United States of America v. Ayinda Harper and Aqudre Quailes

Scranton, Pennsylvania criminal defense lawyers represented the Defendants charged with being a felons in possession of a firearms.



Defendants were indicted for felony possession of a firearm.



The District Court acknowledged that Quailes and Harper "may have violated the conditions of [their] state parole by possessing the firearm,” but it reasoned that this "does not prove that [Quailes or Harper] did not have a Second Amendment right to possess the firearm to begin with.” United States v. Quailes, 688 F. Supp. 3d 184, 196 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (emphasis added); United States v. Harper, 689 F. Supp. 3d 16, 29 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (emphasis added). It then held § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to both defendants and dismissed their indictments as inconsistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.



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The Second Amendment mandates that "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.

Const. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment "confer[s] an

individual right to keep and bear arms” for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. 554 U.S. 570, 595, 629 (2008). But "the right secured by the Second Amendment,” the Court clarified, "is not unlimited.” Id. at

626. To that end, it cautioned that "nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt” on laws like § 922(g)(1) that

prohibit "the possession of firearms by felons.” Id. at 626–27 & n.26.



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The Court "made the constitutional standard endorsed

in Heller more explicit” in Bruen by announcing a new two-

step analytic framework for analyzing Second Amendment

challenges to firearm regulations. 597 U.S. at 31. Courts must

first determine whether "the Second Amendment's plain text

covers an individual's conduct.” Id. at 17. If it does, the

Second Amendment "presumptively protects that conduct,”

and courts must proceed to Bruen's second step, where "the

government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent

with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.”

Id. If the government satisfies its burden, the firearm

regulation passes constitutional muster.

In United States v. Rahimi, the Court clarified that "the

appropriate analysis” under Bruen's second step "involves

n both opinions, we recognized that some Founding-

era forfeiture laws disarmed a felon for a wide range of crimes

but still allowed him to "[re]acquire arms after completing his

sentence and reintegrating into society.” Range II, 2024 WL

5199447, at *810

certain forfeiture laws required convicts to forfeit their

weapons through at least the end of their sentences). These

Founding-era laws, as we explained in Moore, "yield[ed] the

principle that a convict may be disarmed while he completes

his sentence,” and this principle justified applying § 922(g)(1)

to a convict on supervised release. 111 F.4th at 272. We

likened the "historical practice of disarming a convict during

his sentence” to "disarming a convict on supervised release”

because supervised release is also part of a criminal sentence.

Id. at 271. Thus, together, Moore and Range II teach that our

Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation supports

disarming a convict who has not "complete[d] his sentence and

reintegrate[d] into society,” including, as we addressed in

Moore, convicts who are serving a term of federal supervised

release after release from incarceration. Moore, 111 F.4th at

272; see Range II, 2024 WL 5199447, at *8. We did not have

occasion to address in Moore, and do today, whether that

extends to a sentence of state parole or probation, even if not

preceded by imprisonment.

considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent

with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” 602

U.S. 680, 692 (2024) (emphasis added). Under Rahimi's

principles-focused approach to analogical reasoning, we

evaluate challenged regulations at a higher level of generality

than whether "those regulations [are] identical to ones that

could be found in 1791.” Id. Rather than seeking out a perfect

statutory analogue, "dead ringer,” or "historical twin,” id.

(quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30), we draw on "relevantly

similar” historical regulations to derive "principles underlying

the Second Amendment” and then ask if the modern-day

regulation "comport[s] with th[ose] principles” in terms of

"why and how it burdens the Second Amendment right,” id. at

692, 698.

Applying this framework in Range II, we held that the

petitioner, who had completed his sentence and brought an as-

applied challenge in the form of a declaratory judgment action,

was entitled to "protection from prosecution under § 922(g)(1)

for any future possession of a firearm.” 2024 WL 5199447, at

*8. In Moore, on the other hand, we rejected an as-applied

challenge by a convict who had not completed his sentence and

nonetheless possessed a gun while on federal supervised

release. We recounted how felons at the Founding were

disarmed while completing their sentences, Moore, 111 F.4th

at 270–71, whether their sentence was served inside or outside

of prison, id. at 272 (citing a Virginia law imposing sentence

of "forced labor on a ship” and a North Carolina law sentencing

non-violent convicts to service at direction of the local sheriff),

and concluded that "[a] convict completing his sentence on

supervised release does not have a Second Amendment right

to possess a firearm,” id. at 273.



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10

certain forfeiture laws required convicts to forfeit their

weapons through at least the end of their sentences). These

Founding-era laws, as we explained in Moore, "yield[ed] the

principle that a convict may be disarmed while he completes

his sentence,” and this principle justified applying § 922(g)(1)

to a convict on supervised release. 111 F.4th at 272. We

likened the "historical practice of disarming a convict during

his sentence” to "disarming a convict on supervised release”

because supervised release is also part of a criminal sentence.

Id. at 271. Thus, together, Moore and Range II teach that our

Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation supports

disarming a convict who has not "complete[d] his sentence and

reintegrate[d] into society,” including, as we addressed in

Moore, convicts who are serving a term of federal supervised

release after release from incarceration. Moore, 111 F.4th at

272; see Range II, 2024 WL 5199447, at *8. We did not have

occasion to address in Moore, and do today, whether that

extends to a sentence of state parole or probation, even if not

preceded by imprisonment.

B. Section 922(g)(1) is Constitutional as Applied to

Parolees and Probationers

Under Bruen's first step, we conclude that Quailes and

Harper, as adult citizens, are among "the people”

presumptively protected by the Second Amendment, Range II,

2024 WL 5199447, at *5, and that § 922(g)(1) punishes

"quintessential Second Amendment conduct”—possession of

a firearm, Moore, 111 F.4th at 269. But they possessed a

firearm while on state parole, and Harper was also serving a

probationary sentence of intermediate punishment. Because

offenders on parole or probation are "completing [a] sentence,”

neither Quailes nor Harper had "a Second Amendment right to

possess a firearm” at the time of their § 922(g)(1) offenses. Id.





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This Nation's history demonstrates a longstanding and

uninterrupted tradition of disarming convicts still serving a

criminal sentence. Colonial and Founding-era estate forfeiture

laws, which "stand for the proposition that convicts could be

disarmed while serving their sentences,” serve as relevantly

similar historical analogues to § 922(g)(1) as applied to a felon

who possessed a firearm during the period of his sentence.



Moore, 111 F.4th at 271 n.3. These laws, which were

ubiquitous at the Founding, stripped felons of their entire estate

upon conviction—including any firearms and all other goods

and chattels. See Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines

Clause, 102 Cal. L. Rev. 277, 332 & nn.275–76 (2014)

(collecting statutes).7 As we explained in Moore, felony

forfeiture laws "disarmed citizens who had committed a wide

range of crimes . . . until they had finished serving their

sentences.” 111 F.4th at 271. Under these regimes, convicts

could potentially reacquire arms, but only upon successfully

serving their sentence and reintegrating into society. Until

then, an offender subject to complete estate forfeiture remained

disarmed for the entire time that he "was serving out his

sentence, not only while he was physically in prison.” Id. at

272.



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Section 922(g)(1), insofar as it prohibits felons who are

completing their criminal sentences from possessing firearms,

"fits neatly within” the principles underlying the Second

Amendment. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698. We thus join our sister

circuits in holding that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied

to convicts on parole or probation. See, e.g., Goins, 118 F.4th

at 801–02 (holding that "our nation's historical tradition of

forfeiture laws . . . supports disarming those on parole,

probation, or supervised release”); United States v. Gay, 98

F.4th 843, 847 (7th Cir. 2024) (concluding that "parolees lack

the same armament rights as free persons” because "[p]arole is

a form of custody” that simply allows a convict to "serve some

of his sentence[] outside prison walls”).

Reversed