Jerome Render, et al. v. Crystal Marlow and Crystal Marlowe

Louisville, Kentucky personal injury lawyer represented Plaintiffs, who sued Defendants on

malicious prosecution and abuse of process.





On December 22, 2007, three armed suspects (two

males and one female) entered the home of Abbey

Schmitt. The three suspects demanded money and

assaulted Schmitt and her boyfriend, Robert Hayes.

Schmitt reported to responding officers that the female

suspect was African-American, "20-24 years of age,

5'7”, 130 pounds, thin build, and with a short black

afro.” Marlowe's Brief at 7. Schmitt also reported that

one of the male suspects referred to the female suspect as

"Nikki.” Marlowe was assigned to investigate the

robbery.



University of Louisville's campus police

investigated a similar robbery near Schmitt's home.

Campus police presented a photo-pack to the victim of

the similar robbery, and she identified Vaughn Carter as

one of the male suspects. Carter was arrested, and

Marlowe interviewed Carter. Upon questioning, Carter

apparently acknowledged knowing a woman that went by

the nickname of "Nikki.” According to Marlowe, Carter

identified Tiffany Washington as "Nikki” and reported

that she worked at the University of Louisville's campus

library.



Marlowe subsequently compiled a photo-pack

containing Washington's photo. Marlowe utilized

Washington's driver's license photograph and placed it in

a photo-pack with five other female mug-shot

photographs. The driver's license photograph used in the

photo-pack depicted Washington as having straight

shoulder-length hair. Also, Washington's driver's

license photograph had a light blue background while the

other mug shot photographs had a dark colored

background.



Washington was arrested and remained incarcerated

for approximately five days until she posted bail. The

grand jury declined to indict Washington after hearing

alibi evidence that Washington was in Henderson,

Kentucky, on the day of the crime.



The circuit court did not address whether Marlowe

possessed probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant for

Washington in its summary judgment. Considering the

factual complexity and the current posture of this case,

we reverse upon this issue and remand for the circuit

court to determine whether Marlowe possessed probable

cause to obtain an arrest warrant for Washington and if

so, whether Marlowe acted in good faith and was entitled

to qualified official immunity.



On remand, the trial court again considered Marlowe's motion for

summary judgment in light of the Court's holding in Marlowe I. Ultimately, the

court denied Marlowe summary judgment as to Washington's claims. The case

was tried in the fall of 2019 during which Marlowe moved for a directed verdict,

which was granted in part and denied in part. A Jefferson Circuit Court jury

ultimately found in favor of Washington on the counts of malicious prosecution

and abuse of process.



The jury awarded her a total of $2,250,000.00 in damages,

including $250,000.00 in punitive damages. Marlowe now appeals to this Court as

a matter of right. She primarily argues that the trial court erred in denying her

motion for summary judgment and in denying her motion for a directed verdict.



A motion for summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” CR1 56.03. The Kentucky Supreme Court further explained this summary

judgment standard in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.:



While it has been recognized that summary judgment is

designed to expedite the disposition of cases and avoid

unnecessary trials when no genuine issues of material

fact are raised, . . . this Court has also repeatedly

admonished that the rule is to be cautiously applied. The

record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all

doubts are to be resolved in his favor. Even though a

trial court may believe the party opposing the motion

may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary

judgment if there is any issue of material fact. The trial

judge must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue

of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists. It clearly is

not the purpose of the summary judgment rule, as we

have often declared, to cut litigants off from their right of

trial if they have issues to try.

Reversed



See: Jerome Render, et al. v. Crystal Marlowe