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Ronald D. Robbins, II v. State of Indiana

Date: 02-09-2019

Case Number: 18A-CR-2082

Judge: John G. Baker

Court: COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Plaintiff's Attorney: Erik J. Bryant

Deputy Attorney General

Defendant's Attorney: Michael D. Gross

Description:








On September 11, 2016, three-month-old infant L.W. was staying with twenty

four-year-old Robbins, his father. At some point during the evening, L.W.

started crying loudly. Unsure of what to do, Robbins shook L.W. until the child

went limp. Robbins called L.W.’s mother ten minutes later, telling her that

something was wrong with L.W., but he did not know what it was. Robbins’s

grandmother arrived and took L.W. to the emergency room. Robbins

accompanied her. L.W. was eventually transferred to Peyton Manning

Children’s Hospital due to the severity of his injuries.

[3] At the hospital, Robbins spoke with Boone County Police Officer Deborah

Martin about what had happened. Robbins stated that he did not know what

had happened and that L.W. had possibly bumped his head. The next day, on

September 12, 2016, Robbins told the physician treating L.W. the same thing.

The physician said that a mere head bump could not have caused L.W.’s severe

injuries. On September 14, 2016, Robbins again gave multiple false

explanations for why L.W. was injured. Finally, Robbins confessed to Officer

Martin that he had shaken L.W. She provided this information to hospital staff.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2082 | February 5, 2019 Page 3 of 6



[4] Thereafter, while L.W. was still in the hospital, Robbins checked himself into

the St. Vincent Stress Center, where he stayed for three days. Robbins claimed

that he admitted himself to the facility because he was “completely distraught”

and felt suicidal. Tr. Vol. II p. 64. After his release, while L.W. was still in the

hospital, Robbins flew to California to visit his sister. On September 23, 2016,

twelve days after the shaking incident, L.W. died as a result of shaken baby

syndrome.

[5] On September 23, 2016, the State charged Robbins with one count of Level 3

felony aggravated battery and one count of Level 3 felony neglect of a

dependent resulting in serious bodily injury, later adding one count each of

Level 1 felony aggravated battery, Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent

resulting in death, and Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter. On May 14,

2018, Robbins entered into an open guilty plea agreement, pursuant to which

he would plead guilty to the voluntary manslaughter count in exchange for the

dismissal of the other charges.

[6] The plea agreement contained the following statement:

The defendant hereby waives the right to appeal any sentence imposed by the Court, under any standard of review, including but not limited to, an abuse of discretion standard and the appropriateness of the sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), so long as the Court sentences the defendant within the terms of the plea agreement[.]





Appellant’s App. Vol II p. 40.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2082 | February 5, 2019 Page 4 of 6



[7] At the sentencing hearing on August 2, 2018, the trial court considered the

following aggravating factors—(1) the young age of the victim; (2) the fact that

Robbins was in a position to care for the infant; (3) the adverse psychological

impact on the family; and (4) the fact that the infant’s death was the result of

shaken baby syndrome—and the following mitigating factors—(1) Robbins had

no prior criminal history; (2) Robbins was not deemed likely to reoffend; (3) the

crime resulted from circumstances unlikely to reoccur; (4) Robbins would

respond affirmatively to probation or short-term imprisonment; and (5) Robbins

was remorseful. The trial court refused to consider Robbins’s age to be a

mitigating factor.

[8] At the close of the sentencing hearing, the trial court advised Robbins that

“[y]ou have the right to appeal the sentence imposed by this Court. In order to

do so you must file either a Notice of Appeal or a Motion to Correct Errors

within thirty days of today’s date[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 114. Thereafter, the trial

court sentenced Robbins to thirty years in the Department of Correction (DOC)

with ten years suspended to probation. Robbins now appeals.

Discussion and Decision



[9] Robbins argues that the sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the

offense and his character.1



1 Robbins originally waived his right to appeal his sentence because of the written stipulation in his plea agreement. However, Robbins retained his right to appeal because the trial court mistakenly advised him that

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2082 | February 5, 2019 Page 5 of 6



[10] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) states that a “Court may revise a sentence . . . if,

after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character

of the offender.” The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his

sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we will consider numerous

factors such as culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the

damage done to others, and a “myriad of other factors that come to light in a

given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008).

[11] The maximum sentence for a Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter conviction

is thirty years and the minimum sentence is ten years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5.

The advisory sentence is seventeen and one-half years. Id. Here, the trial court

imposed a thirty-year sentence with ten years suspended to probation.

[12] First, as to the nature of the offense, Robbins killed L.W., a three-month-old

infant. More to the point, L.W. was Robbins’s child, and Robbins was

responsible for the care and custody of the infant. By pleading guilty to

voluntary manslaughter, Robbins admitted that he knowingly or intentionally

killed L.W. by shaking him to death. And, after rendering L.W. limp by

shaking, Robbins waited almost ten minutes before notifying L.W.’s mother



he could appeal. See Ricci v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1089, 1093-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that even when defendant waives his right to an appeal in a written guilty plea, he may nevertheless appeal his sentence if the trial court advises him that he may still appeal). Consequently, we will address Robbins’s central argument.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2082 | February 5, 2019 Page 6 of 6



that something was wrong. Even then, Robbins did not call 911 or seek an

ambulance to treat L.W. Instead, he simply waited until his grandmother

arrived to take the infant to the hospital. We find that the nature of the offense

does not render Robbins’s sentence inappropriate.

[13] Second, as to Robbins’s character, despite his show of remorse (as noted by the

trial court as a mitigating factor), Robbins’s actions following L.W.’s admission

to the hospital are telling. Robbins lied repeatedly to both Officer Martin and

L.W.’s treating physician about what could have caused L.W.’s injuries. For

nearly three days, medical personnel did not have the requisite information to

properly treat L.W. because Robbins withheld that information from them.

Only later did Robbins admit what had happened, but by that time, it was too

late. Additionally, while his baby was still hospitalized in dire condition,

Robbins took an extended trip to California to visit his sister. These actions and

traits reflect negatively on Robbins’s character. We find that Robbins’s

character does not render his sentence inappropriate.

[14] In sum, we will not revise Robbins’s sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate

Rule 7(B).
Outcome:
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:

About This Case

What was the outcome of Ronald D. Robbins, II v. State of Indiana?

The outcome was: The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Which court heard Ronald D. Robbins, II v. State of Indiana?

This case was heard in COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA, IN. The presiding judge was John G. Baker.

Who were the attorneys in Ronald D. Robbins, II v. State of Indiana?

Plaintiff's attorney: Erik J. Bryant Deputy Attorney General. Defendant's attorney: Michael D. Gross.

When was Ronald D. Robbins, II v. State of Indiana decided?

This case was decided on February 9, 2019.