Jenna Zingg v. Thomas Groblewski

In 2015, Jenna Zingg ("Zingg"),

a pretrial detainee at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute-

Framingham ("MCI-Framingham"), sued Dr. Thomas Groblewski

("Groblewski") and the Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional

Healthcare ("MPCH") in the United States District Court for the

District of Massachusetts. She brought a Massachusetts state law

claim for common law negligence and a federal law claim, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for a violation of her right under the Eighth

Amendment of the United States Constitution, as incorporated

against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV.

The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary

judgment on the § 1983 claim and dismissed Zingg's state law

negligence claim without prejudice. We affirm.

I.

The following facts are not in dispute. Jenna Zingg

entered MCI-Framingham on March 12, 2013, as a pretrial detainee.

She had a long history of psoriasis and had tried a variety of

treatments, including clobetasol, the most potent topical steroid

available; Dovonex, a weaker topical vitamin D analog; and Humira,

a systemic treatment that targets the immune system.

Zingg responded well to Humira, which she had been taking

for about nine months prior to entering MCI-Framingham. However,

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Zingg did not receive her regularly scheduled Humira injections

after entering MCI-Framingham, and her psoriasis worsened.

On April 25, after Zingg submitted repeated requests for

medical attention, she was examined by Patricia Casella, a

physician's assistant at MCI-Framingham who worked for MPCH, the

contractor that provides all medical and mental health services to

individuals held in Massachusetts Department of Correction

facilities. At that examination, Casella prescribed Zingg with

clobetasol, which was a formulary medication, meaning that it was

pre-approved for administration by MPCH.

Zingg's psoriasis became more and more severe, even

while she was using clobetasol, and she submitted increasingly

urgent requests for medical attention between July 1 and July 11.

On July 12, Casella again examined Zingg and, noting the

deterioration of her condition, prescribed her Humira and Dovonex,

which was prescribed pending approval of a prescription for Humira.

Both of these medications, however, were non-formulary medications

and, as such, were not pre-approved to be administered to MPCH's

patients. Thus, the pharmacy forwarded the requests to Dr. Thomas

Groblewski, who, as the statewide medical director for MPCH, was

responsible for approving all non-formulary prescription requests

made by MPCH practitioners.

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On July 15, Groblewski approved the Dovonex request but

denied the request for Humira. The pharmacy sent Casella a denial

of the Humira request that same day.

Zingg's psoriasis continued to get worse while she used

Dovonex, and, on August 6, MPCH approved a request for Zingg to

see a dermatologist at Lemuel Shattuck Hospital. At her August 9

appointment with the dermatologist, Zingg was diagnosed with

severe psoriasis and mild psoriatic arthritis, admitted as an inpatient,

and screened for risk of infection. She was given an

initial dose of Humira on August 11 and discharged to MCIFramingham

the next day. She received a second Humira shot at the

prison on August 27 and was released from prison on September 5,

by which time she had experienced significant improvement in her

condition.

All of the events at issue took place in 2013. Zingg

filed this suit on March 11, 2015. In the suit, she brought a

claim under § 1983, alleging that Groblewski, and, vicariously,

MPCH, acted with deliberate indifference to her serious medical

needs in violation of her federal constitutional right under the

Eighth Amendment to adequate medical care while incarcerated.1 She

1 Although all of the medical practitioners with whom Zingg

interacted worked for MPCH, Zingg premises her federal

constitutional claim only on Groblewski's July 15 decision to deny

the request for Humira, and she names as defendants only Groblewski

and MPCH, as his employer.

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also brought a claim under Massachusetts law, alleging that the

same defendants were negligent in providing her proper medical

care.

Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary

judgment on Zingg's § 1983 claim. They did so on the grounds that

she had failed to show that a jury could reasonably find that

Groblewski's decision not to approve the request for Humira

constituted deliberate indifference to Zingg's serious medical

needs and thus violated her Eighth Amendment right and that, in

any event, Groblewski was entitled to qualified immunity on that

claim.

On September 29, 2017, the District Court granted the

defendants' motion, without reaching the qualified immunity issue.

The District Court did so on the ground that no reasonable jury

could find that Groblewski acted with deliberate indifference to

Zingg's medical needs. And, on November 7, 2017, the District

Court entered final judgment for the defendants on Zingg's § 1983

claim and dismissed her state law negligence claim without

prejudice, as no federal law claim remained. Zingg filed this

timely appeal.

II.

Zingg argues that the District Court erred in granting

the defendants summary judgment on her § 1983 claim. Zingg also

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argues that Groblewski is not entitled to qualified immunity, but,

as we will explain, we need not reach that issue.

A.

Our review of the District Court's grant of summary

judgment is de novo. Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir.

2015). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party

“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). "We consider a dispute genuine if 'a reasonable

jury, drawing favorable inferences, could resolve it in favor of

the nonmoving party.'” Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 777

F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Velázquez–Pérez v. Developers

Diversified Realty Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 270 (1st Cir. 2014)).

Nevertheless, “if the summary judgment record

satisfactorily demonstrates that the plaintiff's case is, and may

be expected to remain, deficient in vital evidentiary support,

this may suffice to show that the movant has met its initial

burden.” Ocasio-Hernández, 777 F.3d at 4 (quoting Carmona v.

Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 133 (1st Cir. 2000)). In making that

assessment, we must keep in mind that “[c]onclusory allegations,

improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation[ ] are

insufficient to establish a genuine dispute of fact.” Id. (quoting

Velázquez–Pérez, 753 F.3d at 270).

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B.

The Eighth Amendment, applied to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment, protects incarcerated people from state

corrections officials' “deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Feeney v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 464 F.3d 158, 161-62

(1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06

(1976)). There are both objective and subjective components to a

claim for this type of Eighth Amendment violation. Perry, 782

F.3d at 78 (quoting Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., 645 F.3d 484,

497 (1st Cir. 2011)).

The objective component requires the plaintiff to prove

that she has a medical need "that has been diagnosed by a physician

as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s

attention.” Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014)

(en banc) (quoting Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923

F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990)). The defendants do not dispute

that Zingg put forth evidence sufficient to meet this requirement.

The subjective component requires the plaintiff to show

that prison officials, in treating the plaintiff's medical needs,

possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. That state of

mind is one that amounts to deliberate indifference to the

claimant’s health or safety. Perry, 782 F.3d at 78.

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The "obvious case" that would meet this "deliberate

indifference" standard "would be a denial of needed medical

treatment in order to punish the inmate.” Watson v. Caton, 984

F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993). But, deliberate indifference may

also take the form of “wanton” or criminal recklessness in the

treatment afforded. Id.

To show such a state of mind, the plaintiff must provide

evidence that the defendant had "actual knowledge of impending

harm, easily preventable,” id., and yet failed to take the steps

that would have easily prevented that harm. Such a showing may be

made by demonstrating that the defendant provided medical care

that was “so inadequate as to shock the conscience,” Feeney, 464

F.3d at 162 (quoting Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 235 (1st

Cir. 1991)), or, put otherwise, that was "so clearly inadequate as

to amount to a refusal to provide essential care." Torraco, 923

F.2d at 234.

III.

We begin by examining Zingg's contention that the record

would permit a jury to find that Groblewski knew enough about

Zingg's medical history to make it obvious that the course of

treatment that he approved -- namely, prescribing Dovonex but not

Humira -- would amount to a refusal to provide essential care.

Zingg points out, in this regard, that the record shows that the

dermatologist who had been treating Zingg prior to her

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incarceration wrote to the MCI-Framingham medical department on

April 10, 2013. In that letter, the dermatologist stated that

"[s]urface medications have been inadequate to treat her skin

condition" and "[s]urface medications cannot possibly treat her

psoriatic arthritis."

There is no evidence in the record, however, that would

permit a jury to find that Groblewski was aware of this assessment.

The undisputed record shows that Groblewski did not even become

involved in Zingg's care until July 15. And, at that point, the

record shows that his involvement was solely in his capacity as

the statewide medical director responsible for reviewing all nonformulary

medication requests.

Moreover, the undisputed record shows that Groblewski,

in making his decision to deny Humira on July 15, consulted

exclusively the two non-formulary requests that he received from

Casella. Yet, there is nothing in the non-formulary requests that

would have indicated to Groblewski that Zingg had already

unsuccessfully received the treatment described in the

dermatologist's letter.

With regard to Zingg's medical history and condition,

those non-formulary requests stated only that Zingg had a history

of moderate to severe psoriasis, that she was taking Humira prior

to her incarceration, that she had been using clobetasol at MCIFramingham

for several months, and that she had increasing

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psoriasis and joint pain.2 In fact, although the non-formulary

request for Humira concluded that "[Patient] needs to resume her

[H]umira 40 mg every other week as in community," Casella also

requested a non-formulary prescription for Dovonex, which was

"indicated pending Humira approval."

Of course, a decision to replace the strongest topical

medication for treating psoriasis, which had failed, with a weaker

topical medication, could be concerning. But, Zingg does not

identify any evidence in the record from which a jury could

reasonably find that Groblewski intended for Dovonex to replace,

rather than to supplement, clobetasol. After all, the record shows

that she had been using clobetasol in the months before Groblewski

approved Dovonex, and her medical records also indicate that she

was prescribed both in the weeks after. And, while it is true

that Groblewski did not expressly state that he intended for

Dovonex to be used alongside clobetasol, Casella stated in her

deposition that "[Groblewski] wanted to determine whether the

clobetasol and the Dovonex together would provide better relief

[than clobetasol alone]."

Thus, we do not see how a jury could find that Groblewski

intended for Dovonex to be the exclusive means of treating her

2 The requests also described her condition in more detail,

explaining that she had moderate plaque lesions on her elbows and

that severe psoriasis covered ninety percent of her vulva and inner

thighs.

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condition, given that we may not credit conclusory allegations in

reviewing a motion for summary judgment. Ocasio-Hernández, 777

F.3d at 4. And, the fact that a jury could not reasonably so find

is problematic, as Zingg did not produce any evidence to suggest

that Groblewski knew, when he prescribed Dovonex but not Humira,

that even the combination of clobetasol and Dovonex would not work

for her.

As stated above, there is no evidence that Groblewski

knew anything about Zingg's condition or topical medication

history beyond what was in the non-formulary requests. And those

requests, as we have explained, did not themselves indicate that

the combination of the two ointments would not work.

In addition, there is no basis in the record from which

a jury could conclude that it is so implausible that the two

medications at issue here -- clobetasol and Dovonex -- would be

effective in combination that it may be reasonably inferred that

Groblewski knew that his prescribed course of treatment would be

ineffective, even if he did not directly say as much. To the

contrary, the record shows that before Zingg's incarceration, at

times when she was not on Humira, Zingg had taken clobetasol and

Dovonex together, indicating that the two topical medications are

sometimes prescribed in combination and are expected to provide

better relief together than either one would if prescribed alone.

And, it is undisputed that MPCH's treatment protocol for psoriasis

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requires patients to try two topical medications before moving on

to systemic treatments. Indeed, even in cases where topical

medications "may not have been effective for the patient in the

community [before incarceration]," MPCH's treatment protocol

requires trials of topical medications because "it is not uncommon

to find that such medications, when prescribed in a controlled

environment (such as prison), produce better results."

Thus, we do not see how we could conclude that

Groblewski, when faced only with the two non-formulary requests

from Casella and MPCH's treatment protocol for psoriasis, acted in

a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as exhibiting a

"deliberate intent to harm" or "wanton disregard" for Zingg's

health, Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir. 2011), in

opting to approve the use of a topical drug before approving a

systemic treatment. That is especially the case given that the

parties do not dispute that the systemic treatment at issue could

pose other risks to Zingg's health that would not be presented by

the topical treatment.

IV.

Zingg does make a number of other arguments as to why

the District Court's grant of summary judgment on her Eighth

Amendment claim was improper. But, we are not persuaded.

First, Zingg asserts that the District Court did not

credit the opinion of her well-qualified expert, who stated that

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treating Zingg with only Dovonex after clobetasol was unsuccessful

was akin to "shooting a pistol at an armored car after a missile

had failed." But, the District Court did not fail to credit that

evidence.

The District Court found that "[e]ven assuming [the

expert's statement] to be true, . . . the record fail[ed] to

demonstrate deliberate indifference." The District Court reached

that conclusion after determining that the expert's opinion was

helpful to Zingg only if Groblewski meant to prescribe Dovonex

instead of, and not in addition to, the more potent clobetasol.

And, as the District Court correctly determined, nothing in the

record permitted a jury reasonably to find that Groblewski intended

for Zingg to stop using clobetasol when she began using Dovonex.

Thus, although "the [D]istrict [C]ourt [is] required to assume

that any disputes of material fact--including conflicting opinions

offered by competent experts--could be resolved by the jury in the

[nonmovant's] favor," Jones v. City of Boston, 845 F.3d 28, 32

(1st Cir. 2016), the District Court did not disregard that

requirement in determining that Zingg's expert did not provide a

basis for denying the defendants' summary judgment motion as to

her Eighth Amendment claim.

Zingg next contends that she met her burden at summary

judgment with respect to that claim because she put forth evidence

to show that Groblewski did not gather more information before

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denying Humira and prescribing Dovonex. As support for this

contention, Zingg points to Leavitt, where we recognized that a

reasonable jury could conclude that a corrections official acted

with deliberate indifference when that official, being aware of a

serious risk to a patient's health, chose not to confirm that risk

by failing to review information that he typically reviewed for

other patients. 645 F.3d at 498-500 (showing that a medical

professional at a county jail with firsthand knowledge of an HIVpositive

patient's condition neglected to examine a critical

report and to follow up on that patient's symptoms). See also

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 n.8 (1994) (noting that a

prison official “would not escape liability if the evidence showed

that he merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly

suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk

that he strongly suspected to exist”).

These circumstances, however, are not present here.

Zingg identifies no record evidence that would permit a jury to

find that Groblewski was aware or even "strongly suspected" that

her condition required care beyond the prescribed course of

treatment by the protocol. Rather, Groblewski's decision followed

MPCH's "general practice standards," which Zingg does not

challenge as being themselves inconsistent with the Eighth

Amendment. And, while those standards require a member of the

medical staff, in this case Casella, to assess the patient and

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obtain prior medical records, they require Groblewski only to do

what Zingg does not dispute that he did: review non-formulary

request forms when approving non-formulary medications or defining

alternative treatments. Therefore, although Groblewski admits

that he could have sought more information about Zingg's case, the

evidence in the record at most supports a finding that Groblewski

"fail[ed] to alleviate a significant risk that he should have

perceived but did not[.]" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. And, while

such a failure, insofar as it occurred, is "no cause for

commendation, [it] cannot under [Supreme Court case law] be

condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Id.3

Finally, Zingg asserts that a jury could find that

Groblewski denied Humira because of its cost and that such a

finding would suffice to permit a jury to find that Groblewski was

deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs. To support

this assertion, she cites the fact that MPCH would be covering the

cost for Humira, which is an expensive medication; the fact that

cost containment was important to MPCH, which Groblewski knew; and

3 Zingg argues briefly that psoriatic arthritis is not treatable

with topical medication at all and thus that a reasonable jury

could conclude that Groblewski knew that topical medications alone

would be ineffective. Yet, though Groblewski did know that Zingg

had joint pain, which Casella listed on the non-formulary request,

he did not have any information indicating that she had "probable

psoriatic arthritis," which was indicated in Zingg's medical

history. Moreover, until her diagnosis in August 2013 during her

incarceration, Zingg had never been formally diagnosed with

psoriatic arthritis.

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the fact that Casella told Zingg, during her April 25 examination,

that Humira would not be approved because of its high cost.

We are not aware of any authority, however, to support

the proposition that there is a per se Eighth Amendment prohibition

against corrections officials considering cost, even when

considered only in the course of selecting treatment that is aimed

at attending to an incarcerated person's serious medical needs.

See Battista, 645 F.3d at 453 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s

Eighth Amendment jurisprudence “leave[s] ample room for

professional judgment, constraints presented by the institutional

setting, and the need to give latitude to administrators who have

to make difficult trade-offs as to risks and resources.”). Thus,

even if there were sufficient evidence in the record to show that

Groblewski took cost into account in making his July 15 denial of

Humira in favor of Dovonex, that evidence would not in and of

itself provide a supportable basis for a finding of deliberate

indifference, given what the record shows regarding what

Groblewski knew about Zingg's condition, MPCH's treatment protocol

for psoriasis, and the potential risks posed by Humira that topical

medications do not pose.4

4 Zingg also argues that her ultimate receipt of proper care several

weeks later does not absolve Groblewski. It is certainly true

that we have rejected the notion that "the fact that [a patient]

received some treatment, including eventually being transferred to

a hospital, shows that his serious medical needs were not ignored."

Perry, 782 F.3d at 81. However, Zingg's later treatment has no

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* * *



bearing on our conclusion that the District Court correctly

determined that the record provided no basis from which a jury

could reasonably find that Groblewski's care, while lacking, was

not constitutionally inadequate.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below is

affirmed.