Date: 06-25-2016

Case Style: State of Louisiana v. Robert Eric Nelson

Case Number: 50,627-KA

Judge: J. Jay Caraway

Court: COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Jeffrey Landry
Colin Clark

Jerry L. Jones, District Attorneys
Mr. Neal Johnson. Assistant District Attorney

Defendant's Attorney: Lavalle B. Salomon

Description: On April 23, 2013, officers of the Monroe Police Department
responded to a burglary complaint at an apartment complex in Monroe,
Louisiana. At the base of the stairway, officers discovered a Louisiana
identification card and a brown jacket belonging to Robert E. Nelson
(“Nelson”). The following day, officers spotted Nelson in an automobile,
he attempted flight, but was quickly apprehended. The automobile he was
in contained, in plain view, a small flat screen TV, two small gas cans, and
several bottles of bleach. Now in custody, Nelson began to cry “I didn’t
mean to kill her” repeatedly. After the officers advised Nelson of his
Miranda rights, he told the officers that he had broken into the residence of 1
Shirley Cagle (“Cagle”) at 417 Isabelle in Monroe.
Subsequently, officers went to the residence and discovered a door
pushed open and quickly discovered the lifeless body of Cagle. A complete
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).2
The charges included domestic abuse battery involving strangulation, simple burglary3 and possession of a controlled dangerous substance being marijuana, and simple burglary and aggravated flight from an officer.
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search of the residence also indicated that a small flat screen TV was
missing and that there had been an attempt to burn the house down.
On April 30, 2015, the grand jury charged Nelson with a bill of
indictment for one count of first degree murder, a violation of La. R.S.
14:30A(1) and/or A(5).
On June 30, 2015, at Nelson’s Boykin hearing, Nelson pled guilty to 2
second degree murder. In exchange for his plea of guilty, the State agreed
not to pursue the indictment for first degree murder and not seek the death
penalty. Additionally, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges
pending against him. At this hearing, the trial court advised Nelson as to 3
the consequences of pleading guilty to second degree murder:
[trial court]: By pleading guilty [Nelson], you’ll be giving up the right to appeal the conviction of Second Degree Murder because you are convicting yourself by pleading guilty. And you will also be giving up the right to appeal the sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because you have agreed to that. Do you understand?
[Nelson]: Yes Sir.
Also at this hearing, Nelson agreed to the following recitation of facts by
the assistant district attorney:
[assistant district attorney]: Your Honor, this incidence is usually a felony murder doctrine. There was a burglary of [Cagle]’s home. She was over 80 years old...Nelson made an entry. While committing the burglary, re-entering the house, [Cagle] woke up. He struck her. She died.
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Thereafter, Nelson waived sentencing delays and the trial court, pursuant to
La. R.S. 13:30.1(B), sentenced him to serve a mandatory life sentence
without parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
On July 29, 2015, Nelson, pro se, filed a “Motion to Reconsider
Sentence.” In this pleading, Nelson argued that La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) is
unconstitutional under the Federal and Louisiana Constitutions.
Specifically, Nelson averred that the mandatory sentence to life without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence provided in the
statute is a cruel, excessive or unusual punishment, whether considered
categorically or as applied to Nelson. On July 31, 2015, the trial court
denied Nelson’s motion.
This appeal followed, and Nelson’s appellate counsel has filed an
Anders brief, seeking to withdraw, on grounds that he could find no
nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); State v. Jyles, 96-2669 (La.
12/12/97), 704 So.2d 241; State v. Mouton, 95-0981 (La. 4/28/95), 653
So.2d 1176; and State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528 (La. App. 4th Cir.1990).
This court granted Nelson additional time to brief arguments, which he
declined to utilize.
Discussion
Benjamin , supra, outlines the procedure to be utilized in the appellate
courts when an Anders brief is filed on behalf of an indigent defendant by
appointed counsel who does not find any error to raise on appeal. State v.
Fuller, 37,127 (La. App. 2d Cir. 6/25/03), 850 So.2d 909. Appellate
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counsel must provide a detailed discussion of various aspects of the case,
including sufficiency of the evidence, the lack of objection to any of the
testimony presented at trial, and the adequacy of the trial court's compliance
with sentencing procedures. Jyles, supra; Benjamin, supra. Moreover, the
brief must not only provide a review of the procedural history of the case
and evidence produced at trial, but also a detailed and reviewable
assessment for both the defendant and the appellate court of whether the
appeal is worth pursing in the first place. Jyles, supra. Lastly, a copy of the
counsel’s brief must be provided to indigent and time allowed to raise any
point that he pleases. Anders, supra.
After review, we find that appellate counsel’s brief complies with all
of the requirements set forth in Anders and the aforementioned
jurisprudence. The brief provides a procedural history of the case, the
adequacy of the trial court’s compliance with sentencing procedures, and a
detailed assessment of whether the appeal is worth pursing in the first place.
Also, appellate counsel verified that he mailed copies of the motion to
withdraw and his brief to the defendant.
We also agree with appellate counsel that there are no nonfrivolous
issues to be raised on appeal.
A plea agreement is considered a contract between the state and the
criminal defendant. State v. Davis, 41,430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 11/1/06), 942
So.2d 652. Plea agreements are governed by the principles of contract..
State v. Honeycutt, 41,601 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2/28/07), 953 So.2d 914.
Defendant is precluded from seeking review of his sentence because it was
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imposed in conformity with a plea agreement set forth in the record at the
time of the plea. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2; State v. Young, 96-0195 (La.
10/15/96), 680 So.2d 1171. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) provides that “whoever
commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence.”
The record reflects that Nelson freely and voluntarily entered into a
valid plea agreement. The trial court advised him that by pleading guilty to
second degree murder, he would be sentenced to the mandatory term of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence. Nelson admitted that he entered into the home of Cagle with the
intent of committing a burglary and murdered her when she awoke. He
benefitted substantially from the plea of guilty and cannot now complain of
the imposition of the mandatory agreed upon sentence. Young, supra.
Accordingly, appellate’s counsel motion to withdraw is granted.
Error Patent
The trial court sentenced Nelson “to serve a mandatory life sentence
without parole, probation or suspension of sentence.” However, La. R.S.
14:30.1(B) mandates that the sentence be served “at hard labor.” Thus, this
failure makes the sentence illegally lenient, and this is not an error
automatically cured by La. R.S. 15:301.1. La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A) provides
that “An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that
imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review.” Therefore, the
sentence is hereby amended to reflect that it be served at hard labor.

Outcome: Considering the foregoing, appellate’s counsel motion to withdraw is
granted. The sentence is amended to reflect that it be served at hard labor,
and affirmed as amended.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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