United States of America v. Jeremy Dustin Parke

Tulsa, Oklahoma criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with

three counts for sexual abuse of a minor.



Each count was punishable by a different sentence: Count One carried a maximum sentence of fifteen years, Count Two carried a maximum of two years, and Count Three carried a minimum of fifteen years and a

maximum of life imprisonment.



On June 17, 2022, Mr. Papke and the Government reached a plea agreement

(the "First Plea”). The parties entered into the plea agreement under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), which allows parties in a criminal case to "agree

that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the

case.” If a district court accepts a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea, the parties' agreed-upon

sentence is binding on the district court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C).

In the First Plea, Mr. Papke agreed to plead guilty to Count Three, and in

return the Government would move to dismiss Counts One and Two. The parties also

agreed that the district court could sentence Mr. Papke to no less than thirteen years

and no more than fifteen years. A magistrate judge recommended acceptance of the

First Plea and ordered U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services to prepare a PSR. The

PSR calculated a recommended sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing

Commission Guidelines of 151 to 188 months, based on the severity of Mr. Papke's

conduct and his lack of prior criminal history.



The district court conducted a sentencing hearing on August 23, 2023. At the

outset, the district court told the parties that it had "concerns” about the First Plea

and asked the Government if "the victim [was] consulted in the context of the plea

deal that was struck here?” ROA Vol. I at 62. The Government confirmed that it had

consulted both L.P. and her father regarding the plea agreement and told the court

they both supported it. The Government explained it had entered the First Plea to

"avoid having to put the child victim through the crucible of a trial and testimony and

all the uncertainty” involved in a trial. Id. at 63. Next, L.P. spoke to the court and

described how Mr. Papke's actions had scarred and harmed her.



After L.P. gave her statement, the district court stated it was concerned about

"whether this plea agreement is sufficient considering the nature of the offense here.”

Id. at 67. The court then asked whether L.P. and her family wanted the court "to

accept this deal,” and the Government detailed prior conversations with L.P. and her

family indicating that they supported the First Plea. Id. at 67–68. The Government

also noted that the stipulated sentencing range was within the Guidelines range, and

stated that, in its opinion, the stipulated length "of imprisonment . . . paired with

lifetime supervised release is appropriate.” Id. at 68. The court then heard from L.P.'s

father, who spoke about the severe harm Mr. Papke had caused and expressed that, in

his view, Mr. Papke should spend the rest of his life in prison for his crimes. Even so,

L.P.'s father asked the court to accept the First Plea because he believed "a trial

would be really hard on” L.P., and her family wanted her to "start healing.” Id. at 71.

Finally, the court directly asked L.P. if she supported the First Plea, and she

confirmed that she wanted the court to accept it.



After taking a short recess, the court told the parties it had decided to reject the

First Plea because it did not believe the deal "adequately reflect[ed] the seriousness

of the offense and . . . would undermine the purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 72–73.

The court acknowledged that L.P. and her family wanted the court to "accept the

agreement.” Id. at 75. But "at the end of the day,” the court explained, it was "the

court that must live with the agreement, and certainly Mr. Papke must live with it as

well.” Id.. The court also emphasized that it did not take sentencing decisions

"lightly,” even though in the court's view "when counsel are done with the [case],

[they] move on to the next case.” Id.



On September 18, 2023, the parties filed a joint motion to reconsider, in which

they emphasized that L.P. and her father supported the First Plea. The parties told the

court that L.P. was dealing with serious mental health challenges and that her father

was worried that the specter of testifying at trial might amplify some of L.P.'s

struggles. The parties also noted the First Plea was informed by their evaluation of

the risks inherent in a jury trial. Thus, the parties asked the court to accept the First

Plea.



Several days later, the district court continued the sentencing hearing to

address the motion to reconsider. The court noted the motion did not contain "any

additional information that [the court] didn't already know.” ROA Vol. I at 78. The

Government told the court that it had concerns about L.P.'s testimony because she

had made some inconsistent statements and had forgotten some facts. The

Government also noted that because L.P. had experienced suicidal ideations and at

times engaged in self-harm, it had "serious concerns about the mental and physical

impact that a trial and sitting in the witness stand would have on this victim.” Id.

at 80.



The district court responded that, from what it had observed at the initial

sentencing hearing, it believed L.P. "was very capable of testifying at trial.” Id. at 82.

But the court acknowledged that it had not "visited with her like” the Government

had and that it understood this concern. Id. The court also remarked that regardless of

whether the stipulated sentence was within the Guidelines range, the court was not

required "to sentence only within the [G]uidelines” and had discretion to impose

consecutive sentences for each count, regardless of the Guidelines range. Id.

at 83–84. The court added:



And as I said before, counsel can make an agreement and they

might be able to live with the agreement but it's not your sentence.

There's two people that live with the sentence following a sentencing, the

defendant and me. And we live with that and you move on to the next

case.



And as I said before, it seems that your office has fallen in love

with the 11(c)(1)(C). I've said it before. And we had a visiting judge here

not too long ago that in one day rejected three 11(c)(1)(C)s. So you can

continue to do that and you can try to make this sentence your sentence,

or you can give me some latitude. That's what I have to say about it.

Id. at 87.





The court then told the parties that it would not accept the plea, stating that the

court's decision had not changed and it could not "live with” the sentence stipulated

in the First Plea. Id. at 89. Mr. Papke's counsel stated on the record that the court's

"rejection of the plea agreement [was] procedurally” and "substantively

unreasonable.” Id. The court asked counsel if she could cite "any case in this district”

involving "a sentence that is anywhere close to this for any circumstances that are

similar to this?” Id. at 89–90. Unable to cite such cases, counsel asserted that the

court's "dissatisfaction” with the stipulated sentence was not a sufficient reason to

reject a plea agreement. Id. at 90. In response, the district court elaborated its reasons

for rejecting the First Plea: the stipulated sentencing range would not "reflect the

seriousness of the offense including the relevant conduct,” "be adequate to deter the

defendant,” "promote the respect for the law,” "provide just punishment for the

offense,” nor protect "the public from further crimes by this defendant given the

length of time in which he was comfortable abusing the child.” Id. at 91. At this

point, Mr. Papke withdrew his guilty plea and the district court reset the case for trial.

Id. at 91–92.

Reversed and remanded.