¶ 1 In January 2011, the trial court entered an order dissolving the marriage of petitioner, Elizabeth H. Jensen, and respondent, Phillip M. Jensen. Following an August 2011 hearing, the court allocated the parties’ various assets, including a $327,950 investment retirement account (IRA) with Richard, Merrill & Peterson, held in Phillip’s name. In May 2012, the court modified its

Douglas DeBower appeals from the district court’s order granting physical care of his two minor children to their mother, Samantha McDowell. He argues the court erred in its determination that Samantha was the children’s primary caregiver and contends the best interests of the children would be better served by residing with him. Upon review, we affirm the order of the district court

Tim Le appeals, pro se, challenging the property division provisions of a district court decree dissolving his marriage to Annie Le. He contends (1) Annie violated the Iowa Constitution by trying to make his life miserable, (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution, and (3) the district court’s division of mar

Penny Wosepka appeals the district court’s ruling on her petition to modify the physical care provisions of the decree dissolving her marriage to Mark Wosepka. Penny asserts the court erred in finding there was no substantial and material change in circumstances since the dissolution decree. She also claims she has established herself as the superior parent. Finally, she claims the court er

James Wasson appeals from the decree dissolving his marriage to Tammy Wasson. He contends the district court erred in granting joint physical care of the parties’ two minor children, in requiring him to pay spousal support, and in ordering him to pay $1500 of Tammy’s trial attorney fees. In response, Tammy requests we affirm the district court’s decree and seeks an award of ap

Megan Frison appeals and Zachary Holmlund cross-appeals from the district court’s order modifying the parties’ prior stipulated child custody, child support, and visitation order. Both Megan and Zachary contend the court erred in several respects. Upon our review, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The parties are the pa

Paul Pelletier appeals, and Karen Pelletier cross-appeals, from the district court’s decree dissolving their marriage. The parties challenge the ruling as it relates to custody, visitation, support, alimony, property distribution, attorney fees, contempt, and a request for an injunction. Because we agree with the findings and analysis of the district court, we affirm.

I. Background F

Appellant, Emiel Owens, Jr., appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellees, James E. Mason and Shelly Godfrey (collectively, “the Masons”), on their claims for nuisance and a permanent injunction. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 7, 2003, Anderson Hills, Ltd, the developer of the Anderson Hills

2

Subdivision, Grimes County, Texas, c

Victoria V. Ochsner appeals from the trial court‘s order modifying child support in a suit for modification of the parent-child relationship concerning the Child of Victoria and Preston A. Ochsner. We affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND

The Child was born in 1998, and Victoria and Preston divorced in 2001. The trial court appointed Victoria and Preston as joint managing conservators

The Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA)establishes an insurance program for federal employees. FEGLIA permits an employee to name a beneficiary of life insurance proceeds, and specifies an “order of precedence” providing that an employee’s death benefits accrue first to that beneficiary ahead of other potential recipients. 5 U. S. C. §8705(a).

Appellant, Hap Houchin, challenges a protective order entered in favor of appellee, Mendy Houchin, and her daughter, Whitney Houchin. By his issues, Hap challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions that he had committed family violence against Mendy and Whitney and that Hap is likely to commit family violence in the future. Further, H

The United States of America charged Wayne Franklin Miles, age 53 with influencing, impeding or tetaliating against a federal official by threatening or injuring a family member in violation of 18 U.S.C. 115 and possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a contract substance (meth) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922 as a result of threats made by the defendant against United States Congressman John

This appeal involves two parallel divorce proceedings, one in Texas and one in Canada.1 In two issues, appellant Gary Willmore complains that the Texas trial court did not order reimbursement to him for the community estate’s economic contribution to property in Canada that the trial court in the Canadian divorce had previously awarded to appellee Karen A. Quigley. We affirm.

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Appellant, Emiel Owens, Jr., appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellees, James E. Mason and Shelly Godfrey (collectively, “the Masons”), on their claims for nuisance and a permanent injunction. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 7, 2003, Anderson Hills, Ltd, the developer of the Anderson Hills

2 Subdivision, Grimes County, Texas, co

The district court permitted the government to foreclose on federal tax liens on a ski cabin (the Ski Cabin) titled in the name of the D.E. Brown Family Trust (Family Trust), whose beneficiaries were Douglas Brown’s wife and children.

The taxes were owed by Douglas Brown (Brown) and his wife (together, the Browns), not the trust, but the court found that the Browns were the beneficia

¶1 Anthony Watkins was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, H.C. His conviction was based on the holding that he occupied a “position of special trust in relation to the victim” under Utah Code section 76-5-404.1(4)(h). Because Mr. Watkins was temporarily staying in the spare bedroom of H.C.’s father’s house, the district court and the court of appeals both

¶1 Antonio Godinez appeals the termination of his in loco parentis visitation rights. Finding no error, we affirm the superior court’s order.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Nereyda Padilla and Godinez married in 2004. Godinez became “Daddy” to Padilla’s daughter, M.L., who was born in August 2001, and whom Godinez had known for two years.
¶3 On

¶1 Michael Martin Huege (Father) appeals the family
2
court’s order granting a motion for change of jurisdiction filed
by Heather Marie Huege (Mother). For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Father and Mother were married in Idaho in October
2007 and moved to Arizona in October 2009. In September 2010,
Mother gave b

Robert R. Tweed (Tweed) and his investment firm, Tweed Financial Services, Inc. (TFI), appeal the order denying their petition to compel arbitration of claims for damages asserted against them by Ronay Family Limited Partnership (Ronay). The claims arose out of Tweed's provision of advice concerning Ronay's purchase of investments offered by CapWest Securities, Inc. (CapWest), for which Tweed and

Husband appeals from a judgment of dissolution
of marriage, arguing that the court erred in dividing
the parties’ retirement benefits, and, specifically, in its
treatment of wife’s federal Civil Service Retirement System
(CSRS) benefits. In particular, husband asserts that the
trial court’s apportionment methodology (described in
detail below) violated

2 Wife appeals a dissolution judgment, challenging the trial court's property
3 division. In particular, wife quarrels with two components of the trial court's property
4 division. First, wife contends that the equalizing payment included in the judgment was
5 too large based on the trial court's incorrect "finding that the parties had a $33,600 debt
6 on their home." Wife also ass

2 Mother appeals the trial court's supplemental judgment modifying child
3 support; she asserts that the amount of child support the trial court ordered father to pay is
4 too low. Father cross-appeals; he asserts that the amount is too high. Both parties
contend that the trial court erred in calculating father's presumed income.1 5 In addition,
6 mother contends that, even if the

This appeal is a sequel to an appeal in the same dissolution of marriage case that we decided three years ago. Lilly v. Lilly, 35 So. 3d 1022 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). In the first appeal this court affirmed an award of rehabilitative alimony to the former wife

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(Wife). The question presented in the current appeal is whether the trial court properly converted the rehabilitative alimony a

Stella Maris Parra de Rey a/k/a Stella Maria Parra de Rey (“the Wife”) appeals from a final judgment for dissolution of marriage entered pursuant to Alfonso Rey’s (“the Husband”) motion for summary judgment, upholding the validity of a marital settlement agreement entered into between the parties. We affirm.

The Husband and the Wife married in 1982. During the

United States citizen Fauzia Din filed a visa petition on behalf of her husband Kanishka Berashk, a citizen and resident of Afghanistan. Nine months later, the visa was denied. Consular officials informed Din and Berashk only

4 DIN V. KERRY

that the visa had been denied under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), a broad provision that excludes aliens on a variety of terrorism-related grounds