Jennifer Marie Masias v. The State of Texas

Eastland, Texas - Criminal defense attorney represented Jennifer Marie Masias with an Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity charge

From September 2016 to May 2017, Appellant and her twelve codefendants

were the focus of an extensive drug investigation in Palo Pinto County. The

investigation, referred to as Operation Homeward Bound, involved the collaboration

of law enforcement officers from various agencies in the coordination of traffic stops

of suspects, the use of GPS trackers on suspects' vehicles, the extraction and review

of suspects' cell phone records and data, and the interviews and surveillance of

suspects. The operation yielded thousands of pages of offense reports, hundreds of

hours of video of traffic stops and suspect interviews, and thousands of text messages

and pages of phone records.

Appellant was a primary supplier of methamphetamine to the members of the

conspiracy in Palo Pinto County; she obtained multiple ounces of methamphetamine

each week from a supplier in the Dallas–Fort Worth Metroplex and would return to

Palo Pinto County with those quantities. During the course of the nine-month

investigation that began in September 2016, Appellant was arrested five times in

connection to her possession of large amounts of methamphetamine. The majority

of the evidence that was relied on to indict Appellant was seized by law enforcement

pursuant to these arrests and with the assistance of GPS tracking.

A. First Arrest: September 6, 2016

Appellant was first arrested in connection to this case on September 6, 2016.

On this date, law enforcement officers, among them Officer Robert Allensworth of 3

the Mineral Wells Police Department and Deputy John Baker of the Palo Pinto

County Sheriff's Department, responded to reports of a disturbance—that a woman,

Appellant, had confronted a man at gunpoint in the parking lot of an E-Z Mart in

Mineral Wells. After they arrived at the E-Z Mart, law enforcement made contact

with Appellant and Vincent Gonzales, the man who claimed that Appellant had

confronted him at gunpoint. Appellant denied that she possessed a firearm and

consented to a search of her vehicle. Deputy Baker searched Appellant's vehicle

and discovered four baggies in the center console, which contained a large amount

of methamphetamine. No firearm was found in Appellant's vehicle. Appellant's

identification card was also discovered in the center console. Appellant and

Gonzales were both arrested for possession of the methamphetamine because neither

would claim ownership of it.

Officer Allensworth testified that, pursuant to the routine procedure for these

types of investigations, law enforcement did not test the baggies for fingerprints or

for DNA. Furthermore, law enforcement did not search Appellant's person at the

scene of her arrest because no female officer was available to conduct the search in

accordance with departmental policy. Appellant was later searched during the

booking process at the jail, and a small amount—less than one gram—of

methamphetamine was discovered on her person.

The Texas Department of Public Safety lab report indicated that the substance

that was seized from Appellant's vehicle was analyzed and determined to be

methamphetamine and that it had a net weight of approximately 23.2 grams. DPS

Special Agent Mitchell Jones, who worked closely with the investigators of the

operation, testified that a "user” amount of methamphetamine typically would be

less than one gram but that one gram could produce multiple doses for

methamphetamine users. He also testified that possession of more than one gram of

methamphetamine typically indicated "dealer” amounts that were meant for 4

distribution. According to Special Agent Jones, an amount of methamphetamine

between four and two hundred grams would be characterized as a "distributional”

amount because, to maximize profits, it could be divided into smaller units and sold

to users.

B. Second Arrest: November 17, 2016

Officer Wesley Hamilton of the Euless Police Department was a narcotics

investigator for the Palo Pinto County Sheriff's Department at the time of these

events. Investigator Hamilton was part of the City County Narcotics Unit (CCNU),

a collaborative law enforcement task force that involved the Palo Pinto County

Sheriff's Department and the Mineral Wells Police Department; this task force

focused on drug investigations in the area. He began the investigation—part of

Operation Homeward Bound—into Appellant's activities after he received multiple

reports that Appellant was "selling a lot of methamphetamine” in the area.

On November 17, 2016, Investigator Hamilton initiated a traffic stop after he

observed Appellant fail to stop at an intersection before the marked white line.

During the traffic stop, Investigator Hamilton further observed that Appellant

appeared to be increasingly agitated; he also detected the odor of marihuana

emanating from Appellant's vehicle. He requested Appellant's driver's license, but

she was unable to locate it. Investigator Hamilton observed that, as she searched

various areas of her vehicle for her identification, Appellant would not look at the

center console; in fact, she appeared to studiously avoid doing so. He testified that

this appeared strange because, in his experience, the center console was a common

place for people to store their identification. He instructed Appellant to exit the

vehicle and empty her pockets. Appellant complied and revealed that she had a large

amount of cash on her person, which Investigator Hamilton testified was a common

trait of suspected drug dealers. Investigator Hamilton then searched Appellant's

vehicle and discovered a bag containing methamphetamine in the center console. 5

He also located two electronic scales, a pipe containing methamphetamine residue,

and pills that appeared to be the prescription drugs hydrocodone and carisoprodol.

The discovery of these items indicated to Investigator Hamilton that Appellant was

a drug dealer. The seized methamphetamine was analyzed and, according to the

DPS lab report, had a net weight of 167.17 grams.

C. Phone Records Extracted After November 17, 2016 Arrest

Subsequent to Appellant's arrest, Investigator Hamilton also seized three cell

phones that were in Appellant's possession. He obtained and executed a search

warrant for each phone. The searches of these phones revealed ample evidence of

numerous drug transactions between Appellant and several other individuals, some

of whom were codefendants.

Based on his twenty-one years of experience in law enforcement and narcotics

investigations, Special Agent Jones testified about his interpretation of the many text

messages that were exchanged between Appellant and various other codefendants

between November 11 and November 17. He testified about his interpretation of the

voluminous excerpts of text message conversations that were read to and published

to the jury at Appellant's trial, each of which depicted the arrangement and execution

of numerous drug transactions between Appellant and other codefendants, including

Mary Jacqueline Batchelor, George Luis Soria, Juan Maravilla Vega Jr., and Delfino

Martinez Garcia IV.

For example, in the records extracted from Appellant's cell phone after her

November 17 arrest, Appellant had exchanged text messages with Soria that,

according to Special Agent Jones, indicated the pair had negotiated a series of drug

transactions. Soria texted to Appellant, "Yeah, got your money,” and the text thread

included photographic images of methamphetamine. These and many other

incriminating messages were transmitted between November 11 and November 17. 6

In Appellant's text exchanges with Batchelor spanning the dates of

November 10 through November 14, the two women discussed an exchange of cash.

Batchelor also requested that Appellant provide her "a whole shorty,” which

Special Agent Jones interpreted to mean Batchelor had requested an ounce of

methamphetamine. During this exchange, Appellant kept Batchelor informed that

she intended to pick up new product in Dallas, after which they eventually agreed to

meet at a Walmart during Appellant's return to Palo Pinto County. Batchelor later

texted Appellant that she had arrived at the Walmart, and she also mentioned that

"Luis” (the name commonly used to refer to Soria) had also arrived at the Walmart.

In text messages between Appellant and Vega, spanning the dates of

November 3 through November 15, Vega requested a "size seven” on multiple

occasions. Special Agent Jones testified that this term meant that Vega wanted to

purchase seven grams of methamphetamine, a quarter of an ounce, from Appellant.

Other text messages indicated multiple and ongoing drug transactions between

Appellant and Vega between November 3 and November 15.

Between November 13 and November 17, a similar exchange of text messages

occurred between Appellant and Garcia, which Special Agent Jones testified was

also indicative of their ongoing drug transactions.

Special Agent Jones testified that he searched Bobby Dockins's phone,

pursuant to a lawfully obtained search warrant, and discovered a text message thread

between Dockins and a phone number associated with Appellant. According to

Special Agent Jones's interpretation of these and other messages, Appellant and

Dockins discussed drug debts and other aspects of drug transactions. Special Agent

Jones testified that, in that period of time, thousands of text messages had been sent

to and received by Appellant that reflected Appellant's ongoing drug transactions

with Vega, Batchelor, Soria, Dockins, and Garcia, even though none of the text

messages contained the words "methamphetamine” or "meth.” 7

While confined in the Palo Pinto County jail for the November 17 arrest,

Appellant made several telephone calls and received some visitors; all of these

interactions and encounters were recorded by law enforcement. Appellant called

two indicted codefendants in the alleged conspiracy, namely Batchelor and Jarrett

Masias.

1

Appellant instructed them to collect drug debts from other codefendants to

the alleged conspiracy, including Soria, Vega, and Dockins. Appellant also called

Motley's Bail Bonds. During that recorded telephone call, Appellant acknowledged

that she knew there were drugs in her vehicle when she was arrested.

D. GPS Tracker Placed on Appellant's Vehicle: November 21, 2016

Pursuant to a lawfully obtained order, Investigator Hamilton placed a GPS

tracking device on Appellant's vehicle on November 21, 2016. The tracker detected

that, on November 27, Appellant traveled to an address in Dallas that was later

determined to be a well-known location for drug activity. CCNU investigators

arranged for surveillance of this address two days later, and they observed a

significant number of people going to and from this address in a manner that was

consistent with drug activity. Within the thirty-day period that the GPS tracker was

affixed to Appellant's vehicle, Appellant traveled to this surveilled address multiple

times.

E. Third Arrest: December 1, 2016

After Appellant visited the Dallas address on December 1, 2016,

Investigator Hamilton and Special Agent Jones coordinated a traffic stop of the

vehicle Appellant operated as she returned to Palo Pinto County. DPS Trooper Brent

Henson testified that he initiated the traffic stop of Appellant's vehicle in

coordination with the CCNU investigators. Accompanied by another DPS officer,

Trooper Robert Litvin, Trooper Henson stopped Appellant for a speeding violation

1

Jarrett Masias is Appellant's nephew, and he will be referred to as "Masias” in this opinion.8

and for driving without a license. Deputy Michael Childs of the Parker County

Sheriff's Department arrived at the traffic stop as backup; Trooper Henson had

arranged in advance for Deputy Childs to assist in the stop.

Trooper Henson then instructed Appellant to exit her vehicle; two

passengers—Masias and Dockins—were also in Appellant's vehicle. Masias and

Dockins identified themselves to Trooper Henson, and he then observed an open

beer can in the backseat of Appellant's vehicle near Dockins. Trooper Henson

instructed both men to exit the vehicle. He briefly frisked each of them for weapons,

and then searched the vehicle. During the search of Appellant's vehicle, Trooper

Henson discovered a glass pipe containing crystal residue. Appellant, Masias, and

Dockins were all thereafter placed in handcuffs; Trooper Henson continued his

search of Appellant's vehicle but did not find any methamphetamine or other

contraband. The officers at the scene later decided to search the suspects more

thoroughly, and during the search, a large bag of what appeared to be

methamphetamine fell out of Masias's pants onto the ground. The officers

discovered another similar, large bag of methamphetamine on the ground near the

area where Masias and Dockins were standing. The officers then deployed a canine

unit. Although the canine alerted on Appellant's vehicle, the officers were unable

to find any additional contraband.

According to the DPS lab report, only one of the two seized bags of

contraband were analyzed. The substance in that bag was determined to be

methamphetamine. The net weight of the methamphetamine was 55.53 grams. The

gross weight of the other bag, which also contained a crystalline substance, was

50.73 grams.

2

2

Special Agent Jones later searched Appellant's impounded vehicle and discovered approximately

1.77 grams of methamphetamine lying in the crevice of the driver's seat. The crystals were "loose” on the

seat, unsecured in a bag or other container.9

Appellant, Masias, and Dockins were arrested, and each suspect was

interviewed by Special Agent Jones. Appellant denied responsibility for the two

seized bags of methamphetamine and stated that the contraband belonged to Masias.

Special Agent Jones testified that, during a recorded visitation at the Parker County

jail, Appellant explained to her girlfriend, Mikeulyn Ruggles, that Masias did not

have a criminal record: "That's why I have people like him with me.” Their

discussion indicated that Masias was present during drug transactions so that he

could be blamed for the presence of any seized contraband. According to Special

Agent Jones, this is a common practice among drug traffickers.

During cross-examination by Appellant's trial counsel, Special Agent Jones

testified that the seized bags of methamphetamine were not analyzed for fingerprints

or DNA. He also testified that the vehicle driven by Appellant was registered to

John Teague, an unindicted suspect who was listed on the State's organizational

chart that depicted the hierarchy of the conspiracy.

F. Fourth Arrest: April 25, 2017

DPS Trooper Daniel Hubbard conducted a traffic stop of Appellant in Ellis

County on April 25, 2017, after he observed that one of the headlights on Appellant's

vehicle was not illuminated. Appellant and Ruggles were the only occupants in the

vehicle. During the stop, Trooper Hubbard noted that the vehicle's registration had

been expired for almost one year, that the vehicle's window tint appeared to be

darker than legally permitted, and that Appellant's driver's license was suspended.

He also noticed a backpack located on the floorboard near the front passenger seat.

The top of the backpack was open, and in plain view, he saw a large glass pipe with

crystalline residue protruding from the backpack.

Trooper Hubbard instructed both Appellant and Ruggles to exit Appellant's

vehicle; he then searched the vehicle. During the search, he discovered a loaded

nine-millimeter handgun under the passenger seat. In the backpack, he found three 10

glass pipes with residue and six clear plastic containers that contained various

amounts of methamphetamine, marihuana, and pills. Luggage located in the trunk

contained a digital scale, a small white box with methamphetamine crystals scattered

on the bottom, small baggies that contained methamphetamine, and various packing

materials.

Ruggles adamantly claimed ownership of the handgun, the drugs, and the

paraphernalia. Trooper Hubbard testified that he did not find any affirmative links

to connect Appellant to the backpack. He arrested Appellant for driving without a

license and without insurance; Ruggles was arrested for possession of the

contraband. Trooper Hubbard testified that, to his knowledge, the drug containers,

baggies, and paraphernalia had not been analyzed for fingerprints or DNA.

The DPS lab report indicated that the contraband seized from Appellant's

vehicle on this date included methamphetamine with a net weight between eight and

nine grams.

G. Fifth Arrest: May 8, 2017

Special Agent Jones and Investigator Hamilton went to Appellant's home

address on May 8, 2017, to execute a felony warrant for her arrest. During the

process of executing the warrant and arresting Appellant, they discovered

methamphetamine, marihuana, and drug paraphernalia inside her home. They also

seized a cell phone from Appellant. This phone contained text messages concerning

numerous drug transactions between Appellant, various codefendants, and other

unindicted suspects.

In addition to the thousands of text messages that were retrieved from the cell

phones that were seized from Appellant as a result of her multiple arrests and

searches, Appellant's cell phone records showed that hundreds of calls were made

to similar numbers and to various other codefendants, and other unindicted suspects,

within short, similar periods of time.11

Appellant and twelve other codefendants—including Dockins, Batchelor,

Masias, Vega, Soria, and Garcia—were indicted for engaging in organized criminal

activity by conspiring to distribute a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in an

amount of four grams or more but less than two hundred grams. The indictment

filed against Appellant alleged eight overt acts purportedly committed by Appellant

in furtherance of the charged offense. The overt acts alleged against Appellant

included her conduct of communicating with Dockins, Batchelor, Vega, Soria, and

Garcia to further the activity of the distribution of methamphetamine, and her

possession, together with Dockins and Masias, with the intent to deliver,

methamphetamine in the amount of four grams or more but less than two hundred

grams on November 17, 2016, and December 1, 2016.

II. Standard of Review – Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant asserts, in two issues, that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support her conviction for the charged offense.3 We note that the

distinction between the legal and factual sufficiency standards of review has been

abandoned. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);

Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 289 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref'd)

("Accordingly, a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence is no longer

viable.”).

Thus, we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of

whether it is denominated as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the

standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks,

323 S.W.3d at 912; Polk, 337 S.W.3d at 288–89. Under the Jackson standard, we

3

Appellant acknowledges that a factual sufficiency review has been merged into the legal

sufficiency review analysis but, without offering a specific argument, asks us to ignore established

precedent as set forth in Brooks. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

We decline this invitation and further note that Appellant's inadequate and cursory briefing on this issue

waives any argument regarding the reversal of established precedent. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).12

review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State,

330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence

admitted at trial and defer to the factfinder's role as the sole judge of the witnesses'

credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Winfrey v. State, 393

S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton v.

State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This standard accounts for the

factfinder's duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to

draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at

319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility

of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v.

State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, if the record supports

conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor

of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326;

Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235

S.W.3d at 778.

Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial

evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v.

State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Circumstantial evidence is as

probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without

more, be sufficient to establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). A guilty verdict does

not require that every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant's guilt.

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating

circumstances may be sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in 13

evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of

the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v.

State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

III. Analysis

Appellant asserts, in two issues, that the evidence is insufficient to support her

conviction of engaging in organized criminal activity by conspiring to distribute a

controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, in an amount of four grams or more

but less than two hundred grams. Appellant raises no specific argument regarding

her issues. Rather, she asserts that her conviction cannot stand because the evidence

presented at trial established that none of the seized contraband was found on her

person and that neither her fingerprints nor her DNA was found on any of the seized

drug packages.

A person commits the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity if,

"with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits

of a combination,” she "commits or conspires to commit” one of the predicate

offenses described in the statute. PENAL § 71.02(a); see Hughitt v. State, 583 S.W.3d

623, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); Burt v. State, 567 S.W.3d 335, 340 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2017, pet. ref'd). As such, a person may engage in organized criminal

activity by either committing or conspiring to commit the underlying predicate

offense. Burt, 567 S.W.3d at 342 (citing Barrera v. State, 321 S.W.3d 137, 142–43

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. ref'd)). Here, Appellant was specifically

indicted for "conspir[ing]” to commit the underlying predicate offense, not for

actually committing the underlying predicate offense. Subsection (a)(5) provides

that the delivery or distribution of a controlled substance is one such predicate

offense. PENAL § 71.02(a)(5); see Hughitt, 583 S.W.3d at 627; Burt, 567 S.W.3d at

340. 14

The gravamen of the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity is a

circumstance surrounding the conduct—the existence or creation of a combination

that collaborates to carry on criminal activities. See O'Brien v. State, 544 S.W.3d

376, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). A "[c]ombination” requires that three or more

persons collaborate to carry on criminal activities. PENAL § 71.01(a) (West 2011);

Nguyen v. State, 1 S.W.3d 694, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). "Profits” means

property constituting or derived from any proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly,

from an offense listed in Section 71.02. PENAL § 71.01(c). The Penal Code further

provides that a person "[c]onspires to commit” when she "agrees with one or more

persons that they or one or more of them engage in conduct that would constitute the

offense and that person and one or more of them perform an overt act in pursuance

of the agreement.” Id. § 71.01(b). Such an agreement may be inferred from the acts

of the parties. Id. The overt act "need not [itself] be criminal”; however, "acts that

suffice for party liability—those that encourage, solicit, direct, aid, or attempt to aid

the commission of the underlying offense—would also satisfy the overt act element

of section 71.02.” Estrada v. State, 609 S.W.3d 311, 318 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2020, no pet.) (quoting Otto v. State, 95 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)).

Accordingly, to convict Appellant of the charged offense, the State was required to

prove that Appellant (1) conspired to commit, (2) the distribution of a controlled

substance, namely methamphetamine, (3) with the intent to establish, maintain, or

participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination.

In this case, the State adduced sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict

that Appellant engaged in organized criminal activity as charged in the indictment.

In addition to the extensive and undisputed testimony and the video evidence of

Appellant's arrests on November 17, 2016, and December 1, 2016, which showed

that Appellant possessed methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more but

less than two hundred grams, the State presented an abundance of text messages, 15

recorded telephone calls, and jail visits that, considered in context, further showed

that Appellant was a major participant, and at times the prime mover, in a criminal

combination of three or more people, all of whom intended to distribute

methamphetamine in Palo Pinto County. This evidence clearly showed that

Appellant frequently communicated with various other participants throughout law

enforcement's nine-month investigation into Appellant's ongoing drug operations.

Appellant further contends that no evidence was presented to show that she

possessed any methamphetamine because she was never found to be in actual

possession of the seized contraband, nor were her fingerprints or DNA detected on

the seized drug packages. Appellant's contention is misplaced. Here, Appellant was

charged with conspiring to distribute a controlled substance. The Health and Safety

Code defines "distribute” as "to deliver a controlled substance other than by

administering or dispensing the substance”; it defines "deliver,” in relevant part, as

"to transfer, actually or constructively, to another a controlled substance . . . . The

term includes offering to sell a controlled substance.” HEALTH & SAFETY

§ 481.002(8), (14) (emphasis added); see also Hughitt, 583 S.W.3d at 627–31. As

we have said, the evidence in the record supports Appellant's conviction for

engaging in organized criminal activity by conspiring to distribute a controlled

substance, namely methamphetamine. Furthermore, she has not raised any other

point of contention in support of her issues on appeal.

Consistent with the applicable standards of review, we have carefully

reviewed all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Here,

there is substantial evidence that Appellant conspired to distribute

methamphetamine. In the most egregious of instances, Appellant was arrested while

in possession of approximately 167 grams and 105 grams of methamphetamine on

November 17 and December 1, respectively. The evidence also established that

Appellant was a significant participant, and at times the primary organizer, in a16

criminal combination that collaborated to further the combination's delivery and

distribution activities. Within the time period of Appellant's aforementioned arrests,

the thousands of text messages that were sent and received between Appellant and

her coconspirators also established their continuous discussions of the combination's

extensively planned and executed drug transactions. This evidence, without more,

constituted only a portion of the State's evidence and is more than sufficient to

support the jury's verdict and Appellant's conviction.

Because we hold that the record before us contains sufficient evidence from

which a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant

engaged in organized criminal activity as charged in the indictment, we overrule

Appellant's first and second issues on appeal.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.