satisfaction of a mortgage, a mortgagee "shall file a discharge
thereof with the register of deeds and pay the fee for recording the discharge." Defendant
Flagstar Bank, which customarily charged its mortgagors the nine-dollar recording fee upon
satisfaction of the loan, claimed the fee came within the meaning of "other charges" preempted
by section 501 of DIDMCA. Konynenbelt, supra at 23, 34. This Court disagreed, finding that
Congress intended to foster home loans "by assuring the availability of home loans, albeit at
potentially high interest rates," and that

this legislative purpose dealing with interest rates and the availability of home
loans is not affected by plaintiffs' state law claims objecting to Flagstar's practice
of charging the $9 recording fee. As correctly stated by the trial court, the $9
recording fee was not an "up-front cost" and did not affect the interest rates
imposed by Flagstar. The fee has nothing to do with the lending of money and
the availability of home loans because the fee is imposed after the loan has
already been made. Moreover, Congress also indicated its narrow preemptive
intent under the DIDMCA by insulating the first mortgage home loans from state
usury limitations only[.] [Konynenbelt, supra at 35.]

The prepayment penalty limitation at issue in this case likewise does not affect the
interest rate that defendant may charge, nor does it hinder the intent of both MCL 438.31c(2) and
section 501 of DIDMCA to encourage the availability of mortgage money to acquire residential
housing (by allowing market interest rates to prevail). Rather, it is a regulation designed to
protect borrowers not within the intent of Congress to preempt. Grunbeck, supra at 340;
Konynenbelt, supra at 35.

Moreover, this Court may defer to administrative agency interpretations of statutes within
their responsibility to administer, particularly when such interpretations are consistent with the
legislative history or other persuasive reasoning. Grunbeck, supra at 340-341; Konynenbelt,
supra at 28-29. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (now the Office of Thrift Supervision) has
adopted regulations implementing section 501 of DIDMCA, Grunbeck, supra at 341, including
12 CFR 509.3(c), which provides,

Nothing in this section preempts limitation in state laws on prepayment charges,
attorneys' fees, late charges or other provisions designed to protect borrowers.

Similarly, the Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau ("MFIB"), charged with the
responsibility of regulating financial institutions in Michigan, has issued Mortgage Bulletin
1998-01 concluding that the prepayment penalty proscriptions of MCL 438.31c(2)(c) are not
preempted by section 501 of DIDMCA. The MFIB bulletin provides, in part,

Section 501(a)(1) of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 does not preempt MCL 438.31c(2)(c). As a result, lenders
who make loans secured by first mortgages on residential property, except for
certain alternative mortgage transactions, are prohibited from charging Michigan consumers prepayment fees or penalties outside of those allowed by MCL
438.31c(2)(c). [MFIB Mortgage Bulletin 1998-01, p 1.]

The position of the MFIB is well reasoned, persuasive and therefore entitled this Court's
deference. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by concluding that section 501 of the
DIDMCA does not preempt the limitations on prepayment penalties established by MCL
438.31c(2)(c).

C. MCPA

Defendant argues that even assuming MCPA would prohibit a lender from assessing
"unlawful" charges, MCL 438.31c(2)(c) does not independently limit prepayment penalties, but
is merely one of five statutory criteria necessary to fit within MCL 438.31c(2), an exception to
the usury limits that would otherwise apply. Defendant asserts that because DIMCA preempted
those limits, defendant's loan agreements are lawful and not in violation of MCPA. We
conclude that the trial court correctly determined that count IV of plaintiff Galaske's amended
complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted because it alleges a violation of the
MCPA, MCL 445.901 et seq., premised upon violation of MCL 438.31c(2)(c).

Section (3) of the MCPA, MCL 445.903, declares unlawful, "[u]nfair, unconscionable, or
deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce." Plaintiff Galaske
alleges that defendant's prepayment penalties in excess of those authorized by MCL
438.31c(2)(c) meet the definitions of such practices found in subsections (n), (t), and (z):

(n) Causing a probability of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the legal
rights, obligations, or remedies of a party to a transaction.

(t) Entering into a consumer transaction in which the consumer waives or purports
to waive a right, benefit, or immunity provided by law, unless the waiver is
clearly stated and the consumer has specifically consented to it.

(z) Charging the consumer a price that is grossly in excess of the price at which
similar property or services are sold.

A private person may bring an action for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and actual
damages or $250, whichever is greater, under section 11 of the MCPA, MCL 445.911. See also
Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 449, 468; 597 NW2d 28 (1999), which held that a
private person may bring an action under the MCPA for alleged violation of the Insurance Code.
Also, this Court has approved actions under the MCPA where it was alleged that the defendants
induced borrowers to create sham corporations for the purpose of evading usury limitations.
Rutter v Troy Mortgage Servicing Co, 145 Mich App 116, 120, 124-125; 377 NW2d 846 (1985);
Allan v M & S Mortgage Co, 138 Mich App 28, 42-43; 359 NW2d 238 (1984).

While Rutter, supra, and Allan, supra, are egregious cases of unscrupulous lenders taking
advantage of debtors in dire straits, plaintiff Galaske's allegations in the present case sufficiently
plead a cause a cause of action that raises factual issues. Consequently, one cannot conclude that plaintiff's claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could
possibly justify a right of recovery. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817
(1999).

* * *

Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's opinion.

In summary, we conclude that (1) the trial court correctly held that MCL 438.31c(2)(c)
applies to plaintiff Galaske’s loan from defendant, (2) the trial court properly concluded that
section 501 of DIDMCA does not preempt the limitations on prepayment penalties established
by MCL 438.31c(2)(c), and (3) the trial court correctly determined that count IV of plaintiff
Galaske’s amended complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted because it alleges
a violation of the MCPA, MCL 445.901 et seq., premised upon a violation of MCL
438.31c(2)(c).

We affirm.

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