Preston Knott v. Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. FMC Technologies Surface Integrated Services

Tulsa, Oklahoma personal injury lawyer represented Plaintiff who sued Defendants on a negligence theory.



Preston Knott was working as an employee of FMC, and he was injured when an employee of Cyclone struck Knott's hand with a sledgehammer. Dkt. # 2-2, at 2. Knott sought and received worker's compensation from his employer, FMC. Dkt. # 43, at 7. Knott filed a lawsuit in Tulsa County District Court alleging a negligence claim against Cyclone and John Doe, the unknown employee of Cyclone who caused Knott's injury. Dkt. # 2-2. Cyclone filed a third-party complaint (Dkt. # 24) asserting an indemnification claim against TECHNIP FMC, USA and six other related entities based on an indemnification agreement contained in FMC's subcontract with Devon Energy (Devon).[1] The subcontract between Devon and FMC includes the following indemnification provision:



CONSULTANT shall fully defend, indemnify, release and completely hold harmless COMPANY GROUP from and against all actions, claims, demands, liabilities, damages, losses, costs, and expenses, including, but not limited to reasonable attorneys' fees (and any other costs associated with handling of or defense of any such action or claim of any kind), for injuries to or illness or death of CONSULTANT GROUP or for damage to, loss of or loss of use of CONSULTANT GROUP'S property, to the extent such injury, illness, death, loss or loss of use of arises out of, or is connected with this Agreement, even though such injury, illness, death, loss or loss of use of may have been caused in whole or in part by COMPANY GROUP'S negligence or fault in any degree and under any rule or theory of law.



Dkt. # 46-2, at 5. "FMC” is the "CONSULTANT” and "CONSULTANT GROUP” as defined ito include all employees of FMC. Id. "COMPANY GROUP” is defined as "[(a)] COMPANY,” coventures, and affiliated entities, including directors, officers, agents, employees; (b) its successors and assigns; (c) its parents, and the subsidiaries and affiliates of (a) and (b); and (d) the agents, directors, officers, employees and contractors of (a), (b), and (c). Id. There is no oral or written

contract between FMC and Cyclone, and Cyclone is not expressly referenced in the subcontract between FMC and Devon.



FMC filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that FMC had immunity from Cyclone's claim under Oklahoma's worker's compensation laws. Dkt. # 43. Cyclone responded that its claim for indemnification against FMC was permitted as a matter of Oklahoma law, and Cyclone argued that it could recover against FMC under third-party beneficiary or pass through liability theories. Dkt. # 46, at 10-16. Cyclone also argued that FMC's indemnification agreement with Devon provided an exception to the general rule that an employer was statutorily immune from suit under Oklahoma's worker's compensation laws. Id. at 17-21. Cyclone affirmatively represented to the Court that this case was governed by Oklahoma law. Id. at 10 n.1. The Court rejected Cyclone's argument that FMC had waived its statutory immunity from suit by entering the subcontract with Devon or that there was an independent legal relationship between FMC and Cyclone that would permit Cyclone to seek indemnification from FMC. Dkt. # 51. Applying Oklahoma law, the Court concluded that Oklahoma worker's compensation statutes provide an employer immunity from indirect liability in the form of an indemnification claim by a third-party unless there was an independent legal relationship between the employer and indemnitee. Id. at 5. The Court found that the indemnification agreement between FMC and Devon did not constitute a waiver of FMC's worker's compensation immunity or create any type of legal relationship between FMC and Cyclone, and the Court granted FMC's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint.

Motion denied.