Gerardo Sanchez v. City of Snyder, Texas

Eastland, TX - Criminal defense attorney represented Gerardo Sanchez with appealing from the trial court's order dismissing his lawsuit for want of prosecution. charge.

On May 14, 2014, Appellant filed suit against the City of Snyder for inverse

condemnation related to a vacant mobile home that the City demolished. The City

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filed a plea to the jurisdiction and answer on June 16, 2014. In February 2015, the

City sent written discovery to Appellant. In July 2015, the City filed a motion to

compel because Appellant had not answered the written discovery requests.

Appellant responded to the discovery requests on August 2, 2015, two days before

the hearing on the motion to compel was scheduled to occur.

On August 28, 2018, more than three years later, the City filed a motion to

dismiss for want of prosecution. Appellant had not taken any other action in the

lawsuit in the intervening three years. The trial court held a hearing on the motion

on November 21, 2018.

At the hearing, Appellant's counsel explained that, in the middle of 2015,

Appellant's mother had passed away and Appellant paid about $10,000 for the

funeral. Also around 2015, Appellant's children became entangled in "a series of

criminal matters,” and Appellant cared for "five up to nine grandkids” from

sometime in 2015 to sometime in 2017, which caused him financial issues as well.

Appellant's counsel also indicated that, because of these issues, Appellant had not

paid counsel in full.

Appellant offered to waive a jury trial and proceed to a bench trial, and he

assured the trial court that the issues could be quickly resolved in a day or less of

trial. After a brief recess, the trial court noted that the delay in the case was

approximately four and one-half years, well beyond the applicable eighteen-month

rule promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court. The trial court further noted that it

had accepted Appellant's explanation for the delay, stating that the explanation was

"a reasonable explanation for some delay, but not a total delay. And we've had a

total delay.”

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The trial court concluded:

Conner[1

] compels when it cites the rule that the Court shall dismiss the

case when this case is not brought to trial or final disposition within 18

months of the appearance date, and we're essentially three years past

the 18 months of the time that it should have been disposed of. So,

defendant's motion is granted.

Analysis

"We review a dismissal for want of prosecution under a clear abuse of

discretion standard; the central issue is whether the plaintiff[] exercised reasonable

diligence.” MacGregor v. Rich, 941 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). "A

plaintiff has a duty to 'prosecut[e] the suit to a conclusion with reasonable diligence,'

failing which a trial court may dismiss for want of prosecution.” In re Conner, 458

S.W.3d at 534 (alteration in original) (quoting Callahan v. Staples, 161 S.W.2d 489,

491 (Tex. 1942)). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or without

reference to any guiding rules or principles. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380

S.W.3d 118, 132 (Tex. 2012).

Trial courts are generally granted considerable discretion in managing their

dockets. In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d at 534. "The trial court's authority to dismiss

for want of prosecution stems from two sources: (1) Rule 165a of the Texas Rules

of Civil Procedure, and (2) the court's inherent power.” Villarreal v. San Antonio

Truck & Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1999) (explaining both the statutory and

common law sources of power). The plaintiff's failure to prosecute a case with

reasonable diligence will justify a dismissal under either Rule 165a or the trial

court's inherent authority. In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d at 534. If the trial court's order

does not specify the basis for the dismissal, as is the case in this appeal, we will

affirm if any proper ground supports dismissal. Henderson v. Blalock, 465 S.W.3d

318, 321 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

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In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. 2015).

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Under Rule 165a(2), a case may be dismissed if it is "not disposed of within

time standards promulgated by the Supreme Court.” TEX. R.CIV. P. 165a(2). Under

Rule 6.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Judicial Administration, the time standard for a

nonfamily law civil case is twelve months from appearance date if it is a nonjury

case and eighteen months from appearance date if it is a jury case. TEX. R. JUD.

ADMIN. 6.1(a), reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. F app. (West Supp.

2020). There is no dispute that this case was not disposed of within the time limits

promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court. By the time the City filed its motion to

dismiss for want of prosecution, over four years had passed since the suit was

initially filed and the City filed its answer. Therefore, the trial court was authorized

to dismiss the case for want of prosecution under Rule 165a(2).

Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not accepting his

excuse for not prosecuting the suit as a reasonable explanation for the delay.

Appellant based his excuse for the delay on his financial issues and his resulting

inability to pay his attorney to prosecute the case. At least one court of appeals has

held that the inability to pay a particular attorney is not a sufficient excuse for failing

to exercise due diligence. See Christian v. Christian, 985 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.); see also Rainbow Home Health, Inc. v. Schmidt,

76 S.W.3d 53, 56–57 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding that a

lack of financial ability by the plaintiff is not a reasonable excuse for failing to

prosecute a suit with diligence). While the trial court accepted Appellant's claim

that he had suffered financial issues, the trial court concluded that that did not justify

a "total delay.” We agree with the trial court.

After Appellant filed his late responses to written discovery requests in

August 2015, Appellant had taken no action in the case for three years when the City

filed its motion for dismissal in August 2018. Even though Appellant, through

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counsel,2 asserted that financial issues precluded him from diligently prosecuting the

case, there was little evidence to show when Appellant would be able to resume the

case. Appellant's counsel informed the trial court that Appellant had made a recent

payment to him that brought Appellant's total payments to one-third of the total

attorney's fee.

The record does not establish that the trial court abused its discretion by

granting the City's motion to dismiss for want of prosecution. At the time of

dismissal, Appellant's suit had remained unresolved for more than four years. Five

and one-half years had elapsed since the occurrence of the events leading to the

lawsuit. With no expectation of when Appellant would be ready to try the case and

with the length of time that had passed since suit was filed, the trial court did not err

by granting the City's motion to dismiss. We overrule Appellant's sole issue.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.