John Doe v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Boston, Massachusetts civil litigation lawyer represented Plaintiff, who sued Defendant on a Title IX violation theory.



A writer is free to assume a nom

de plume. That is why Mark Twain and Bob Dylan are better known

than Samuel Clemens and Robert Zimmerman. But, as a rule,

litigants in federal court must publicly reveal their true names.

In this appeal, we tackle a question of first impression in this

circuit: when is it appropriate for a party to a civil suit in

federal court to appear under a pseudonym? This important question

pits the individual's desire for privacy against the public's need

to access judicial proceedings. After determining the appropriate

standard for adjudicating motions for leave to proceed under

pseudonyms, we vacate the district court's denial of the

plaintiff's motion and remand to the district court for application

of the discerned standard.



I



Drawing upon the complaint, we briefly rehearse the

facts (largely undisputed for present purposes) and travel of the

case. In 2013 — during his first year of college at Massachusetts

Institute of Technology (MIT) — plaintiff-appellant John Doe

formed a relationship with a classmate whom we shall call "Jane

Roe." This relationship included episodic sexual intercourse and

lasted until the summer of 2014. But even after the couple broke

up, they occasionally had consensual sex during the fall 2014

semester.

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On the evening of February 26, 2015, Jane went to John's

residence for help repairing her computer and agreed to spend the

night in his bed. The pair fell asleep. At some point in the

early morning hours on February 27, they had sexual intercourse.

John says that he observed Jane "fully conscious, alert, and with

wide open eyes" and that she provided a variety of nonverbal cues

throughout the interaction, thus signaling her effective consent.

Afterward, though, Jane asked John what had happened. John replied

that sexual intercourse had taken place. A few months later, Jane

told John that "the sex they had when she was asleep was not okay."



In January of 2016, Jane filed a formal complaint with

MIT's Title IX office alleging nonconsensual sexual contact and

intercourse occurring on February 27, 2015. That office launched

an investigation, which involved interviewing both John and Jane

(as well as other students) and reviewing documents. On their own

initiative, the MIT investigators added a second charge against

John for sexual harassment arising from conduct during the 2013-

2014 school year (when John and Jane were still in a relationship).

In a written report, the investigators found John responsible for

both charges. Following its receipt of the investigators' report,

MIT designated a panel of three faculty members drawn from its

Committee on Discipline (the Committee) to consider the matter.



On April 25, 2016, the panel held a hearing. John denied

responsibility, but two days later the chair of the Committee

informed John by letter that MIT had found him responsible for

nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse on February 27, 2015

and sexual harassment during the earlier period. The Committee's

letter also informed John that he would be expelled.



John appealed the Committee's findings and sanction. He

argued that, given Jane's nonverbal signals throughout the

encounter — which, he said, fit the pattern established in their

history of consensual intimacy — he reasonably believed that Jane

was awake and had effectively consented to sexual intercourse on

February 27, 2015. He also argued that expulsion was unwarranted

because, although he maintained that he reasonably "thought [he]

had effective consent" from Jane, he took "responsibility for

making a terrible judgement call." MIT denied the appeal a few

weeks later and expelled John just prior to his anticipated

graduation.



On December 16, 2021, John — by then married and working

as a software engineer in New Jersey — filed suit against MIT in

the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.

His suit invoked diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.1

The complaint alleged breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and

denial of basic fairness. Its gist was that MIT's investigation

was infected by "[r]adical feminist anti-male bias" to the point

of presuming "that the female complainant's story was . . . true"

and that John's story was false. John sought monetary damages,

including damages for reputational harm, "past and future economic

losses, loss of educational opportunities, and loss of future

career prospects."



On the same day that he filed his suit, John filed an ex

parte motion to proceed by pseudonym because "requiring him to

reveal his identity would result in significant harm to [him],

including the exact damages he seeks to remedy in this matter."

Five days later, the district court denied the motion in a minute

order. John moved for reconsideration. On the very next day, the

district court denied the motion but stayed the case to facilitate

John's anticipated appeal of the denial of his motion to proceed

by pseudonym.

Vacatated and remanded.