Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport

The defendants, the city of Bridge-port
(city), the Bridgeport redevelopment agency
(agency) and the Bridgeport port authority (authority),
appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered
after a court trial, granting a mandatory injunction
ordering them to reconvey to the plaintiff, Pequonnock
Yacht Club, Inc., certain real property taken by eminent
domain. The defendants appealed from the judgment
of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we trans-ferred
the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In their appeal, the defendants claim that the trial
court improperly: (1) concluded that the taking of the
plaintiff's property by eminent domain was not legally
necessary for the accomplishment of the city's redevel-opment
plan because the plan was purely speculative;
(2) based that decision on evidence that a redeveloper
chosen by the defendants to develop the renewal area
was not able to perform its development plan and, there-fore,
was discharged by the defendants; and (3) found
that the plaintiff was not legally required to allege and
prove that it would suffer irreparable harm before the
court could issue mandatory injunctive relief. The plain-tiff
argues, to the contrary, that the trial court appropri-ately
concluded that the defendants improperly refused
to attempt to integrate the plaintiff's property into the
redevelopment plans. We affirm the trial court's judg-ment
on the alternate ground that the defendants' fail-ure
to consider integration of the plaintiff's property
into the redevelopment plan was unreasonable and,
therefore, the taking of the plaintiff's property by emi-nent
domain was not necessary. Accordingly, we need
not address the three issues that the defendants raise
on appeal.

The trial court reasonably found the following facts.
The plaintiff initially brought an action against the
defendants seeking a temporary and permanent injunc-tion
preventing them from taking the plaintiff's property
by eminent domain. Before any hearing in that action,
the city acquired title to the plaintiff's property by emi-nent
domain, and the plaintiff alternatively sought a
mandatory injunction ordering the defendants to
reconvey the plaintiff's property.

The plaintiff's property consists of two acres and
has been owned and operated by the plaintiff as a 250
member private yacht club and marina for nearly ninety-five
years. Located at 66 California Street in Bridgeport, the property is composed of a two-story clubhouse con-taining
a bar, restaurant, recreation and meeting rooms,
docks containing 196 boat slips, a gas dock, which is
open to the public, and a storage area for those boats
that are removed from the water during the winter.
Open all year round, the club is chartered for 250 dues
paying members. Members of the public are, however,
allowed to enter the premises but not the dock area,
and they may purchase food and beverage items as long
as a member signs them in. The buildings and docks
on the premises are in good condition. There is ample
parking on the premises and in two lots across from
the clubhouse.

The property in question is part of a larger fifty acre
site known as Steel Point, which is the subject of the
East Side NDP No. 1 Urban Renewal Plan Amendment
No. 8. The plan originally was adopted in 1970 and has
been revised eight times. Approximately ten acres of
the Steel Point site are situated on Bridgeport Harbor
comprising six separate water dependent users, one of
which is the plaintiff. The remaining forty upland acres
are generally in a blighted condition, and many of the
buildings on those properties already have been demol-ished.
The original renewal plan and its first seven
amendments did not provide for the acquisition of the
ten acres owned by the six water dependent users. In
1998, the city was negotiating with Alex Conroy, who
eventually was designated as the city's developer. Con-roy
and the city concluded that the scope of the project
and the need for financial support made it necessary
to acquire all the properties in the ‘‘East Side NDP Area
No. 1,'' including the waterfront properties. Accord-ingly,
the city adopted amendment 8, which included
the taking by eminent domain of all fifty acres of Steel
Point, including the waterfront properties. After amend-ment
8 was passed, the city hired TPA Design Group
(TPA) to assist the six water dependent users to find
suitable relocation sites in the event of condemnation.

Upon the city's decision to acquire the plaintiff's prop-erty,
the plaintiff commenced the injunction action
underlying this appeal. During the pendency of the
action and while TPA and the plaintiff were attempting
to find an alternate site for the yacht club, the parties
agreed to the plaintiff's request for a temporary injunc-tion
barring the taking. The trial court found that the
plaintiff had made numerous efforts to discuss with the
defendants the integration of its property into the Steel
Point redevelopment plan. The plaintiff had clearly indi-cated
that it was willing to invest in its property and work with the developer to assimilate the property into
the overall plan. The city routinely and consistently
rejected the plaintiff's efforts to negotiate and main-tained
that it needed to take the plaintiff's property.
The negotiations pertaining to an alternate site for the
yacht club broke down in 1999. The trial court specifi-cally
found that although the defendants had made an
honest effort to find a suitable substitute location for
the yacht club, none was available. In March, 2000, while
the action was pending, the agency formally initiated
condemnation of the plaintiff's property by filing a cer-tificate
of taking in the Bridgeport land records.1

The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended com-plaint
challenging the city's decision to take its property
and requesting that the trial court restore title to the
property to it. The trial court heard evidence on August
7 and 8, 2000. After the taking of testimony had been
completed but before a decision had been rendered,
the trial court learned that the city had dismissed Con-roy,
the designated developer, from the redevelopment
project and that the redevelopment project might be
abandoned. The trial court then held a posttrial hearing
on December 15, 2000.

The only witness to testify on December 15, 2000, was
Michael Freimuth, the city's redevelopment director.
Freimuth testified that Conroy and his partners had
withdrawn from the redevelopment project. He stated,
however, that the defendants had not abandoned the
redevelopment project for Steel Point and were still
pursuing it. He testified that the city currently was solic-iting
new proposals and that the deadline for filing
proposals would be January 31, 2001. Freimuth further
testified that the development now would be commer-cial
rather than retail because it was obvious that Con-roy
had withdrawn from the project because it was
difficult to obtain an adequate number of investors. He
also indicated to the court that the defendants had
not considered allowing the plaintiff to remain on its
property or assimilating the property into whatever pro-posal
might be approved. The trial court concluded at
the hearing that the issue of assimilation was at the
heart of the controversy and offered the parties two
alternative resolutions. The first option was for the
court to decide the case on the evidence presented.
The second option was for the court to extend the
hearing to a future date, which would necessitate grant-ing
the plaintiff continued occupancy of the premises
for an agreed upon time. The parties chose to have the
trial court decide the case.

The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff
and ordered the defendants to reconvey the property
to the plaintiff. The court based its decision on the fact
that the defendants had not considered allowing the
plaintiff to remain on the property. Specifically, the
trial court concluded that it was unreasonable for the
defendants to refuse to negotiate with the plaintiff
regarding the integration of the property into the rede-velopment
plan.

Preliminarily, we briefly address the applicable stan-dard
of review. ‘‘The scope of our appellate review
depends upon the proper characterization of the rulings
made by the trial court. To the extent that the trial
court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to
deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous.
When, however, the trial court draws conclusions of
law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether
its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find
support in the facts that appear in the record. . . .
Torres v. Waterbury, 249 Conn. 110, 118–19, 733 A.2d
817 (1999).'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Olson
v. Accessory Controls & Equipment Corp., 254 Conn.
145, 156, 757 A.2d 14 (2000); AvalonBay Communities,
Inc.v.Orange, 256 Conn. 557, 565–66, 775 A.2d 284
(2001).

‘‘[T]he governing principles for our standard of
review as it pertains to a trial court's discretion to grant
or deny a request for an injunction [are]: A party seeking
injunctive relief has the burden of alleging and proving
irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at
law. . . . A prayer for injunctive relief is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court and the court's ruling
can be reviewed only for the purpose of determining
whether the decision was based on an erroneous state-ment
of law or an abuse of discretion. . . . Walton v.
New Hartford, 223 Conn. 155, 165, 612 A.2d 1153 (1992).
Therefore, unless the trial court has abused its discre-tion,
or failed to exercise its discretion; Wehrhane v.
Peyton, 134 Conn. 486, 498, 58 A.2d 698 (1948); the
trial court's decision must stand. . . . Advest, Inc.v.
Wachtel, 235 Conn. 559, 562–63, 668 A.2d 367 (1995).''
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) AvalonBay Com-munities,
Inc. v. Orange, supra, 256 Conn. 566.

‘‘Where the trial court reaches a correct decision
but on [alternate] grounds, this court has repeatedly
sustained the trial court's action if proper grounds exist
to support it. Favorite v. Miller, 176 Conn. 310, 317,
407 A.2d 974 (1978). [W]e . . . may affirm the court's judgment on a dispositive alternate ground for which
there is support in the trial court record. Skuzinski v.
Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694, 702, 694 A.2d 788
(1997).'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hoskins
v. Titan Value Equities Group, Inc., 252 Conn. 789,
794, 749 A.2d 1144 (2000).

‘‘The [r]edevelopment [a]ct authorizes the taking of
land in an area which has been determined by the [rede-velopment]
agency to be a ‘redevelopment area.' ''
Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 146, 104
A.2d 365 (1954). General Statutes § 8-125 (b) provides
in relevant part that ‘‘ ‘[r]edevelopment area' means an
area within the state which is deteriorated, deteriorat-ing,
substandard or detrimental to the safety, health,
morals or welfare of the community. An area may con-sist
partly or wholly of vacant or unimproved land or
of land with structures and improvements thereon, and
may include structures not in themselves substandard
or insanitary which are found to be essential to com-plete
an adequate unit of development, if the redevelop-ment
area is deteriorated, deteriorating, substandard
or detrimental. . . .'' (Emphasis added.) ‘‘Thus it is
clear that the legislature has delegated to each redevel-opment
agency the power to determine, within certain
limits, what property it is necessary to take in order to
effectuate a complete redevelopment plan which the
agency has adopted.'' Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford,
supra, 146.

‘‘The determination of what property is necessary to
be taken in any given case in order to effectuate the
public purpose is, under our constitution, a matter for
the exercise of the legislative power. When the legisla-ture
delegates the making of that determination to
another agency, the decision of that agency is conclu-sive
. . . .''Id. The agency's decision, however, is ‘‘open
to judicial review only to discover if it was unreasonable
or in bad faith or was an abuse of the power conferred.''
Id. The redevelopment agency is permitted ‘‘to deter-mine,
in good faith, what land it is necessary to appro-priate
in order to accomplish the public purpose. It is
proper for a redevelopment agency, acting in pursuance
of the act, to fix, within reasonable limits, the area of
redevelopment and to include in a taking all property
which is in a deteriorated area, even though certain
of the properties are not in themselves substandard.''
Id., 147.

Although, ‘‘[t]he determination of what constitutes a
redevelopment area and what property is to be taken
is primarily a matter for the redevelopment agency . . . its decision is open to judicial review . . . to discover
whether it has acted unreasonably or in bad faith or
has exceeded its powers. . . . The inclusion within the
area of certain properties which are not substandard
does not constitute unreasonable or arbitrary action,
because it is the condition obtaining as to the entire
area and not as to individual properties which is deter-minative.
'' (Citations omitted.) Graham v. Houlihan,
147 Conn. 321, 328, 160 A.2d 745, cert. denied, 364 U.S.
833, 81 S. Ct. 70, 5 L. Ed. 2d 57 (1960). The legislature,
however, has prescribed in the definition of a redevelop-ment
area that the agency ‘‘shall include [only] proper-ties
‘which are found to be essential to complete an
adequate unit of development.' '' (Emphasis added.)
Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, supra, 141 Conn. 149.
Therefore, property that is not substandard and that is
the subject of a taking within a redevelopment area
must be essential to the redevelopment plan in order
for the agency to justify its taking.

Further, although we have stated that, in determining
whether property that is not substandard is essential
to the plan of redevelopment, ‘‘it is the condition
obtaining as to the entire area and not as to individual
properties which is determinative''; Graham v. Houli-han,
supra, 147 Conn. 328; see Gohld Realty Co. v.
Hartford, supra, 141 Conn. 145–46; we also have recog-nized
that the agency must consider ‘‘whether [the prop-erty]
could be successfully integrated into the overall
plan for the area in order to achieve its objective. If
[the property] could not be, then the acquisition of the
property was essential to complete an adequate unit of
development, even though the property was not, in
itself, substandard.'' Pet Car Products, Inc. v. Barnett,
150 Conn. 42, 52, 184 A.2d 797 (1962). Conversely, if
the property can be integrated, it is logical to conclude
that the acquisition is not essential.

This court has recognized the importance of consider-ing
the condition and use of and the possibility of integ-rating
property that is the subject of a taking and is
located within a redevelopment area. These are signifi-cant
factors that the agency must take into consider-ation
when determining whether property that is not
substandard is essential to complete the development.

It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust ‘‘all
reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires, by
agreement.'' New York, N. H. & H. R.R. Co. v. Long,
69 Conn. 424, 438, 37 A. 1070 (1897); West Hartford v.
Talcott, 138 Conn. 82, 89, 82 A.2d 351 (1951). The author-ity
to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. State v. McCook,
109 Conn. 621, 630, 147 A. 126 (1929). The statute, how-ever,
‘‘should be enforced in such a way as to effectuate
the purpose for which it was enacted.'' (Internal quota-tion
marks omitted.) West Hartford v. Talcott, supra,
90; Crawford v. Bridgeport, 92 Conn. 431, 435, 103 A.
125 (1918).

After an area is taken for redevelopment purposes
some, or even all, of the land taken may be sold or leased
to private individuals, referred to as redevelopers, even
if they are not the original owners. Gohld Realty Co.
v. Hartford, supra, 141 Conn. 143. ‘‘It is, of course,
conceivable that the power of eminent domain granted
by the [redevelopment] act may be abused in some
isolated instances. There may be attempts to use it for
some ulterior purpose not contemplated by the [rede-velopment]
act. See Farist Steel Co. v. Bridgeport,60
Conn. 278, 292, 22 A. 561 [1891]; Schneider v. District
of Columbia, 117 F. Sup. 705, 716 [D.D.C. 1953].'' Gohld
Realty Co. v. Hartford, supra, 145.

In Pet Car Products, Inc. v. Barnett, supra, 150 Conn.
48, the trial court found that the plaintiff's property was
partly in substandard condition and that the redevelop-ment
area also was substandard. The court also found
that the taking of the property was essential to avoid problems that would hinder the success of the planned
redevelopment if the property were not taken, including
traffic congestion and insufficient parking and maneu-vering
areas. Id., 49, 53. Also, the boundaries of the
plaintiff's property negatively impacted the proposed
street layouts and setback lines, and adversely affected
the character of the buildings that the plan was designed
to attract. Id., 49, 52. This court concluded that the trial
court properly had found that the agency had not acted
unreasonably or in excess of its powers in determining
that the acquisition of the plaintiff's buildings was
essential for the completion of an adequate unit of
development. Id., 53. We recognized, however, that
‘‘whether [the property can] be . . . integrated into the
overall plan'' should be considered. Id., 52.

In Broadriver, Inc. v. Stamford, 158 Conn. 522, 534,
265 A.2d 75 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938, 90 S. Ct.
1841, 26 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1970), we also indicated that a
redevelopment agency must reasonably consider inte-gration
of property that is being subjected to eminent
domain powers. In that case, the record indicated that
the plaintiff had attempted but failed to demonstrate
to the court that the defendant had acted unreasonably
when it denied the plaintiff the right to improve its property within the development plan. Id., 534–35.
Although the appeal was resolved in favor of the agency,
this court made it clear that ‘‘[a]lthough the plaintiff's
concern is for its own parcel within the redevelopment
area, the commission's responsibility [is] to consider
conditions existing in the entire area including such
matters as street layouts and the relation and signifi-cance
of the plaintiff's property to the entire area. Pet
Car Products, Inc. v. Barnett, [supra, 150 Conn. 52].''
Broadriver, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 534.

Although in these two cases we concluded that the
redevelopment agency properly had considered integra-tion
and had acted in a reasonable manner, we also
established that a redevelopment agency must make
reasonable efforts to negotiate and consider the integra-tion
of the property that is not substandard into the
overall redevelopment plan.

In the present case, the defendants argue on appeal
that East Side NDP Area No. 1 has been designated a
renewal area for almost thirty years and that the parties
agree that this overall area is of the type specified in
General Statutes § 8-125 (b)2 because the location is
blighted physically, economically and aesthetically and
is in need of redevelopment. According to the defen-dants,
upon designation of the area as a redevelopment
area, the city had legal authority to acquire all properties
within the boundaries of the redevelopment project
regardless of whether the individual parcels were
blighted. Additionally, the defendants argue that it is
the blighted condition of the project's locale as a whole,
and not merely the condition of the plaintiff's individual
parcel, that justifies the exercise of the defendants'
eminent domain powers. The defendants contend that
it was necessary to exercise its eminent domain power
over the plaintiff's property because: (1) the redevelop-ment
project has languished since the 1970s because
the waterfront properties had not been included in the
plan; (2) the inclusion of the six waterfront properties
in the plan would enhance the success of the renewal
project for the whole area; (3) the waterfront properties
would provide value for the upland properties; (4) with-out
including the waterfront properties in the plan of
development, the success of the plan would be doubtful
because it would be difficult to maximize the needed
private investment without the value of the water's edge
being leveraged to provide economic incentives; and
(5) the city wanted to open up the waterfront area for
public access.

The plaintiff agrees that the yacht club, which is not in a blighted condition, is surrounded by property that
is deteriorating and in need of redevelopment. Further,
the plaintiff agrees that under § 8-125, a property that
is not blighted but is located in a blighted area may be
taken by eminent domain when the property is essential
to complete a development. The plaintiff argues, how-ever,
that the trial court properly ruled that the defen-dants
had acted unreasonably by failing to negotiate
with the plaintiff regarding the integration of its prop-erty
into the redevelopment plan. The plaintiff argues
further that because the condition of the nonblighted
property and the use to which the property is devoted
are significant, a nonblighted property that is not essen-tial
to the plan may not be taken for redevelopment
purposes. The plaintiff claims that there is no evidence
in the record that its land is essential for the redevelop-ment
of the blighted area. The plaintiff asserts that the
trial court properly granted the relief sought in ordering
the defendants to reconvey the property to the plaintiff.
We agree with the plaintiff.

The present case is distinguishable from Pet Car
Products, Inc. v. Barnett, supra, 150 Conn. 42, and Broa-driver,
Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 158 Conn. 522, because
in those cases this court concluded that the redevelop-ment
agencies properly had considered integration and
had acted in a reasonable manner. In this case, the
agency provided no reasons to explain why the present
condition and use of the plaintiff's property was detri-mental
to the development plan. The city provided no
specific reasons, other than to enhance desirability of
the area to investors, as to why the plaintiff's property,
which both parties stipulated to be in good condition,
is essential to the accomplishment of the redevelop-ment
plan.

Further, the plaintiff had communicated on multiple
occasions its desire and willingness to make changes
to its property in order to have the property incorpo-rated
into the final redevelopment plan.3 Indeed, in
order to have the property integrated properly, the
plaintiff was amenable to building whatever was neces-sary
on its property and to opening its waterfront areas
for public access. We conclude that it is unreasonable
for a redevelopment agency, even with broad legislative
authority delegated to it, arbitrarily to reject repeated
requests to negotiate some form of assimilation into
the overall redevelopment plan when the subject prop-erty
is in good condition and is economically viable.

As the trial court indicated, waterfront property is a
shrinking commodity and in short supply. As that court noted in its memorandum of decision, ‘‘[j]ust because
the property may be desirable to the defendants does
not justify its taking by eminent domain.'' The city has
failed to establish that the taking was essential to implement
the plan of redevelopment and that its refusal
to negotiate with the plaintiff any assimilation of its
property into the plan was reasonable and not in bad
faith. Therefore, the defendants acted unreasonably.

We conclude that the trial court reasonably concluded
that the defendants acted unreasonably when
they failed to consider or even discuss integration of
the plaintiff's property into the redevelopment plan and
that the defendants had failed to establish that taking
of the plaintiff's property by eminent domain was there-fore
necessary and essential to the redevelopment plan.
We affirm the trial court's decision granting a mandatory
injunction requiring the defendants to reconvey
the property to the plaintiff.

* * *

Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's opinion.

The judgment is affirmed.

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