Nearly eight years ago, a fire destroyed the building facility of the Tiverton Yacht Club (TYC or defendant). The TYC subsequently, while the “embers were still smoldering,� began efforts to rebuild, which became protracted, but ultimately resulted in the grant of a building permit by the Town of Tiverton building official in 2006. However, this only fanned the flames of an existing and increa

{1} The issue presented in this appeal is whether NMSA 1978, Section 56-8-4(D) (2004), bars an award of post-judgment interest against the state and its political subdivisions when a plaintiff successfully establishes the deprivation of a federally protected constitutional right in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (Section 1983). If post-judgment interest is not barred, we must determine whet

The defendants, Kenneth P. Tassmer and Richard W. Perillo, appeal from the judgment of the trial court transferring to the plaintiffs, Ronald J. Vance and Carol P. Vance, title to real property claimed to be owned by the defendants. The defendants claim that the court’s enforcement of the parties’ settlement agreement, after a hearing held pursuant to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnershi

The plaintiffs in this action for equitable relief and monetary damages, John Caltabiano1 and The Dohnna, LLC, appeal from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants L & L Real Estate Holdings II, LLC (L & L); Cumberland Farms, Inc.; Robert Landino and BL Companies, Inc.2 The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly struck the third and fourth counts of their substitute revised a

This appeal arises from an action brought by the plaintiff, Scott Levine, against the defendants, the town of Sterling (town) and its building official, D. Kyle Collins, Jr.,1 relating to the defendants’ refusal to issue to the plaintiff permits to build two additional dwelling units on his property located in the town. The plaintiff appeals2 from the judgment rendered by the trial court in favo

Kenneth O. Kennedy was embroiled in a zoning dispute about the expansion of a strip mall next to his home. In May 2005, he approached Joseph Schutzman, a police officer and building inspector, in the Villa Hills city building. Refusing to speak to Kennedy, Schutzman left the city building.

Kennedy told nearby city workers in the building that “that son of a bitch [Schutzman] broke all of

Appellants Trinity Park, L. P. and Classic Communities, Inc. (hereafter, collectively Trinity) are the developers of a residential housing project known as Trinity Park, which consists of 42 houses in a subdivision located in respondent City of Sunnyvale (City). The City‟s 2007 approval of the Trinity Park development was conditioned upon compliance with the City‟s below market housing ordinan

Appellant Stephen Wollmer asks this court to reverse the denial of his petition for administrative mandamus challenging two approvals by respondents City of Berkeley and the Berkeley City Council (collectively, the City) for a mixed-use affordable housing or senior affordable housing project located at 1200 Ashby Avenue.1 Specifically, he denounces the approvals as violative of the state‟s densi

This case concerns issues similar to those decided in Friends of Yamhill County v. Board of Commissioners, 237 Or App 149, 238 P3d 1016 (2010), rev allowed, 349 Or 602 (2011). That case evaluated the legal standards that a court uses to determine whether a claimant has a "common law vested right * * * to complete and continue" property development under section 5(3) of Measure 49, the referendum t

Kenneth O. Kennedy was embroiled in a zoning dispute about the expansion of a strip mall next to his home. In May 2005, he approached Joseph Schutzman, a police officer and building inspector, in the Villa Hills city building. Refusing to speak to Kennedy, Schutzman left the city building. Kennedy told nearby city workers in the building that “that son of a bitch [Schutzman] broke all of the zon

In this case, we consider whether a business may sue a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover damages it sustained by cautiously complying with an ordinance that the business claims is unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment. The business does not engage in any constitutionally protected activities under the First Amendment or any other provision of the United States Const

Under the law of this Circuit, the viability of a prima
16 facie First Amendment retaliation claim depends on context.
17 Private citizens alleging retaliation for their criticism of
18 public officials must show that they engaged in protected
19 speech, persons acting under color of state law took adverse
20 action against them in retaliation for that speech, and the
21 re

We are asked once again to intervene in a decades-old landuse dispute between Aubrey Henry and the sundry local government bodies and neighboring residents who played a part in turning back his development plans. Henry chiefly alleges that the defendants took his property by granting him a less intensive conditional use permit than the one to which he claims he was entitled. Because he had no such

In these consolidated interlocutory appeals, the City of North Richland Hills (the City) challenges the trial courts’ respective denials of the City’s partial pleas to the jurisdiction in the lawsuits filed against it by Appellees Hometown Urban Partners, Ltd. (Urban Partners), Arcadia Land Partners 25, Ltd., and Arcadia Holdings (collectively, Arcadia).[1] The City contends that governmental

The City of Cayce ("City") cited Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk") for violating a public nuisance ordinance, Cayce, SC, Code § 28-251. The citation was based on the condition of one of Norfolk's bridges that was covered with rust and graffiti. A municipal judge found Norfolk guilty of violating the ordinance. The circuit court reversed based on its determination the ordinance was p

The defendant zoning board of appeals of the town of Weston (board) granted a variance to the defendant homeowners, Joseph Ryan and Lois Ryan,1 allowing the roof on their newly constructed dwelling to exceed the town’s thirty-five foot building height restriction by two feet, seven inches. The plaintiffs, Curtis Morikawa and Diane Lynch, owners of an adjoining property, appealed from the boardâ€

In this appeal, we consider the circumstances under which the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592 (a),1 may save an otherwise time barred medical malpractice action commenced after the dismissal of a prior action pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 52-190a, as amended by Public Acts 2005, No. 05-275, § 2 (P.A. 05- 275),2 for failure to attach to the complaint

In this certified appeal, we consider two significant issues that have arisen under General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 52-190a, as amended by Public Acts 2005, No. 05-275, § 2 (P.A. 05-275),1 namely: (1) whether a surgeon, who likely would be qualified to testify as an expert witness at the trial of a medical malpractice action against a specialist physician pursuant to subsection (d) of General

This certified appeal and cross appeal arise from a marital dissolution action brought by the plaintiff, Howard B. Sosin, against the defendant, Susan F. Sosin. The trial court rendered a judgment of dissolution and, as part of the distribution of marital assets, ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of $24,000,000 out of certain bank and brokerage accounts.

The plaintiff filed

The defendant, Margaret P. Morrow (defendant or Morrow), appeals from a Washington County Superior Court judgment declaring that Melanie B. Cahill (plaintiff or Cahill) perfected title to the defendant’s property by adverse possession. She challenges the trial justice’s decision on two grounds. First, that he failed to give sufficient weight to the plaintiff’s offers to purchase the property

This case came before the Supreme Court on October 27, 2010, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues in this appeal should not summarily be decided. The defendant, Baird Properties, LLC (defendant or Baird) appeals from: (1) a Superior Court order enjoining the defendant and “its member,� Michael Baird, from harassing the intervenors, James and Lee St

[¶1] This is the second appeal in a dispute between adjacent owners of shorefront land in York Harbor. See Britton v. Dep’t of Conservation (Britton I), 2009 ME 60, 974 A.2d 303. In Britton I, we held that if a wharf extending in front of the tidal flats of adjacent property injures the adjacent landowners’ enjoyment of their riparian rights, the Wharves and Weirs Act, 38 M.R.S. § 1026 (2010

D. Douglas Rehman [“Rehman�], pro se, appeals the trial court’s entry of summary final judgment in favor of Lake County, Florida, [“Lake County�], Mid-Lake Holdings, LLC, Ashish Karve, Chaitrali Karve, and Albert E. Harthman [“collectively Harthman�].

The proceeding below was an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes

Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP, and Jacob Mazin Company, Inc. (together Jordan- Arapahoe) own land in Arapahoe County, Colorado that they intended to develop for use as a car dealership and sell to CarMax, Inc. Learning of the planned development, the Arapahoe County Board of County Commissioners rezoned the land, thwarting the sale.

Jordan-Arapahoe sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming Arapahoe Cou

Quo warranto against the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District and its trustees on the ground that it is operating under an invalid and unconstitutional plan. There is no dispute about the facts. The issue to be decided is whether the plan under which the District is organized and operating attempts to confer [365 Mo. 6] powers in excess of the constitutional authority under which the District was